Prosper Makuru vs Anna Munisi (Civil Appeal No. 1358 of 2024) [2026] TZCA 225 (3 March 2026)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT ARUSHA fCORAM: MWANDAMBO, J.A.. MWAMPASHI. 3.A. And MLACHA. J J U CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1358 OF 2024 PROSPER MAKURU ............ ....................................... APPELLANT VERSUS ANNA MUNISI..................................................................... RESPONDENT (Appeal from the ruling and of the High Court of Tanzania, at Arusha) (MassenaL 3) dated the 13th day of January, 2016 in Misc. Civil Application No. 247 of 2015 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 2n d 813rd March, 2026 MWANDAMBO, J.A.: The appellant, Prosper Makuru was aggrieved by the decision of the High Court sitting at Arusha in Misc. Civil Application No. 247 of 2015 dismissing his application for extension of time to apply for revision of the decision of the District Court in an appeal from Arusha Urban Primary Court in Probate and Administration Cause No 110 of 2005. Briefly, the appellant petitioned for the grant of letters of administration in the Probate matter involving the estate of the late Paulo Makuru who died intestate. On 16 December 2005, the Primary Court i granted the petition. It granted the appellant letters of administration to administer the estate of the deceased. In the course of the administration, the appellant encountered snags in relation to some of the properties believed to be part of the estate but he could not collect them because they were allegedly distributed and transferred to the persons who held them by the deceased before his demise. In what appears to be execution proceedings in the matter, the Primary Court made a determination that the properties already transferred by the deceased before his death should not be disturbed and the administrator should only deal with the properties which were not yet transferred or distributed by the deceased. That aggrieved the appellant who unsuccessfully appealed to the District Court of Arusha in Civil Appeal No. 8 of 2005. The decision of the District Court was made on 30 October 2007. Thereafter, a lot of water passed under the bridge but suffice to say that, the application for extension of time for revision was made to the High Court on 4 December 2015. On 13 January 2016, the court dismissed it for lack of merit, hence the instant appeal predicated upon two grounds of appeal. Ms. Christine Kimale and Mr. Ipanga Kimaay, learned advocates appeared at the hearing of the appeal representing the appellant and respondent, respectively. Before the hearing kicked off, the Court invited the [earned counsel to address it on the issue whether the appellant had locus standi in the proceedings before the District Court which gave rise to the application before the High Court whose decision is challenged in this appeal. Ms. Kimale readily conceded appellant's lack of locus standi. She argued, rightly so, that, in so far as the appellant was appointed as administrator of the deceased's estate, he was bound to commence proceedings as an administrator rather than in his individual capacity as it were. The learned advocate was forthright that, in consequence, the proceedings commenced by the appellant in the District Court in Civil Appeal No. 8 of 2005 and the application for extension of time for revision before the High Court in Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 247 of 2015 were a nullity, so were the decisions from them, the impugned decision included. She thus invited the Court to invoke its revisional power vested in it by section 6 (2) of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act (the AJA) and declare the said proceedings a nullity resulting in quashing the resultant decisions including the ruling from which the instant appeal has emanated. Mr. Kimaay shared similar views but urged that the order should not extend to the proceedings before the Primary Court. Since the appeal has originated in the Primary Court in the petition for the grant of letters of administration which were indeed granted to the appellant, the law applicable was no other than the Fifth Schedule to the Magistrate's Courts Act (" the MCA") which vests the Primary Court Powers to appoint administrators of estates of deceased persons where the law applicable to the deceased is Islamic or customary law. It is pertinent that, after the Primary Court had granted letters to the appellant as the administrator of the estate, he became the personal legal representative of the deceased and whatever he did in the administration of the estate, was done in a representative capacity consistent with the Court's decision in Abbas Ally Athuman Bantulaki & . Another v. Kelvin Victor Mahity [2022] TZCA 509. Flowing from the above, the appellant had right to bring and defend proceedings which included appeals on behalf of the estate which he was appointed to administer pursuant to the letters of administration granted to him by Arusha Urban Primary Court. That means, as the Primary Court made a decision prejudicial to the estate, the appellant had right to appeal against that decision in his capacity as a personal legal representative of the deceased. Approaching the District Court in his personal capacity was without locus standi. The phrase locus standi was succinctly explained by Samatta, JK (as he then was) in Lujuna Shubi Ballonzi, Senior v. Registered Trustees of Chama cha Mapinduzi [1996] T.L.R. 203 thus: In this country, locus standi is governed by common iaw. According to that law, in order to maintain proceedings successfully, a plaintiffor an applicant must show not only that the court has power to determine the issue but also that he is entitled to bring the matter before the court... Courts do not have power to determine issues of genera! interest... They can only accord protection to interests which are regarded as being entitled to legal recognition. They will thus not make any determination of any issue that is academic, hypothetical, premature or dead. Because a court is a court o fjustice and not an academy of law, to maintain an action... a litigant must assert interference with or deprivation of, or threat o f interference with or deprivation of a right or interest which the law takes cognizance o f Since court will protect only enforceable interests, nebulous or shadow interests do not suffice for the purpose of suing or making an application..." (at page 208.] The Supreme Court of Malawi in The Attorney General v. Malawi Congress Party and Another, Civil Appeal No. 32 of 1996 quoted with approval in The Registered Trustee of Sos Children's Villages Tanzania v. Igenge Charles & Others [2022] TZCA 428 put it in the following words:- '’Locus standi is a jurisdictional issue, it is a rule o f equality that a person cannot maintain a suit or action unless he has an interest in the subject of it, that is to say, unless he stands in sufficiently dose relation to it so as to give a right which requires prosecution or infringement o f which he brings the action ." There can be no doubt that, by instituting Civil Appeal No. 8 of 2005 in his personal capacity rather than in the representative capacity, the appellant had no locus standi and, the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain and determine that appeal. Apparently, the same error continued before the High Court in the application for extension of time to apply for revision determined on the assumption that the appellant had locus standi to take out proceedings in his personal capacity. As conceded by both learned counsel, the proceedings before the District Court were a nullity from which no valid decision could have been made. Accordingly, in the exercise of the Court's power vested in it by section 6 (2) of the AJA, the proceedings of the High Court and the resultant decision from which the appeal has arisen together with the proceedings of the District Court of Arusha in Civil Appeal No. 8 of 2005 and the judgment from it are hereby quashed for being a nullity. That said, the appeal from the decision we have held to be a nullity is struck out. Any person interested in challenging the decision of the Arusha Urban Primary Court Probate and Administration Cause No. 110 of 6 2005 shall be at liberty to do so in accordance with the law. We make no order as to costs. Order accordingly. DATED at ARUSHA this 3r d day of March, 2026. L. J. S. MWANDAMBO JUSTICE OF APPEAL A. M. MWAMPASHI JUSTICE OF APPEAL L. M. MLACHA JUSTICE OF APPEAL The Judgment delivered this 3r d day of March 2026 in the presence of Mr. Brian Steven Kimbele, learned Counsel holding briefs for Ms. Christine Kimale, learned Counsel for the Appellant and Mr. Ipanga Kimaay, learned Counsel for the Respondent and Mr. Fahmi Karemwa, Court clerk, is hereby certified as a true copy of the original. R. W. CHAUNGU ^ DEPUTY REGISTRAR COURT OF APPEAL