Musa Meckior Edward @ Sanga vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 478 of 2022) [2026] TZCA 299 (11 March 2026)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT MBEYA (CQRAM: MKUYE, J.A.. RUMANYIKA. J.A. And AGATHO. J.A.) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 478 OF 2022 MUSA MECKIOR EDWARD @ SANGA ......................................... APPELLANT VERSUS REPUBLIC........................................................................... RESPONDENT (Appeal from the decision of the High Court of Tanzania at Mbeya) Monqella, J. dated the 9th day of August, 2022 in Criminal Sessions Case No. 69 Of 2022 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 18th February & 11th March, 2026 RUMANYIKA. J.A The appellant, Musa Meckior Edward @ Sanga was charged with murder contrary to sections 196 and 197 of the Penal Code in the High Court of Tanzania at Mbeya. It was alleged that on 12th January, 2022 at Lumbila-Iwambi area, in the District and Region of Mbeya, he murdered Edward Merkior Ndonde (the deceased). Speaking through Mr. Mwakolo, , learned counsel, holding the dock briefs, the appellant, at a later stag? successfully offered a plea of lesser offence of manslaughter contrary to sections 195 and 198 of the Penal Code. Pages 15 and 16 of the record i

of appeal refers. Therefore, the charge of murder was substituted and recorded as such, in terms of section 276(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act. Responding to the substituted charge, therefore, the appellant is recorded to have stated; "It is true I caused the death o f the deceased Edward Merkior Ndonde as correctly read in the charge Then the prosecution narrated the material facts of the case, as is required in law and practice. That, in a fracas ensued between them, the appellant hit his own father (the deceased) in head with a stool and stabbed him with a knife to death. Copy of the respective post-mortem report was successfully tendered as an exhibit PI, along with the appellant's cautioned and extra-judicial statements of the appellant (exhibits P4 and P2), respectively. After admitting those facts as all being correct, the appellant was convicted as charged and sentenced to eighteen years' imprisonment, upon presentation to court of the respective aggravating and mitigating factors by both sides. Notably, the mitigation included, among others; One, that, the appellant is a first offender, two, that, he readily confessed his guilt and three, that, he killed his own father while self-defending, just as the 2

killing was a result of fight between them. He also stated that the deceased had initiated the fight, by attempting to assault him with a knife and stool, and hence, the author of own death. The learned trial Judge viewed it as a high-level commission of offence. Ultimately, the appellant was convicted on his own unequivocal plea of guilt to the charge of manslaughter and sentenced to eighteen years' imprisonment. Aggrieved, the appellant is now before us, only assailing the sentence. He has fronted a one-ground supplementary memorandum of appeal filed on 18th February, 2026, in substitute of the substantive memorandum which was filed previously on 05/02/2024. The complaint is paraphrased thus; the sentence of eighteen years' imprisonment is manifestly excessive, in total disregard of the mitigating factors presented. Mr. Simon Mwakolo, learned counsel represented the appellant at the scheduled hearing of the appeal, whereas the respondent Republic was represented by Mr. Alex Mwita, Senior State Attorney and Ms. Veneranda Masai, learned State Attorney. The appellant's learned counsel contended that, the learned trial Judge when passing the impugned sentence did not consider the existing material factors including the mitigation of the appellant which appears 3

on page 21 of the record of appeal, namely; One, he was the first offender, two, he readily pleaded guilty, three, the death was a result of fight, four, he killed the deceased under the heat of passion and; five, he had a family of wife and children which depended on him for survival. To rounding up, while referring us to the appellant's cautioned and extra judicial statements which appear on page 35 of the record of appeal, Mr. Mwakolo asserted that, the deceased authored his own death, having initiated the fight, therefore, the appellant deserved a lenient sentence under the circumstances. Mindful of the legal principle that an appellate court can alter the sentence passed by a trial court, but conditionally, Mr. Mwakolo contended that this is a fit case for the Court to do the needful. To fortify his preposition, he referred us to the Court's decisions in Bahati John v. R (Criminal Appeal No. 114 of 2019) [2022] TZCA 407 and in Charles Mashimba v. R (Criminal Appeal No. 86 of 2002) [2004] TZCA 2016. In other words that power of sentencing by a court would be interfered only in some exceptionally deserving circumstances, as is in the present case. Expounding on the extent to which the sentences could be interfered on appeal, as held, for instance in Bahati John (supra), Mr. Mwakolo contended that, in that case the appellant who had killed his 4

own son unintentionally, the twenty years' custodial sentence imposed on him by the lower court was altered, resulting into his immediate release from the prison. Rounding up his point, Mr. Mwakolo asserted that, the appellant could have not avoided the fight by fleeing away, as suggested by the learned trial Judge in the impugned decision, given the obtaining circumstances. He prayed for the appeal to be allowed, with the seemingly excessive custodial sentence reduced. Ms. Masai on her part opposed the appeal with moderate zeal and vigor. While appreciating the Court's power to interfere with the sentences passed by the High court, which is exercisable but sparingly, she contended that the present one is not a fit case for that, as it did not meet the threshold required. Notably, she asserted, although the offence of manslaughter carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, here, the appellant was fairly sentenced to eighteen years' imprisonment only. The learned State Attorney cited a number of our decisions, such as one in Gabriel Mango v. R (Criminal Appeal No. 42 of 2007 [2007] TZCA 302, to reinforce her point. Upon hearing the learned counsel's submissions, also mindful of the authorities cited, there is only one pivotal issue for our consideration,

here, namely; whether the impugned custodial sentence of eighteen years is manifestly excessive, calling for the Court's interference. It is undisputed, in the instant case that, the appellant pleaded guilty to the offence of manslaughter, unequivocally. Worth noting, is that the material facts that were subsequently presented by the public prosecutor under section 282 of the Criminal Procedure Act (the CPA) are self-telling. They would not suggest any preceding threats by the deceased to the appellant warranting the alleged self defence. That kind of defence only came out in his confessional statements (exhibits P2 and P4). Nonetheless, it is undeniable fact that the appellant caused the death of his own elderly father, unintentionally. It is recalled that, while responding to the facts of the case as presented by the public prosecutor, after the substituting charge for the lesser offence, was read to him, the appellant is on record to have stated as follows: "I admit and agree to all the facts stated by the prosecution..." The learned trial Judge, therefore, considered the appellant to have maintained his plea of guilty and sentenced him to the eighteen-years' term imprisonment. He is aggrieved with it for being manifestly excessive, as alluded to before.

In order to appreciate the material factors that prompted to the imposition of the impugned sentence, we shall reproduce part of the relevant antecedents as presented. It reads thus: "...we have no previous criminal record on the accused... however we pray for punishment in accordance with the taw because it is unacceptable thing to kill your own parent.... the weapon used was excessive whereby he used a stool and knife to attack the deceased...He...had time to cooi his temper...should have avoided the killing being an army officer..." In mitigation, Mr. Mwakolo who also represented the appellant, then, asserted as follows: .. The stool and knife were from the house he did not come with them...He has a wife and5 children. The 1st born is in Form III, others in primary and nursery school and the last born is an infant... Overwhelming is that, upon presentation of the aggravating and mitigating factors, the learned trial Judge viewed it as the high-level commission of offence, in line with the Tanzania Sentencing Manual, as appears on page 23 of the record of appeal. She imposed the impugned sentence. This, is of course irrespective of what might be the motive of the killer, which needs no proof in homicide cases. 7

All in all, in re-assessing the deserving sentence as urged to, we shall consider, among other things, the extent of force used and the nature of the wounds inflicted by the appellant on the seemingly helpless elderly deceased parent. Also worth noting, is that the doer was such an energetic, youth and member of Tanzania Peoples Defence Forces (TPDF). Let alone the vulnerability of the deceased's parts of the body attacked and the number of blows, in accordance with the postmortem report on examination (exhibit PI). The medical doctor established that the dead body bore multiple fresh cut wounds. By all dimensions, therefore, it cannot be said that the force used by appellant was not unusual and excessive, against his own elderly parent in the circumstances of the case. We also note that the charged offence of manslaughter carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, while the appellant was sentenced to eighteen years' imprisonment, as hinted before. At least it is undeniable fact that the said appellant's criminal acts pose a double impact. This should not be underrated; First, he lost his own father whom he cannot get back any more; secondly, the inhuman acts apart, the appellant must have regretted and he is remorseful. However, before we venture into considering whether or not to alter the impugned sentence, we are guided by the general long established 8

principle that the Court's power to do so is not automatic and that guaranteed. It is only possible where the case has met one or two criteria; One, where, for instance, the sentencing discretion has been exercised on wrong principles; two, where material factors have been not given due consideration; and three, where the sentence imposed is manifestly excessive. We stressed this stance, about three decades ago in Yohana Balicheko v. R [1994] T. L. R. 5. Also see- Waiman Julius v. R (Criminal Appeal No. 135 of 2007) [2010] TZCA 212, and Bahati John (supra), amongst a plethora of authorities. The preceding observations apart, we would increasingly observe that in assessing any plea of guilt-based-sentence, at least that one has also to meet the following threshold; One, judicial officers have to be eyes on and hands off, not being over- zealous of the mitigation or the antecedents, in isolation of the other. It is so because criminal justice demands that due consideration of both victimology and penology combined, is paramount; two, with exception of the offences which are scheduled under the Minimum Sentences Act, which is not the case before us, sentencing is a discretionary exercise but not an easy task. Three, it is one thing for a judicial officer to appreciate the being of mitigation presented before him while it is the other thing to consider it adequately before imposing the deserving sentence. In passing, therefore, we note 9

that any alleged excessiveness of the sentence may not necessarily mean its illegality, but rather its being on the high side, as it is the case before us. In the present case, therefore and having considered the antecedents and the mitigation as observed earlier on, we are settled in our minds that, though legal, the impugned sentence was indeed, on the high side. Therefore, had the learned trial Judge respectfully looked into the said material factors twice and thrice, a little bit more critically, she would have imposed a more lesser sentence. This is to say that, this is a fit case that warrants the Court's intervention, in line with a bunch of our decisions, such in Yohana Balicheko (supra) and Ghati Kahuru @ Obosi v. R (Criminal Appeal No 221 of 2016) [2018] TZCA 443 ). Based on the renowned principles of criminology and penology, we are inclined to alter the sentence, in consonant with what was observed in an inspirational decision by Samatta, J. (as he then was) in Tabu Fikwa v. R [1988] T. L. R 48. Accordingly, the eighteen years' custodial sentence is reduced to a twelve-years' in substitution, which, in our consider will meet the justice of the case. Before we pen off, we wish to say a word or two in passing that, quite often than not, in homicide cases, as is here, only penology 10

has been our number one priority, but if, in any other criminal trials we will consider victimology zealously as well, so much the better. In the upshot of it all, therefore, the appeal is hereby allowed to the extent stated above. DATED at MBEYA this 10t h day of March, 2026. R. K. MKUYE JUSTICE OF APPEAL S. M . RUMANYIKA JUSTICE OF APPEAL U. J. AGATHO JUSTICE OF APPEAL The Judgment delivered this 11t hday of March, 2026 in the presence of the Appellant in person, Ms. Imelda Aluko, learned State Attorney representing the respondent/Republic and Ms. Jasmin Kazi, Court Clerk, is hereby certified as a true copy of the original.