Salehe Hassan Masokola vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 54B of 2024) [2026] TZCA 404 (13 April 2026)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT PAR ES SALAAM ( CORAM: SEHEL. 3.A.. MGONYA. 3.A. And KHAMIS, J.AJ CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 54B OF 2024 SALEHE HA5SAN MASOKOLA .............. .......... .........................APPELLANT VERSUS THE REPUBLIC ...... ...................... .................. ............... RESPONDENT (Appeal from the Judgment of the High Court of Tanzania, in the District Registry of Dar es Salaam at Kibaha) (Mkwizu. 3 .^ dated the 29th day of May, 2023 in Criminal Sessions Case No. 72 of 2021 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 9th February, & l J h April, 2026 MGONYA. J.A.: This appeal emanates from a filicide case falling within our jurisdiction, in which the appellant, SALEHE HASSAN MASOKOLA, was convicted of the murder of his three children, namely SHEILA SALEHE MASOKOLA, NURDIN SALEHE MASOKOLA and SABRA7I SALEHE MASOKOLA, the offences having been committed at Ditere-Chalinze Village in Bagamoyo District within the Coast Region. Upon conviction, he was sentenced to a mandatory penalty prescribed for murder under the law, death by hanging. The evidence adduced at trial, upon which the appellant was convicted, established the following facts: The appellant and one Moshi Rajabu cohabited as husband and wife and were blessed with three children, namely Sheila Salehe Masokola, Nurdin Salehe Masokola, and Sabrati Salehe Masokola. Subsequently, the parties separated. Moshi Rajabu returned to her parental home, taking with her the youngest child, Sabrati, while the two elder children, Sheila and Nurdin, remained in the custody of their father at Kunte Village, where the appellant also resided with his parents. Despite repeated efforts by the appellant to effect a reconciliation and persuade Moshi Rajabu to resume living together, those attempts were unsuccessful. According to the testimony of Moshi Rajabu (the appellant's estranged wife), which was received in evidence as Exh. P7, following her persistent refusal to return to the matrimonial home on multiple occasions, the appellant expressly stated to her: "Ipo siku nitakufanyia kitu ambacho hata jamii itashangaa" In substance and legal effect, this utterance constituted a threat by the appellant that, on some future occasion, he would commit a grave act against her, extraordinary or shocking nature as to astonish or bewilder the entire community. On 25th November, 2018 the appellant proceeded to Lusanga Village in Mvomero District, Morogoro Region, where he visited his wife at her parents' residence. Following the visit, he departed accompanied by his two children, Sabrati Salehe and Nurdin Salehe, who had been residing with their mother, telling his wife and his in-laws that he was going to buy some juice for the kids. He then proceeded to his mother's house to collect the elder child, Sheila, who was staying there. Thereafter, the appellant took all three children to the family farm located at Ditere Chalinze Village. Upon arrival at the farm, the appellant prepared and served food to the children. After they had consumed the meal, according to his cautioned statement (Exh. P2), which was duly recorded by Detective Corporal Mbaraka (PW5), and his extrajudicial confession recorded by Juma Ally Mbonde, Justice of Peace (PW2), the appellant mixed a quantity of a beverage known as "potello" juice with a poisonous herbicide and administered the mixture to the three children for them to drink. Approximately ten minutes after ingestion, all three children succumbed to death. The appellant further admitted, in the aforementioned statements, that he himself had consumed a portion of the same poisoned juice prior to departing the scene and returning home. While on route, he lost consciousness and was subsequently assisted by Atanas Paschal, whose witness statement was admitted as Exh. P6. Later, Detective Corporal John (PW3), accompanied by Dr. Victor Joseph Bama (PW4) and other police officers, attended the scene. There, they discovered the bodies of the three deceased children lying on a bed inside a hut occupied by Julius Simon (PW7), the farm caretaker. An autopsy was performed on the bodies of the deceased by Dr. Victor Joseph Bama (PW4), who prepared the postmortem reports admitted collectively as Exh. P4. The report concluded that the cause of death was "ingestion o f poison resuiting in respiratory failure." Additionally, the investigative team collected samples from the scene, including vomit located outside the hut and a bottle containing the residual poisonous substance. These items were submitted to the Government Chemist Laboratory Agency for forensic analysis by Joseph Jackson Ntiba (PW1), a Government Chemist. His Forensic Examination Report (Exh. PI), which was admitted into evidence, confirmed the presence of "organochiorine poison"\n the samples. Following his arrest, the appellant was interrogated both at the hospital and at the police station, where he confessed to causing the deaths of the deceased. He further admitted responsibility in his extrajudicial statement (Exh. P2) and cautioned statement (Exh. P5), acknowledging that he had administered a poisonous drink to the deceased. Upon completion of the investigation and fulfillment of al! requisite preliminary procedures, the appellant was charged and tried before the High Court of Tanzania at Kibaha. The prosecution called eight witnesses and presented seven documentary exhibits. The appellant appeared as the sole defence witness and tendered no exhibits. In his defence, the appellant emphatically denied committing the offence as charged. He retracted the confessions contained in Exhs. P2 and P5. While he did not contest certain key facts such as having taken his three children alive to Ditere Village on 25th November, 2018 being the last person seen with them, admitting during initial questioning to PW8 (Det. CpI. Rajabu) that he had consumed poison, confirming that he recorded his cautioned statement at the police station in his mother's presence, and acknowledging that the Magistrate recorded his extrajudicial statement. He nonetheless disputed his culpability in the deaths. The learned trial Judge, having been satisfied by the prosecution's case, found the appellant guilty and convicted him primarily on the basis of circumstantial evidence presented through the testimony of prosecution witnesses, supplemented by the appellant's own admissions as contained in two key documentary exhibits: his cautioned statement and extrajudicial confession. Dissatisfied with both the conviction and the imposed sentence, the appellant lodged an appeal, setting forth eight grounds in his original memorandum of appeal and further five grounds in a supplementary memorandum. At the hearing of the appeal, both parties appeared duly represented. The appellant was represented by learned counsel Mr. Hussein Ashiru Lugwisa, while the respondent the Republic, was represented by learned Senior State Attorney Ms. Fidesta Uisso, assisted by learned State Attorney Ms. Amina Macha. In arguing the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Lugwisa, respectfully prayed that this Honorable Court adopt the appellant's written submissions previously filed herein and grant him leave to address the grounds of appeal as set out hereunder. In his submissions on grounds four, five, six, and eight of the memorandum of appeal, argued conjointly, the learned counsel vigorously impugned the reliability of the prosecution’s key documentary evidence, namely the Forensic Examination Report (Exh. PI) and the Postmortem 6 Report (Exh. P4). He contended that the findings contained in these two exhibits are materially contradictory and irreconcilable, thereby rendering them unreliable and insufficient to sustain the prosecution's case beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, counsel submitted that the medical practitioner who conducted the postmortem examination on the deceased's bodies lacked the requisite credentials, being neither a qualified pathologist nor a specialist in forensic pathology, and that this deficiency undermined the evidential value and probative weight of the Postmortem Report. In elaborating these grounds, Mr. Lugwisa maintained that the apparent inconsistencies between the two prosecution exhibits fatally impair their credibility. He specifically drew the Court's attention to page 126 of the record of appeal, where, in item (a) of Exhibit 2 as referenced therein, the report refers to the presence of vomit, stating: "KIELELEZO M ATAPJSHI - Uchunguzi wa gramu 25.72 za sampuli ya matapishi uiiyoleta umedhihirisha kutokuwa na sumu yoyote inayotambufika." Further, the learned counsel drew the Court's attention to the postmortem report, which expressly concluded that the deceased met their deaths as a result of a poisonous substance, while in the Forensic Examination Report, the Government chemist detected no poison in the specimen brought for examination. He submitted that the two documentary exhibits in question contained materially distinct and irreconcilable findings, notwithstanding that both reports related to the same deceased persons. In his considered view, the admission and reliance upon such contradictory evidence vitiated the appellant's conviction. The learned counsel further contended that the medical officer who conducted the autopsy was not a registered pathologist and was therefore unqualified to render a definitive opinion on the cause of death. He pointed out that the doctor had not performed any internal examination or dissection of the bodies, yet proceeded to opine that the deceased had been poisoned. Referring specifically to the testimony of PW4 recorded at page 88 of the proceedings, counsel noted the doctor's description of frothy bubbles emanating from the mouths and noses of the deceased together with distended stomachs, observations which, in the doctor's view, indicated ingestion of poison. Mr. Lugwisa submitted that, for the medical officer to have discharged his duty competently, he was obliged to conduct a full post-mortem dissection and chemical analysis to confirm the presence and nature of any poison. The glaring inconsistency between the opinion expressed in Exh. P4 and the contents of Exh. PI, he argued, s rendered both documents unreliable and incapable of sustaining a safe conviction. Consequently, counsel urged the Court to expunge Exhs. PI and P4 from the record in their entirety. He reminded the Court that a criminal conviction may only be founded upon proof beyond reasonable doubt and cannot rest upon contradictory or unreliable evidence. Turning to the first and second grounds of appeal as set out in the supplementary memorandum of appeal, the learned counsel reiterated his earlier submissions concerning the Forensic Examination Report and the Postmortem Report. He maintained that both exhibits were inherently suspicious and wholly uncorroborated. In the absence of any independent corroborative evidence, he submitted that the trial court erred in relying upon them as a basis for convicting the appellant. With respect to the third ground of appeal contained in the original memorandum, counsel submitted that the trial court had wrongly admitted and relied upon Exhs. P6 and P7, the extra-judicial statements of Atanas Paschal and Moshi Rajabu, in convicting the appellant. He contended that these statements were received in evidence in flagrant breach of the mandatory provisions of section 36 (2) (d) and (e) of the Evidence Act, Cap. 6 (the TEA). Specifically, the statements were not served upon the appellant in accordance with the statutory requirements; instead, they were furnished to him only on the very day the trial commenced. This occasioned both surprise and manifest prejudice to the defense. Counsel emphasized that the law required such statements to be served at least ten days prior to the commencement of trial. In support of this submission, he invited the Court to follow its own binding precedent in Rahim Rashid @ Masangano & Another v. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 360 of 2008 (unreported), wherein statements admitted in similar breach of the Act were ordered to be expunged from the record. He therefore prayed that Exhs. P6 and P7 be likewise expunged as having been procured and admitted illegally and that the conviction founded upon them be set aside. On the second ground of appeal in the original memorandum, on the admissibility of the appellant's cautioned statement, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant's cautioned statement was unlawfully obtained and recorded in breach of section 59 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Cap. 20 (the CPA), which mandates that, upon completion of the recording, the recording officer must prepare and endorse a certificate confirming that the accused made the statement as a free and voluntary agent. Counsel further invoked section 10(3) of the TEA, which requires that where a statement is recorded in the presence 10 of a witness, the accused must sign the document to attest to its voluntary character. It was pointed out that, notwithstanding the presence of the appellant's mother during the recording, her signature does not appear anywhere on the cautioned statement. In light of these statutory violations, counsel prayed that the Court be pleased to expunge the cautioned statement from the record, contending that it was unsafe for the trial court to have relied upon it as a basis for conviction. On the first ground in the original memorandum and the third ground in the supplementary memorandum on the admissibility of the extrajudicial statement (Exh. P2), the learned counsel contended that the extrajudicial statement was procured in violation of the Chief Justice's Directives on the recording of such statements. First, it was submitted that the statement was obtained involuntarily, as the appellant did not affix his signature to authenticate his willingness to be recorded. Second, counsel drew the Court's attention to the fact that the statement was recorded inside the Justice of Peace's chamber in the presence of an unidentified third person whose name and official capacity were never disclosed to the appellant. Furthermore, the police officers who escorted the appellant had already furnished the Justice of Peace with information 11 concerning the circumstances of the arrest, particulars that ought to have been narrated by the appellant himself. For these reasons, it was submitted that the extrajudicial statement was not freely and voluntarily made and therefore ought not to have been admitted in evidence. On the fourth ground in the original memorandum and the fourth and fifth grounds in the supplementary memorandum, on whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, learned counsel submitted that the prosecution failed to prove the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He observed that no eyewitness was called to the alleged offenses and that the entire case rested on circumstantial evidence, which was required to form an unbroken chain of events pointing irresistibly to the guilt of the appellant. The learned counsel said, the conviction was said to have been founded upon four key pieces of evidence: the appellant's cautioned statement, the extrajudicial statement (Exh. P2), the forensic examination report, and the postmortem report. However, having demonstrated material legal defects in each of the foregoing documents, counsel maintained that the prosecution's case was riddled with doubts and could not sustain a conviction. 12 In conclusion, counsel prayed the Court to quash the conviction and set aside the sentence imposed by the trial court, with a further order for the immediate release of the appellant from custody. When called upon to respond, Ms. Uisso, learned Senior State Attorney, supported the conviction and the sentence. Addressing the alleged inconsistency between Exh. PI (Forensic Examination Report) and Exh. P4 (Postmortem Report), the learned Senior State Attorney submitted that the doctor, PW4, having externally examined the bodies, observed bubbles and swelling in the stomachs of the deceased, being classical signs of poisoning. She argued that this constituted a valid expert opinion based on external observation. The doctor was under no obligation to conduct an internal examination (postmortem dissection) once the cause of death had already been established through the appellant's own disclosure to his wife that he had administered poison to the children. Under the circumstances, counsel submitted that no fault could be found in the manner in which PW4 conducted and documented his examination. Ms. Uisso therefore prayed that the ground be dismissed in its entirety. The learned Senior State Attorney, referring to the Forensic Examination Report tendered by PW1, submitted that it constitutes a distinct evidentiary document from the postmortem report. These reports 13 serve separate purposes: the postmortem report ascertains the cause of death of the deceased, whereas the forensic report examines the nature and characteristics of the specimens submitted for analysis. Regarding the qualifications of the medical practitioner and the contention that PW4 was not authorized to conduct the postmortem examination on the basis that he was not a pathologist, counsel directed the Court’s attention to section 2 of the Inquests Act, Cap. 24, which defines a "medical practitioner" as a person duly authorized to practice medicine. Furthermore, section 11 of the same Act empowers such a medical practitioner to perform a postmortem examination upon receipt of the requisite order. PW4, having been duly certified and qualified as a medical practitioner and having testified to that effect before the trial court, was lawfully entitled to conduct the examination. As to the requirement of corroboration, the learned Senior State Attorney maintained that the forensic and postmortem reports were adequately corroborated by the oral testimonies of PW1 and PW4, respectively. In light of this, she submitted that the appellant's complaints under these grounds of appeal lack merit and ought to be dismissed. Turning to the admissibility of the appellant’s extrajudicial statement and cautioned statement, Ms. Uisso contended that both documents were 14 properly admitted into evidence by the trial court, no objection having been raised thereto by the appellant's counsel at the time of tendering. She characterized the present objection as an afterthought, which cannot be entertained at the appellate stage. Accordingly, she prayed that this ground be dismissed. In response to the assertion that the appellant's conviction was erroneously founded upon Exhs. P6 and P7, being the witness statements of Atanas Paschal and Moshi Rajabu, the learned Senior State Attorney submitted that the appellant was fully aware of these statements, as the prosecution case had been scheduled for hearing, and copies thereof were duly supplied to the appellant prior to the commencement of the trial, in compliance with the provisions of section 36 (2) (d) and (e) of the TEA. With respect to the retracted cautioned statement and extrajudicial statement, counsel pointed out that the record of the cautioned statement contains a signed declaration by the appellant confirming that it was voluntarily made and recorded in the presence of his mother. Similarly, the extrajudicial statement bears the appellant's signature and acknowledgment of its authenticity. As regards the presence of Rehema, the court clerk, during the recording of the extrajudicial statement, Ms. Uisso submitted that such presence is duly recognized and sanctioned 15 under the applicable standard form and procedural requirements (item 3 thereof). Furthermore, upon arrest, the appellant freely disclosed to the Justice of Peace the circumstances surrounding his apprehension, as reflected in the extrajudicial statement, without any prior briefing by police officers as alleged, and that the statement was thus recorded in conformity with the Chief Justice's directives governing such procedures. To support this submission, the learned counsel cited the decision in Vicent Homo v. Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 337 of 2017) [2019] TZCA 343 (30 August 2019). She therefore prayed that both aspects of this ground concerning admissibility be dismissed. Finally, on the ground challenging the sufficiency of proof beyond reasonable doubt, the learned Senior State Attorney rejected the appellant's contention, asserting that the prosecution case was established to the required standard on the basis of circumstantial evidence. In particular, the appellant was the last person seen in the company of the deceased children, as admitted in his own testimony, and he had been with them and took them to the family farm, where their bodies were subsequently discovered. Moreover, the appellant expressly admitted to administering poison to the children. This admission was corroborated by PW4 (the medical practitioner) and by Exh. P7, the 16 witness statement of Moshi Rajabu, the appellant’s wife, in which she recounted the appellant's telephone communication informing her that he had killed the children. As to mens red, counsel submitted that the record clearly shows the appellant consumed poison himself and administered it to his children. Further, he had repeatedly threatened his wife with unusual conduct should she refuse to return home. She said these circumstances, taken together, demonstrate that the appellant's acts were intentional and deliberate. In view of the strength of the prosecution's evidence. She prayed that the appeal be dismissed in its entirety. In rejoinder, Mr. Lugwisa essentially reiterated the submissions advanced in chief, maintaining that the appellant had no malice aforethought or intent to commit murder. He therefore prayed that the Court quash the conviction, set aside the sentence imposed upon the appellant, and order his immediate release. We have carefully reviewed the evidence on record and the submissions presented by both parties. It is undisputed that the prosecution's case against the appellant rests entirely on circumstantial evidence. It is a well-established principle of law in criminal matters that, where the evidence is purely circumstantial, a conviction may only be 17 based thereon if the court is satisfied that such evidence irresistibly and cogently points to the guilt of the accused while excluding any reasonable possibility that someone else committed the offense. This principle is affirmed in Elisha Ndamaye v. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 51 of 1999, Court of Appeal at Mwanza, (unreported), and Jimmy Runangaza v. Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 159 "B " of 2017) [2018] TZCA 188 quoted with approval in John Shini v. Republic (Criminal Appeal 573 of 2016) [2020] TZCA 1747 among other authorities. In the present appeal, the prosecution bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was responsible for the deaths of his three children. To this end, the prosecution obtained and analyzed vomit and other specimens collected from the scene where the bodies were discovered in order to investigate the potential cause of death. Subsequently, a postmortem examination was conducted to determine the precise cause. This brings us to the appellant's primary grievance in grounds 4, 5, 6, and 8 of the memorandum of appeal, where the appellant alleges inconsistency between the Forensic Examination Report (Exh. PI) and the postmortem report (Exh. P4). The appellant contends that these two documents contradict each other, as Exh. PI indicates that no poison was detected in the vomit, whereas the postmortem report, as testified to by 18 the doctor (PW4) and found in his report, concludes that the children died as a result of poisoning by a toxic substance. We have thoroughly examined both exhibits. Exh. PI pertains to five specimens submitted to the Government Chemist's Laboratory. Items (a) and (c) consisted of vomit and residual vomit, respectively; in neither case were any known poisonous substances detected. Items (b), (d), and (e) were liquid specimens. Forensic analysis revealed the presence of "Organochlorine" in items (b) and (e), while item (d) tested negative for any known poison. For clarity and reference, the report's key findings may be summarized as follows: no poisons were identified in the vomit samples (items a and c), but organochlorine, a poisonous substance, was positively detected in two of the liquid specimens (items b and e). For ease reference, this is what the report revealed: "2.0MATOKEO YA UCHUNGUZI Uchunguzi umefanyika na matokeo yake ni kama ifuatavyo: a) KIELELEZO: A - MA TAPJSHI Uchunguzi wa gramu 25.72 za sampuli ya Matapishi uliyotufetea umedhihirisha kutokuwemo kwa sumu yoyote inayotambulika. 19 b) KIELELEZO: B - KIMIMINIKA Uchunguzi wa miiilita 500 za sampuli ya kimiminika ulichotuletea umedhihirisha kuwemo kwa "Organochforine." c) KIELELEZO: C - MABAKI YA MATAPISHI Uchunguzi wa gramu 32.46 za mabaki ya matapishi u/iyotuletea umedhihirisha kutokuwepo kwa sumu yoyote inayotambuiika. d) KIELELEZO: D - KIMIMINIKA Uchunguzi wa miiilita 20 za sampuli ya kimiminika ulichotuletea umedhihirisha kutokuwepo kwa sumu yoyote inayotambuiika. e) KIELELEZO: E - KIMIMINIKA Uchunguzi wa miiilita 123 za sampuli ya kimiminika ulichotuletea umedhihirisha kuwepo kwa " Organochforine We have further noted from the report that the "Organochlorine" detected in specimens (b) and (e), being the remains of the juice collected from the scene, is normally used as a pesticide and, if consumed by the human being, can cause dangerous consequences to the body, even death. The report revealed: 20 "3.0 MAONI YA KITAALAMU NA HITIMISHO Kutokana na matokeo ya uchunguzi wa kitaalamu kwa sampuli uiizotuietea, Vielelezo "B - KIMIMINIKA" na "E - KIMIMINIKA" umedhirihisha kuwemo kwa " Organochiorine "Organochiorine" ni chembechembe za kemikafi ambazo pamoja na matumizi mengine hutumika kutengeneza dawa za kuulia wadudu. Kemikafi hii huweza kuieta madhara kwa binadamu na hata kusababisha kifo kutegemea na kiasi kitakachoingia mwiiini." From the analysis of Exh. PI, it is evident that the Government Chemist, following laboratory examination, detected the presence of poisonous substances classified as Organochlorine compounds in the specimen recovered from the crime scene. Since this substance ia alleged to have been administered to the children, the toxic effects documented in the report culminating in fatal outcomes are inevitably manifested, consistent with the deaths as observed and certified by the medical practitioner who conducted the postmortem examinations. With reference to the three postmortem reports, collectively admitted into evidence as Exh. P4, the doctor who performed the autopsies on the deceased recorded specific findings upon external examination of the bodies. These included the presence of frothy bubbles 21 emanating from the mouths of the deceased and marked abdominal distension (swollen stomachs), attributable to the ingestion of a poisonous substance. These observations directly indicated acute poisoning leading to circulatory and respiratory failure as the result of death. The testimony of PW4 as recorded at page 88 of the record establishes that, upon conducting a medical examination of the deceased's children, he formed the professional opinion that they had been poisoned. PW4 provided his expert reasoning in support of this conclusion, stating in his own words: "/ examined the deceased's bodies and found that the nature o f death is the ingestion o f poison. This is because o f the nature o f the bubbies that were emitting from their mouth and nose, and the fuii stomach was ail an indication that they ingested poison." This evidence constitutes direct medical expert testimony from PW4, who, based on his clinical assessment and specialized knowledge, diagnosed poisoning as the cause of the condition observed in the deceased children. Such testimony is relevant in establishing the cause of death involving allegations of poisoning. From the abstracts referred to above, it is clear that the two reports differ materially in their nature and objectives, with each addressing a 22 separate purpose and yielding its own discrete findings, as earlier set out. In the circumstances, the suggestion that the reports are in contradiction with one another lacks foundation and cannot be sustained. Furthermore, we are disconcerted as to why Mr. Lugwisa, in canvassing the grounds relating to the findings in Exh. PI, elected to isolate and rely solely upon item (a), the vomit sample which, on its face, disclosed no traces of any known poisonous substances. In so doing, he sought to persuade the Court that the report as a whole established the complete absence of poisonous substances in the specimens submitted for analysis, thereby purporting to contradict the findings contained in Exh. P4. ITie learned counsel ought not to have construed the report in isolation from the other material factors expressly indicated therein. With due respect to the learned counsel, such a selective and incomplete approach is incompatible in assisting the Court in reaching to a fair decision. In addressing the appellant's contention that PW4 lacked the requisite qualifications and was not a competent person to conduct the postmortem examination of the deceased's bodies on the ground that he was not a pathologist, we observe as follows: As rightly submitted by the learned Senior State Attorney, this Court has had the benefit of examining the provisions of the Inquests Act. Section 2 of the Act defines "medical 23 practitioner” to mean a person for the time being authorized to practice the medical profession by virtue of his being registered or licensed under the provisions of the Medical, Dental, and Allied Health Professionals Act, and includes any person for the time being in charge of a hospital. This definition is broad and does not restrict the performance of post-mortem examinations exclusively to pathologists. Accordingly, provided PW4 satisfied the statutory criteria of a "medical practitioner” as defined, his competence to undertake the examination cannot be impugned merely on the basis that he did not hold specialist qualifications in pathology. See Hussein Bakari @ Kadogoo v. Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 54 of 2006) [2009] TZCA 103. So, from the above examination, it is apparent that PW4 was indeed a qualified medical practitioner, duly competent and authorized to conduct postmortem examinations. Further, section 11(3) of the Inquests Act expressly provides that the medical practitioner who performs the postmortem examination shall prepare and submit a report in the prescribed Form C set out in the Schedule to the Act. This report must state the cause of death, bear the medical practitioner's signature, and, when read at the inquest, constitute prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. However, the coroner 24 retains the discretion to summon the medical practitioner to give oral testimony if deemed necessary. This provision underscores that only a qualified medical practitioner as directed under section 10 of the Act is empowered to undertake such an examination and certify the cause of death in the context of an inquest. The report serves as key evidentiary material in proceedings to establish the circumstances and cause of death. The same states: 11(3) - The medical practitioner shall make a report to be in the Form C prescribed in the Schedule, stating the cause o f death and shall be signed by him ; andf on being read at the inquest shall be prima facie evidence o f the facts stated in it, but the Coroner may call the medical practitioner if he considers it necessary. The record at page 87 reflects that during his testimony concerning his professional credentials as the medical practitioner who conducted the postmortem examination on the deceased's bodies, PW4 introduced himself to the trial court as a duly certified medical doctor. In his own words, he stated: 7 then went to Bombo Tanga where I qualified to be an Assistant Medical Officer in 2007. I am a certified Doctor in 2000 with Reg. No. 8845.1have 32 years o f experience now." 25 From the above, we are satisfied that PW4 was a qualified medical practitioner and certified doctor, duly authorized under section 11(3) of the Inquests Act to conduct a postmortem examination of the deceased's bodies and to prepare and submit a report thereon for the purpose of ascertaining the cause of deaths. More so, no evidence was adduced by any party to establish that PW4 was not a duly qualified medical practitioner, registered and licensed in accordance with the pertinent provisions of sections 3 and 22 of the Medical, Dental and Allied Health Professionals Act No. 11 of 2017. In the absence of any such contrary evidence, this Court has no basis upon which to question or doubt the professional qualifications of PW4. In light of the foregoing, we find the grounds of appeal advanced in this regard to be unsubstantiated and without merit. Regarding to the first and second grounds of appeal as originally set out in the memorandum of appeal, the appellant impugns the learned trial Judge's conviction on the basis that it rested upon two documents, Exhs. PI (Forensic Examination Report) and P4 (Postmortem Report) which he contends were suspicious in character and lacked corroboration. As regards the alleged suspicious nature of these documents, we reiterate that the purpose, content, and evidential value of each exhibit have been fully and exhaustively addressed earlier in this judgment. The 26 two reports are distinct in their scope and origin: Exh. PI embodies the results of scientific forensic analysis, while Exh. P4 records the findings of the postmortem examination. We are not persuaded that either document is inherently suspicious or unreliable. We further disagree with the submissions of learned counsel for the appellant that the said exhibits were uncorroborated. Concerning the Forensic Examination Report, this constitutes expert evidence derived from scientific examination and analysis; as such, it is self-contained and stands on its own footing as the considered opinion of the expert who performed the tests. To the extent that any corroboration might be thought necessary, the oral testimony of PW1 who personally conducted the examination of the specimens and prepared the report, provides ample support. As for the Postmortem Report, this was directly corroborated by the oral evidence of PW4, the medical practitioner who carried out the examination and authored the report. Moreover, the findings in this expert report receive additional corroborative force from the appellant’s own admissions contained in his cautioned statement and extrajudicial confession, wherein he unequivocally admitted to administer poison to his three children, following which they immediately became unresponsive, indicating, on his own account, that they died as a result. 27 In our jurisdiction's legal system, as in other jurisdictions, expert reports such as forensic examination reports and postmortem (autopsy) reports are relevant in establishing key facts in criminal proceedings, particularly in cases involving death, injury, or scientific identification of evidence. There are several compelling significant reasons as to why we should not easily ignore properly admitted expert reports, and these are: First, section 52 of the TEA makes expert opinion relevant in proving scientific facts which are beyond ordinary knowledge, on the cause of death, nature of injuries, time since death, presence of poisons, or matching of fingerprints or even D IM A. Second, proof of essential elements of offenses. In murder cases, the postmortem report is routinely required to prove (a) that death occurred, (b) the cause (e.g., blunt force trauma, stabbing, poisoning etc.), and (c) sometimes malice aforethought (inferred from wound severity). Forensic reports link the accused to the scene or weapon (e.g., fingerprints on a knife or ballistic matching). Third is corroboration and reliability. Expert reports corroborate confessions, eyewitness accounts, or circumstantial evidence. From our perspective, a voluntary confession along with a postmortem report that confirms the presence of injuries are adequate grounds for conviction. Fourth is inquest and investigative necessity. Under the Inquests Act (Cap. 24), 28 postmortem examinations are mandatory for sudden, violent, or suspicious deaths to determine whether an inquest or criminal proceedings are needed. From the above reasons, we are inclined to disagree with Mr. Lugwisa insofar as his invitation that we should disregard these documents for being suspicious and uncorroborated based on the ground that they contradict each other, the reason that we have declined above. In all the circumstances, we are satisfied that the trial court properly relied upon these exhibits, supported as they were by the testimony of the relevant expert witnesses and the appellant's own inculpatory statements. The grounds of appeal challenging their admissibility, reliability, and evidential weight are accordingly dismissed. The third ground in the memorandum of appeal rests on non- compliance with the mandatory requirements of section 36 (2) (d) and (e) of the TEA. In this complaint, the appellant contends that the learned trial judge erred in law and fact by convicting him on the basis of exhibits P6 and P7, being the written witness statements of Atanas Paschal and Moshi Rajabu which were allegedly improperly admitted into evidence in contravention of the aforementioned statutory provisions. 29 These subsections impose strict conditions for the admissibility of written or electronic statements in criminal proceedings in lieu of direct oral testimony. Under section 36 (2)(d), a copy of the statement must be served on the other parties before the hearing at which it is proposed to tender it; and under section 36 (2)(e)/ no objection by way of notice must be served by any other party within ten days of such service, subject to the court's power to determine the relevance of any objection raised. In that case, the appellant therefore submits that the admission of these statements without satisfying the said procedural safeguards rendered them inadmissible, and their reliance upon them vitiated the conviction. When responding to this ground, Ms. Ulottu submitted that the impugned witness statements had been duly served upon the appellant prior to the hearing at which they were tendered. She further contended that, as the matter had been scheduled for criminal sessions, the statements had in fact been served on the appellant in advance, which, according to her, explains why the appellant already had them among his documents. At this juncture, two issues arise for determination. The first is whether the statements of the two witnesses were served upon the appellant within the statutory timeframe. The second is whether, in the event that the first issue is answered in the affirmative, the appellant may 30 nevertheless derive any benefit from the alleged non-compliance with the law. Section 36 of the TEA permits the admission of a written or electronic statement made by a witness in criminal proceedings as evidence of the facts stated therein, in place of oral testimony, where the maker of the statement is unable to testify, provided that certain prescribed conditions are satisfied. The conditions for admissibility under section 36(2) include the following: 1st, that the maker is not called as a witness because he is dead or unfit (bodily or mental condition), he is outside the country and it is not reasonably practicable to be called, he cannot be found despite reasonable steps, or he cannot attend due to law or non-identifiability. 2n d , that the statement is, or purports to be, signed by the maker. 3r d , the same contains a declaration that it is true to the best of the maker's knowledge and belief and acknowledges liability to prosecution for perjury if he willful stated in it anything which he knew to be false. 4th , before the hearing where it is to be tendered, a copy of the statement is served by or on behalf of the party proposing to tender it (in our case, it is the prosecution) on each of the other parties (including the accused); and 5 th, if none of the other parties (e.g., the accused) serves a notice within 10 days from the service of the copy objecting, the statement can be 31 admitted during trial. But if an objection is raised, the court can determine its relevance. See the case of Manoni Isheli v. Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 193 of 2022) [2024] TZCA 1225 at page 12. This mechanism ensures fairness by giving the accused prior notice and an opportunity to challenge the admission of the untested (hearsay) statement, protecting the right to confront evidence while allowing efficient proof where a witness is genuinely unavailable. Upon a careful perusal of the record, we observed that the said witnesses, namely Atanas Paschal and Moshi Rajabu, were duly included in the list of witnesses during the preliminary hearing. Their names appear as witnesses in the list at page 58 of the record in number 1 and 8, respectively. We further noted that the trial commenced on 15th May 2023, as reflected at page 60 of the record. It is evident from the record that on 17th May, 2023 a Notice issued pursuant to section 36 (1) and (2) (a) of the TEA was duly prepared, filed before the trial court, and served upon the appellant. On the same date, as reflected on pages 114 and 116 of the record, learned counsel for the appellant, who was then the accused, Mr. Isaya Juma, expressly indicated that he had no objection to the admission of the two witness statements. In clear terms, he stated, " We do not have an objection."m e have 32 consistently held that the conditions set out under section 34B now 36 of TEA accumulatively and should ail be observed regardless that the appellant did not object to the tendering of the statements. See the cases of Joseph Shabani Mohamed Bai & Others v. Republic, (Criminal Appeal No. 399 of 2015) [2017] T2CA 178 and Magige Marwa Mwita & 2 Others v. Republic, (Criminal Appeal No. 621 of 2021) [2024] TZCA 994. On the second ground in the memorandum of appeal, the appellant contends that the learned trial Judge erred in law by relying on his cautioned statement in securing the conviction, on the ground that the said statement was unlawfully obtained and recorded out of time. However, this ground does not warrant our extensive consideration. A careful examination of the record reveals that, during the trial, no objection was raised regarding the admissibility of the appellant's cautioned statement. Instead, the appellant elected to reserve his right for cross-examining the relevant witness. Our reference in this regard is to page 92 of the record, where learned counsel for the appellant addressed the court in the following words: "We do not object to the admission but wiii subject it to cross-examination." 33 From the foregoing, we declare the ground meritless. Similarly, the appellant in the first ground in the memorandum of appeal and the third ground in the supplementary memorandum of appeal, challenges the admissibility of the extrajudicial statement that formed part of the evidence relied upon in securing his conviction. The appellant contends that he did not append his signature to the said statement and that it was recorded in the presence of another person. He further alleges that the police officer who escorted him to the Justice of Peace disclosed certain information relating to his arrest, contrary to the prescribed procedural directives. This Court has on numerous occasions underscored the importance of observing the procedural safeguards governing the recording of extrajudicial statements, with a view to preventing abuse and ensuring the reliability of such statements. Strict compliance with the guidelines issued by the Chief Justice is essential for the admissibility of such statements in evidence. Any failure to adhere to those guidelines, such as recording the statement in an improper location, failure to comply with the prescribed format, or absence of proof that the statement was made voluntarily, may render the statement inadmissible or devoid of probative value. 34 With regard to the appellant's complaints, the record reveals that prior to the admission of the appellant's extrajudicial statement in evidence, the appellant retracted the statement, thereby necessitating the conduct of a trial within a trial to determine its admissibility. Upon conclusion of that inquiry, the learned trial Judge ruled in favor of the prosecution and admitted the statement in evidence as Exh. P2. We have carefully examined Exh. P2. In our perusal of the document, particularly towards its concluding part at page 131 of the record, we noted the presence of a declaration bearing the appellant's names written in handwriting distinct from that of the Justice of Peace, affirming that the statement was recorded before the Justice of Peace. The declaration reads as follows: "Maelezo yangu ndiyo hayo na nimeyatoa kwa hiari yangu mbeie ya MUnzi wa Amani. Sahihi yake: [Salehe Hassani], Mtoa Ungamo ." This position is further corroborated by the testimony of PW2 before the trial court, when he testified as PW1 during the trial within a trial. In his evidence, the Justice of Peace stated that the appellant voluntarily expressed his readiness to make a statement. He further explained that after the statement had been recorded, it was read over to the appellant, 35 whereupon both of them appended their signatures to it before the document was duly stamped. In his own words, he stated: "The accused said that he is ready to give his statement and that he is aware that the statement may be used against him in a court o f law. I then recorded his statement In the end, I read the statement to the accused, and he signed, and I signed and stamped the statement" Having carefully considered the testimony of the Justice of Peace, we find no basis upon which to doubt his evidence. We accordingly accept his testimony as truthful, reliable, and credible. Our reasons for reaching this conclusion are not far to reach; they may be indicated as herein below: First, the Justice of Peace is a neutral, independent judicial officer with no motive to fabricate the case against the appellant. Unlike investigating police officers, a Justice of Peace performs an official judicial function under the law and is not part of the investigative team. He has no personal interest in the outcome of the case. Second, the statement was recorded in strict compliance with section 28 of the TEA and the Chief Justice's Guidelines. From the record, the Justice of Peace testified, and Exh. P2 itself shows that he followed the prescribed format. He cautioned the accused that the statement could be used in evidence, satisfied himself that it was being made willingly, read it back, and only then obtained the signature. Compliance with these mandatory safeguards creates a strong presumption of regularity. Third, the appellant's own signature is conclusive acknowledgement of voluntariness. The statement bears the accused's signature immediately below the endorsement that it was read over, explained, and made willingly. By signing, the accused expressly affirmed both the contents and the voluntary nature of the statement. No evidence was led that the signature was obtained by force, trickery, or while the accused was under duress. Fourth, we are satisfied by the Justice of Peace testimony, which was clear, consistent, and unshaken under cross-examination in both the trial within a trial and in his testimony in chief. The witness gave his evidence in a straightforward manner, without embellishment or contradiction. Nothing emerged in cross-examination to suggest bias, poor recollection, or improbability. Fifth, corroboration by the extrajudicial statement itself (Exh. P2) corroborates the Justice for Peace's oral testimony. In addition, its contents are materially consistent with independent evidence such as the postmortem report and the forensic examination report. Taking into account all the above reasons, those factors leave us with no doubt that the Justice of Peace recorded the statement in the manner he described. We are in agreement with Ms. Uisso that the 37 extrajudicial statement was made freely and voluntarily and that the appellant willingly signed it. We therefore reject the ground of appeal for being devoid of merit. Finally, on the 4th ground in the memorandum of appeal and the 4th and 5th grounds in the supplementary memorandum of appeal where the appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt during the trial. It is not in dispute that the case before us was founded entirely on circumstantial evidence, there having been no eyewitness to the demise of the three children. The legal position regarding reliance on circumstantial evidence is well settled. In the case of Katabe Kachochoba v. Republic [1986] TLR 170, the Court underscored the necessity of establishing a clear and cogent nexus between the accused and the offence. Mere presence in the vicinity of the crime or proximity to the scene is insufficient unless supported by additional incriminating circumstances linking the accused to the commission of the offence. Nevertheless, circumstantial evidence, when properly established, is admissible and may form the sole basis of a conviction, provided it satisfies the well-established legal requirements. The courts have consistently reiterated that the burden of proof rests squarely and throughout on the prosecution to establish all the essential ingredients of 38 the offence charged. The accused bears no obligation to prove his innocence, and where any reasonable doubt arises, such doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. This principle accords with the constitutional safeguards enshrined in the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977, particularly the presumption of innocence embodied under Article 13(6)(a), even though the phrase "beyond reasonable doubt" is not expressly used therein. The standard, as consistently affirmed by the courts, requires that the evidence adduced must exclude any reasonable hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused. See, for instance, the principles stated in Vitalis Kambilanga v. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 681 of 2021 [2023] TZCA 161. Having carefully examined the evidence adduced by the prosecution in the present case, we are in agreement with the view advanced by the learned Senior State Attorney that the prosecution succeeded in proving its case beyond reasonable doubt so as to sustain the appellant's conviction. Our reasons for arriving at this conclusion are not materially different from those advanced by her. Nonetheless, it is incumbent upon us to determine this ground of appeal by articulating those reasons and demonstrating how the evidence on record forms a complete chain of incriminating circumstances that irresistibly points to the guilt of the 39 appellant and ultimately justifies both the conviction and the sentence imposed. First, the appellant confessed in his own cautioned statement and in his extrajudicial statement. In those two pieces of evidence, the appellant categorically confessed to have killed his three children by administering poison. As the contents of the appellant's cautioned statement are the same as those in his extrajudicial statement, we would like to quote a passage in the latter so as to see what the appellant confessed: Tulilala hadiasubuhi. Asubuhinilichukua sumu ya 24D ya kuua majani. Nilimpikia uji yule mdogo akanywa na wale wakubwa niliwapikia ugall. Waliposhiba, nikawasiliana na mama yao kwa simu kuona kama jibu lake la mwisho ndilo hiio. Nikamwambia, mimi nakufa na wanangu Hi nisije kumsumbua. Hivyo niiiwawekea watoto sumu kwenye juice nikawapa na waiipokunywa, walitapika sana. Niliwalaza kitandani. Hivyo hadi saa 5 wote walishafariki. Nilimpigia simu nikamwambia kuwa watoto wameshafariki. Akasema kuwa ameamua turudiane. NHimwambia amechelewa. Hivyo nilikata simu na mimi nilikunywa sumu. NiHtoka nikiwa nakuja 40 nyumbani, ndipo nilipoanguka na kupoteza fahamu." It is settled that once a voluntary confession is admitted after a proper trial within a trial, as it was in this case, and where the court is satisfied of its truthfulness and lack of inducement, it constitutes the most potent form of direct evidence. This Court repeatedly held that such confessions, when corroborated even minimally, are sufficient to found a conviction. See Sami Nzalia @ Kisenga v. Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 268 of 2023) [2026] TZCA 113, where extrajudicial and cautioned confessions, corroborated by medical evidence, sustained a murder conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Second, shortly after administering the poison, the appellant telephoned his wife and expressly admitted that he had already given the poison to the children because of her refusal to return to the matrimonial home. (See the above passage from the appellant's extrajudicial statement.) This contemporaneous admission, made while the children were still alive or in the immediate aftermath, constitutes a direct acknowledgment of causation and motive / malice aforethought. See the case of Hamis Salehe Lyapinga v. Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 37 of 2000) [2005] TZCA 119, the Court stated: 41 "It is knowledge that malice aforethought can be inferred from the conduct o f the accused" The above appellant's statement to his wife was a powerful evidence of both actus reus and mens rea. The courts have consistently treated such conduct and statements as compelling corroboration that eliminates reasonable doubt. Third, the forensic report from the Government Chemist confirmed that specimens recovered from the scene contained poisonous substances, "Organochlorine poisorT. Scientific evidence of this nature is objective and conclusive when it matches the poison described in the confessions. In poisoning cases, forensic analysis linking the toxic agent to the scene and the victims' bodies has been held to prove administration and causation beyond reasonable doubt. See Sesilia Mbalamwezi v. Republic (supra) where the Chief Government Chemist's confirmation of lethal quantities of diazinon, combined with the confession, led the Court to dismiss the appeal and affirm the murder conviction, proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt on circumstantial and forensic evidence. Finally, the post-mortem reports unequivocally revealed that the three children died from the poisonous substance administered to them. Medical and post-mortem evidence establishing the cause of death as poisoning, when aligned with the appellant's admissions and the forensic 42 findings on the scene specimens, forms an unbroken evidential chain leaving no room for reasonable doubt where post-mortem evidence corroborated confessions to sustain death sentences. Taken together, the above six pillars of evidence with multiple consistent confessions (cautioned, extrajudicial, oral, and telephonic), antecedent declarations of intent, and irrefutable scientific corroboration (forensic and postmortem) form a complete and unbroken chain that excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. From the above, we are in agreement with the learned Senior State Attorney that the appellant was rightly convicted of a grave offense, which he executed inhumanly and with complete disregard to the sanctity of human life. The murder in question was not the result of a periodic fit of anger but rather entailed premeditated murder. Having noted the children's innocence of being taken by their own father, who cooked for them before giving them the poisonous juice bought by him, the appellant could have rethought his murderous intent, but instead went ahead and brazenly executed his heartbreaking ill intent. These, in our view, are aggravating circumstances. That said, we are satisfied that the prosecution has therefore discharged its burden to the criminal standard required by law. The 43 appellant's conviction was accordingly safe and proper. Consequently, this ground too fails. Accordingly, we uphold the conviction and dismiss the to the extent explained above. DATED at DODOMA this 10th day of April, 2026. B. M. A. SEHEL JUSTICE OF APPEAL L. E. MGONYA JUSTICE OF APPEAL A. S. KHAMIS JUSTICE OF APPEAL Judgment delivered this 13th day of April, 2026 via virtual Court, in the presence of the Appellant in person, Mr. Frank Rimoy, State Attorney for the Respondent/Republic and Ms. Christina Mwanandeje, Court Clerk; is hereby certified as a true copy of the original. DEPUTY REGISTRAR COURT OF APPEAL 44