Katuramu & 49 Others v Attorney General (Constitutional Application 1 of 2016) [2017] UGSC 31 (28 April 2017)

# Katuramu & 49 Others v Attorney General (Constitutional Application 1 of 2016) [2017] UGSC 31 (28 April 2017) [ Share this document on WhatsApp opens in new tab __](https://api.whatsapp.com/send?text=Katuramu++%26+49+Others+v+Attorney+General+%28Constitutional+Application+1+of+2016%29+%5B2017%5D+UGSC+31+%2828+April+2017%29+-+https%3A%2F%2Fulii.org%2Fen%2Fakn%2Fug%2Fjudgment%2Fugsc%2F2017%2F31%2Feng%402017-04-28) [ Share this document on X opens in new tab __](https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?text=Katuramu++%26+49+Others+v+Attorney+General+%28Constitutional+Application+1+of+2016%29+%5B2017%5D+UGSC+31+%2828+April+2017%29+-+https%3A%2F%2Fulii.org%2Fen%2Fakn%2Fug%2Fjudgment%2Fugsc%2F2017%2F31%2Feng%402017-04-28) [ Share this document on Facebook opens in new tab __](https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=https://ulii.org/en/akn/ug/judgment/ugsc/2017/31/eng@2017-04-28) [ Share this document on LinkedIn opens in new tab __](https://www.linkedin.com/sharing/share-offsite/?url=https://ulii.org/en/akn/ug/judgment/ugsc/2017/31/eng@2017-04-28) [ Share this document by email __](mailto:?subject=Take%20a%20look%20at%20this%20document%20from%20ULII:%20Katuramu%20&%2049%20Others%20v%20Attorney%20General%20%E2%80%A6&body=https://ulii.org/en/akn/ug/judgment/ugsc/2017/31/eng@2017-04-28) __Save [ Download RTF (4.0 MB) ](/en/akn/ug/judgment/ugsc/2017/31/eng@2017-04-28/source) Toggle dropdown * [Download PDF](/en/akn/ug/judgment/ugsc/2017/31/eng@2017-04-28/source.pdf) Report a problem ##### Is there something wrong with this document? Problem category *Incorrect informationMissing informationNo PDF downloadDocument is emptyDocument is not accessible on my deviceOther What's the problem? * Your email address * CancelReport problem __ * Share * [ Download RTF (4.0 MB) ](/en/akn/ug/judgment/ugsc/2017/31/eng@2017-04-28/source) * [Download PDF](/en/akn/ug/judgment/ugsc/2017/31/eng@2017-04-28/source.pdf) * * * * * Report a problem __ ##### Katuramu & 49 Others v Attorney General (Constitutional Application 1 of 2016) [2017] UGSC 31 (28 April 2017) Copy citation __Save * __Document detail * __Related documents * __Citations 2 / 2 Citation Katuramu & 49 Others v Attorney General (Constitutional Application 1 of 2016) [2017] UGSC 31 (28 April 2017) Copy Media Neutral Citation [2017] UGSC 31 Copy Court [Supreme Court of Uganda](/en/judgments/UGSC/) Case number Constitutional Application 1 of 2016 Judgment date 28 April 2017 Language English Summary ###### Flynote * Slip Rule Read full summary __ ##### Ask AI Ask questions and understand this document faster using AI. __Ask AI * * * Skip to document content 3. 5 10 THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KOLOLO CONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATION NO.1 OF 2016 _(Arising from Constitutional Appeal_ _N_ _o._ 3 _of 2006)_ JOHN SANYU KA TURAMU AND 49 OTHERS:::::::APPLICANTS VERSUS ATTORNEY GENERAL OF UGANDA::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::RESPONDENT 15 _Coram_ _:_ Tumwesigye; Kisaakye; Nshimye; Mwangusya; Opio Aweri; Mwondha; Tibatemwa -Ekirikubinza; JJSC. _RULING OF THE COURT._ Introduction This is a ruling on an application brought by Notice of Motion under Section 99 CPA 0.52 r 1 CPR, Rules 2 (2), 34 (2), 35 (1) and (2), 42 (1) of the Supreme Court Rules, OR in the alternative under section 82 (b) CPA 0.46 (1) (b) CPR Rules 2 (2),42 (1) SCR. The application sought for the following orders:- 25 1) A declaration that the order of court dated 215T January 2009 in Attorney General _VS_ Susan Kigula and 417 others SCCA No.3 of 2006 referred to as the I" order, was an _r_ 5 accidental _/I_ _slip or omission or was a mistake or error of law_ _apparent on the face of the record"._ 2. An order that the accidental slip or omission be corrected with the result that the applicant shall be entitled to remission on their sentences as per the relevant provisions 10 of [the Prisons Act](/akn/ug/act/2006/17). 3. Or in the alternative to paragraph 2 above, an order that the mistake or error of law apparent on the face of the record be corrected with the result that the applicants shall be entitled to remission on their sentences as per the 15 relevant provisions of [the Prisons Act](/akn/ug/act/2006/17). 4. An order that the respondent bear the costs of the application. The application was supported by the grounds set out in the affidavits of the head applicant John Sanyu Katuramu and Gabula 20 Africa Evans Bright Ronald. **Br****i****ef****l****y they are:-** 1. _The app_ _li_ _cants had all been sentenced to suffer death for_ _various offences fo_ _r w_ _hich each had been convicted_ _2) The applicants_ _'__death sentences arose from their respective_ _25_ _convictions for offences_ _w_ _here court could only_ _mandato_ _rily i_ _mpose a death sentence_ _._ 3. _That_ _w_ _hen the applicants appealed to the Supreme Court_ _the highest court the applicants could only appeal against_ _con_ _v_ _iction s_ _i_ _nce the death sentence was mandator_ _y._ [2] , _'__:_ " 5 4) _That when the Supreme Court confirmed the_ _sentences,__it_ _is only because the court had confirmed their respective_ _convictions._ 5. _That when the Supreme Court in_**Attorney General VS** **Susan K****i****gu****l****a SCCA No****.****3 of 2006** _upheld the findings of_ _**10**_ _the Constitutional Court that mandatory death sentences_ _were unconstitutional It meant that the sentences of the_ _appellants in that appeal were unconstitutional_ 6. _That consequently court revisited the sentences and in_ _order No._ 2 _asked the High Court to hear submissions in_ _**15**_ _mitigation of sentences._ 7. _That by slip or omission the court ordered that the_ _applicants to whom order No._ 1 _pertains, should serve life_ _imprisonment without remissions._ 8. _Or in the alternative_ _,__because of the mistake or error_ _**20**_ _apparent on the face of the record court ordered that the_ _applicants_ _,__to whom order No._ 1 _pertains,__serve life_ _imprisonment without remission._ 9. _That order No._ 1 _was not a logical consequence of the_ _holding of the court that each convict is entitled to be_ _**25**_ _heard in mitigation of sentence_ _._ _10) That_ _If_ _the accidental slip or omission had not occurred_ _court would have ordered that the applicants are entitled to_ _remission of sentence as per[the Prisons Act](/akn/ug/act/2006/17) _ _11) That_ _If_ _the mistake or error apparent on the face of the_ _**30**_ _record had not occurred court would have ordered that the_ **[3]** , ..:._ " _5_ _appellants are ent_ _i_ _tled to remiss_ _i_ _on of sentences as per the_ _Prisons Act_ _12) That it is only fair and just that the ap_ _p_ _licants b_ _e_ _allow_ _ed_ _t_ _o_ _benefit from the provisions of[the Prisons Act](/akn/ug/act/2006/17) on remissi_ _o_ _n_ _o_ _f s_ _e_ _ntences_ _._ 10 The application was opposed by way of affidavit deponed by Elisha Bafirawala, a Principal State Attorney in the Attorney General Chambers. Briefly that- 1) The findings of the Court in Constitutional Appeal No.3 of 15 2006, Attorney General VS Susan Kigula sought by the applicants. 2. The application is devoid of sufficient grounds to merit the remedy sought under the slip rule. Background facts. 20 The applicants were parties to Constitutional Appeal No.3 of 2006 Attorney General VS Susan Kigula and others (the Kigula case). They had filed a petition in the Constitutional Court challenging the constitutionally of the death penalty under the Constitution of Uganda. They were persons who at different 25 times had been convicted of diverse capital offences under the Penal Code Act and had been sentenced to death as provided for under the laws of Uganda. They petitioned that the imposition on them of the death sentence was inconsistent with Articles 24 and 44 of [the Constitution](/akn/ug/act/statute/1995/constitution). 30 They further contended in the alternative that:- [4] , , \-- 5 1) The various provisions of the Laws of Uganda which provide for a mandatory death sentence were unconstitutional because they are inconsistent with Article 20,21,22,24 and 44 (a) of [the Constitution](/akn/ug/act/statute/1995/constitution) because they deny the convicted persons the right to 10 appeal against sentence, thereby denying them the right of equality before the law and the right to a fair hearing as provided for in [the Constitution](/akn/ug/act/statute/1995/constitution). 2. The long delay between the pronouncement by the court of the death sentence and the actual execution, 15 allows for the death row syndrome to set in. Therefore the carrying out of the death sentence after such a long delay constitutes cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Articles 24 and 44 (a) of the Constitution. 20 3) Section 99 (1) of the Trial on Indictments Act which provides for hanging as legal mode of carrying out the death sentence, is cruel, inhuman and degrading contrary to Article 24 and 44 of [the Constitution](/akn/ug/act/statute/1995/constitution). The Attorney General opposed the petition contending that the 25 death penalty was provided for in [the Constitution](/akn/ug/act/statute/1995/constitution) of Uganda and its imposition, whether as a mandatory sentences or as a maximum sentence, was constitutional. The Constitutional Court heard the petition and made the following declarations:- 30 1) The imposition of the death penalty does not constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment in terms of Articles 24 and 44 of [the Constitution](/akn/ug/act/statute/1995/constitution) and therefore the [5] 5 various provisions of the laws of Uganda prescribing the death sentence are not inconsistent with or in contravention of Articles 24, and 44 or any provisions of [the Constitution](/akn/ug/act/statute/1995/constitution). 2) The various provisions of the laws of Uganda which 10 prescribe a mandatory death sentence are inconsistent with Articles 21, 22, (1) 24, 28, 44 (a) and 44 (c) of the Constitution and, therefore, are unconstitutional. 3. Implementing the carrying out of the death sentence by hanging is constitutional as it operationalizes Article 22 (1) 15 of [the Constitution](/akn/ug/act/statute/1995/constitution). Therefore, section 99 (1) of the Trial on Indictment Act is not unconstitutional or inconsistent with Articles 24 and 44 (a) of [the Constitution](/akn/ug/act/statute/1995/constitution). 4. A delay beyond three years after a death sentence has been confirmed by the highest appellate court is an 20 inordinate delay. Therefore, for the condemned prisoners who have been on death row for three years and above after their sentences had been confirmed by the highest appellate court, it would be unconstitutional to carry out the death sentence as it would be inconsistent with Articles 25 24 and 44 (a) of [the Constitution](/akn/ug/act/statute/1995/constitution). Consequently, the court made the following orders:- 1. _For those pet_ _i_ _tioners_ _w_ _hose appeal process is compl_ _e_ _t_ _ed_ _and their sentence of death has been confirmed by th_ _e_ _Supreme Court their redress wJ!1 be put_ _o_ _n hold for_ _t_ _w_ _o_ _30_ _years to enable the Executive to exercise its discr_ _e_ _tion_ _under Article_ 121 _of[the Constitution](/akn/ug/act/statute/1995/constitution). They may return to _ _court for redress after the exp_ _i_ _ration of that period_ [6) _,__J_ , , _5_ _b) For the pet_ _i_ _t_ _i_ _one_ _r_ _s_ _w_ _hose ap_ _pe_ _a_ _l_ _s are_ _s_ _ti_ _l_ _l_ _pe_ _nd_ _i_ _ng b_ _e_ _f_ _o_ _r_ _e_ _an app_ _e_ _ll_ _ate co_ _ur_ _t_ _:-_ **(1). Shal****l****be afforded a hear****i****ng in m****i****tigation of sentence.** **(ll)****.****The court shall exerc****i****se****i****ts d****i****scretion whether or not to** **conf****ir****m the sentence****.** **1****0****(III). Therefore,****i****n respect of those whose sentence of death** **wi****ll****be conf****irm****ed****,****the d****i****scre****ti****on under Art****i****cle****121.** **Should be exercised w****i****th****i****n three years.** The Attorney General was not wholly satisfied by the above decision and appealed to the Supreme Court. The petitioners were also dissatisfied with parts of the decision of the Constitutional Court and filed a cross appeal to the Supreme Court. By unanimous decision, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and by majority decision the same court also dismissed the cross-appeal. The Supreme Court confirmed the declarations made by the Constitutional Court but modified the Orders made by the court as follows:- **1)****For****t****hose responde****n****ts****wh****ose se****n****tences were already** 25 **conf****i****rmed by the h****i****ghes****t****court****, th****e****i****r petit****i****ons for mercy** **under Art****i****c****l****e****1****21****o****f****the Const****it****u****ti****o****n****must be processed** **with****i****n three ye****ar****s****f****rom****t****he da****t****e of confirmat****i****on o****f** **sentence****.****Whe****r****e afte****r****three years****n****o dec****i****s****i****on****h****ad been** **made by the****E****xecut****i****ve****,****the dea****th****sentence sha****l****l be** 30 **deemed comm****u****ted to****i****mpr****i****sonment fo****r l****ife w****i****thout** **rem****i****ss****i****on****.** [7] 5 **2) For those respondents whose sentences arose from the** **mandatory sentence prov****i****s****i****ons and are st****ill****pending before** **an appe****ll****ate cou****r****t, the****ir****cases shall be rem****i****tted to the High** **Court for them to be****h****ea****r****d o****nl****y on m****i****t****i****gations of** **sentence, and the****hi****gh Co****u****rt may pass suc****h****sentence as it** 10 **deems f****i****t unde****r th****e law.** **3)****Each party sha****ll****bear****i****ts ow****n****costs****.** The instant application is challenging the first order on the ground that it was issued in error which error should be corrected. 15 **Representat****i****on****.** The applicants were represented by Mr. Kiiza Rwakafuzi assisted by _MIS_ Carol Namara while the Respondent was represented by Mr. Batanda, State Attorney in the Attorney General's Chambers. Both counsel filed written arguments but were allowed to orally 20 highlight their written arguments in court. **Issues for determ****i****natio****n.** 1. Whether the applicants are guilty of dilatory and indolent conduct in the institution of the instant application. 2. Whether the order of the court mandating commutation of 25 the applicants' sentences to imprisonment for life without remission was an accidental slip or omission; and 3. If _SO_ whether the applicants are entitled to remission on their sentences. **RESOLUTION** 30 ISSUE No.1 [8] , _' 5 It was the contention of counsel for the respondent that the applicants are guilty of indolent conduct in the institution of the instant application. This was because the applicants filed the instant application 8 years and two months from the date the decision in **Kigu****l****a** case was handled down on 21st January 2008. **1****0** Learned counsel contended that the above dilatory conduct did offend the principle of "interest republican finis litmus (in the interest of society as a whole, litigation must come to an end). Counsel relied on the case of **DAVID Muhende VS Humprey** **M****i****rembe SCCA No.5 o****f****2012** to support the above contention. **15** In reply the learned counsel for the applicants contended that they could not file this application on time because at that time the Supreme Court lacked Coram. Counsel further contended that in matters concerning enforcement of constitutional rights there is no time limit. That was why the Kigula case was filed in 20 2003; it benefitted people who had been on death row in the 1990's. In view of the above argument, counsel contended that it cannot be said that this application is late. It is trite law that under the inherent powers of the court and slip rule; the court's jurisdiction is circumscribed and must not be 25 invoked to circumvent the principle of finality of the court's decisions. The above position was emphasized in the case of **Dav****i****d Muhende**(supra) which was cited by counsel for the respondent. In that case, the applicant filed his application under rules 2 (2) and 35 of the Judicature (Supreme Court Rules) 30 Directions. The application was filed 12 (twelve) years after the date of court's judgment under slip rule. An objection was raised on the question of delay by the applicant in filing the application after 12 years. (9) " 5 While upholding the objection this court observed as follows:- "We think that the reasons the applicant is advancing to justify his delay are not convincing, considering the long period of his inaction, and so there was inordinate delay in bringing this application in court The court will refuse to entertain 10 delayed application brought under rules 2 (2) and 35 of the rules of this court unless sufficient reasons are shown to justify the delay. We agree with the learned counsel for the respondent that the phrase "at any time" appearing in rules of this court should not be interpreted to mean that inordinately delayed applications 15 without justification will be permitted by this court". It must be noted that this court handed down its decision in the Kigula case on 21st January, 2008. The instant application to correct the error in the above judgment was filed on 22nd March, 2016\. It is not denied that this application was indeed filed 8 20 years and two months from the date of the decision. It is clear from the record that controversy surrounding the impugned order arose within one year from the decision of the court. One would wonder why it took the applicants over eight years to file their application under slip rule. 25 The reason that by that time the Supreme Court had no Coram is untenable. The above allegation was not based on evidence at all. It was submission from the bar. We agree with counsel for the respondent that during the alleged period this court had Coram and continued in its business and entertained applications and 30 delivered rulings and judgments. In any case even if the court had no Coram the applicant was still bound to file this matter in court, and to leave the issue of constituting the Coram to the [10] , , 5 court. Lack of Coram could not have given the applicant license to sit back and twiddle their thumbs. Another reason which counsel gave for the delay was that matters of enforcement of human rights have no limitation. With greatest respect to counsel, the issue at hand was not about 10 enforcement of human rights. It was about the inherent powers of the court and slips rule where the jurisdiction of the court is circumscribed and where relevant principles have to be adhered to and followed strictly. In conclusion, we find that the applicants have failed to give 15 sufficient reasons to justify the filing of the application after eight years and two month for the delay. We accordingly find the conduct of the applicant latter and dilatory and should suffer the same fate as Muhenda in the Muhenda application. Issue No.2 20 It was the contention of the applicants that order No.1 was not a logical consequence of the findings of the court in SCCA No.3 of 2006\. Counsel for the applicants submitted that the Supreme Court having held that the highest court has jurisdiction in confirming both conviction and sentence and that the mandatory 25 death sentences were unconstitutional could not have issued order No.1 in that form. The applicants argued that referring to them in order **No.1 of****SCCA****NO.3 of 2006** as "those respondents whose sentences were confirmed by the highest court...." was not a logical inference from the findings and holdings of the 30 Supreme Court because the court had only confirmed their conviction and sentence was guaranteed by law. The learned counsel concluded that since the **SCCA****NO****.****3 of 2006** was about [11] , , _,__I_ 5 the constitutionality of mandatory death sentence and the Supreme Court having found that the mandatory death sentences was unconstitutional and allowed the respondents in respect of Order No, 2 to appear before the High Court to mitigate sentence, the same court should have also accorded the 10 respondents in order No.1 to benefit from remission. Therefore, denying the respondent remission was accidental slip or omission or mistake or error of law apparent on the face of the record which this court should correct. Counsel for the Respondent on the other hand contended inter 15 alia that the instant application was devoid of sufficient grounds to merit the remedy sought under slip rule. Counsel argued that the court's order mandating commutation of the applicants' sentences to imprisonment for life without remission was not accidental slip or omission. He submitted that this court made its 20 position clear as the import of the impugned order by adopting the opinion of the Solicitor General on the issue. The learned counsel concluded that the applicants were baiting this court to sit on appeal in its own decision. We have carefully perused the notice of motion, the affidavits in 25 support and objection to the same. We have also studied the submissions of the parties and the authorities they relied upon in support and opposition to this application. The circumstances under which this court is required to apply slip rule under Rules 2 (2) and 35 of the Rules of this Court to correct the error or 30 injustice have been put beyond doubt in a number of authorities. The recent case of David Muhenda **VS Humprey M****i****rembe** (supra) summarizes them all as follows:- [12] \- ' ..•. _ 5 "Under Rule 2 (2) of the Judicature (supreme Court Rules) Directions 51 11-13, This court has power to recall its judgment and make orders as may be necessary for achieving the end of justice. In doing so, it is not limited to rule 35 of the rule of this court, see for example Livingstone 5ewanyana VS Martin Aliker 10 Misc. Application No. 40 of 1991 and Nsereko Joseph Kisukye V5 Bank of Uganda, Civil Appeal No.1 of 2012 and Orient Bank Ltd V5 Fredrick Zaabwe and another, Civil Application No. 17 of 2007\. In Nsereko Joseph Kisukye case, for example, the court recalled the judgment and made clarifications on the orders it 15 had made to make them implementable. However, the power of the court in this regard is not open ended. As it was stated in Orient Bank V5 Fredrick Zambwe (supra) _li_ _the dec_ _i_ _sion of this court on any issue or law is f_ _i_ _na~ so_ _that the unsuc_ _c_ _essful part_ _y_ _cannot app_ _ly_ _for its_ _reversal"__.__This_ _2_ _0_ _pr_ _i_ _nc_ _i_ _p_ _l_ _e_ _i_ _s base_ _d_ _o_ _n_ _t_ _h_ _e de_ _cisi_ _on o_ _f_ Lakhamshi Brothers Ltd V5 R. Raja and sons [1966] EA 313 _page_ 314 _where S_ _i_ _r Charles_ _Ne_ _w_ _bold P_ _.__stated_ " There are circumstances in which the court will exercise its jurisdiction and recall its judgment, that is, only in 25 order to give effect to what clearly would have been its intention had there not been an omission in relation to the particular matter. But this application and the two or three others to which I have referred go far beyond that. It asks, as I have said, this court in the same proceeding to sit on its own previous judgment. 30 There is a principle which is of the greatest importance in the administration of justice and the principle is this, it is in the interest of all persons that there should be an end to litigation". [131 • - _I I I_ 5 This principle was restated in the case of Fangmin VS Dr. Kaijuka Mutabazi Emmanuel SCCA No. 06 of 2009". In UDB VS Oil Seeds (U) Ltd Civil Application No. 15 of 1977, it was held thus; "A slip order will only be made where the court is fully satisfied 10 that it is giving effect to the intention of the court at the time when judgment was given, or in the case of a matter which was overlooked, where it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, as to the order which it would have made had the matter been brought to its attention". 15 In the instant case we are persuaded that the two orders this court made were deliberate, well intended and were meant to serve independent purposes. The two above orders were first made by the Court of Appeal and later slightly modified by the Supreme Court on appeal. The first order applied to those who 20 were convicted under mandatory death sentences whose convictions had been affirmed by the Supreme Court while the 2nd order was in respect of those convicted under mandatory death sentences whose appeals were still pending before the appellate court. In the 1st category, the Supreme Court 25 commuted their sentences from death to life imprisonment without remission. In the 2nd order, the convicts were to be remitted to the High Court for mitigation of sentences. The above intention of the Supreme Court in Kigula case was confirmed in the case of Ambaa Jacob and another VS Uganda, 30 Criminal Appeal No. 10 30f 2009 (SC) where Supreme Court confirmed the differences between the 1st and 2nd order. In the above case, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal [14] • .' _r_ _I_ 5 and proceeded to hear submissions on mitigation of sentence. The Supreme Court held that in view of the decision in the Kigula case, the Court of Appeal ought to have remitted the case to the High Court to enable the appellants to make submissions in mitigation of the death sentence. 10 The court stated as follows:- "We would like to emphasize that, after the Constitutional Court held that the mandatory death sentence was unconstitutional, and the decision was confirmed by this court, it meant that the condemned persons remained with their convictions, but without 15 death sentence. Normally the sentence is passed by the trial court (High Court in this case) so that the convicted person may exercise his or her right of appeal against a conviction and sentence to the Court of Appeal. This was the reason why this court decided that the pending cases go back to the trial court 20 which was now in a position to exercise judicial discretion in passing sentence. It is within the jurisdiction of the High Court as trial court to maintain the death sentence even after receiving submission in mitigation. The convicted persons as indicted, could then still appeal to the Court of Appeal against sentence" 25 It is clear from the above passage and decision in the Kigula case that the above two orders of the Supreme Court were in respect of two categories of cases; I" order was in respect of convicts whose death sentences had gone through the appeal processes and had been confirmed by the Supreme Court and were waiting 30 execution. Due to their pleas of death syndrome, they were saved from execution by the court deliberately substituting their sentence with one of life without remission. For the second category, their appeals were still pending in either the Court of [15] _. .. • I 5 Appeal or Supreme Court; they were referred to the High Court for mitigation of their sentences. In the same vein, we also find that there was no mistake on the face of the record. It was a manifest intention of the Court when it made the first order commuting sentence from death to life **10** imprisonment without remission for convicts whose death sentences had been confirmed by the Supreme Court. This was logical because their cases could not be remitted to the High Court for mitigation. An error or mistake on the face of the record would have occurred under the 1st order if the court had allowed the execution to be carried on after concluding that mandatory death sentence was unconstitutional. In view of the above analysis, we find that this application is - misconceived and untenable under rule 2 (2) and 35 of the 20 Supreme Court Rules. It is an attempt to induce this court to correct a mistake arising from misunderstanding law with regard to remission under [the Prisons Act](/akn/ug/act/2006/17). To do so, would tantamount to the court sitting on appeal in its own judgment. In **Ahmed** Kawoya **Kanga VS Banga Aggrey Fred [2007] KALR 164,** it was 25 held as follows:- "The **error o****r****omission must be an erro****r in****express****i****ng manifest** **intention of the court. Co****u****rt cannot correct a mistake of its own** **i****n****l****aw o****r****otherw****i****se eve****n****where apparent on the face of the** **record. Under s****li****p Ru****l****e court cannot correct a m****i****stake arising** **30****from****i****ts misunde****r****stand****i****ng of the law****"** In the result, we find that the instant application is devoid of sufficient grounds to merit remedy sought under slip rule. [16] " " - . " 5 **Issue No.3** We are of the view that issue No.2 disposes of issue NO.3. We would only add that remission would only be available in the circumstances after presidential prerogative of mercy under Article 121 of [the Constitution](/akn/ug/act/statute/1995/constitution). 10 In conclusion, we find that the present application attempts to implore this court to correct what the applicants perceive to be a misunderstanding by the court of the law on mitigation of sentences under [the Prisons Act](/akn/ug/act/2006/17) which is not tenable under the Slip rule. The application is dismissed. 15 In the interest of justice parties should bear their own costs. Dated at Kololo this 28th day of.. April 2017 Hon. Justice Jotham Tumwesigye, JSC 20 Hon. Justice Dr. Esther Kisaakye, JSC 25 30 Hon. Justice Augustine Nshimye, JSC Han. Justice Eldad Mwangusya, JSC Hon. Justice OPio-Aweri, JSC Hon. Justice Faith Mwondha, JSC Hon. Justice Prof. Dr. Lillian Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza, JSC [17) 3. ·, .• /, -.s' We also find that the present application attempts to implore this court to correct what the applicants perceive to be a 10 misunderstanding by the court of the law on mitigation of sentences under [the Prisons Act](/akn/ug/act/2006/17) which is not tenable under the Slip rule, The application is dismissed. In the interest of justice parties should bear their own costs. 3. 4. 15 20 25 30 35 _.__**28th**_ _April_ Dated at Kololo this day of. 2017 Hon. Justice Dr. Esther Kisaakye, JSC Hon. Justice Opio-A Hon. Justice Faith Mwondha, JSC Hon. Justice Prof. Dr. Lillian Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza, JSC #### __Related documents #### More documents like this one ▲ To the top >