John Mbatira @ M. Tuke & Others vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 697 of 2024) [2026] TZCA 354 (26 March 2026)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT MUSOMA fCORAM: NDIKA. J.A.. FIKIRINI. J.A.. And ISMAIL. J.A.^ CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 697 OF 2024 JOHN MBATIRA @ M TUKE............................................... FIRST APPELLANT SADICK SHABAN @ YOHANA ............................ ......... SECOND APPELLANT MANGA MGONOKI ......................................................... THIRD APPELLANT STEVEN AUGUSTINO @ ODIERO ................................. FOURTH APPELLANT VERSUS THE REPUBLIC ................ . .................................................... RESPONDENT (Appeal from the Judgment of the High Court of Tanzania at Musoma) (Mtuiva, J.) dated the 10th day of October 2023 in Criminal Sessions Case No. 181 of 2022 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 19th February & 26th March, 2026 NDIKA. J.A.: The High Court of Tanzania sitting at Musoma convicted John Mbatira alias Mtuke, Sadick Shaban also called Yohana, Manga Mgonoki, and Steven Augustino otherwise known as Odiero, hereafter referred to as "the first, second, third, and fourth appellants" respectively, of the murder of Rashid Ally Hassan, hereafter referred to as "the deceased." They were sentenced to death. Discontented with the outcome, they are appealing to this Court. In the early morning hours of 30th June 2022, an alarm was sounded, prompting numerous inhabitants of Mwanzaburiga village in Butiama District to gather by the River Kyarano, which traverses the village. The deceased's lifeless body was discovered floating face down in the shallow waters of the river. Dr. Salum Ahamada Salum (PW2), who performed an autopsy later that day at Butiama District Hospital, determined that the cause of death was severe trauma inflicted with a blunt object to both the face and the posterior part of the head, resulting in skull depression. A significant application of force during the assault on the deceased was observed, resulting in two substantial lacerations to the head and considerable blood loss. PW2 determined in the postmortem examination report (exhibit PI) that the cause of death was traumatic brain injury accompanied by severe haemorrhaging. It is not seriously disputed before this Court, as it was during the trial, that the deceased suffered a violent death. Whether the appellants were truly the perpetrators of the killing was and remains a point of contention. To establish the culpability of the appellants, the prosecution presented three main strands of evidence: first, circumstantial evidence indicating that the deceased was last observed in the company of the appellants on the night prior to the finding of his body; secondly, that the first, second and fourth appellants confessed to the crime and implicated the third appellant as well; and finally, that the second appellant was found in possession of a belt believed to have been stolen from the deceased at the time of his death. Regarding the first strand, the prosecution depended on the evidence presented by PW3 Warioba Silimba and PW4 Famu Helemani. PW3 stated that while driving his Toyo passenger rickshaw towards Nyasirori from the village centre on the evening of 29th June 2022, he observed the first appellant strolling beside the deceased along the road towards their respective homes. Subsequently, while returning from Nyasirori, he saw them entering the first appellant's residence. On his third trip, he spotted them, together with numerous others, consuming local brew at the same location. In addition to the first appellant and the deceased, he identified that the third appellant and a certain Mzee Osingo had joined the group. PW3 further stated that the next day at 09:00 hours, he attended to an alarm in the village and learnt of the deceased's violent death. PW4 recalled that at approximately 19:45 hours on 29th June 2022, along the boundary of Buturi-Mwanzaburiga centre, he encountered numerous individuals, including the deceased, Mzee Osingo, and all the appellants, who were walking in two groups thirty metres apart. The initial group comprised Mzee Osingo and the third and fourth appellants/ and the second group consisted of the deceased and the first and second appellants. He stated that he recognised them using the illumination from a flashlight affixed to the front of his punctured motorcycle and that he engaged in conversation with them for about ten minutes. PW4 recognised the deceased with whom he was familiar having been a customer at the deceased's eatery situated in the village centre. Like PW3, he awoke the following day to discover the slaying of the deceased. He later that day named the appellants to the police as suspects. It is noteworthy that both PW3 and PW4 admitted their lack of knowledge regarding the events that followed that night and the way the deceased separated from the appellants. The second principal element of the prosecution's case was founded on the confessions in three cautioned statements, exhibits P2, P6, and P7, respectively, attributed to the first, second, and fourth appellants, which also implicated the third appellant. PW5 No. G.7338 Detective Corporal Haruna stated that police investigations implicated the first appellant as a suspect. On 6thJuly 2022, at approximately 05:00 hours, PW5 and PW6 No. H.83 Corporal Onesmo apprehended the first appellant at his residence in Mwanzaburiga. They transported him to Butiama Police Station, where PW5 recorded his cautioned statement (exhibit P2) by which he confessed to the homicide and provided a comprehensive account of how the assault was orchestrated and carried out. He identified all his co-appellants as his accomplices. The said cautioned statement was admitted following the trial court's determination of its voluntariness after a trial-within-trial. PW6 participated in the investigations of the case and the apprehension of both the second and third appellants, in addition to the first appellant. He asserted that he apprehended the second appellant at his residence in Mwanzaburiga on 13thJuly 2022. Later that day, with the aid of PW1 Paul Gervas Lupama, a local militiaman, PW6 arrested the third appellant at Mtaa wa Pili in Nyehunge village, Sengerema District. The fourth appellant was apprehended by a local militiaman named Mataro, who transported him to Kiabakari Police Station and thereafter to Butiama Police Station on 25th July 2022. After the arrest and transfer of the second and fourth appellants to Butiama Police Station, PW6 recorded their confessional statements dated 13th July 2022 and 25th July 2022, respectively (exhibits P6 and P7), in which they allegedly admitted to the crime and provided details regarding the planning and execution of the attack. They also implicated their co appellants, including the third appellant. The cautioned statements too 5 were accepted upon the trial court's ruling after a trial-within-a-trial that they were made freely. The third essential element of the prosecution's account pertained to the confiscation of a brown waist belt marked with the initials "R.H." PW1 and PW6 stated that the belt was retrieved from the second appellant's bag after his arrest on 13th July 2022, in the presence of the deceased's daughter, Neema Rashid, who recognised it as belonging to the deceased. The certificate of seizure and the associated seized item (the belt) were entered into evidence as exhibits P4 and P5, respectively. The first appellant denied the criminal allegation but admitted to being arrested at his residence on 5th July 2022. He retracted the cautioned statement ascribed to him, asserting that it was obtained through torture inflicted by PW6 while PW5 was recording it. The second appellant also refuted the allegation but acknowledged the circumstances of his arrest in Nyehunge and subsequent detention on 13th July 2022. The third appellant not only denied the allegation but also accused the prosecution of unlawfully keeping him illegally incarcerated for a prolonged duration prior to his arraignment. The fourth appellant ultimately acknowledged the death of the deceased but refuted any involvement in killing him. He also retracted the cautioned statement ascribed to him, asserting that it was obtained through torture. The High Court determined that the prosecution established that the death was homicidal based on PW2's testimony and the post-mortem report (exhibit P.l) indicating that traumatic brain injury from blunt force was compatible with a violent homicide. The court deemed PW3 and PW4 credible and reliable witnesses who placed the appellants with the deceased on the evening prior to the discovery of the body. Their evidence constituted "last-seen" or circumstantial evidence and was presented at the earliest opportune fulfilling the criteria established in relevant legal precedents. Moreover, the court accepted and relied on the cautioned statements (exhibits P2, P6, and P7). Upon evaluating the claims of torture and delay in recording the statements, the learned trial judge held that the statements were freely made and recorded within the required time frame and included specific information that could solely originate from participants, thereby rendering them corroborative rather than inadmissible. The court, applying the law on circumstantial evidence and corroboration concluded that the overall evidence overwhelmingly indicated guilt, resulting in the conviction of all the four appellants for murder in violation of sections 196 and 197 of the Penal Code, Cap. 16, and sentencing them to death by hanging, as previously stated. Mr. Onyango Otieno, learned counsel, represented the first, second, and third appellants in the appeal, arguing four grounds. For convenience, we have organised them as follows: first, that the trial court improperly relied on the testimony provided by PW5 and exhibit P2 which he tendered, as he was not designated as a prosecution witness during the committal proceedings. Secondly, that the prosecution failed or neglected to field certain material witnesses. Thirdly, that the confiscation of exhibit P5, as demonstrated by exhibit P4, was unlawful. Finally, that the charge against the appellants was not substantiated to the requisite standard. Mr. Emmanuel P. Mng'arwe, learned advocate for the fourth appellant, argued two points: first, that the cautioned statement attributed to the fourth appellant was incomplete and hence inadmissible. Secondly, that the charge against the fourth appellant was not substantiated beyond a reasonable doubt. We intend to individually consider the initial three grounds of appeal presented by Mr. Otieno, followed by an examination of the first ground of appeal submitted for the fourth appellant. Eventually, we will conclude with the common issue presented by the appellants on whether the charge was substantiated to the requisite standard. Mr. Otieno asserted in the first ground that the trial court erroneously relied on the testimony of PW5 and exhibit P2 he introduced into evidence, despite him not being designated as a prosecution witness during the committal hearings. This argument was based on section 308 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Cap. 20 R.E. 2023, henceforth referred to as "the CPA" which precludes the presentation of a prosecution witness whose statement or substance of evidence was not disclosed during the committal hearing unless sufficient notice in writing is provided to the accused person or his advocate of the intention to call such witness: " 308 . -(1) A witness whose statement or substance o f evidence was not read at committai proceedings shaii not be called by prosecution the prosecution at the triai unless the prosecution has given a reasonable notice in writing to the accused person or his advocate o f the intention to call such witness." Mr. Otieno contended that PW5's name was absent from the list of intended prosecution witnesses on pages 10 and 11 of the record of appeal, and that his statement or the essence of his evidence was not presented. The trial court observed on page 62 of the record of appeal that PW5 was not designated as a prospective witness; still, it unexpectedly decided on pages 68 to 72 in favour of the witness testifying irregularly. He urged us to expunge PW5's testimony along with the cautioned statement he introduced into evidence. We have no doubt that Ms. Choghoghwe adequately addressed the current complaint. Initially, she rightly asserted that although PW5 was not designated as a prospective prosecution witness, the record indicates on page 11 that exhibit P2, which was the substance of the evidence he presented at the trial, was enumerated and read over during the committal proceedings. Moreover, she also correctly stated that, as shown on page 63 of the appeal record, the prosecution on 22n dSeptember 2023 served requisite notice on the appellants to produce PW5 as an additional witness, in accordance with section 308 (1) of the CPA, to present exhibit P2. Consequently, the presiding trial judge accurately determined on 25t h September 2023, as shown on page 71, that the procedure was adhered to and permitted PW5 to testify and present exhibit P2. The first ground of grievance lacks merit. in the second ground, Mr. Otieno criticised the prosecution for failing to present Neema Rashid, whom he asserted was a crucial witness due to her involvement in both the identification and arrest of the second appellant, as well as the confiscation of the belt (exhibit P5) from the same appellant at Nyehunge, as testified by PW6 and shown on page 111 of the record of appeal. He implored us to infer negatively from the failure to present Neema as a witness, consistent with established precedents on that aspect. Although Ms. Choghoghwe conceded that Neema was a crucial witness, she argued that her exclusion did not adversely impact the prosecution's case, given that PW1 and PW6 detailed the circumstances of the second appellant's apprehension at Nyehunge. Initially, we find it instructive to stress the established principle that the prosecution must call all witnesses necessary to establish the truth in a case, irrespective of possible discrepancies in their testimonies. When the prosecution fails or neglects to summon a crucial witness about a significant issue, the court may infer negatively against the prosecution - see, for instance, Yohanis Msigwa v. Republic [1990] T.L.R. 148 and Aziz Abdallah v. Republic [1991] T.L.R. 71. The Court further stated in the latter case that the credibility of the prosecution's case is not inherently undermined when evidence indicates that multiple witnesses may have testified about the occurrence, and the prosecution fails or neglects to present some of them. In the instant appeal, both counsel concur, quite correctly, that Neema was a crucial witness. We agree with Ms. Choghoghwe that, li regarding the circumstances of the second appellant's apprehension, Neema could not have made any significant contribution to the evidence presented by PW1 and PW6. However, we think that Neema was the sole and vital witness capable of elucidating to the trial court how she identified the belt (exhibit P5) as a personal possession of her deceased father, Exhibit P5 and the associated certificate of seizure (exhibit P4) were clearly intended to demonstrate that the second appellant was found in possession of a personal item stolen from the deceased during the homicide, thereby leading to the invocation of the doctrine of recent possession against the second appellant. The lack of Neema's testimony on that matter makes the application of the concept unfeasible. This undoubtedly clarifies why the trial court did not utilise that strand of evidence as the basis of the second appellant's conviction. Under these circumstances, we disregard exhibits P4 and P5. Although we recognise the validity of the second ground of appeal, we see no need to draw an adverse inference regarding the prosecution's case, given that the evidence in question did not serve its intended purpose. Our discourse of the preceding ground of appeal, which led to exhibits P4 and P5 being discounted, is clearly determinative of the grievance in the third ground of appeal alleging illegality of the seizure of the belt. We need not consider and ascertain it. 12 Regarding the contention by the fourth appellant that the cautioned statement (exhibit P7) attributed to him, Mr. Mng'arwe submitted that the statement purportedly made under section 58 of the CPA was incomplete because it was not accompanied with a statement recorded by the fourth appellant himself in terms of section 59 of the CPA. Citing a decision of the High Court in William Mwita @ Mugerwa & Another v. Republic [2023] TZHC 18150, he moved for the document to be expunged from the record. Conversely, Ms. Choghoghwe found no fault in the impugned statement, confidently claiming that it fully complied with the law. Indeed, cautioned statements may be made pursuant to either section 58 or section 59 of the CPA. To elucidate the distinctness of the procedure involved, we present the relevant provisions in part, commencing with section 58 (1) about the recording of a suspect's interrogation by a police officer, as follows: " 58 . -(1) A police officer who interviews a person for the purpose o f ascertaining whether the person has committed an offence shah\ unless it is in ail circumstances impracticable to do so, cause the interview to be recorded. 13 (2) Where a person who is being interviewed by a police officer for the purpose of ascertaining whether he has committed an offence makes, during the interview, either oraiiy or in writing, a confession relating to an offence, the police officer shall make, or cause to be made, while the interview is being held or as soon as practicable after the interview is completed, a record In writing, setting out- (a) so far as it is practicable to do so, the questions asked o f the person during the interview and the answers given by the person to those questions; (b) particulars o f any statement made by the person orally during the interview otherwise than in answer to a question; (c) whether the person wrote out any statement during the interview and, if so, the times when he commenced to write out the statement; (d) whether a caution was given to the person before he made the confession and, if so, the terms in which the caution was given, the time when it was given and any response made by the person to the caution; (e) the times when the interview was commenced and completed; and 14 (f) where the interview was interrupted, the time when it was interrupted and recommenced." Conversely, section 59 of the CPA caters for the recording of a statement by a suspect at his own initiative. Subsection (1) of that section stipulates thus: "59,-flJ Where a person under restraint informs a police officer that he wishes to write out a statement, the police officer shaii- (a) cause him to be furnished with any writing materiais he requires for writing out the statement; and (b) ask him, if he has been cautioned as required by paragraph (c) o f section 54, to set out at the commencement o f the statement the terms o f the caution given to him, so far as he recaiis them." Briefly, a record of interview pursuant to section 58 must typically be documented in a question-and-answer format unless it is impracticable to do so. This occurs when a police officer interrogates an individual to see if he has perpetrated an offence, and that individual subsequently confesses - see, for instance, Seko Samwe Iv. Republic [2005] T.L.R. 371; Amiri Ramadhani v. Republic [2007] TZCA 211; Ramadhani Salum v. Republic [2007] TZCA 245; and Mussa Mustapha Kusa and Another v. Republic [2011] TZCA 356. 15 A cautioned statement under section 59 must generally be made without the writer being influenced by enquiries. The suspect simply writes out his statement and then offers it to the police officer who bears the burden to ensure compliance with provisions of section 59 - see Seko Samwel {supra) and Ramadhani Salum {supra). This procedure is subject to subsection (4) of that section allowing the police officer to record the statement in certain circumstances. Exhibit P7, presented on pages 278 to 281 of the record of appeal, purports to have been created under sections 54, 58, and 59 of the CPA (formerly sections 53, 57, and 58 of the CPA R.E. 2019). However, since it was recorded following PW6's interview with the fourth appellant rather than on the fourth appellants own initiative, we hold that it was created in accordance with section 58 of the CPA. On this basis, we respectfully find Mr. Mngarwe's submission that exhibit P7 is incomplete for not being accompanied with the fourth appellant's statement made under section 59 of the CPA a misconception of the law. It is necessary to reiterate that a cautioned statement may be made pursuant to either section 58 or section 59 of the CPA. The High Court's decision in William Mwita @ Mugerwa {supra), which he referenced in support of his proposition, does not bolster his argument. We are thus convinced that exhibit P7 was complete and properly admitted. 16 The final complaint by all the appellants concerns whether the charged offence was sufficiently established. Regarding the above issue, Mr. Otieno contended, rather briefly, that the prosecution's assertion, grounded in the testimonies of PW3 and PW4, that the deceased was last observed alive in the presence of the appellants did not establish that they were the assailants of the homicide. Referencing Gabriel Simon Mnyele v. Republic [2010] TZCA 97 regarding the cogency of such evidence, he urged us to conclude that the convictions predicated exclusively on such evidence were unsafe. Mr. Mng'arwe emphasised that PW4's testimony was insufficient to associate the fourth appellant with the homicide under the last seen approach. Referencing Emmanuel Agaton Ndunguru v. Republic [2025] TZCA 325, he argued that the last seen doctrine relies on circumstantial evidence, which must establish an unbroken chain leading to the inevitable conclusion that, with a high degree of probability/ the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. Ms. Choghoghwe contested the points presented by her esteemed colleagues. She argued, citing the evidence of PW3 and PW4, that the deceased was last seen alive in the presence of the appellants on the night in issue. Consequently, the appellants were required, in accordance 17 with established legal precedents, particularly Miraji Idd Waziri @ Simwana & Another v. Republic [2020] TZCA 387, to furnish a credible explanation for their separation from him that evening, which they did not provide. Moreover, she asserted that exhibits P2, P6, and P7 substantiated the testimonies of PW3 and PW4 in critical aspects, detailing how the appellants orchestrated and implemented the premeditated scheme to kill the deceased on that fateful night. The trial court, acknowledging the lack of eyewitnesses to the homicide, assessed the circumstantial evidence provided by PW3 and PW4, which suggested that the deceased was last observed alive in the presence of the appellants. PW3 claimed to have seen the first appellant with the deceased on three occasions that evening, noting that during the last instance, they were at the first appellant's home, in the company of the third appellant and Mzee Osingo. PW4 stated that at approximately 19:45 hours, he encountered the deceased, Mzee Osingo, together with all the appellants, who were walking on a road in two groups, thirty metres apart, at the boundary of Buturi-Mwanzaburiga. The initial group included Mzee Osingo and the third and fourth appellants, while the second group comprised the deceased and the first and second appellants. The trial court noted that 18 the PW3 and PW4 recorded their statements on the same day the deceased's body was discovered, promptly naming the appellants and Mzee Osingo as the suspects. Thus, the court deemed the two witnesses credible, and we find no justification to question their reliability. We think that it is evident from the above evidence that the deceased first strolled from the village centre to the residence of the first appellant, where he consumed some drinks with the first appellant and others. He then proceeded to walk alongside the appellants in two groups towards the boundary of Buturi-Mwanzaburiga, where PW4 met and conversed with them. This was likely the final instance the deceased was observed alive. As rightly argued by Ms. Choghoghwe, it is settled that where there is evidence that an accused was the last person to be seen with the deceased alive then a presumption arises that he is the killer unless he offers a plausible explanation to the contrary - see, for example, as Makungire Mtani v. Republic [1983] T.L.R. 179; Mathayo Mwalimu and Another v. Republic [2009] T.L.R. 271; and Miraji Idd Waziri {supra). The appellants, in their respective defence testimony, not only refuted the allegation of having killed the deceased but also asserted their unfamiliarity with him. It signifies that they contested being the last 19 individuals observed in the company of the deceased alive. We indicated earlier that the trial court gave full credence to the two witnesses and preferred their version to that of the appellants. As stated earlier, the prosecution also relied on the cautioned statements, ascribed to the first, second and fourth appellants, which were accepted following the trial court's finding that they were made freely, after a trial-within-a-trial. The statements indicate that the appellants not only admitted to the homicide but also offered explicit details concerning the planning and execution of the assault on the deceased, ending in the dumping of his body in the River Kyarano. The third appellant was also implicated by his co-appellants in their respective statements. We recall that the three appellants retracted their cautioned statement during their respective defence testimonies, alleging that these admissions were procured through torture. Our jurisprudence instructs that a trial court can only base a conviction on a repudiated or retracted confession if it is substantiated by independent evidence or if the court acknowledges the inherent risks of relying on an uncorroborated confession and is thoroughly convinced of its veracity - see Hatibu Gandhi & Others v. Republic [1996] T.L.R. 12; Mboje Mawe & Others v. Republic [2011] TZCA 136; and Mashimba Dotto @ 20 Lukubanija v. Republic [2014] TZCA 271. In AM Salehe Msutu v. Republic [1980] T.L.R. 1 at page 4, this Court, citing Tuwamoi v. Uganda [1967] EA 84, stated that: "It has long been an established rule o fpractice in East Africa, including this country, that a repudiated confessionf though as a matter o f law may support a conviction, generally requires as a matter o f prudence corroboration as is normally the case where a confession is retracted." Besides, even though the trial court can consider a co-accused's confession against another accused in consonance with section 33 (1) of the Evidence Act, Cap. 6 R.E. 2023, henceforth "the EA", section 33 (2) of the EA provides that " a conviction o f an accused person shall not be based solely on a confession by a co-accused." Thus, such a confession requires corroboration - refer to, for instance, Joseph Keneth Ngole and Others v. Republic [2007] TZCA 199 and Abubakari Issa @ Mnyambo v. Republic [2011] TZCA 10. We have analysed the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in conjunction with the three cautioned statements, taking the above perspective into account. It is unmistakeable that the retracted confessions are fundamentally supported by independent evidence. Initially, the first, second, and fourth appellants detailed in the statements 21 their movements with the deceased on the night in question, culminating at a location near the River Kyarano where they perpetrated the homicide. This is notably demonstrated by PW4's testimony that he observed them that night going with the deceased towards the Buturi-Mwanzaburiga boundary, likely in the direction of the River Kyarano. As previously mentioned, that was the final occasion the deceased was observed alive. PW4 identified the appellants to the police as suspects on the same day he became aware of the inexplicable circumstances surrounding the deceased's death. It is instructive here to refer to our observation in Marwa Wangiti Mwita & Another v. Republic [2002] T.L.R. 39 that the ability of a witness to name a suspect at the earliest opportunity is an all-important assurance of his credibility and reliability. Secondly, the first, second, and fourth appellants admitted in their statements that upon reaching the River Kyarano, they unleashed violence against the deceased with a club and stones, leading to his demise, following which they discarded his body in the river's shallow waters. Both PW3 confirmed the discovery of the deceased's body in the water after the alarm was sounded, and the medic (PW2), who arrived later, also verified that he found the body floating in the water. PW2 indicated that the corpse displayed several lesions inflicted by a blunt object to both the facial region and the posterior aspect of the cranium, resulting in skull 22 depression. The autopsy report (exhibit PI) verifies that the cause of death was severe brain damage accompanied by substantial haemorrhaging. This evidence is clearly consistent with the appellants' acknowledgement of the types of objects used to execute their malicious plan. Based on the entirety of the evidence presented, we conclude that all the appellants were culpable for the killing in question. Did the homicide amount to murder? Section 200 of the Penal Code, Cap. 16 R.E. 2023, together with the frequently referenced decision of Enock Kipela v. Republic [1999] TZCA 9, specifies the criteria for inferring malice aforethought for a killing to be classified as murder. In this case, the murder was premeditated. The appellants confessed to having led the deceased to the crime scene with the aim to murder him. They wielded a club, with which they delivered a solitary strike to the deceased's susceptible bodily portion, and subsequently employed stones to administer more blows. The medical witness stated that enormous force was applied during the assault on the deceased, leading to two major lacerations to the head and extensive blood loss. We take the view that the trial judge was warranted in determining, based on the totality of the evidence, that the homicide was committed with malice aforethought. We have no basis to interfere with this conclusion. Consequently, we dismiss the final ground of appeal. We ultimately find the appeal undeserving and proceed to dismiss it in its entirety. DATED at DODOMA this 26th day of March 2026. G. A. M. NDIKA JUSTICE OF APPEAL P. S. FIKIRINI JUSTICE OF APPEAL M. K. ISMAIL JUSTICE OF APPEAL Judgment delivered virtually from Musoma Prison this 26th day of March, 2026 in the presence of the 1s t, 2n d , 3r d and 4th appellants in person, Ms. Martha Mbosoii, learned State Attorney for the respondent/Republic and Magesa Fabiane Mgeta, Court Clerk is hereby certified^ a,|rue copy of the original. A. S. CHlftGULU DEPUTY REGISTRAR COURT OF APPEAL 24