Ruth Langeni M Fanga vs Katibu Mkuu Kiongozi & Others (Civil Appeal No. 1235 of 2025) [2026] TZCA 515 (7 May 2026)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT MWANZA (CORAM: MW ANDAMBO, J.A.. KENTE. J.A. And MGONYA. J.A.: CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1235 OF 2025 RUTH LANGENI M FANGA APPELLANT VERSUS KATIBU MKUU K I O N G O Z I ............................. HALMASHAURI YA M ANISPAA YA ILEMELA M W ANASHERIA MKUU W A SERI K A L I ......... 1 st RESPONDENT 2 nd RESPONDENT 3 rd RESPONDENT (Appeal from the Ruling of the High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza) 30th April & 7th May, 2026 KENTE, J.A.: This appeal arises from a ruling by a learned High Court Judge (sitting at Mwanza) dismissing an application for extension of time to commence judicial review proceedings on the grounds that, the filing of the application by the appellant herein namely, Ruth Langeni Mfanga almost one year and seven months after termination of her employment contract, was inordinately and inexcusably delayed. ( Kilekam aienqa, 3 .) dated the 27th day of September, 2024 in Misc. Civil Application No. 124 o f 2023 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT The factual premises leading up to the instant appeal is largely uncontested. The appellant was employed by the second respondent i

herein namely, Ilemela Municipal Council as a Ward Executive Officer on 1st January 2013 apparently on a permanent and pensionable contract. However, following allegations of absenteeism, her contract of employment was terminated on 25th February, 2019. Aggrieved by the said termination, she vainly appealed to the Public Service Commission where she also lost the case on 20th July, 2020. Still dissatisfied, the appellant appealed to the Permanent Secretary (President's Office) which also decided in her disfavour. She received the above-mentioned decision with which she was disenchanted, on 2n d January, 2022. To that end, on 28th August, 2023 she filed an application for enlargement of time within which to seek leave to commence judicial review proceedings. The grounds upon which the extension of time was sought were that, after receiving the decision of the President on 2n d January, 2022, she had to issue the respondents with a mandatory 90 days' statutory notice of intention to sue the Government as required under the Government Proceedings Act (Chapter 5 of the Revised Laws) and later on, she fell sick. As such, the appellant deposed that, she was neither negligent nor procrastinative in the pursuit of her rights. The High Court however, refused the application stimulating the appellant to launch the present appeal in which the key question we have to consider is whether the reasons assigned by the High Court Judge in declining to grant an extension 2

of time were legally justified. That in essence, is the issue which is deducible from the appellant's complaints in her seven-grounds memorandum of appeal. Going by the appellant's affidavit in support of the application before the High Court which culminated into an unhappy ending, the reasons for the delay by the appellant to launch judicial review proceedings after receiving the decision by the President, were in relation to health issues and procedural irregularities in the process leading to the termination of her employment contract. Obviously, we are mindful that indeed, sufficient grounds such as health issues and clear and significant technical or procedural irregularities in the decision sought to be reviewed as pleaded in the present matter, are needed for grant of extension of time. However, the emerging jurisprudence has built into these requirements the need for an applicant not only to lead evidence showing good cause and demonstrate diligence and promptness on their part, but also a well-established principle in common law jurisdictions that, extension of time is a discretionary power of the court which is not a guaranteed right but is judicially exercised based on whether "good cause" or "sufficient reason" is given to account for the delay. It follows therefore that, while extension of time is granted at the discretion of the court, the grant or refusal to grant it would depend on the 3

established facts and circumstances of each case. This means the applicant must provide a valid explanation to account for the delay. As stated earlier, the contention of the applicant in the present case as contained in her supporting affidavit is that, she was unable to apply for judicial review of the decision of the President within the statutory period because, upon receiving a notification of the said decision, she had to issue the first respondent with a ninety days' statutory notice pursuant to section 6(2) and (3) of the Government Proceedings Act and further that, she later on became ill and was admitted to Magige Dispensary in Mwanza on 16th September, 2022. As it happened however, the learned High Court Judge did not agree with the appellant's explanation. He took the view that, she had not accounted for each day of the delay and thus failed to meet the threshold which both statutory and case law prescribed. In particular, the learned Judge observed, in relation to the appellant's accounting that, the said accounting had several days which were not accounted for and there was no evidence showing that the appellant was admitted for illness or she simply received medical diagnosis and treatment on an outpatient basis. The learned High Court Judge was resoundingly unequivocal that, if the appellant was admitted to hospital, the said admission did not prevent her from seeking legal representation and that, serving a 90 days' notice was, 4

in the circumstances of this case, unnecessary as to form a ground for extension of time. Our earlier decision in the case of Hassan v. Latifa Lukio Mashayo, Civil Application No. 03 of 2007 [2008] T2CA 220 was cited by the learned Judge to underscore the point that, delay of even a single day has to be accounted for, otherwise there would be no point of having procedural rules prescribing the periods within which certain steps have to be taken. As for the appellant's next limb of complaint that the decision sought to be challenged by way judicial review was tainted with illegality, the learned Judge was not short of expressing his mindfulness of the settled position of the law that, as a general rule, a claim of illegality of the decision sought to be challenged constitutes a reason for extension of time regardless of whether or not reasonable explanation has been given by the applicant to account for the delay. He was astute in observing, correctly so in our view that, illegality is a good reason for extension of time, but only if it touches on matters of jurisdiction, denial of the right to be heard or if the matter giving rise to the decision sought to be challenged, was time barred. As a consequence of the foregoing discourse, the learned Judge concluded that, the evidence and arguments advanced by the appellant had not attained the required threshold for grant of an extension of time. 5

In advancing her arguments in support of the appeal, the appellant who appeared in person fending for herself, had no much to say. She only augmented on her arguments contained in the written submissions filed earlier on in terms of Rule 106(1) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2009 insisting that, she had accounted for each day of the delay and that, she had as well demonstrated, albeit on a balance of probabilities that, indeed the decision sought to be challenged by way of judicial review, was stained by illegality. For his part, Mr. Lameck Merumba learned Principal State Attorney who appeared along with Mr. Allen Mbuya learned State Attorney representing the respondents, begun by outlining the sequence of events from the time the appellant received the decision of the President on 2n d January 2022 to 28th August 2023 when she finally lodged the application giving rise to the impugned decision of the High Court. Relying on the principles applicable to any case of the present nature and the undisputed facts obtaining in the instant case, the learned Principal State Attorney concluded that, the High Court Judge was on firm ground when he held that the appellant had not accounted for each day of the delay. In respect of the second limb of the appellant's complaint, Mr. Merumba, submitted that, the said complaint was being raised more or less 6

for the first time as the appellant's counsel had not seriously raised and pursued it in the High Court. The learned Principal State Attorney projected, by way of an overarching contention that, in the event of this Court disagreeing with him in the above postulation, it remains his position that the said illegality was not demonstrated as appearing on the face of the record so as not to require lengthy arguments or new evidence to prove. We have examined the record of the application before the High Court, including, for the avoidance of doubt, the appellant's affidavit which was filed in support of the application together with the exhibits thereof. We also have in mind the arguments which were filed to support and oppose the application. With respect to the applicant, we would quickly observe that, the application before the High Court was not founded on legally discernible and tenable grounds. From the reading of the affidavit on record, it is not in dispute that the appellant's employment contract was terminated on 2n d January 2022 when she was notified of the President's decision to that effect. In terms of the applicable law, the time within which to file an application for review, begun to run right from this day. According to the applicant, on 28th March, 2022 she sought medical treatment at Magige

Dispensary. The period between 2n d January and 28th March 2022 creates 85 oddy days which were not sufficiently accounted for. Moreover, as correctly submitted by Mr. Merumba, the applicant attended her last clinic session on 16th September 2022 and she engaged Mr. Majid Kangile who was her advocate at the time, on 19th September, 2022. The three days between 16th and 19th September 2022 were equally unaccounted for. But then, to crown it all, the application giving rise to the ruling which is subject to this appeal, was not filed until 28th August, 2023. The question for our determination is whether, on these facts, the High Court Judge should have exercised his discretion to grant the appellant an extension of time to launch judicial review proceedings out of time. As we see it, and as correctly submitted by Mr. Merumba, the learned High Court Judge was on firm ground to decline the prayer by the applicant. While the appellant placed much reliance on her illness as a cause for her inability to commence judicial review proceedings within time, she did not demonstrate, by way of evidence as required by law, how the alleged illness completely incapacitated her from taking the necessary legal steps or instructing an advocate nor did she account for the whole period of delay so as to satisfy the "sufficient or reasonable cause" requirement as envisaged in section 14(1) of the Law of Limitation Act.

Needless to say, the failure by the appellant to do so was fatal to the application before the High Court. Put in simpler terms, considering the length of the delay which was inordinate, the appellant had not shown sufficient reasons to enable the learned High Court Judge to exercise his discretion in her favour granting her an extension of time to initiate judicial review proceedings out of time. As for the appellant's complaint that the decision sought to be challenged by way of judicial review was legally flawed, void or unlawful on its face as not to require her to give any explanation for the delay pursuant to our decision in the case of VIP Engineering and Marketing & Thee Others v. Citibank Tanzania Limited [(Consolidated Civil Reference No. 6 of 2006) [2007] TZCA 165 (26 September 2007)], we entirely agree with Mr. Merumba's second position that when established, illegality can form the basis for extension of time in judicial proceedings but only if the ruling or decision sought to be challenged is manifestly illegal or tainted with a fundamental error of law. That in essence, is what the courts will review in considering whether to grant an extension when illegality of the decision sought to be challenged, is pleaded. On the established facts of this case, it is not irrelevant to observe at this point that, the appellant should have, but did not focus on demonstrating that illegality was established and that the grounds which 9

were presented to the High Court Judge had in fact established, on a balance of probabilities that, the decision terminating her employment contract was manifestly illegal. It is for the above reasons that we find the present appeal as lacking in merit. We sustain the decision of the High Court and consequently dismiss the appeal, but with no order as to costs. DATED at MWANZA this 06th day of May, 2026. Judgment delivered this 7th day of May, 2026 in the presence of appellant in person unrepresented, Mr. Felician Daniel, learned State Attorney for the respondent/Republic and Mr. John Banene, Court Clerk; is hereby certified as a true copy of the original. L. S. MWANDAMBO JUSTICE OF APPEAL P. M. KENTE JUSTICE OF APPEAL L. E. MGONYA JUSTICE OF APPEAL A. L. KALEGEYA DEPUTY REGISTRAR COURT OF APPEAL 10