James Gideon Kusaga vs Registered Trustees of the North Eastern Diocese Of The Evangelical Lutheran Church In Tanzania (Civil Application No. 542/12 of 2023) [2026] TZCA 530 (12 May 2026)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT DODOMA frORAM; KEREFU. J.A.. MWAMPASHI. J.A. And ISMAIL, JS A_J CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 542/12 OF 2023 JAMES GIDEON KUSAGA ................................. ............. ...... APPLICANT VERSUS REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF THE NORTH EASTERN DIOCESE OF THE EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH IN TANZANIA ................................. RESPONDENT (Appeal from the Judgment and Decree of the High Court of Tanzania at Tanga) fMkasimonawa. 3.) dated the 8th day of November, 2021 in Labour Revision No. 24 of 2020 RULING OF THE COURT 24* April & 12th May, 2026 ISMAIL. J.A.: These are revisionai proceedings taken at the instance of the applicant. The proceedings are intended to challenge the decision of the High Court in Labour Revision No. 24 of 2020 which upheld the decision of the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration (the CMA) which found that the applicant's employment had not been terminated. The reason for so holding was that, no tetter had been served on the i

applicant to bring the employment to an end. The High Court held that the applicant could not be heard to complain about the alleged termination of employment since it was not proved that he returned to work after he had been discontinued from his studies. He could not, as such, lodge his complaint with the CMA. It is this holding that ruffled the applicant's feathers, hence the instant application. To appreciate the context and sequence of events in the instant application, it is apt that the background to the matter be, albeit briefly, stated. It is to the effect that, the applicant was an employee of the respondent. He was employed on 1s t February, 2006, to serve as a supporting teacher of Kanisa la Kiinjili la Kilutheri Tanzania (KKKT) Dayosisi ya Kaskazini Mashariki. In 2014, he enrolled with Sebastian Kolowa Memorial University to pursue a Bachelor of Education Special Needs, on the employer's full sponsorship. Midway through his degree program i.e. in 2015, the respondent promulgated a Training Policy - SERA YA MAFUNZO. The Policy covered employees who, in 2016, were still pursuing their degree programs. Under the new dispensation, students who were to be expelled from the college on disciplinary grounds, or those that would be discontinued on account of their failure in their studies, would have 2

their financial support or sponsorship rescinded or countermanded. It is noteworthy that, what followed this change of policy stance was a thorn in the flesh as, on 19th June, 2017, the applicant's education journey was truncated, when he was discontinued from his studies following a failure in his examinations. His attempt to challenge the decision fell through, as the University Senate confirmed his ejection. Believing that the decision cost him his employment, his next move was to institute a complaint with the CMA at Tanga. His contention was that, his employment had been unfairly terminated. His quest for reinstatement fell to naught as the CMA took the view that, no termination had been effected because the applicant was yet to report back to his office or workplace after his discontinuation from studies. His application for revision to the High Court suffered from the same fate. The stance taken by the High Court was that, no termination would be carried out by the respondent while the applicant had not reported back to his workplace. It, consequently, dismissed the application. Feeling hard done, the applicant has escalated his grievance to this Court. He has invoked the provisions of section 4 (3) of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, Cap. 141 and rule 65 of the Tanzania Court

of Appeal Rules, 2009. A trio of grounds for the revision have been raised. We will not reproduce these grounds of revision in view of what will unfold in the course of disposing of this matter. At the hearing of the application, the applicant appeared in person, unrepresented, whereas the respondent was represented by Mr. Kapimpiti Mgalula, learned counsel. As we were set out to begin, we invited the parties to address us on one singular point of law. The point of law related to the propriety of the party to proceedings subsequent to the decision of the CMA. Specifically, we intended to be addressed on whether the name "Registered Trustees of the North Eastern Diocese of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanzania" which featured in the revision proceedings in the High Court are the same as "Dayosisi ya Kaskazini Mashariki KKKT" which was impleaded as the respondent in the CMA. In his brief submission, the applicant began by drawing our attention to page 53 of the record of appeal, at which a letter of employment is located. He argued that, in the said letter, the employer is Dayosisi ya Kaskazini Mashariki KKKT. He contended that, the change of name to the current respondent came after he had been advised by

the High Court. The applicant referred us to Form No. CMA F6 found at page 15 of the record of appeal. He urged the Court to consider the main application and proceed to quash and set aside the decisions of the CMA and the High Court, and order that the case be heard afresh. Mr. Mgalula was quick to submit that, something was wrong with the citation of the respondent. He conceded that the name of the original respondent i.e. "Dayosisi ya Kaskazini Mashariki KKKT" morphed into what is the party now i.e. "Registered Trustees of the North Eastern Diocese of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanzania". While acknowledging that the latter did not have the capacity to sue or be sued, he lashed out at the manner in which such change was done. On CMA F6, Mr. Mgalula firmly contended that, the fact that the case number in that form is different from the number of the proceedings which were initially instituted in the CMA, suggests that this was a different case from what is referred to in CMA FI, that instituted the proceedings which bred the proceedings in the High Court. He contended that, this anomaly renders the instant application incompetent. He urged us to nullify the CMA's proceedings and the

proceedings in the High Court as they emanated from nullity proceedings. From the parties' brief submissions, the issue for our determination is whether the proceedings in the High Court picked the right party. For a start, we wish to state that, it is the requirement of the law in litigation that, names of the parties must be clearly identified at the point of instituting the proceedings, and that, such names should be maintained in the entirety of the trial and subsequent proceedings. Where it is intended that the name of a party should be changed then such change must be preceded by a court order that allows it - see: Inter-Consult Limited v. Mrs. Nora Kasanga & Another [2019] TZCA 792. So crucial is the identification of names of the parties to litigationthat anyunauthorised change brings an undesirable consequence to the proceedings that come subsequent to the change. Thus, in Jaluma General Supplies Ltd v. Stanbic Bank (T) Ltd [2011] TZCA 123, we guided as follows: "Names o f parties is centraI to their identification in litigation. Both parties are limited liability companies with all their attributes. I f one changes its name, it becomes a different legal entity, altogether.

Consequently, the name of the appellant in the Notice o f Appeal was fundamentally different from that in the plaint It was fatally different from that in the plaint It was a fatal irregularity rendering the Notice of appeal incompetent" The foregoing position was accentuated in our subsequent reasoning in CRDB Bank PLC (Formerly CRDB (1996) Ltd) v. George Mathew Kilindu [2020] TZCA 361. Highlighting the consequence of an irregular citation of new names, the Court held as follows: "It is our considered view that citing o f all these new names for the appellant without leave or an order o f the court is a fatal irregularity which has affected the competence o f the entire appeal and cannot be rectified by a Slip Rule as we decided in the case o f Inter-Consuit Limited (supra) cited to us by Mr. Masumbuko." As alluded to earlier on and as emphasized by Mr. Mgalula, the party who featured in the CMA was replaced in a manner that did not conform to the law and practice that govern such situations. The applicant has referred us to Form CMA F6 found at page 15 of the record of appeal. Our cursory glance at it reveals that the same

did not have a bearing on the matter that bred the instant matter. Whereas the dispute referred to the CMA bore a registration Number CMA/TAN/LUSH/05/2017, and was filed on 10th May, 2017, the dispute referred at page 15 of the record of appeal was registered as Labour Dispute No. CMA/TAN/LUSH/08/2017 and was instituted on 7th June, 2019. These differences point to the fact that these were, most likely, two distinct disputes. But even assuming that they refer to one dispute, the fact that change of the name of the respondent was not authorised makes it inoperative, rendering the matter suffer from a serious credibility or competence crisis. We take the view that, the proceedings in the High Court which bear the name of a party that was not a party in the original proceedings in the CMA were irregular and so is the application before us. There is yet another disquiet that deserves a mention, and adds more misery to the applicant's already fledging case. This is in relation to the locus standi of the erstwhile respondent in the CMA proceedings. As gleaned from CMA FI, the party impleaded as the respondent is "Dayosisi ya Kaskazini Mashariki KKKT." While there can be no doubt that the said respondent underwent the registration process under the 8

Societies Act, Cap. 337, followed by the eventual incorporation thereof under section 2 (1) and section 5 of the Trustees Incorporation Act, it is also clear, in our considered view that, such incorporation effectively placed powers of that institution to sue and be sued under the Registered Trustees, and not "Dayosisi ya Kaskazini Mashariki KKKT" that did not have a legal personality to get involved in any proceedings, including arbitral proceedings in the CMA. This was, therefore, a suit preferred against a non-existing party, and we hasten to hold that these proceedings were unmaintainable and what was bred out of it was, undoubtedly, discrepant. We are fortified in our view by our earlier decision in Afriq Engineering and Construction Company Limited v. The Registered trustees of the Diocese of Central Tanganyika [2024] TZCA 591 in which we held as follows: "In this appeal, the DCT, being a religious institution, is required by law to be registered as a society under section 12 (1) of the Societies Act, Cap. 337(the Societies Act). The procedure is well prescribed under the Societies (Application for Registration) Ruies, GN. 119 of 1958. Upon being issued with a certificate of registration, it is required under section 2(1) o f the Trustees Incorporation Act, to be

incorporated and be issued with a certificate of incorporation stipulating its name which under section 5 of the same Act shaii indude the words "Registered Trustees." Therefore, once the certificate is issued, the DCT is deemed to have been incorporated, thus can on/y sue and be sued in its incorporation name and not otherwise. It foliows therefore that, before the arbitrator, the DCT could not have been sued in its registered name, as suggested by Mr. Shayo, because, such a name did not ciothe it with iegai personality. We thus agree with the submission made by Mr. Mkumbukwa that, since the appellant's claim before the arbitrator was brought against the DCT, a non-existing entity, it was legally unmaintainable. Likewise, it was equally wrong for the arbitrator to proceed with the said matter and finally issue an award in the name o f the respondent who was not a party to the arbitral proceedings." So significant is the totality of these flaws that they fraught the proceedings, right from their inception in CMA to the High Court. They cannot be allowed to see the light of the day. 10

Consequently, we nullify the proceedings of CMA and the High Court, quash and set aside the decisions emanating therefrom, and strike out the application before us. We make no order as to costs. DATED at DODOMA this 11th day of May, 2026. R. J. KEREFU JUSTICE OF APPEAL A. M. MWAMPASHI JUSTICE OF APPEAL M. K. ISMAIL JUSTICE OF APPEAL Ruling delivered virtually this 12th day of May, 2026 in the presence of the applicant in person - unrepresented, Mr. Kapimpiti Mgalula, learned counsel for the respondent, and Mr. Shafii Kassim, Court Clerk, is hereby certified as a true copy of the original. li