Registered Trustees Of Chama Cha Demokrasia Na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) & Another vs Said Issa Mohamed & Others (Consolidated Civil Applications Nos 1,2,3 and 4 of 2026) [2026] TZCA 415 (15 April 2026)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT DODOMA ( CORAM: MWARI3A. 3.A.. MAIGE. 3.A. And MWAMPASHI, 3.A.) CONSOLIDATED CIVIL APPLICATIONS NOS 1,2,3 AND 4 OF 2026 THE REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF CHAMA CHA DEMOKRASIA NA MAENDELEO (CHADEMA) ......................................... 1 st APPLICANT GENERAL SECRETARY OF CHAMA CHA DEMOKRASIA NA MAENDELEO (CHADEMA) .............. ......................... 2 nd APPLICANT VERSUS SAID ISSA MOHAMED ................................................ 1 st RESPONDENT AHMED RASHID KHAMIS ..........................................2 nd RESPONDENT MAULIDAH ANNA KOMU............................................3 rd RESPONDENT (Revision from the proceedings and orders of the High Court of Tanzania, at Dar es Salaam) fMwancia, 3.) dated 10th 3une, 2025, 28th 3uly, 2025,18th August, 2025, 29th September, 2025 and 11th February, 2026). in Civil Cause No. 8323 of 2025. Miscellaneous Civil Applications Nos^ 14Q83 of 2025 and 20585 of 2025 RULING OF THE COURT 24th March & 15th April 2026 MAIGE. 3.A.: At the High Court of Tanzania, the respondents herein instituted a petition against the applicants both jointly and severally for the following substantive reliefs: One, declaration that the applicants are in breach of section 6A (1), (2) and (5) of the Political i

Parties Act; Two, Declaration that the applicants' allocation of funds, assets and resources for political and administrative activities between Mainland Tanzania and Tanzania Zanzibar are illegal and null and void; Three, an order that the applicants be directed to comply with section 6A (1), (2) and (5) of the Political Parties Act; Four, an order for temporary suspension of all political activities pending compliance with the court orders; and Five, an order for perpetual injunction over the use of the Party's assets, funds and resources until the Respondents comply with the relevant laws. The respondents' cause of action was pleaded at paragraph 4 of the petition in the following words: "4. The petitioners claim against the respondents jointly and severally for declaratory orders that the respondents are in breach o f the laws relating to political parties and the Party's own constitution for reasons o f uneven distribution and utilization o f the party assets and financial resources between Tanzania Zanzibar and Mainland Tanzania; discrimination based on religion and gender; and espousing views and statements calculated at disrupting the union among and between the two sides o f the United Republic of Tanzania.

Whereas the first respondent instituted the suit under his capacity as member of the Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Chadema), herein after referred to as the Party, the second and third respondents instituted the same under their capacities as members of the Board of Trustees of the Party. Aside from contesting the factuality of the petition, the applicants challenged the maintainability of the suit by way of a notice of preliminary objection raising the following points: (1) The petition is not maintainable in law for the failure to disclose the true value o f the subject matter and or the pecuniary jurisdiction o f the court (2) The petition is bad in law for failure to exhaust internal local remedies; (3) The petition is bad in law for lack o f corresponding affidavits o f the petitioners; (4) The petition is bad in law as the 2nd and 3rd petitioners for whom they are part, thus they cannot be petitioners and a first respondent at the same time; (5) The petitioners lack locus stand to institute this petition.

(6) The petitioners have no cause o f action against the 2n d respondent. (7) The second respondent has no capacity to be sued on behalf o f Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeieo; (8) The petition is not anchored in any law for its institution; and (9) The petition is bad in iaw as it has been preferred by a wrong document Along with the petition, the respondent lodged Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 8960 of 2025 (herein after referred to as the first application), for temporary injunctive orders to restrain the applicants from organizing and/ or participating in any and all political activities pending determination of the petition and restraining the applicants, their servants, workmen, agents, and or whomsoever purporting to act on the respondent's behalf from utilizing the properties and assets of the Party pending determination of the petition. In opposition, the applicants deposed counter affidavits which were, however, struck out for the reason of being fatally defective.

In accordance with established practice, the trial court gave precedence to the points of law over the application for temporary injunction. Consequently, a hearing on the preliminary objection was conducted on June 10, 2025. During these proceedings, the learned counsel for the applicants raised a further preliminary point, contending that the petition was time barred. While the court's ruling addressed and resolved the initial nine grounds of preliminary objection against the applicants, it refrained from making a finding on this additional point, stating instead: "Although the respondents did not submit on this point, the counsel for the respondents built his argument on the assumption that the dispute may have been ongoing for 30 years. I think , as time limitation is a question o f law, the same cannot be dealt with on assumption basis. And the fact that it was raised in the submission o f the counsel for the respondents, the same shall be resolved during hearing o f the petition." Upon the delivery of the aforementioned ruling, the trial court called for the hearing of the first application. The applicants' counsel sought an adjournment of the hearings on the grounds that his co counsel had suffered a family bereavement and intended to attend

the funeral rites. The learned trial judge, however, found the grounds for adjournment insufficient and proceeded with the hearing of the respondent's preliminary objection. Upon striking out the applicants' counter-affidavit, the trial court ordered inter- partes hearing to continue. At this stage, the applicants' counsel successfully applied for leave to withdraw from the matter. Following his discharge, the court ordered the hearing to proceed in the applicants’ absence, ultimately granting the two temporary injunctive orders as sought in the chamber summons. Soon after delivery of the ruling, the applicants lodged Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 8960 of 2025 (the second application) calling upon the trial court to, in terms of Order XXXVII rule 5 of the CPC, set aside and discharge the temporary injunction in the first application for the reason of the applicants' alleged denial of a right of hearing. The application was, however, dismissed for want of merit on 18th August, 2025. Persisting in their contention that the suit was unmaintainable, the applicants filed a further notice of preliminary objection on September 14, 2025. This subsequent notice set forth the following grounds of objection:

1. That the trial court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine matters relating to the alleged violation of political parties rights o f the petitioners and members o f Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo from Tanzania Zanzibar, allegedly guaranteed under various provisions o f the Constitution o f the United Republic o f Tanzania ; including Articles 3(1), 8(1) and (2), 20(1) and (2), 26(1), and 29(1), (2) and (5), on the ground that this court is not a constitutional court as envisaged under section 4 and 4(1) o f the Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement Act.
2. That the allegations o f discrimination concerning unequal distribution and ownership o f Party's assets between Mainland Tanzania and Tanzania Zanzibar, as well as discrimination in employment opportunities within the Party, if at all exist, implicate Articles 13(1) and (2) & (4) and (5), 22(1) and (2) 24(1) and (2), 26(1), and 29(1) -(2) & (5) o f the Constitution, and are therefore matters exclusively triable by a Constitutional court property seized o f jurisdiction under section 4 and 8(1) o f the Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement Act, read together with Article 30 (3) o f the Constitution.
3. That the allegations attributing statements to senior party members allegedly questioning the constitutional status o f Tanzania Zanzibar within the

Union, and allegedly preferring policies aimed at striping Zanzibar o f its constitutional privileges, if true, raise constitutional questions touching on numerous provisions o f the Constitution o f the United Republic o f Tanzania, including Articles 1, 2(1), 3(1), 8(l)-(3), 9(a)- (k), and others, and thus fall outside the jurisdiction o f this Court, which is not a constitutional court as contemplated under Article 26(2) and 30 (3) o f the Constitution and section 4 and 8(1) o f the Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement Act 4. That the allegations o f discriminatory views based on religion and gender, allegedly expressed during internal party meetings and public addresses, if true, contravene Articles 12(1) and (2), 13(1), (2), (4) and (5), 22(1X2), 23(l)-(2), 24(l)-(2), 26(1), 29(1), (2) and (5) o f the Constitution, and are matters which can only be competently interrogated by constitutional court and not by this Court 5. That the allegations touching on failure to promote Union Principles, good governance, national ethics, non-discrimination, social inclusion directly implicate the constitutional foundation and framework o f the United Republic o f Tanzania as encapsulated under Articles 1, 2(1) and (2), 3(1), 8(l)-(3), 9(a)-(k), and related provisions of the Constitution. 8

6. That the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain claims arising from or affecting Tanzania Zanzibar, as provided under section 2(2) o f the Judicature and Application o f Law Act read together with Articles 4(1), 114(1) and (2), and 115(1) and (2) o f the Constitution o f the United Republic of Tanzania.
7. That the petition is materially defective on account of the contention by the 2n d and J d petitioners, who are also members o f the Registered Trustees o f Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo, that they are senior party leaders in Tanzania Zanzibar, an arrangement alleged to be in contravention o f section 41(3) o f the Political Parties Act, which prohibits registered trustees from holding leadership or other prominent positions within a political party. By a ruling rendered on February 11, 2026, the trial court dismissed the preliminary objection in its entirety. The trial court departed from the applicants' position in points one to five, finding that the claims were anchored in statutory obligations rather than constitutional breaches. It characterized the prayers as seeking to enforce compliance with the Political Parties Act. The trial court reasoned that references to constitutional values such as non discrimination and the Union, served only as contextual guides to the scope of these statutory duties. Adopting the position that

pleading a constitutional principle does not inherently render proceedings constitutional, the court applied the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. Relying on the precedent in Tanzania Cigarette Company Ltd v. FCC & Another [2012] TZHC 31, TANZLII, the trial court concluded that, as the matter was capable of being resolved through statutory remedies, the respondents were not expected to pursue Constitutional law remedies. Regarding the issue of territorial jurisdiction in the sixth point of preliminary objection, the trial court held that it possessed jurisdiction because the applicants are based in Dar es Salaam, where the party's administration, finances, and decision-making organs substantially operate. In further argument, the trial judge held that Article 115 of the Constitution does not exclude the High Court of Tanzania’s jurisdiction; rather, it recognizes the High Court of Zanzibar's authority, resulting in concurrent jurisdiction between the two fora regardless of whether the cause of action orose in Zanzibar. On the last point of preliminary objection as to the alleged contravention of section 41(3) of the Political Parties Act, the trial court ruled that as the proposition that the 2n d and 3rd respondents 10

concurrently held trustee and senior leadership positions required factual ascertainment, it was an issue which required evidentiary proof and thus could not be resolved without trial. Addressing the argument raised during the hearing that the claim should have been brought by way of judicial review, the trial court observed: " I hasten to state that judicial review is a supervisory remedy concerned primarily with questions o f process, legality, and procedural propriety. The Petition before this Court, however, seeks substantive declarations and enforcement o f statutory obligations under the Political Parties Act. Judicial Review would not provide an adequate or effective remedy for the relief sought In these circumstances, I am satisfied that the Petitioners were entitled to approach this Court as they have done." Aggrieved by what they perceived as a flagrant disregard for their rights and apparent judicial bias, the applicants lodged an informal administrative complaint with the Chief Justice. In this communication, they sought an immediate administrative intervention regarding the trial court's handling of both the principal 11

petition and the two interlocutory applications. Recognizing the gravity of the concerns raised in the applicants' letter, the Court, acting under the direction of the Chief Justice, exercised its revisional jurisdiction to initiate a suo motu revision over the proceedings of the trial court. In the suo motu revision, parties were required to address the Court on correctness, legality or propriety of the proceedings and findings of the trial court on the following matters:

1. The decision to proceed with the case after overruling the preliminary objection to its jurisdiction, particularly its finding that: (a) The suit does not touch on the parties' constitutional rights. (b) The limitation issue shall be resolved during hearing o f the petition. (c) The respondents' failure to disclose the value o f the properties, the subject matter o f the petition was inconsequential. (d) That the 2n d and J d respondents had locus standi to sue.

2. The procedure adopted at the hearing o f the application for interim injunction; specifically\ the issue o f the principle o f the right to be heard. 12

3. The scope o f the interim order issued by the trial court in its ruling dated 10/06/2025; in consideration of: (i) Its conformity or otherwise with the requirements o f Order XXXVII rule 3 o f the Civil Procedure Code ; and (ii) Its effect or otherwise on the applicants' Constitutional rights. When the matter came for hearing, the applicants were represented by Mr. Mpale Kaba Mpoki, learned counsel leading a team of other learned advocates namely; Dr. Rugemeleza Nshalla, Mr. Hekima Mwasipu, Mr. Dickson Matata, Mr. Gaston Garubindi and Mr. Nashon Nkungu. On their part, the respondents were represented by Mr. Mulamuzi Patrick Byabusha, assisted by Messrs. Shaban Nsato Marijani, Gido Thomas Simfukwe and Alvan Fideris Kaily, all learned advocates. In their respective oral representations, the learned counsel addressed the Court on the correctness, legality and propriety of the matters pointed out above. We have taken careful note of the positions advanced by each party. In the interest of a comprehensive resolution, we shall, in the process of adjudicating the issues for determination, make specific reference to the contentions of the learned advocates as and when the context requires. 13

Before doing so, we find it necessary to, though briefly, make exposition of the scope of the Court's jurisdiction to deal with a suo motu revision like this. As we understand the law, such power is conferred by the general revisional powers under section 4 (3) of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act which provides as follows: "4(1).... ( 2 ).... (3) Without prejudice to subsection (2), the Court o f Appeal shall have the power, authority and jurisdiction to call for and examine the record of any proceedings before the High Court for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety o f any finding, order or any other decision made thereon and as to the regularity o f any proceedings o f the High Court." As a matter of law, the revisional jurisdiction under the above provision can be invoked either upon application or by the Court's own motion. Where the revision is upon application, it is the law, the same must be a formal application brought by way of a notice of motion and an affidavit. It is a settled principle of law that a revision application is not an alternative to an appeal. Conversely, when the 14

Court proceeds suo motu, it may, where compelling reasons exist, determines the legality, propriety, or correctness of a High Court decision, order, or proceeding. This power remains exercisable even in circumstances where the same issues could potentially be resolved through appellate process. This position is supported by established precedents, including, Millicom (Tanzania) N.V. v. James Alan Russel Bell and Another (Civil Revision No. 2 of 2017) [2017] TZCA 1364, TANZLII, Mosses J. Mwakibete v. Editor-Uhuru Shirika la Magazeti ya Chama and Another [1995] TLR 134 and the Registered Trustees of Masjid Mwinyi v. Pius Kipengele and Others (Civil Revision No. 2 of 2020) [2021] TZCA 357, TANZLII. In legal practice, the general rule is that revisional jurisdiction cannot be exercised against an order or decision that does not finalize the matter in dispute, as provided under Section 5(2) (b) of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act. Nevertheless, in a suo motu revision, where good cause is shown, these powers may be invoked against interlocutory decisions in as long as the proceedings, decisions, or orders are marred by grave irregularities, illegalities, or impropriety. This principle was illustrated in Tanzania Heart Institute v. The Board of Trustees of NSSF (Civil 15

Revision No. 109 of 2008) [2008] TZCA 59, TANZLII. In that case, although the Court found a formal revisional application to be incompetent because it challenged an interlocutory decision, it declined to strike it out. Instead, having determined that the underlying proceedings were fatally irregular, the Court invoked its suo motu revisional powers to rectify the defects. Specifically, the Court observed: "Therefore, the Court suo motu has decided to invoke its powers o f revision under the provisions o f section 4(3) o f the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, CAP 141 R.E. 2002 to revise the proceedings in the High Court record. This is not the first time that the Court takes this course o f action when it transpires that the proceedings in the High Court are fraught with impropriety, illegality and or impropriety. Because o f the peculiar circumstances, the Court suo motu called for the proceedings from the High Court and invoked its revisional jurisdiction in Fahari Bottlers Ltd. v. The Registrar o f Companies and the National Bank o f Commerce (1997) LTD., Civil Revision No. 1 o f 1999 (unreported )." 16

We shall start our deliberation with the question of whether the petition before the trial court was founded upon constitutional or statutory causes of action. The grievance raised, it appears to us, challenges the correctness of the trial court's decision on the preliminary objection rather than the legality, propriety, or regularity of the process by which it was reached. In other words, the applicants' complaint addresses the substantive merits of the ruling. Having reviewed the pleadings, the reliefs sought, and the trial court's analysis of counsel's arguments, we find that the trial court acted in compliance with established legal procedures and principles. The decision was, in our view, reached judiciously, irrespective of whether the ultimate conclusion was correct. Consequently, we deem it inappropriate to intervene at this interlocutory stage. To do otherwise would set a precarious precedent, allowing the Court to adjudicate interlocutory issues that are properly reserved for an appeal following a final determination. We, therefore, decline to consider the complaint regarding the nature of the cause of action, as well as the related grievances concerning judicial review, locus standi and valuation of the subject 17

matter of dispute all of which were addressed by the trial court as indicated in the respective rulings. We now turn to the contention that the suit was time barred. Mr. Mpoki argued that the suit was time-barred due to the absence of specific pleadings confirming that it was filed within the prescribed period. In response, it was contended that, although the petition lacked an explicit statement on limitation, paragraphs 7 and 11 of the petition indicate that the cause of action accrued in 2024. Given that the petition was lodged in 2025, Mr. Byabusha argued that it fell within the six-year limitation period applicable to suits for which no specific period is provided by law. Alternatively, it was argued that as the matter involves property held in trust, limitation is inapplicable pursuant to section 18(1) of the Law of Limitation Act. In his brief rejoinder, Mr. Mpoki countered that under Order VII Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code, any such ground of exemption from limitation should have been specifically pleaded in the petition. As noted above, the trial court refrained from resolving the issue of limitation, opting instead to defer its determination until the final judgment. Mr. Mpoki contended that since a statute of limitations is a jurisdictional matter, it must be resolved as a threshold issue before a court can adjudicate the substantive claims. 18

The respondent offered no submissions on this point. We agree with Mr. Mpoki that, the question of whether a suit is time-barred is fundamental to a court's competence, as no court has the jurisdiction to entertain an expired claim. By proceeding without first confirming its jurisdiction, the trial court acted erroneously. Furthermore, the record reveals no contentious factual issues that would have necessitated deferring this point for evidentiary ascertainment. This failure constitutes a grave procedural irregularity that cannot be sustained. Consequently, we find that the trial court erred in failing to determine the issue of limitation thus proceeding without ascertaining whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Next for our consideration is on the legality and or propriety of the procedure adopted in granting the interim injunctive orders. The central grievance is the alleged violation of the audi alteram partem rule after the applicants' advocate was discharged from the record. The respondent countered this by asserting that the right to a hearing was not extinguished by the court but was instead forfeited by conduct. They argued that, the counsel's presence during the striking out of the counter-affidavit, coupled 19

with his subsequent election not to participate in the hearing, constituted a valid waiver of the applicants' right to be heard. The position of the law on this issue is well-settled and requires little deliberation. It is a matter of established procedure that upon the discharge of an advocate from the conduct of a case, the court is duty-bound to adjourn the proceedings. This ensures that the now-unrepresented party is served with a fresh notice of hearing so as to be afforded a fair hearing. A failure to adhere to this requirement constitutes a fatal irregularity, as it effectively deprives a litigant of the fundamental right to be heard. In this instance, the trial court proceeded with the hearing in the applicants' absence at a time when they were unaware of their counsel's withdrawal. Such a manifest denial of the right to be heard is a fundamental irregularity that strikes at the root of the decision, making both the rulings null and void. Consequently, we quash the trial court's proceedings subsequent to the discharge of the advocate and the resultant ruling granting temporary injunctive orders. In the final result, the record is remitted to the High Court with instructions that the point in limine concerning time limitations be adjudicated before another judge of the High Court prior to any 20

further proceedings. In view of the intra-party nature of this dispute and to encourage a reconciliation between the parties, we make no order as to costs. DATED at DODOMA this 14th day of April, 2026. A. G. MWARIJA JUSTICE OF APPEAL I. J. MAIGE JUSTICE OF APPEAL A. S. MWAMPASHI JUSTICE OF APPEAL Ruling delivered this 15th day of April, 2026 in the presence of Mr. Rugemeleza Nshala assisted by Mr. Dickson Matata, learned counsel for the 1s t and 2n d Applicants, Mr. Shaban Nsato Marijani, learned for the 1s t ,2n d and 3r d Respondents through Visual Court and Ms. Christina Mwanandeje, Court Clerk; is hereby certified as a true copy of the original. 21