Mang'ombe Maige & Others vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 926 of 2023) [2026] TZCA 292 (9 March 2026)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT SHINYANGA (CORAM: WAMBALI. 3,A.. MAKUNGU, J.A. And MGEYEKWA. J.A.^ CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.926 OF 2023 MANG'OMBE M AIG E.............................................................1 st APPELLANT PETER PAULO KIFUTUMO ....................... . .......................2 nd APPELLANT NKOI NDOLILE ............................................................... . 3rd APPELLANT MANOTA CHARLES . ............................................................. 4 th APPELLANT EMMANUEL CHARLES .......................................................... 5™ APPELLANT MAYALA JO H N ..................................................................... 6™ APPELLANT KASHINJE KAPALE................................................. ............ 7™ APPELLANT VERSUS THE REPUBLIC ............................... . ...................... . .............. RESPONDENT (Appeal from the decision of the High Court of Tanzania at Shinyanga) (Morris, J.1 ) dated the 10th day of November, 2023 in Criminal Appeal No. 91 of 2022 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 26th February & 9th March, 2026 MGEYEKWA. J.A.: The appellants, Mang'ombe Maige, Peter Paulo Kifutumo, Nkoi Ndolile, Manota Charles, Emmanuel Charles, Mayala John and Kashinje Kapale (the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh appellants i respectively) together with Mlekwa Mshesha and Manoni Manuali (deceased), who are not part of this appeal, were arraigned in the District Court of Shinyanga charged with the offence of arson contrary to section 319 (a) of the Penal Code. The particulars of the offence were that on 6th October, 2018, at Mwenge village within Shinyanga District in Shinyanga Region, the appellants willfully and unlawfully set fire to a dwelling house of one Pauio Kifutumo. The appellants pleaded not guilty to the offence and the case proceeded to trial. The prosecution's case rested on the evidence of seven witnesses, without tendering any exhibits. The appellants were given the opportunity to defend themselves and strongly disputed the allegations levelled against them, but they too did not tender any exhibits. The material background facts giving rise to this appeal revolve around a long-standing family misunderstanding between PW1 and his son, the second appellant, Peter Paulo. PW1, who was the complainant testified that their relationship had been strained for some time, particularly after the second appellant allegedly stole his cattle and fled to Zanzibar. According to PW1, local leaders, including the first appellant, who was the Sub-Village Chairman and Manoni Manuali (deceased), the militia commander, had on previous occasions summoned and pressured him to resolve the dispute and demanded money for settlement. PW1 2 further alleged that the third appellant had once told members of the sungusungu that PW1 and his family should be set on fire. PW1 testified that on 6th October, 2018, the material day, he had gone to the auction market to sell his cattle. On his way back home, he heard a blast, and upon arrival, he found his three houses engulfed in flames. His motorcycles, fifty bags of paddy, and other household properties were also burning. When he inquired from his wife, Kabula Kazimoto (PW4), about what had happened, she informed him that the appellants, who had previously invaded their home, were responsible for the arson. PW1 recalled that during that earlier night incident, he had identified the ten appellants and had recognized them, in particular, the voice of Manoni Manuali (deceased), whom he knew as the sub-village militia commander. PW1 further testified that upon learning that his houses were on fire, he asked about his family and was told that his two children, Rahel Paulo (PW2) and Rehema Paulo (PW3) went to the police station to report the incident He immediately followed them there. At the station, he found PW2 and PW3 pleading with the police to escort them to the scene of the crime, but the police officers were reportedly reluctant due to fear of the mob that was setting the houses ablaze. PW1 maintained that he informed the police that the persons responsible for setting the fire were the appellants, whom he identified as being ten of them. 3 PW2 and PW3, stated that they were present at home when the appellants arrived. According to them, the appellants asked for PW l's whereabouts and were told that he had gone to the market. The appellants allegedly declared that they had come to destroy the entire family. They claimed to have recognized the appellants, as the incident occurred during the daytime and many of the assailants were their neighbors and local leaders of their village. They specifically alleged seeing Mang'ombe Maige, Nkoi INIdolile and Kashinje Kapale (the first, third, and seventh appellants respectively) carrying petrol while others removed household properties from the houses and set them on fire using matches. In essence, their evidence was that they witnessed the appellants actively participating in the burning of the houses. More evidence came from Paschal Chuma (PW5), the Village Executive Officer (the VEO) and Edward Mahangwa Maganga (PW6), the Ward Councilor. PW5 recalled that on the material day, he attended another incident involving a suspect arrested by a police officer. While on his way to the police station to record a statement, he received information that a mob was setting fire to PW l's houses. He proceeded to PW l's residence in the company of PW6 and found his houses were on fire. They reported the matter to the police. PW6 recalled that he interrogated PW4 at the scene of the crime, and she told him that the perpetrators were a "huge mob" and that she could not identify any individual. PW6 recounted the confusion that reigned at PW4's house and testified that the District Commissioner later visited the scene of the crime, interrogated the victims, but no specific individuals were identified, and the villagers were warned accordingly. PW7's evidence was limited to having witnessed the houses burning. In their defence, the appellants gave sworn testimonies and uniformly denied the charges preferred against them. They disowned, in totality, any participation in the alleged act of arson and maintained that they were innocent of the offence charged. The first appellant, who testified as DW1 and described himself as a former sub-village chairman, stated that on the material day he proceeded to his farm in the morning and returned home at about 13:00 hours. Later in the evening, he heard reports that certain houses within the village had been set ablaze. He contended that he neither witnessed the incident nor took part in it. The third appellant, testifying as DW2, similarly asserted that he was not present at the scene of the crime at the material time. His account substantially mirrored that of DW1. He added that approximately five houses, including those belonging to the 5 complainant, were burnt. He expressed surprise at his subsequent arrest in connection with the alleged offence. The second appellant, who testified as DW3, recalled that on the material day he was engaged in his usual occupation as a motorcycle rider. He stated that he transported a passenger to Mwakitolyo mining area and returned to the village at about 21:00 hours. Upon his return, he met PW1, who informed him of the incident and advised that they should vacate the village. He declined to leave. He further testified that it was only after a lapse of two years that he was arrested and linked to the alleged crime. The sixth appellant, who testified as DW6, stated that on the material day, he attended an auction and returned home at about 21:00 hours. The fourth appellant, testifying as DW7, likewise maintained that he was away when the incident occurred and only learnt upon his return that the houses of PW1 had been set on fire. The fifth appellant, who testified as DW10, also distanced himself from the alleged offence, stating that he was at INtambalale village attending to his mining activities at the material time. In support of the defence case, Frank Shabani testified as DW11 on behalf of the fifth appellant. He stated that he had been with the second 6 appellant on the material day, although he conceded that he could not recall the exact date. Similarly, Robert Mwandu (DW12) testified in support of the sixth appellant, expressing surprise at his arrest and asserting that the sixth appellant had been with him at home on the day in question. Collectively, the defence evidence sought to establish alibi and to cast doubt on the appellants' presence at the scene of the alleged arson, each maintaining that his arrest and prosecution were unfounded. Upon completion of the trial, the magistrate found that the charge had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and, accordingly, acquitted the accused persons as earlier indicated. However, upon an appeal lodged by the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) at the High Court, the learned Judge re-evaluated the evidence, quashed the acquittal, and proceeded to convict the appellants. Each of them was sentenced to serve a sentence of twelve years imprisonment. At the hearing of appeal, the appellants who were also present were represented by Ms. Gloria Lucius Ikanda, learned counsel, whereas, the respondent Republic was represented by Mr. Jukael Reuben Jairo, learned Senior State Attorney. Before we proceed to determine the merits of the second appeal, it is apposite to set out, albeit briefly, the procedural trajectory of this in this 7 appeal.The prosecution was initially instituted by the Republic against ten accused persons on a charge of arson. During the pendency of the trial, the ninth accused passed away. Consequently, the proceedings against him were marked as abated in accordance with the law. Aggrieved by the outcome at the trial court, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) preferred a first appeal to the High Court against all ten respondents. It is borne out by the record of appeal that Malimi Hepa (deceased) did not enter an appearance when the appeal was called on for hearing. Notwithstanding his absence, the learned Judge proceeded to hear and determine the appeal. Dissatisfied, the appellants preferred the present appeal before the Court. Before the hearing of the appeal began in earnest, Ms. Ikanda informed the Court that Manoni Manuali, who was the third appellant, had passed away. She accordingly moved the Court, under Rule 105 (2) of the Tanzania Court of Appeal Rules, 2009, to have his appeal marked as abated. The prayer was granted and, pursuant to the said rule, we marked his appeal as abated. Before us, therefore, are the remaining appellants, namely Mang'ombe Maige, Peter Paulo Kifutumo, Nkoi Ndolile, Manota Charles, Emmanuel Charles, Mayala John and Kashinje Kapale, being the first, 8 second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh appellants respectively. In their original memoranda of appeal, they advanced three grounds of appeal. Subsequently, on 25th February, 2026, learned counsel for the appellants lodged an amended memorandum of appeal containing three grounds. For purpose of brevity, and the reason become apparent in the course of our determination, we do not deem it necessary to reproduce the grounds of appeal verbatim in this judgment. Arguing the appeal before us, learned counsel for the appellants, Ms. Ikanda, moved the Court to consolidate the three grounds of appeal into a single, comprehensive ground framed as follows: "The first appellate court misdirected itself in holding that the prosecution had proved the case beyond reasonable doubt" Submitting on the consolidated ground of appeal, the learned counsel for the appellants argued that the first appellate court erred in law and fact by affirming the conviction on the basis of what she described as frail, contradictory and unreliable evidence, particularly that of PW2, PW3 and PW4. Ms. Ikanda clarified that the prosecution's evidence was tainted with several contradictions and inconsistencies. Expounding, she asserted that there were material contradictions as to how the fire was ignited. She submitted that according to PW2, one Mayala (the sixth appellant) entered into the kitchen armed with a match and started the fire therein. In contrast, PW3 testified that the fire was started outside the house. In her submission, she said such divergence went to the root of the prosecution's case, as it concerned the genesis of the alleged offence. The learned counsel for the appellants highlighted inconsistencies regarding what transpired at the scene of the crime. PW2 testified that the appellants removed all properties from PW l's house; that some of those properties were set ablaze while others were stolen. PW3, however, stated that some properties were left inside the house while others were taken out, and he made no mention of any theft. PW4, on his part, asserted that all household utilities were completely burnt. Counsel argued that if the witnesses were indeed present and observed the same occurrence, their accounts ought not to have been so markedly divergent on such fundamental matters. Ms. Ikanda submitted that another contradiction is related to whether villagers responded to the incident. She clarified that PW1 testified that villagers went to the scene of the crime after the alarm was raised. PW5 and PW6 similarly stated that villagers proceeded there. 10 Conversely, PW4 maintained categorically that no villagers came to the scene of the crime at all. Counsel faulted the learned Judge for apparently preferring PW4's version while disregarding the contrary testimonies, without assigning cogent reasons. With respect to the issue of recognition, Ms. Ikanda submitted that although PW2, PW3 and PW4 purported to name the appellants, only the first, third, sixth and seventh appellants were specifically linked to the commission of the offence. She contended that the witnesses did not properly recognize the appellants. In her view, mere assertion of "recognition" was insufficient; what was required was clear, descriptive and reliable identification evidence capable of sustaining a conviction. Ms. Ikanda also reiterated what she termed a material contradiction concerning the presence of villagers at the scene of the crime. She argued that PW1 testified that upon raising an alarm many villagers assembled at the scene of the crime, whereas PW4 categorically denied that none of villagers went to the scene of the crime. In her submission, this was not a minor discrepancy attributable to lapse of memory or the dramatic nature of the event; rather, it bore directly on the circumstances in which the offence was allegedly committed and undermined the coherence of the prosecution's narrative. 11 The learned counsel for the appellants further assailed the judgment on account of the delay in arresting the appellants and the failure to call material witnesses. Expounding, she submitted that the incident occurred in 2018, yet the appellants were arrested in 2020. In such circumstances, she argued, the police officers who effected or witnessed the arrests were material witnesses, whose evidence was necessary to explain the sequence of events. She emphasized that the two years delay was inordinate, particularly given that both the appellants and the prosecution witnesses resided in the same village and allegedly knew one another. The record of appeal, she submitted, was silent as to whether the appellants had absconded or were otherwise unavailable during that period. Even those who had temporarily gone to the mines had eventually returned to the village, yet no prompt action was taken. Taken cumulatively, Ms. Ikanda argued that the inconsistencies and contradictions of the prosecution witnesses demonstrated that the prosecution had failed to discharge its burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt. She therefore contended that the learned Judge erred in affirming the conviction on the basis of such evidence. When prompted by the Court on the learned Judge's observation that it was "not necessary to eliminate every doubt," Ms. Ikanda 12 submitted that the law does not require the elimination of fanciful or speculative doubts. However, she maintained that the doubts arising in the present case were neither fanciful nor trivial. In her view, the learned Judge improperly minimized substantial inconsistencies on the ground that the incident was dramatic in nature, instead of appreciating that the contradictions went to the substance of the prosecution's case and thereby generated reasonable doubt warranting acquittal. In conclusion, she urged the Court to allow the appeal, quash the conviction of the appellants, set aside the sentences and set the appellants free. In response, Mr. Jukael Reuben Jairo opposed the appeal and urged us to uphold the decision of the first appellate court, which he described as sound and well-reasoned. Turning to the consolidated ground of appeal, Mr. Jairo maintained that the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. He submitted that PW2, PW3 and PW4 were credible witnesses who recognized the appellants and gave specific accounts of the role played by each of them in the commission of the offence. When pressed by the Court on the alleged contradictions in their testimonies, he initially conceded that certain discrepancies were apparent. However, he took a different swipe and contended that they 13 were not material and did not go to the substance of the charge. According to him, such inconsistencies are inevitable in honest testimony and do not necessarily impeach the credibility of a witness. He further emphasized that the incident occurred in broad daylight, affording ample opportunity for clear visual identification within the meaning of section 67 (1) (a) and (b) of the Tanzania Evidence Act Cap.6 [R.E 2023]. On the issue of naming the assailants at the earliest opportunity, Mr. Jairo submitted that PW2, PW3 and PW4 named the assailants immediately after the incident to PW1. When queried by the Court on the discrepancy in the number of assailants mentioned by the witnesses, he candidly acknowledged that PW1 spoke of eight assailants while PW2 mentioned ten. Notwithstanding that variance, he maintained that the crucial factor was prompt identification, which, in his view, enhanced reliability. In support, he relied on Ahmad Seluke & Others v. Republic (Criminal Appeal 131 of 2009) [2011] TZCA 12 (30 June 2011, TanzLII), where the Court cited the case of Marwa Wangiti Mwita and Another v. Republic (Criminal Appeal 6 of 1995) [2000] TZCA 23 (12 June 2000, TanzLII). When he was further prompted by the Court whether PW4 promptly named the assailants to PW6, the learned Senior State Attorney candidly 14 conceded that PW4 informed PW6 that she was unable to identify the assailants due to the mob situation at the scene of the crime. He sought to explain that inconsistency on the ground that PW4 was acting out of fear in tense and intimidating circumstances. He also invoked the doctrine of common intention under section 23 of the Penal Code, contending that the appellants had a common intention to commit the crime. On the issue of material witnesses, Mr. Jairo initially argued that the police officers were not material witnesses, there being no dispute as to the arrest. When the Court observed that they could have clarified the delay in arresting the appellants who resided in the same village, he conceded that they were material in that regard, but maintained that their absence occasioned no miscarriage of justice, relying on section 152 of the Evidence Act that the prosecution is entitled to determine which witnesses are necessary to prove its case. He ultimately urged us to dismiss the appeal. Having anxiously considered the rival submissions of learned counsel for both parties and having ourseives re-evaluated the entire evidence on record, we are of the settled view that the central issue for determination in this appeal is whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. 15 At the outset, it is appropriate to delineate what is undisputed and what remains contentious. It is common ground that PW l's house was set on fire. It is equally not in dispute that PW1 and the appellants were known to one another before the incident, and that certain household properties and utilities were removed from PW l's house. What is sharply contested, however, is whether all the properties and utilities were consumed by fire or whether some were stolen. More fundamentally, it is disputed whether the appellants were present and properly recognized at the scene of the crime, a matter which bears directly on the delay in their arrest. It is also disputed whether the prosecution failed to call material witnesses whose testimony could have clarified critical aspects of the case. Turning to the substance of the consolidated ground of appeal, a careful and independent scrutiny of the evidence discloses that the conviction rested principally on the testimonies of PW2, PW3 and PW4. Regrettably, as correctly submitted by Ms. Ikanda that PW2, PW3 and PW4 testimonies are marred by material contradictions and discrepancies. The witnesses gave inconsistent accounts regarding the manner in which the fire was ignited, the fate of the household properties, and the persons who attended the scene of the crime. These inconsistencies are not minor 16 or peripheral; they go to the very heart of the prosecution's narrative. Of particular concern is the contradiction relating to what transpired after the alarm was raised. While PW2's evidence suggests that villagers responded and assembled at the scene of the crime, PW4 stated categorically that no villagers came at all. This divergence as to whether members of the public were present further obscures the circumstances under which the alleged offence was committed and weakens the coherence of the prosecution's version. Equally troubling is the discrepancy between the charge and the oral testimony regarding the number of houses allegedly set on fire. The charge specifies that one house belonging to PW1 was set on fire. Yet PW1, PW2 and other witnesses testified that three houses were burned. This variance is neither trivial nor inconsequential. It touches the very substratum of the charge and raises serious doubt as to the consistency and accuracy of the prosecution's case. A conviction cannot safely stand on evidence that materially departs from the particulars contained in the charge. Regarding the manner in which the fire was ignited, a matter upon which the first appellate Judge placed considerable reliance, we agree with the submission of Ms. Ikanda that the testimonies of PW2 and PW3 17 are materially inconsistent. PW2 testified that Mayala John, the sixth appellant, went to the kitchen, ignited a fire, which then spread to all other parts of the house, including the motorcycle parked outside, which exploded. In contrast, PW3 stated that the sixth appellant, holding a matchbox, set fire only to the properties outside the house. While the learned Senior State Attorney sought to characterize this as a minor contradiction, we find it material, particularly when viewed alongside other inconsistencies in the record of appeal. It bears directly on the credibility of PW2 and PW3 and raises doubt as to whether they genuinely recognized the sixth appellant at the scene of the crime. Further scrutiny of PW3's evidence reveals additional contradictions, a point on which the first appellate Judge heavily relied. PW3, in his evidence in chief, testified that all ten assailants, including the appellants, were holding containers of petrol. Yet, amidst the said examination-in- chief, she stated that only the first, third, and seventh appellants possessed petrol containers. This self-contradiction renders her evidence unreliable. PW2, in turn, testified that only three assailants were in possession of petrol. If the court were to accept PW3's first account, it would conflict sharply with PW2's testimony, leaving the court at a crossroads as to which version to believe. The contradictions extend to 18 the fate of the household properties. PW4 testified that the assailants removed all properties from the house, which were then completely burnt. PW2, however, testified that not all properties were burnt; some were taken away by the appellants. Notably, the act of taking away the properties was observed only by PW4. PW3 did not refer to this aspect of the incident. Viewed cumulatively, as correctly argued by Ms. Ikanda, these contradictions strike at the very core of the prosecution's case, affecting both the credibility of the witnesses and the reliability of their account of the events. They raise serious doubt as to whether the appellants were correctly identified. A further inconsistency arises from the evidence of PW4. Our perusal of the record of appeal does not bear out that contention; PW4 herself did not testify that she named the assailants to PW1 immediately after the incident; that assertion appears only in PW l's testimony. Moreover, when PW6 arrived at the scene of the crime and inquired from PW4 whether she knew the perpetrators, she replied that she did not, because of a large mob. If she really saw her assailants properly, we think that was the right and proper opportunity to name them to PW5 and PW6 who arrived at the scene of the crime on the material day and this could have lent credence to her story. This is because the ability of a witness to 19 name a suspect at the earliest opportunity is an all-important assurance of his/her reliability. In a long line of authorities, the Court has consistently reiterated that the ability of a witness to name or identify the culprit at the earliest opportunity lends substantial credence to his or her evidence and fortifies the assurance of its reliability. Prompt naming of a suspect minimizes the possibility of subsequent fabrication, embellishment or mistaken identity, and thus enhances the probative value of the identification evidence. See: Jaribu Abdallah v. Republic [2003] T.L.R. 271, and Marwa Wangiti Mwita and Another v. Republic, (Criminal Appeal No. 6 of 1995) [2000] TZCA 4 (12 June 2000, TanzLII). In the latter case, we stated: "The ability o f a witness to name a suspect at the earliest opportunity is an all important assurance o f his reliability, in the same way as unexplained delay or complete failure to do so should put a prudent court to inquiry." We are alive to the principle that recognition of a person previously known to a witness may, in appropriate circumstances, carry greater assurance than the identification of a stranger. Nonetheless, even evidence of recognition must be examined with circumspection, particularly where the prevailing circumstances were chaotic or 20 emotionally charged. In the present case, PW4 herself expressed uncertainty in her account as intimated above. That hesitation detracts from the firmness required of recognition evidence and leaves open the real possibility of error. As held in Waziri Amani v. Republic [1980] T.L.R. 250, where evidence of identification or recognition is not free from the possibility of mistake, it cannot safely ground a conviction. This doubt is compounded by the unexplained delay in arrest and arraignment. The incident is said to have occurred on 6th October, 2018, yet the appellants were not brought before the trial court until 19th November, 2021, more than two years later. If the appellants had indeed been clearly and positively recognised at the scene of the crime, one would reasonably have expected their immediate apprehension, or at the very least, a cogent explanation for the delay. None was forthcoming. When the uncertainty surrounding PW4's recognition evidence is considered alongside the inordinate and unexplained delay in the arrest and arraignment of the appellant, the only reasonable inference is that the purported recognition was attended by the possibility of mistaken identity. The cumulative effect of these deficiencies substantially undermines the prosecution's case and renders the evidence unsafe to sustain a conviction. 21 Regarding the issue of material witnesses, we are aware that in terms of section 152 of the Evidence Act, no particular number of witnesses is required to prove any fact. However, the law is very clear that where a crucial witness who is within reach is not called to testify in court. Failure to call such material witnesses entitles the Court to draw an adverse inference where such witnesses are within reach but are not called without sufficient reason being shown by the prosecution. In Boniface Kundakira Tarimo v. Republic, (Criminal Appeal No. 350 of 2008) [2011] TZCA 456 (14 October 2011, TanzLII), when considering a similar situation, the Court stated that: " ...It is thus now settled that, where a witness who is in a better position to explain some missing links in the party's case, is not called without any sufficient reason being shown by the party, an adverse inference may be drawn against that party, even if such inference is only a permissible one." We had taken the same position in our earlier decision of Aziz Abdallah v. Republic [1991] T.L.R. 71. In our considered view, the police officers and the people's militia, who were reportedly informed of the incident and involved thereafter, were material witnesses in the present case. Their evidence could have 22 clarified the circumstances and timing of the arrests, particularly the unexplained two years delay between the commission of the offence in 2018 and the arrest of the appellants in 2020. Given that the appellants and the prosecution witnesses resided in the same village and knew one another, and in the absence of any explanation as to whether the appellants had absconded or were unavailable, the delay was inordinate. We therefore hold that the failure to call those witnesses left a material gap in the prosecution's case. Had the first appellate court considered and scrutinized the entire evidence on record, it would have found that the prosecution witnesses' evidence was not watertight. As such we find the consolidated ground of appeal has merit. On the whole, unexplainable delay to arrest the appellants, contradiction in the evidence and failure to call material witnesses, raised reasonable doubt on the prosecution case. Such doubt should have been in favour of the appellants. We therefore allow the ground of appeal and hold that the case against the appellant was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. In the event, we allow the appeal, quash the convictions and set 23 aside the sentences imposed on the appellants. We, accordingly, order that the appellants be released from prison unless lawfully held for other causes. DATED at SHINYANGA this 6th day of March, 2026. F. L. K. WAMBALI JUSTICE OF APPEAL 0. 0. MAKUNGU JUSTICE OF APPEAL A. Z. MGEYEKWA JUSTICE OF APPEAL The Judgment delivered this 9th day of March, 2026 in the presence of the Appellant in person, represented by Ms. Gloria Ikanda, learned counsel and Mr. Leonard Kiwango, learned State Attorney for the Respondent/Republic, via virtual Court, and Mr. Elias Nkwabi, Court Clerk; is hereby certified as a true copy of the original. 24