Didace Magesa Tangatya vs Yapi Merkezi Instaat Ve Sanayi Anonim Sirketi (Civil Appeal No. 1150 of 2024) [2026] TZCA 461 (29 April 2026)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT PAR ES SALAAM (CORAM: NDIKA. J.A.. MURUKE. J.A.. And MGEYEKWA. 3.A.) CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1150 OF 2024 DIDACE MAG ESA TANGATYA......................................................APPELLANT VERSUS YAPI MERKEZIINSTAAT VE SANAYI ANONIM SIRKETI ........... RESPONDENT (Appeal from the Ruling and Order of the High Court of Tanzania, Labour Division at Morogoro) (Mansoor, J.) dated the 23r d day of January 2024 in Miscellaneous Labour Application No. 17 of 2023 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 21s t& 29thApril, 2026 NDIKA. J.A.: Didace Magesa Tangatya, the appellant, contests the ruling of the High Court of Tanzania, Labour Division sitting at Morogoro (Mansoor, X, as she was then), dated 23rd January 2024, which declined his motion for an extension of time to file an application for review of that court's decision in Miscellaneous Labour Application No. 5 of 2022. The context of the appeal is as follows: the appellant was engaged by the respondent, Yapi Merkezi Instaat Ve Sanayi Anonim Sirketi, on 1s t September 2018, as a Senior Human Resources Officer on a fixed-term contract. His employment endured a mere two months, concluding on 17th November 2018. Subsequently, he unsuccessfully pursued a claim for breach of contract at the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration in Morogoro ("the CMA") on 15th January 2019, seeking, among other remedies, pay in lieu of notice, repatriation expenses, maintenance allowance, and compensation for sixty months totalling TZS 156,000,000.00. Displeased with the result, he filed Labour Revision No. 2 of 2021 in the High Court to contest the CMA's award. On 19th January 2022, the High Court (Kalunde, J.) marked the initial revision withdrawn at the appellant's request, as he preferred to pursue Labour Revision No. 15 of 2021, which he had filed at the High Court on 21s t September 2021. The second revision was also unproductive; the High Court (Chaba, J.) dismissed it on 31s t March 2022 on the basis that it was time-barred. The aftermath of the said dismissal resulted in the appellant persistently filing numerous applications for an extension of time to renew his quest for a revision of the CMA's award. The initial matter was Miscellaneous Labour Application No. 5 of 2022, which the High Court (Hassan, J.) "dismissed" on 26th September 2022, after upholding a preliminary objection that the case violated relevant procedural provisions. 2 In the second matter, Labour Review No. 1 of 2022 lodged on 6th October 2022, the appellant requested but failed in obtaining a review of Justice Hassan's ruling. The court presided over by Ngwembe, X, (as he then was), dismissed the application on 30th August 2023, citing incompetence. Undeterred, about thirty-five days later, that is on 4th October 2023, the appellant filed Miscellaneous Labour Application No. 17 of 2023, from which this appeal arises, once more requesting an extension of time to seek a review of the decision made by Hassan, J. The appellant claimed that illness hindered the timely submission of the filing. The respondent contested by submitting a counter-affidavit and medical data from the issuing hospital contradicting the appellant's alleged illness. The court evaluated procedural adherence, the sufficiency of the appellant's rationale for the delay, the reliability of the medical evidence, and whether the appellant accurately specified the decision intended for review. It determined that the appellant's medical evidence did not encompass the pertinent timeframe, and that the hospital's verification of the appellant's documentation uncovered inconsistencies in it. Furthermore, it was noted that the appellant exhibited irregular attendance at court proceedings during the 3 purported period of infirmity, and his submissions lacked clarity regarding the decision being contested. The court concluded that there was insufficient justification for granting an extension, after considering the necessity to account for each day of delay and evaluating believability. The application was ultimately dismissed. The appellant contests the High Court's decision on five grounds, asserting that the court mistakenly refused to grant the requested extension of time, despite sufficient justification being presented in accordance with section 56(1) of the Labour Court Rules, Government Notice No. 106 of 2007. Fending for himself, the appellant censured the High Court for failing to adequately analyse his arguments and for dismissing his medical proof as spurious without justification. He asserted that he adequately demonstrated that illness hindered him from submitting the intended application punctually. He elaborated that he was attended at the Dodoma Regional Hospital where the medics advised him to avoid long distance travelling, which then prevented him to travel to the High Court at Morogoro to file the intended application. To strengthen his argument, the appellant directed our attention to pages 198 to 200 of the appeal record, revealing three documents. The 4 initial document is a letter from Dodoma Hospital dated 14th August 2021, indicating that he was experiencing severe hypertension for years. The second document is a medical record stating that he was again tested on 14th February 2023 and diagnosed with severe hypertension. The final document is an affidavit dated 20th September 2023, in which he attested that on 7th October 2022, he was advised by the medical professionals at the said hospital against long-distance travel, and he adhered to this counsel until 15th February 2023, when he travelled to the High Court at Morogoro after receiving permission on 14th February 2023 to undertake such travel. To bolster his appeal, he referenced Murtaza Mohamed Raza Vi rani & Another v. Mehboob Hassanali Versi [2023] TZCA 6. In contrast, besides criticising the appellant for failing to address the delay, Mr. Humphrey Aloyce Chuwa, counsel for the respondent, endorsed the High Court's position that the appellant's purported sickness was substantiated by fraudulent paperwork. The aforementioned documents were refuted by a letter dated 10th November 2023 from the Dodoma Regional Hospital, which stated particularly that the appellant did not visit the clinic on 7th October 2022. Furthermore, Mr. Chuwa asserted that the appellant is documented to have appeared in court in Morogoro during the same timeframe in which he alleged to have received counsel against long-distance travel. 5 Moreover, in addition to Mr. Chuwa's reproach of the appellant for not elucidating the delay in submitting the intended application, he contended that the appellant exhibited negligence rather than diligence throughout the process. Referencing Hamisi Mohamed (administration of The Estates of The Late Risasi Ngawe) v. Mtumwa Moshi (administratrix of The Late Moshi Abdallah) [2020] TZCA 13 and Wambura NJ. Waryuba v. The Secretary Ministry of Finance & Another [2021] TZCA 457, he urged us to reject the appeal. At the outset, we wish to stress that whether to grant an extension of time is a discretionary matter for the court, to be exercised cautiously and flexibly while examining the pertinent facts of the case. The court typically considers the duration of the delay, the reasons for it, the potential prejudice to each party depending on how the court exercises its discretion, the parties' conduct, the necessity to balance the interests of a party with a favourable decision against the rights of a party with a constitutionally protected right of appeal, and the presence of a significant legal issue, such as the decision's illegality: see, for instance, Dar es Salaam City Council v. Jayantilal P. Rajani [1988] TZCA 26; Eliya Anderson v. Republic [2013] TZCA 2382; Principal Secretary, Ministry of Defence and National Service v. Devram Valambhia 6 [1992] T.L.R. 185; and Lyamuya Construction Co. Ltd v. Board of Registered of Young Women's Christian Association of Tanzania [2011] TZCA4. Judicial discretion allows judges to interpret and apply the law based on their judgement and experience. To protect the presiding judge's independence, judicial discretion is rarely interfered with. At page 94 of Mbogo and Another v. Shah [1968] EA 93, Sir Clement de Lestang, VP of the erstwhile Court of Appeal for East Africa, stated: "I think it is weii settled that this court will not interfere with the exercise of its discretion by an inferior court unless it is satisfied that its decision is clearly wrong, because it has misdirected itselfor because it has acted on matters on which it should not have acted or because it has failed to take into consideration matters which it should have taken into consideration and in doing so arrived at a wrong conclusion". [Emphasis added] Sir Charles Newbold P stated on page 96 in the same case thus: "... a Court o fAppealshould not interfere with the exercise o f the discretion o f a judge unless it is satisfied that thejudge in exercising his discretion i has misdirected himselfin some matter and as a result has arrived at a wrong decision, or unless it is manifest from the case as a whole that the judge has been clearly wrong in the exercise of his discretion and that as a resuit there has been misjustice" The appellant filed Miscellaneous Labour Application No. 17 of 2023 on 4th October 2023, seeking an extension of time to request a review of the dismissal order given by Hassan, J. on 26th September 2022, as previously indicated. It is unequivocal that he initially applied for review on 6th October 2022 vide Labour Review No. 1 of 2022, which was timely. Nonetheless, as previously indicated, Ngwembe, J. (as he was then) dismissed the said review application on 30th August 2023 on the grounds of its incompetence. To renew his pursuit for review, he submitted Miscellaneous Labour Application No. 17 of 2023 thirty-five days later. The interval between 26th September 2022, when Hassan, J. issued the contested dismissal order, and 30th August 2023, when the initial review application was dismissed, constitutes an excusable technical delay - refer to Fortunatus Masha v. William Shija and Another [1997] T.L.R. 154; Salvand K. A. Rwegasira v. China Henan International Group Co. Ltd [2006] TZCA 345; and Bharya Engineering & Contracting Co. Ltd v. Hamoud Ahmed Nassor 8 [2018] TZCA 339. Thus, the appellant was only required to justify the thirty-five-day interval from 30th August 2023 to 4th October 2023 when the application pertinent to this appeal was submitted. We indicated earlier that the appellant alleged before the High Court and this Court that illness was the reason for the delay. He was unable to travel to the court at Morogoro for about two years due to his doctors' advice against long-distance travel, until he received clearance on 14th February 2023. The High Court examined his medical documents and deemed them fraudulent. Nonetheless, we assert that these records were irrelevant to the delay in this case, which occurred from 30th August 2023 to 4th October 2023. The assertion that he was too ill to travel until February 14, 2023, fails to account for the said thirty-five-day delay in requesting an extension of time following the striking out of his initial review application by Ngwembe, J. (as he then was) on a technicality. The appellant erroneously presumed that the delay commenced on 26th September 2022, the date of the contested dismissal, yet failed to elucidate the delay subsequent to the termination of the initial review application. At this juncture, we emphasise that the obligation to justify delay in an application for an extension of time is both paramount and well- 9 established. In this case, we concur with the learned judge of the High Court, albeit for slightly different reasons, that the appellant did not adequately account for the delay. The thirty-five-day wait in this matter is plainly excessive and unjustifiable. Disregarding it would be highly prejudicial to the respondent. We eventually hold the appeal to be without merit and so dismiss it. This employment action is typically exempt from cost awards; thus, we order each party to bear its own costs. DATED at DAR ES SALAAM this 28th day of April 2026. Judgment delivered this 29th day of April, 2026 in the presence of the appellant in person-unrepresented, Mr. Humphrey Alloyce, learned counsel for the respondent and Mr. Ladislaus Msuba, Court clerk; is hereby certif G. A. M. NDIKA JUSTICE OF APPEAL Z. G. MURUKE JUSTICE OF APPEAL A. Z. MGEYEKWA JUSTICE OF APPEAL