Chief Secretary & Others vs Pere Muganda (Civil Appeal No. 329 of 2024) [2026] TZCA 433 (23 April 2026)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT PAR ES SALAAM (CORAM: SEHEL, J.A.. KIHWELO. 3.A. And AGATHO, J.A.^ CIVIL APPEAL NO. 329 OF 2024 THE CHIEF SECRETARY ................................................................ 1 st APPELLANT SIHA DISTRICT COUNCIL.............................................................2 nd APPELLANT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.............................................................3 rd APPELLANT VERSUS PERE MUGANDA................................................................................ RESPONDENT (Appeal from the decision of the High Court of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam Main Registry) (Matuma, 3.^ dated the 3rd day of April, 2024 in Misc. Civil Application No. 1418 of 2024 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 16th & 23rd April, 2026 KIHWELO. J.A.: The High Court of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam, Main Registry (Matuma, J.) in Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 1418 of 2024 on 3rd April 2024 while considering an application for extension of time to lodge a fresh application for judicial review held as follows: "In the circum stances o f this case, I have considered that the applicant applied fo r lea ve im m ediately after exhausting adm inistrative channels, lodged h is application fo r ju d icia l review w ithin tim e after having obtained leave and did not stay fo r long tim e to lodge th is application. I fin d no any prejudice to l the respondents in case th is application is granted. Rather, I fin d that, it is the applicant who w ill su ffer fo r having been denied access to try fighting fo r h is innocence and em ploym ent w hile he has shown diligence and efforts to struggle fo r the same. I therefore, grant th is application and extend the applicant (sic) fourteen days from the date o f this ruling w ithin which he has to re file afresh h is application fo r ju d icia l review. No orders as to costs. It is so ordered." The "real sting of the matter" is the dissatisfaction by the appellants with the above order enlarging time within which the respondent could lodge an application for judicial review. In further seeking to challenge that decision the appellants lodged an appeal before this Court which was predicated on four grounds of grievance as follows: 1. That, the High Court erred in law and fact by taking into account irrelevant m atters in reaching into the decision. 2. That, the High Court erred in law and fa ct by failin g to take into account relevant m atters in reaching into the im pugned decision. 3. That, the High Court erred in law and fa ct by taking into account extraneous m atters not pleaded in the affid avit supporting the application. 2 4. That, the High Court erred in taw and fa ct by im properly exercising its discretion in granting the application in to ta l disregard o f the unexplained delay o f 23 days which is inordinate. When, eventually the matter was placed before us for hearing on 16th April, 2026, the appellants enjoyed the services of Mr. Stanley Mahenge and Ms. Agnes Makubha, both learned State Attorneys, whereas the respondent appeared through Mr. Isaac Nassor Tasinga, learned counsel. Both parties had earlier on lodged written submissions in support and opposition of the appeal in terms of rule 106 (1) and (8) of the Tanzania Court of Appeal Rules, 2009 which they fully prayed to adopt during the hearing. In the upshot, Mr. Mahenge invited us to allow the appeal with costs, whereas Mr. Tasinga urged us to dismiss the appeal with costs. Following a brief dialogue between Mr. Mahenge and the Bench, the learned counsel elected to combine grounds 1, 2 and 3 of appeal since they were interwoven, while ground 4 was argued separately. Earlier on, Mr. Mahenge had intimated in his submissions that he was going to argue conjointly grounds 1 and 2 only. Arguing the appeal, Mr. Mahenge contended that the respondent on 23rd December, 2023 applied for enlargement of time within which to lodge a fresh application for judicial review in terms of section 14 of the Law of 3 Limitation Act, Cap 89 ("the Law of Limitation") and the central issue was delay of 23 days between the time when the initial application was struck out on 30th November, 2023 and 23rd December, 2023 when the application for enlargement of time was actually lodged. He argued that, in terms of the provisions of section 14 of the Law of Limitation a party seeking extension of time must demonstrate reasonable or sufficient cause for the court to exercise its discretion. Put differently, for the court to exercise its discretionary powers, there has to be reasonable or sufficient cause. He went further to submit that although the terms reasonable or sufficient cause have not been defined by statute, there is in this regard, considerable case laws which have defined it depending on the circumstances of each particular case and cited to us the case of Lyamuya Construction Company Ltd v. Board of Trustees of Young Women's Christian Association of Tanzania [2011] TZCA 4 TANZLII to demonstrate his proposition. He took the view that, the High Court in granting the impugned enlargement of time did not take into account relevant matters as set out by case laws instead, he considered, what Mr. Mahenge termed, irrelevant matters such as difficulties faced by ordinary citizens in dealing with the court system. 4 The learned counsel went further to argue that there was no explanation for the delay nor was there any affidavit of the officer to whom the follow up was made to support the assertion of the 23 days' delay. In his view, the High Court overlooked this significant lapse of time and instead focused on extraneous matters. To demonstrate his proposition, he paid homage to the case of Octavian Rugerezi Francis v. Teachers Service Commission and 2 Others [2024] TZCA 91 TANZLII, Said Sultan Ngalema and Others v. Isack Boaz Ng'wiwanishi and Others [2022] TZCA 684 and Jamillah Hassan Muyonga v. Almas Charles Mvungi [2023] TZCA 365 TANZLII. In support of ground 4 of the appeal, Mr. Mahenge was very brief and essentially, he argued that the High Court improperly exercised its discretion in granting the enlargement of time in utter disregard of the inordinate delay of 23 days and the established principles. Reliance was placed in the preciously cited cases of Lyamuya Construction Company Ltd v. Board of Trustees of Young Women's Christian Association of Tanzania (supra) and Octavian Rugerezi Francis v. Teachers Service Commission and 2 Others (supra). On the adversary side, Mr. Tasinga was fairly brief in responding to the appellants' submissions. His contention was that; the appellants have nothing 5 justifiable to criticize the High Court Judge who exercised his discretion judiciously in line with the requirements of the law in enlarging time within which the respondent was to lodge the application for judicial review. Mr. Tasinga resolutely argued that the High Court Judge judiciously exercised his powers by granting the extension of time to the respondent to lodge the application for judicial review having considered the principles underpinning such application and bearing in mind the circumstances obtaining such application. In particular, Mr. Tasinga was of the view that, considering the circumstances of this case and bearing in mind that the respondent was not served in time with the documents necessary for lodging the application and was not home and dry but rather diligently made every effort to follow up his case, the High Court Judge was justified in granting the application for extension of time. In further reply to the appeal, Mr. Tasinga had an opposing view to that of Mr. Mahenge in that the High Court Judge did not consider extraneous matters while determining the application but rather he paid due regard to the principles applicable in applications of that nature. He was of the view that, the High Court Judge found out that the respondent ably accounted for the delay of 23 days which was not inordinate delay given the nature of the matter which originated from the administrative machinery at various levels and the fact that the respondent was a lay person but who took trouble to pursue his matter diligently. Conversely, Mr. Tasinga argued briefly in response to ground 4 of appeal that, the High Judge acted judiciously in granting the application as alluded to above and implored us to dismiss the appeal with costs. We have studiously examined the record of appeal in light of the submissions of the learned counsel and we, on our part, are of the view that this appeal can sufficiently be disposed of within the narrow circumference on whether the High Court Judge exercised his powers judiciously in granting the impugned extension of time. We are well aware that, the appeal before us is not an application for extension of time but rather an appeal faulting the decision of the High Court Judge in granting extension of time and therefore, our deliberation will limit itself to that focus without necessarily falling into the trap of reconsidering an application for extension of time. In other words, our concentration will be limited to the extent to which the discretion of a Judge of the High Court and any judicial officer in that matter can be challenged. We must admit that this issue has caused us considerable anxiety. 7 As starting point let us examine the provision of section 14 of the law of limitation Act which reads: 14. Extension o f period in certain cases (1) Notw ithstanding the provisions o f th is Act, the court may, fo r any reasonable o r su fficien t cause, extend the period o f lim itation fo r the institution o f an appeal or an application, other than an application fo r the execution o f a decree, and an application fo r such extension m ay be m ade either before o r after the expiry o f the period o f lim itation prescribed fo r such appeal or application. (2) For the purposes o f th is section "the co u rt" m eans the court having ju risd ictio n to entertain the appeal or, as the case m ay be, the application. From the ordinary and plain meaning of section 14 what guides the court in considering whether or not to extend time is the existence of reasonable or sufficient cause. It is under those circumstances that the court will be considered to have exercised its powers judiciously. Now regressing to the matter before us, both trained legal minds argued and rightly so in our considered opinion, that the words reasonable and sufficient cause do not lend to a particular statutory meaning. What is reasonable or sufficient cause depend on the circumstances of each particular case as there is no one size fits a ll circumstances and the judge is expected to consider each case according to its peculiar circumstances. In other words, the terms "good cause" and "sufficient cause" are relative ones and dependent upon circumstances of each particular case. We are certain that, the law relating to extension of time is now fairly settled, the court's power to extend time under section 14 of the Law of Limitation is both broad and discretionary and is only exercisable in favour of the applicant upon showing good cause or sufficient cause. It is also a peremptory principle of law that in applications of this nature it is not possible to lay down any hard and fast rules as to what amounts to good cause or sufficient cause. Each case is determined on its own peculiar circumstances, but of course taking into consideration among other things whether the applicant brought the application promptly, whether the applicant was diligent in pursuing the application and not negligent. Mr. Mahenge sturdily argued that the High Court improperly exercised its discretion in granting the enlargement of time in utter disregard of the principles governing extension of time citing inordinate delay of 23 days and failure to consider the established principles in Lyamuya Construction Company Ltd V. Board of Trustees of Young Women's Christian 9 Association of Tanzania (supra). On our part, that argument sounds attractive but, as we have already hinted above, in applications of this nature it is not possible to lay down any hard and fast rules as to what amounts to good cause or sufficient cause. Each case is determined on its own peculiar circumstances but of course taking into consideration among other things that, the applicant brought the application promptly and was diligent enough in pursuing the application. In other words, the applicant did not stay home and dry but rather persistently pursued his application. In the appeal before us, the applicant brought the application promptly and was diligent enough in pursuing his application. He was not home and dry but rather persistently pursued his application as evident on record as it can conspicuously be seen in the impugned decision at page 306 of the record of appeal which we quoted above at the beginning of this decision. It is not fair therefore, to criticise the High Court Judge for something he took pain to analyze in his decision. It is our firm view that, the High Court Judge exercised his powers judiciously considering the circumstances surrounding that particular case and we don't find any justifiable reason to hold that the High Court Judge considered irrelevant matters or overlooked the inordinate delay. In actual fact he took trouble to explain at considerable length the peculiarity of the 10 matter which was before him. We are satisfied, as the learned High Court Judge did, that the respondent demonstrated sufficient and good cause to warrant the extension which was granted. There can be no better words to express our view than to hold that, for the reasons we have assigned, we do not see any reason for faulting the judgment of the High Court. We find no merit in the appeal and therefore, we dismiss it with costs. DATED at DAR ES SALAAM this 22n d day of April, 2026. B. M.A. SEHEL JUSTICE OF APPEAL P. F. KIHWELO JUSTICE OF APPEAL U. J. AGATHO JUSTICE OF APPEAL Judgment delivered this 23rd day of April, 2026 in the presence of Mr. Urso Luoga, learned State attorney for the Appellants and Mr. Isaac Nassor Tasinga, learned counsel for the Respondent and Mr. Oscar Msaki, Court Clerk; is hereby certified as a true copy of the original. D. R. LYIMO DEPUTY REGISTRAR COURT OF APPEAL 11