Constantine Gomela vs Reliance Insurance Company (Tanzania) Limited (Civil Appeal No. 396 of 2024) [2026] TZCA 477 (5 May 2026)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT PAR ES SALAAM (CORAM; NDIKA. 3.A.. MURUKE. 3.A. And MGEYEKWA, JA) CIVIL APPEAL NO. 396 OF 2024 CONSTANTINE GOMELA............................................................................. APPELLANT VERSUS RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY (TANZANIA) LIMITED ............................................................................. RESPONDENT (Appeal against the Ruling and Order of the High Court of Tanzania, Main Registry at Dar es Salaam) (Mqanqa, 3.) dated the 27th February, 2024 in Revision Application No. 27663 of 2023 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 21st April & 5th May, 2026 MGEYEKWA. J.A.: The appellant, Constantine Gomela, has preferred this appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Tanzania (Labour Division) at Dar es Salaam (Mganga, J.) in Revision Application No. 27663 of 2023 dated 27th February 2024. The High Court set aside the award of the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration (the CMA), which decided in favour of the appellant. Before delving into the merits of the appeal, it is apposite to set out, albeit briefly, the background giving rise to the dispute. The appellant and the respondent were at all material times in an employer employee relationship. The appellant was employed as a Marketing Manager with effect from 6th 1

January 2011, and served until his termination on allegations of underperformance. The termination was communicated through notices, culminating in the parties parting ways, and thereby giving rise to the present controversy. Aggrieved by the respondent's decision, the appellant lodged a complaint before the CMA on the ground of unfair termination. Upon perusal of the parties' pleadings, the CMA framed five issues for determination, namely: limitation of time, the status of the employee, substantive fairness, procedural fairness, and reliefs. The matter proceeded to full hearing, during which evidence was adduced by both sides in support of their respective positions. Upon evaluation of the evidence, the CMA found that the claim had been filed within time, that the appellant's termination was both substantively and procedurally unfair, and proceeded to award him compensation equivalent to twelve months' salaries in the sum of TZS 4,800,000. It further awarded unpaid salaries for fifteen months amounting to TZS 6,000,000, as well as terminal benefits comprising unpaid leave pay of TZS 400,000 and one month's salary in lieu of notice of TZS 400,000. Dissatisfied with that outcome, the respondent filed a revision in the High Court. In the affidavit in support of the application, sworn by Upendo Minja, a Principal Officer, advancing four grounds in support of the prayer for revision before the High Court, namely:

1. Whether it was proper for the arbitrator to award the respondent TZS 11,600,000/= as compensation, despite the arbitrator noting that the respondent was not confirmed as the applicant's employee.
2. Whether it was proper for the arbitrator to calculate the compensation amount based on a salary o f TZS 400,000/=, despite the fact that the respondent provided no evidence to justify that monthly salary amount
3. Whether it was proper for the arbitrator to rely on the letter tendered as exhibit AP2 (dated 2$h February 2021) to hold that the matter was filed within time, despite the authenticity o f that exhibit being questionable.
4. Whether the Commission acted properly in holding that the respondent was entitled to TZS 11,600,000/= without properly evaluating the evidence placed before it. The High Court first addressed the third issue, namely the question of limitation, and overturned the findings of the CMA, holding that the dispute was time-barred. Having so held, the Court nevertheless proceeded to consider the first ground and ultimately concluded that the appellant was still on probation at the material time. Undeterred, the appellant has lodged this appeal before the Court. In the Memorandum of Appeal, two (2) grounds were advanced. However, we shall reproduce only the first ground, the second being factual in nature and therefore, by virtue of section 58 of the Labour Institutions Act, Cap.300 [R. E. 2023], outside the purview of this Court. The sole ground of appeal is as follows: 3

l. That the Honourable Judge erred both in law and fact by holding that the Appellant preferred and/or instituted his suit before the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration out o f the prescribed time provided by the law. At the hearing of the appeal, the appellant appeared in person, unrepresented while the respondent was represented by Mr. Dickson Sanga, learned counsel. The appellant did not file written submissions as required under Rule 106 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2009, and accordingly canvassed the appeal orally. On the other hand, the respondent duly filed written submissions on 9th September 2024, which were adopted by the respondent's counsel. In support of the sole ground of appeal, the appellant was brief. In essence, he maintained that his complaint before the CMA was filed within time. He clarified that he was served with a termination letter (exhibit AP2) on 26th July 2022 and placed reliance on the CMA's findings at page 95 of the record of appeal, where the arbitrator observed that there was no dispute as to the date of service of termination letter. He further argued that time began to run from that date and, since he lodged his claim on 24th August 2022, he was within the statutory period of thirty days. Upon being prompted by the Court whether time began to run from 2n d February, 2021, upon alleged service of the notice of termination (exhibit D2), the appellant replied that he had never been served with the said notice and 4

disowned the signature appearing thereon. In conclusion, he urged the Court to find that the claim before the CMA was filed within time and to allow the appeal. In conclusion, he urged the Court to find that the claim before the CMA was filed within time and to allow the appeal. On the adversary side, Mr. Sanga was fairly brief in responding to the appellants' submissions. His contention was that; the appellant had nothing justifiable to criticize the High Court Judge who correctly found that the appellant's lodged his complaint in the CMA out of time. Mr. Sanga firmly contended that the termination process was set in motion by a 28 days notice (exhibit D2) served upon the appellant on 8th February, 2021. He maintained that the cause of action accrued upon the expiry of that notice in March 2021. In further reply, Mr. Sanga opposed the appellant's position and maintained that the learned Judge did not misdirect himself in evaluating the evidence. Rather, he properly applied the law governing limitation of time and correctly found that the appellant's reliance on exhibit AP2 was misplaced, the same lacking authenticity. Elaborating, the learned counsel submitted that during cross-examination the appellant stated that exhibit AP2 was signed by one Upendo Minja, the Human Resources Officer, which was incorrect, as the document was in fact signed by Rukia Goroga, the Deputy Chief Executive Officer. He added that no cogent evidence was adduced to demonstrate that Upendo Minja authored or issued the said letter. In support of that proposition, 5

he cited Prucheria John v Wilbard Wilson and William Wilson, Land Appeal No. 64 of 2019 (unreported), and contended that it was unsafe for the CMA to place reliance on a document whose authenticity was doubtful. He further contended that even if the appellant denies service of the termination notice (exhibit D2), he could not ignore the fact that he was terminated in February, 2021, having received his terminal benefits in the same year, as evidenced by exhibit D3. We have carefully examined the record of appeal in light of the submissions by learned counsel. In our view, the appeal can be conveniently disposed of within a narrow compass, namely, whether the CMA had jurisdiction to entertain the dispute, which turns on whether the matter was instituted within the prescribed statutory limitation period. Our point of departure is the law governing limitation of time in lodging a dispute relating to termination before the CMA. This is provided for under Rule 10(1) of the Labour Institutions (Mediation and Arbitration) Rules, G.N. No. 64 of 2007, which stipulates as follows: "10 (1) Disputes about the fairness o f an employee's termination o f employment must be referred to the Commission within thirty days from the date o f termination or the date that the employer made a final decision to terminate or uphold the decision to terminate. 6

(2) All other disputes must be referred to the Commission within sixty days from the date when the dispute arose. [Emphasis added] Be that as it may, on the basis of the foregoing provision, it is evident that a dispute relating to termination must be lodged before the CMA within thirty days, whereas other employment-related disputes are to be filed within sixty days from the date the cause of action accrues. In the present appeal, the parties are sharply divided on whether the appellant's claims for termination and unpaid salaries were instituted within the prescribed time. The appellant, for his part, maintained that the dispute was lodged within time, reckoning from 26th July, 2022, the date he alleges to have been served with the termination letter (Exhibit AP2), to 24th August 2022, when he lodged his complaint before the CMA. The respondent, on the other hand, challenged the authenticity of exhibit AP2 and instead relied on exhibit D2, contending that the appellant was duly served on 8th February, 2021 with a notice of termination to take effect after twenty-eight days. On that footing, he argued that the cause of action accrued in March 2021, and that the claim lodged in 2022 was clearly out of time. It is regrettable that the CMA summarily disposed of this contestation, it stated that the date of service of the termination letter was not in dispute and that no cross-examination was conducted thereon. With respect, that finding is plainly 7

borne out neither by the record nor the proceedings, as we shall shortly demonstrate. It is settled that, in labour law, the decision to terminate employment lies within the domain of the employer. Once the employer makes that decision, the effective date of termination is that which is communicated in the notice of termination. An employee cannot, ordinarily, assert a date of termination at variance with the terms of the notice. In the present case, the parties are at variance as to which of the two notices exhibit D2 tendered by the respondent, or exhibit AP2 relied upon by the appellant constitutes the operative notice for purposes of computing time within which to institute the dispute before the CMA. The appellant contended that the cause of action arose on 26th July, 2022, when he was allegedly served with the termination letter (exhibit AP2). The respondent, on the other hand, maintained that the relevant notice was exhibit D2, which stipulated that the termination would take effect upon the lapse of 28 days, that is, on or about 6th March, 2021. Upon a careful scrutiny of the record of appeal, we are in agreement with learned counsel for the respondent that both the oral testimony and the documentary evidence support the conclusion reached by the High Court that exhibit D2 was the operative notice of termination. The contents of exhibit D2 8

are clear and unequivocal: the appellant's employment was to terminate upon the expiry of 28 days from the date of its issuance. In that regard, we find no merit in the appellant's contention that the cause of action accrued upon his alleged receipt of the termination letter on 26th July 2022. It is, in our view, immaterial for the appellant to contend that he had no knowledge of the termination notice or that it was not served upon him in a timely manner. Such an argument might have availed him had it been premised on the footing that exhibit D2 was provisional in nature pending a final decision following, for instance, an internal appeal process as contemplated under Rule 10(1) of the Labour Institutions (Mediation and Arbitration) Rules (supra). That, however, is not the case here. We are therefore unable to accept the appellant's account, particularly his assertion that he only became aware of his termination on 26thJuly 2022. On the contrary, we hold that the cause of action accrued upon the expiry of the 28-day notice, that is, on or about 6th March, 2021 . As alluded to above, rule 10(1) of the Labour Institutions (Mediation and Arbitration) Rules, G.N. No. 64 of 2007 requires termination disputes to be lodged within thirty (30) days. The appellant filed his claim before the CMA on 24th August, 2022, long after the prescribed period had lapsed. The claim was therefore statute-barred, and the CMA ought to have declined jurisdiction and dismissed it pursuant to section 3(1) of the Law of Limitation Act. Accordingly, 9

this ground lacks merit. The learned Judge cannot be faulted for upholding the dismissal of the appellant's application. For these reasons, the appeal is devoid of merit. The judgment of the High Court is upheld. The appeal is dismissed. As this is a labour matter, we make no order as to costs. It is so ordered. DATED at DAR ES SALAAM this 4th day of May, 2026. Judgment delivered this 5th day of May, 2026 in the presence of the appellant in person/unpresented, Mr. Runyoro Adolf, learned counsel for the respondent and Mr. Ladislaus Msuba, Court Clerk; is hereby certified as a true copy of the original. G. A. M. NDIKA JUSTICE OF APPEAL Z. G. MURUKE JUSTICE OF APPEAL A. Z. MGEYEKWA JUSTICE OF APPEAL ^ J. E. FOVO DEPUTY REGISTRAR VV\ COURT OF APPEAL 10