Equity Bank Tanzania Limited vs Prudence Alibalio Katangwa (Civil Appeal No. 324 of 2024) [2026] TZCA 337 (24 March 2026)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT PAR ES SALAAM f CO RAM: NDIKA. J.A.. MASHAKA. J.A. And NGWEMBE. J.A,1 ! CIVIL APPEAL NO. 324 OF 2024 EQUITY BANK TANZANIA LIMITED ............. ............................APPELLANT VERSU5 PRUDENCE ALIBALIO KATANGWA ......................................... RESPONDENT (Appeal from the Judgment and Decree of the High Court of Tanzania, at Dar es Salaam) ( Laltaika, 3.1 dated 17th day of December, 2021 in Civil Appeal No. 226 of 2019 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 2n d December 2025 & 24th March, 2026 NGWEMBE. JA.: This is a second appeal. It stems from the decision of the High Court of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam in Civil Appeal No. 226 of 2019, originating from the District Court of Ilala, in Civil Case No. 188 of 2016. The material background leading to the dispute arose from failure of the interbank money transfer from the appellant's bank to Citibank of i London in the United Kingdom. It is on record that the respondent operated a bank account No. 3003211212174 with the appellant (Equity Bank) and on 14th March, 2016 he instructed the appellant to deduct from his account and transfer Sterling Pounds seven thousand (£7,000.00) to the account of Walker Movement Limited at the Citibank of London in the United Kingdom. According to the respondent, the said amount of money was intended to purchase a truck make MAN TGA Tractor unit from Walker Movement Limited (the company). However, the amount of money did not reach the company. After his dose follow up with the appellant and the supplier, he realized that the supplier did not receive any amount of money through Citibank. He thus demanded refund of his money from the appellant but in vain. After fruitless efforts of follow up to the appellant, the respondent instituted a civil action before the District Court of Ilala, claiming mainly refund of his money. Upon full trial, the court found that the appellant was not liable for any failure of the supplier to receive the said money, since they were transferred from the appellant to the supplier's bank. The trial court ordered the appellant to assist the respondent in corresponding with the Citibank to complete the transfer to the supplier for the intended purpose. The respondent was not amused by the decision of the trial court. He successfully appealed to the High Court raising a number of grounds, but in the course suo motu, the learned Judge raised other grounds and invited the parties to address him. The grounds were in respect to: the rights and responsibilities o f customer and bank in international money transfer; Privity o f contract in banker-customer relationship; Consumer protection schemes (if any) in money transfer; and the middle ground in a situation where the money in dispute is allegedly abroad, while the customer and the bank are in Tanzania. Having been addressed by the parties on the above issues together with other grounds of appeal, the learned Judge found that in Electronic Fund Transfer (EFT), the appellant was responsible in case of any failure of that transaction. Thus, he awarded the respondent refund of £7,000.00 and general damages of TZS. 100,000.00. Being dissatisfied with the first appellate court's decision, the appellant preferred the instant appeal having a total of 5 grounds of appeal. However, on the hearing, the appellant abandoned the last ground and proceeded with four grievances as follows: 1. The appellate Judge erred both in law and in fact in holding that the appellant is responsible for actions and omissions, contractual or otherwise o f the intermediary bank and all other banks in the 3 transmission chain whilst there were none established and approved by the respondent and at the required standard; 2. The appellate Judge erred both in law and in fact in holding that the money transferred by the appellant did not reach the intended recipient or beneficiary without there being any evidence thereof; 3. The appellate Judge erred both in law and in fact in failure to take into consideration in his judgment matters which were raised by the respondent and which were part o f the record o f the trial court and its decision thereof; and 4. The appellate Judge erred both in law and in fact in holding that the trial magistrate had erred both in law and in fact for believing that the appellant had another duty to perform after the respondent had instructed the appellant to send the money to the beneficiary bank. On the hearing of this appeal, Mr. Karoli Valerian Tarimo, learned counsel appeared for the appellant and Mr. Nickson Ludovick, also learned advocate represented the respondent. Both parties adopted their respective written submissions, to which we will revert briefly. The appellant's submission was based on the principle of burden and standard of proof in civil cases. When addressing on the 1s t ground, he maintained that the respondent never proved his claim against the appellant. It was his argument that, since there was no proof of relationship between the appellant and the intermediary bank (Citibank), the respondent was required to prove existence of duties and breach or omission of those duties by the appellant. Cited the case of Barelia Karangiu Rangi v. Asteria Nayalavambwa, Civil Appeal No. 237 of 2007 (unreported) to support his argument that a general rule of law of "he who alleges must provd' was not complied with by the respondent. He insisted that the respondent failed to discharge his duty to prove the case to the standard required, which is, on balance of probability. Since the respondent failed to discharge his burden to the required standard, the High Court erred to decide in favour of him. Thus, he implored the Court to allow this ground of appeal. On the second ground, M r. Tarimo was brief that the appellate court erred in holding that the transferred money never reached the beneficiary without any evidence being adduced by the said beneficiary or the respondent. Consequently, the first appellate court made an error to find the appellant was liable on an unproven claim. Submitting on the 3r d and 4th grounds, Mr. Tarimo contented that the respondent failed to provide further and better information from the Citibank which was apparent as was testified by DW1 and DW2 together with exhibit D2 shown on pages 68, 98 and 99 of the record of appeal. He insisted that after transferring the said money, both the appellant and the respondent received confirmation from the intermediary bank that the said 5 money had been transferred to the beneficiary bank. According to the appellant, that confirmation of receipt of money from the beneficiary bank, her duty ended there. Therefore, he challenged the first appellate court to let the appellant perform extra duties while the respondent failed to perform his responsibility by obtaining proper information from the beneficiary bank, in compliance with the International Electronic Money Transfer Regulations. He cited section 4 of the Anti-Money Laundering (Electronic Funds Transfer and Case Transaction Reporting) Regulations, 2019 to support his argument. He rested his case by urging the Court to allow the appeal and restore the trial court's decision. In turn, M r. Ludovick submitted jointly grounds 1 and 2 that the respondent was unable to access the mechanism used by the appellant in transferring the said money to the beneficiary bank, which is an exclusive responsibility of the appellant. He cited section 48 of the Banking and Financial Institutions Act in support of his argument. He further argued that, it was the duty of the appellant to ensure that the transaction initiated by the respondent was completed in accordance to the international money transfer, including communicating with the intermediary banks. Disappearance of the respondent's money was within the appellant's knowledge as provided for under section 115 of the Evidence Act R.E. 2023. 6 Also, he supported his argument with our decision in the case of Ecobank Tanzania Limited v. Future Trading Company Limited, (Civil Appeal No. 82 of 2019) [2021] TZCA 368 (3 August 2021) where it was held that the relationship between a bank and its client is fiduciary. He insisted that, since the appellant failed to trace whereabouts of the transferred money, her duty was to refund the respondent. Arguing on ground 3, M r. Ludovick began by citing the case of Hassan Bundala @ Swaga v. Republic, (Criminal Appeal No. 386 of 2015) [2015] TZCA 261 (23 February 2015), that the first appellate court deals with matters decided by the lower courts and not on new matters which were neither raised nor decided by the trial court. In regard to the present appeal, M r. Ludocvick submitted that the first appellate court dutifully reevaluated the whole evidence adduced during trial before its conclusion. Therefore, he invited the Court to dismiss this ground of appeal for it is unmerited. In regard to the 4th ground of appeal, the learned counsel maintained that the respondent had no access to the interbank telecommunication systems and if there were any information needed, the appellant would inform the respondent and there is no ground to blame him. The respondent observed that the appeal has no merits. 7 We have paid a deserving consideration to the parties' written arguments and we have perused inquisitively, the record of appeal which provides the genesis of the dispute as well as the law brought to our notice by the parties. In our considered view, the epicenter which holds the parties asunder is whereabouts of the respondent's monies (£7,000.00). This will be discussed in detail in due course. In the meantime, certain facts hold the parties together including: one, the parties are in a banker - customer relationship; two, the respondent operated an account in the appellant's bank and under his instructions the appellant debited certain amount of money from the respondent's account and was instructed to transfer that money to the recipient; three the appellant deducted from the respondent's account a total of £7,000.00; four, the recipient of the said amount of money was Walker Movement Ltd, located at Tamworth Road, Sawley- Nottingham NG 10 3 AF, London in United Kingdom for the purpose of purchasing a vehicle; five, despite being deducted from the respondent's account the amount of money is neither with the appellant nor with the respondent nor with the recipient. The question is where did that money go. Considering the 1s t ground of appeal, we find no difficulty to agree with the appellant that the respondent who was the plaintiff at trial had a burden of proof on his claim. It is settled general rule of law that he who alleges must prove the allegations. The rule finds a backing from section 110 and 111 of the Law Evidence Act Cap 6 R. E. 2002 now is sections 117 and 118 of R. E. 2023 which among other things state: 110 "Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any iegai right or iiabiiity dependent on existence o f facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist' 111 "The burden o f proof in a suit iies on that person who wouid fali if no evidence at aii were given on either side" See also the case of Godfrey Sayi v. Anna Siame (Legal representative of Mary Mndolwa), Civil Appeal No. 114 of 2012 (unreported). Undisputedly, in civil cases, the party with legal burden also bears the evidential burden and the standard in each case is on a balance of probabilities. The respondent does not dispute on that grand legal burden, only that he performed that solemn duty at trial by producing reliable evidence. M r. Ludovick firmly submitted that the respondent was unable to access the mechanism used by the appellant in transferring the said money to the Citibank, but the one with exclusive responsibility was the appellant. He further argued that, it was the duty of the appellant to ensure that the transaction it initiated was completed in accordance to the international 9 money transfer, including communication with the recipient bank. Disappearance of the respondent's money was within the appellant's knowledge. However, we take note that in customer and banker relationship, it is both fiduciary and contractual. It is presumed that both parties will perform their respective duties with utmost honesty without exploiting any negligence or ignorance of the other party. We pay reliance under regulation 35 of the Bank of Tanzania (Financial Consumer Protection) Regulations, GN. No. 884 of 2019 on safeguarding customers' assets: Regulation 35 - "Every financial service provider shall - (a) be liable for the consumers' loss incurred through fraud ' misappropriation or misuse involving consumers assets held, administered or controlled by the financial service provider; (b) take disciplinary action against employees involved in fraud, misappropriation and misuse o f consumers'assets and report to the Bank; (c) promptly refund a consumer for the actual amount lost due to fraud, misappropriation and misuse o f consumers' assets, unless proved that the loss occurred due to consumer's negligence or fraudulent behavior; 10 (d) require consumers to update their details within the timeline specified by the Bank; (e) create convenient avenue through which consumers can make the required updates; (f) continuously create awareness on fraudulent practices and consumers' responsibility to guide against threats; and (g) require consumers to update their records as and when the need arises to ensure data accuracy and ultimate enhance protection." The excerpt above, places responsibility on the banker to protect customer's deposits and all other transactions unless the loss is occasioned by the customer's failure to act. This stance is not new as we considered similar circumstances in the case of Kitunda Engineering Company Limited & Others v. CRDB Bank Ltd, (Civil Appeal No. 63 of 2013) [2014] TZCA 2185 (17 March 2014). The Court observed: "The customer's duty o f care towards the bank is not limited to the local, domestic level, but it is drawn from an internationally recognized practice... The law is not discriminatory. It imposes a corresponding duty o f care on a banker towards its customer. The duty o f a bank owes to its customer was underscored in Dukhiya versus Standard Bank o f l i South Africa Limited, [19591 EA 958. The then Court o f Appeal for Eastern Africa , in a nutshell, stated the bank's duty o f care... And further, a banker is expected to act prudently at all tim es" The above underscores the inseparability of utmost good faith in contractual or fiduciary relationship between the banker and a customer. We have perceived that the parties up to this point are generally at one, but they differ on the scope and boundaries of their duties. The High Court in this point discussed at length as appears in pages 292 to 294 of the record of appeal that the respondent's duty ended when he instructed the appellant to transfer his money to the recipient. The process of money transfer through EFT, the respondent had no control only the appellant. It is evident that the appellant delegated part of her duty to the Citibank in London to perform her duty and ensure that the monies reach the recipient company. Regulation 58 of GN. No. 884 of 2019 is relevant to the circumstances of this case as follows: "Where a complaint from the consumer involves more than one financial service provider, the responsibility to resolve the matter shall solely be on the service provider who initiated the financial product or service." (emphasis is added). 12 Premised on the above legal position, it is undisputed that the respondent owned an account to the appellant and according to pages 7 to 9 of the record of appeal, on 14th March, 2016 he instructed the appellant to deduct a total of £7,000.00 from his account and transfer the amount to Walker Movement Ltd. However, the recipient company never received that monies. All documentations related to the respondent's instructions were tendered and admitted at trial. Therefore, we have a different view from the appellant's submission that the respondent failed to prove his case. Both in law and in evidence, indicates that the respondent proved his claim against the appellant to the required standard that is on balance of probability. Moreover, the appellant as a financial service provider which initiated the services of that money transfer, in law was duty bound to resolve as to whereabouts of the respondent's monies. We therefore, conclude the 1s t ground of appeal as unmerited. The respondent dutifully proved his case to the required standard. The remaining grounds 2, 3 and 4 raise the question of whereabouts of the respondent's monies and the duty of the parties. The appellant's stance is that having completed the transfer, to the Citibank of London, it had no further duty but the respondent did not perform. Also, as per the testimony of DW2 that after they had transferred the monies to the Citibank 13 and the latter confirmed receipt, her duty ended there. However, the Citibank, later on required some additional information which the respondent failed to provide. In the contrary, the respondent argued strongly that after his instructions to the appellant and upon the appellant's deduction in his account, the interbank money transfer had nothing to do with the respondent. We have inquisitively perused the Court record which indicates that the said correspondences which were required by Citibank was not disclosed and tendered in court by the appellant. Moreover, if the appellant had no further duty, why did the Citibank demand the said further information to it instead of the respondent? Also, DW1 stated clearly that the money was withheld by Citibank for further investigation and the respondent was required to supply further and better information but failed. All said, yet the contents of exhibits D2 and D3 are relevant in the circumstances of this matter. For clarity, the contents of exhibit D3 are reproduced hereunder: "IN RELATION TO YOUR MT199 DATED 02NQV2016 UNDER REFERENCE 0TT081469729. PLEASE BE INFORMED THAT WE HAVE ALREADY PROVIDED THE BENEFICIARY BANK WITH THE NECESSARY DETAILS AND NOW WE HAVE REQUESTED THEM TO PROVIDE US WITH THE CREDIT CONFIRMATION AND WILL UPDATE YOU UPON THEIR REVERT WE ARE ALSO SUGGEST YOU TO DIRECTLY LIAISE WITH THE BENEFICIARY TO CONFIRM WHETHER THEY HA VE RECEIVED THE FUNDS IN RELA TION TO THIS PA YMENT. "(emphasis applied). It is noteworthy that the Citibank informed the appellant on receipt of the required information and that it forwarded to the beneficiary bank waiting for their response. It was further suggested by the Citibank to the appellant, that she should make direct correspondence with the beneficiary to confirm receipt of that payment as shown in exhibit D3 above. The High Court at page 294 of the record of appeal discussed at length on the duty of the transferring bank as follows: "To transfer the funds into the accounts o f the intended recipient either directly or through another bank , falls squarely on the shoulders o f the transfer bank namely respondent (appellant herein )." We find the learned Judge was correct on this point, that the respondent had no place in the interbank correspondence as exhibited in exhibit D3. According to the available evidence on record, we are satisfied that though the respondent had a duty to perform in respect of the information demanded by the Citibank, he discharged them and beyond. He 15 had no further duty to perform. To the contrary, as briefly pointed out above, the appellant had an exclusive significant duty which she did not perform. Considering her paramount duty under the provisions of the law cited above and under the principles of law, we have discussed above, we are satisfied that the appellant failed to perform her duty to the required standard. On whether the High Court failed to consider the evidence adduced by the parties, we have reviewed the entire record in light of the learned Judge's consideration, we are satisfied that the High Court dutifully, reevaluated the whole evidence adduced at trial. Thus, the High Court Judge was justified in his findings and conclusion. Back to the question of whereabouts of the respondent's monies. In this appeal, the respondent is lamenting for his monies and failure of his intended business of motor vehicle. Equally the appellant is complaining that it transferred the monies to the Citibank of London and the recipient Walker Movement Ltd is complaining to have not received the respondent's monies. Thus, every one is complaining, the question is whereabouts that monies and who bears the liabilities? As we have alluded to above, it is undisputed fact that the monies were deducted by the appellant from the respondent's account upon being instructed to do so. The said monies were 16 intended to reach the supplier, Walker Movement Ltd, but failed. We therefore, agree with the reasoning of the High Court Judge on pages 292 to 293 of the record of appeal that the said amount of money is with a third party whose duty to follow up falls squarely on the appellant. In terms of regulation 58, we reproduced above, we find no difficulty to conclude that the appellant had a statutory duty to make follow up as to whereabouts of that monies. Since the appellant failed to perform its statutory duties, it remains liable to promptly refund the respondent the actual amount lost under its control. We, therefore, find this appeal wanting on the following: first, by operation of the above cited laws the appellant was duty bound to make follow up of whereabouts of that monies of the respondent, failure of which she is liable to compensate the respondent; second, the respondent produced all relevant documents and correspondences to prove his claim to the required standard of law; and three, the appellant as a financial service provider failed to perform its statutory duties towards compliance of the respondent's instructions to transfer his money to the recipient. In that regard, the High Court was correct that the respondent had no place in the interbank correspondences and we find no error in its decision. 17 In totality and for the reasons so stated, this appeal falls short of merits and is hereby dismissed with costs. DATED at DODOMA this 21s t day of March, 2026. G. A. M. NDIKA JUSTICE OF APPEAL L. L. MASHAKA JUSTICE OF APPEAL P . J. NGWEMBE JUSTICE OF APPEAL The Judgment delivered virtually this 24th day of March 2026 in the presence of Mr. Karoli Tarimo, learned Counsel for the Appellant, M r. Ludovick Nickson, learned Counsel for the Respondent and Ms. Christina Mwandeje, Court clerk, is hereby certified as a true copy of the original.