BPI France (SA) & Others vs Kom Food Products Company Limited & Others (Civil Revision No. 5 of 2026) [2026] TZCA 403 (13 April 2026)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT DODOMA f COR AM: KOROSSO, J.A.. GALEBA,3.A. And ISMAIL 3.AJ CIVIL REVISION NO. 5 OF 2026 BPI FRANCE (SA) (France)...................................................1 st APPLICANT BPI FRANCE ASSURANCE EXPORT SAS (France)............. 2 nd APPLICANT SIDEL BLOWING & SERVICES SAS (France) . .......................3 rd APPLICANT VERSUS KOM FOOD PRODUCTS COMPANY LIMITED (Tanzania) ......................... .................................1 st RESPONDENT KAHAMA OIL MILLS LIMITED (Tanzania) ..... . .................. 2 nd RESPONDENT KOM GROUP OF COMPANIES LIMITED (Tanzania) ........... 3 rd RESPONDENT (Application for revision from the Ruling and Order of the High Court of Tanzania, Commercial Division at Dar es Salaam) fKadilu.JJ dated the 15th December 2025 in Misc. Commercial Cause No. 20870 of 2025 RULING OF THE COURT 24h March & 13t hApril, 2026 ISMAIL. J.A.: The parties to this revision suo motu were also parties to arbitral proceedings presided over by the International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, in Paris. The applicants emerged victorious in the said arbitral proceedings whose final arbitral award was issued on 20th June, 2025.

Pursuant to the provisions of sections 73 (1), (2) and 83 (1) of the Arbitration Act, Cap. 15 R.E, 2023 and the Regulations made there under, the applicants enlisted the services of Messrs Bowmans Tanzania Limited who instituted a petition in the Commercial Division of the High Court (the Commercial Court), for recognition and enforcement of the award. It is gathered from the record that determination of the substance of the petition was scuppered as its competence was put on the line, thanks to several preliminary objections which were raised by the respondents. Of the preliminary points raised, the question of time bar stood out and nipped the petition in the bud when the learned Judge of the Commercial Court adjudged the petition as time-barred. She, in consequence, struck out the petition with costs. The applicants were profoundly incensed by the decision and their swift reaction was to institute a notice of appeal to this Court. The notice of appeal, a copy of which was served on Messrs Mulungu Law Chambers, the respondents' firm of advocates, was filed in Court on 24th December, 2025. Instructively, the filing of the notice of appeal was followed by a letter requesting certified copies of the proceedings, ruling and drawn order. The letter bore the same date as that of the notice of appeal.

While necessary steps in the appeal process were being awaited, on 20th January, 2026, a certain Mr. Denis Le Fers, purportedly acting on the applicants' behalf, wrote to the Chief Justice, raising a number of complaints, castigating the manner in which the proceedings in the Commercial Court were conducted. Our reading of the complaint letter reveals that the applicants not only implored the Chief Justice to initiate an administrative inquiry into the circumstances under which the impugned decision was issued, they also beseeches him to find ways through which the decision may be vacated or varied. This is particularly gathered from paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 whose substance is as reproduced hereunder: "12. The Petitioners are advised that they have a right to appeal the ruiing, which they intend to pursue. However, the purpose o f this tetter is not to invite Your Lordship to sit on appeal over a judicial decision. Rather, is to draw attention to a matter o f grave administrative and institutional concern. A decision grounded upon a plainly incorrect reading o f the court's own electronic records should not be possible. 13. The consequences o f the error are substantial. A valid enforceable foreign arbitral award could be rendered unenforceable in

Tanzania on the basis o f an arithmetical and iogicai impossibility. Such an outcome would be prejudicial to the Petitioners and risk undermining confidence in the High Court o f Tanzania (Commercial Division) as a reliable forum for the enforcement o f international arbitral awards. 14. The Petitioners make this complaint with full respect for the independence o f the judiciary and the office o f the Honourable Judge concerned. They nevertheless submit that judicial independence must be accompanied by judicial accountability, particularly where an error is so patent as to admit o f no reasonable explanation and where reliance is placed on the court's own electronic systems." Acting on the provisions of section 6 (3) of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, Cap. 141 R.E. 2023 (the AJA) and rules 65 (1), (6) and (7) of the Tanzania Court of Appeal Rules, 2009, the Chief Justice gave a direction that revisional proceedings be opened suo motu. Upon notification of the existence of the revisional proceedings, the respondents came with all guns blazing. Through their legal counsel, they filed a notice of preliminary objections, impugning the proceedings. The notice consisted of seven grounds of objection. These grounds were, in the course of the hearing, whittled down to three, and they are paraphrased as follows:

(I) The suo motu revision application and the proceedings are frivolous, vexatious, an abuse o f court process and therefore incompetent as the applicants have initiated the appeal process; (ii) The suo motu revision application is a nullity as it has been initiated by a person who purports to represent the second applicant but he does not have locus standi to act on behalf o f first and third applicants; and (Hi) That the suo motu revision application is incompetent for being lodged manually in contravention o f the provisions o f the Judicature and Application o f Laws (Electronic Filing Rules) 2018 . At the hearing before us, the applicants were represented by Mr. Evarist Kameja, learned counsel, whilst the respondents enjoyed the services of Dr. Chacha Bhoke Murungu, learned counsel. Dr. Murungu fired the first salvo. In respect of the first ground of objection, he began by drawing our attention to paragraph 15 of the applicants' letter to the Chief Justice. The learned counsel contended that, discerning from the substance of the said letter, it was not intended that there should be a judicial intervention by way of revision or at all. He

argued that, by administrative inquiry, the applicants intended that there be a judicial review and not a revision. Dr. Murungu argued that, in the said letter, the applicants have admitted, in so many words, that they instituted a notice of appeal, meaning that an appeal is impending. In so doing, the learned counsel stressed, the applicants realized that the decision sought to be impugned by way of revision was appealable and that, pursuit of revision while the notice of appeal is alive and kicking was an act of riding two horses at one time, an act that is, for all intents and purposes, an abhorrent forum shopping, Delving further on this contention, Dr. Murungu argued that this is a typical case in which revision would not be considered as a probable course of action as no special circumstances warranting that route exist. He predicated his contention on the following factors: one, that the applicants were parties to the matter which bred the instant proceedings; two, that the applicants acknowledge that there is a room for an appeal against the impugned decision, and that they were so advised; and three, the right of appeal has not been blocked by any law or judicial process. Dr. Murungu bolstered his arguments by referring us to our decisions in Tanzania Electricity Company Limited (TANESCO) v. Mufungo 6

Leonard Majura & 14 Others [2016] TZCA 933; Isidore Leka Shirima & Another v. The Public Service Social Security Fund (As a successor of PSPF, PPF, LAPF, GEPF) & 3 Others [2021] TZCA 3530.; and Millicom Tanzania N.V. v. James Allan Russels Bell & Others [2018] TZCA 355. For his part, Mr. Kameja found nothing imperfectious in the course of action taken by the applicants. It was his contention that the decision by the Commercial court was shrouded in serious irregularity whose remedy can only be achieved through revision and not appeal. He pointed out the irregularities that the applicants were unable to put up with. They included, one, failure to accord the applicants the right to a fair hearing after checking the judiciary portal; and, two, determination of a preliminary objection based on the factual account. These, he contended, were wayward conducts which cannot be remedied through an appeal process. Mr. Kameja played down the significance of the decisions cited by his counterpart, arguing that the same were distinguishable. He, instead, urged us to borrow a leaf from our decision in the case of The Registered Trustees of Masjid Mwinyi v. Pius Kipengele & 5

Others [2021] 72CA357 in which revision suomotu proceeded to hearing even where the right of appeal existed. As we stated earlier on, the directions by the Chief Justice to order commencement of these revisional proceedings were substantially made pursuant to section 6 (3) of the AJA, the substance of which states as follows: "(3) Without prejudice to subsection (2), the Court o f Appeal shaii have the power, authority and jurisdiction to caii for and examine the record o f any proceedings before the High Court for the purpose o f satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety o f any finding, order or any other decision made thereon and as to the regularity o f any proceedings o f the High Court ." This provision broadly talks about the power, authority or jurisdiction of the Court to call and examine the record of any proceedings with a view to satisfying itself of the correctness, legality or propriety of the finding of the lower court, and regularity of the proceedings that bred the impugned decision. In the instant matter, the haggling by the learned counsel is not about the powers that are bestowed upon the Court. It is about the circumstances under which such powers may be triggered, and 8

the question is whether, in the circumstances of this case, such powers were properly called into question. That the Court must be properly moved to exercise its revisional powers is a settled position that has been underscored in many a decision of the Court. These include: Moses Mwakibete v. The Editor - Uhuru & 2 Others [1995] T.L.R. 134; Transport Equipment Ltd v. Devram P. Valambhia [1995] T.L.R. 161; Halais Pro-Chemie v. Wella A.G. [1996] T.L.R. 269; and Tanzania Telecommunication Company Limited & Others v. Tri-Telecommunication Tanzania Limited [2006] IE.A. 393. These decisions provide one consistent message which is to the effect that, revision is not meant to serve as an alternative to an appeal. It is a route that can only be pursued where exceptional circumstances exist or permit. Thus, in Moses Mwakibete (supra) we elucidated as follows: "The revisionaljurisdiction o f this Court is provided by the Appellate Jurisdiction Act (Amendment) Act 17 o f 1993-s 2(2) and (3). The jurisdiction in ss (2) is exercised either in the course o f hearing an appeal or incidental to an appeal. Subsection (3) enables this Court to call for and examine the record o f any proceedings before the High Court for the purpose o f satisfying itself as to the

correctness, legality or propriety o f any finding , order or any other decision made thereon and as to the regularity o f any proceedings in the High Court. ... Before proceeding to hear such application on merits this Court must satisfy itself whether it is being properly moved to exercise its revisional jurisdiction. The revisional powers conferred by ss (3) were not meant to be used as an alternative to the appellate jurisdiction o f this Court, unless it is acting on its own motion , cannot properly be moved to use its revisional powers in ss (3) in cases where the applicant has the right to appeal with or without leave and has not exercised that option." The Court further guided as hereunder: "In our view this Court can be moved to use its revisional jurisdiction under ss (3) only in cases where there is no right o f appeal or where there is, it has been blocked by judicial process. Lastly where such right exists but was not taken, good and sufficient reasons are given why no appeal was lodged ." The most succinct position in this respect was pronounced by the Court in Halais Pro-Chemie (supra) wherein it was held as follows: 10

"We think that Mwakibete's case read together with the case o f Transport Equipment Ltd are authority for the following legal propositions concerning the revisionai jurisdiction o f the Court under ss (3) o f s 4 o f the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1979: (i) The Court may, on its own motion and at any time, invoke its revisionai jurisdiction in respect o f proceedings in the High Court; (ii) Except under exceptional circumstances, a party to proceedings in the High Court cannot invoke the revisionaijurisdiction o f the Court as an alternative to the appellate jurisdiction o f the Court; (Hi) A party to proceedings in the High Court may invoke the revisionaijurisdiction o f the Court in matters which are not appealable with or without leave; (iv) A party to proceedings in the High Court may invoke the revisionaijurisdiction o f the Court where the appellate process has been blocked by judicial process.' The matter before us clearly does not fail under propositions (i), (ii) and (Hi). Does it fall under proposition (iv)? Can it be said that the decision o f i i

the High Court dismissing the applicant's application for extension o f time to apply for leave to appeal amounts to a judicial process which blocked the applicants move? We do not think so." Dr. Murungu contended that the applicants expressed their dissatisfaction with the decision of the Commercial Court and that, through the notice of appeal, they communicated their decision to challenge it by way of appeal. This contention was conceded to by Mr. Kameja who confirmed that an appeal is impeding. Unfortunately, the applicants chose to be economical with this fact in their complaint letter and, as a result, the Chief Justice was kept oblivious thereto. What is clear is that the applicants chose a two-pronged approach in challenging the decision. The question is whether this is allowed. Dr. Murungu lashed it out and took the view that this is inappropriate, whereas Mr. Kameja saw nothing blemished in the choice taken by the applicants. With respect to Mr. Kameja, his viewpoint was a little specious and we resist the urge to go along with it. We venture to think that, as Dr. Murungu rightly asserted, this was clearly an appealable matter whose process was actively pursued by the applicant up until the time they fielded their complaint to the Chief Justice. 12

By filing the notice of appeal, the applicants clearly acknowledged that: (i) the right of appeal exists; (ii) such right was not blocked by any judicial process; and (iii) the applicants never indicated that there exists good and sufficient reason to justify the recourse to the remedy of revision under section 6 (3) of the AJA. See also: Olmeshuki Kisambu v. Christopher Nain'gola [2002] T.L.R. 280; We are convinced, yet again, by the contention by Dr. Murungu, that what the applicants are attempting to do is to ride two horses or indulge in what is otherwise known as forum shopping, a practice that we hold as improper and inappropriate. We consider this to be an act that is analogous to what this Court was confronted with in Tanzania Telecommunication Company Limited & Others (supra) and was observed as hereunder: "... since the appeal process was actively being pursuedit would be improper for the Court to allow the parties to invoke the revisional jurisdiction while at the same time pursuing the appeal process. This Court cannot a llo w it, it is im proper. "[Emphasis added]. 13

Mr. Kameja pointed out a couple of anomalies that allegedly marred the proceedings before the Commercial court. In his contention, the anomalies justify the invocation of the revision route. He has invited us to be guided by the decisions in The Registered Trustees of Masjid Mwinyi (supra) Patrick Magologozi Mongella v. The Board of Trustees of the Public Service Social Security Fund [2022] 7ZCA 216 in both of which revisional proceedings were allowed to proceed. While we appreciate that, in both cases, the Court entertained revisional proceedings, we take an unflustered view that the circumstances in those cases are dissimilar to what obtains in the instant matter. The crucial distinction resides in the fact that in both of the cases, the right of appeal was, for this or that reason, blocked. Whereas in Patrick Magologozi Mongella (supra) the law expressly blocked pursuit of an appeal as a course of action against the decision of the Labour Court on matters of fact, there is a serious peculiarity in the facts obtaining in The Registered Trustees of Masjid Mwinyi (supra), making the matter starkly distinguishable from the instant application. The distinction can be gathered from the observation that was made by the Court when it gave a thumbs up to the application and distinguished it from the case of Tanzania Electricity Company Limited 14

(TANESCO) (supra) that the counsel sought a solace in. To appreciate the distinction, it behooves us to reproduce part of the Court's reasoning in that matter. We observed as follows: "However, it is our considered view that Tanzania Electricity Company Limited (TANESCO) (supra), is distinguishabie to the matter at hand. We think that in the present application the circumstances are with the above cited case because there are special matters which were considered by the Court in ordering the suo motu revision o f the proceedings - see also Moses Mwakibete (supra), Transport Equipment Ltd (supra) and Oimeshuki Kisambu (supra). Those matters are: One , though the notice o f appeal has been lodged by the applicant in respect o f the decision o f Mgonya, J, in Civil Case No. 24 o f 2019 involving the applicant and two other respondents, so far the High Court has dealt with the dispute between the parties others concerning the disputed properties in about six cases, the most recent being Land Appeal No. 10 o f 2016 as per the background facts we have alluded to above. Indeed, in all other matters, there is no evidence that an appeal has been lodged before this Court. Two, in all [cases] dealt by the High 15

Court on the disputed properties, parties are not the same as those in Land Case No. 24 o f 2019. Therefore, even if the intended appeal against Mgonya, J is actively processed before the Court, other parties will not have a right to join in that appeal as they were not parties to the original case. The remedy for an interested party who has no right to appeal is to lodge an application for revision. Three , we think that whatever decision which will be made in the intended appeal\ the dispute between the parties on the disputed properties which has been severally dealt by the High Court will not put the matter to rest..." In our considered view, none of the predicaments that the Court encountered in The Registered Trustees of Masjid Mwinyi (supra) exist in the instant matter. We are constrained to hold that the reasoning of the Court in both of the decisions Mr. Kameja relied upon is of no aid to his cause as they drift away from where his arguments reside. It is in view of the foregoing, that we find plausibility in the first preliminary point of objection raised by Dr. Murungu, and we hold that revision suo motu was an erroneous course of action that was built on quick sand. It must flounder. We, accordingly, sustain this ground of objection. 16

Consequently, on this ground alone, we strike out the application. We see no need of delving into other points of objection, as doing that will amount to a wasted effort. We make no order as to costs. DATED at DODOMA this 9th day of April, 2026. W. B. KOROSSO JUSTICE OF APPEAL Z. N. GALEBA JUSTICE OF APPEAL M. K. ISMAIL JUSTICE OF APPEAL Ruling delivered this 13th day of April, 2026 in presence of Mr. Evarist Kameja, learned counsel for the Applicants, and Dr. Chacha Murungu, learned counsel for the Respondents via virtual court, and Ms. Christina Mwanandenje, Court Clerk, is hereby certified as a true copy of 17