Bahati Stephano Mgala vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 419 of 2023) [2026] TZCA 176 (27 February 2026)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT MBEYA f CO RAM: KEREFU, J.A., KAIRO. J.A. And NANGELA, 3.A.1 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 419 OF 2023 BAHATI STEPHANO MGALA.......................................................APPELLANT VERSUS THE REPUBLIC ..................................................................... RESPONDENT (Appeal from the Decision of the High Court of Tanzania at Mbeya) (Nqunyale, J.) dated the 07th day of March, 2023 in Criminal Appeal No. 133 of 2022 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 17th& 27th February, 2026 NANGELA, J.A. This is a second appeal. The appellant, BAHATI STEPHANO MGALA, is seeking to overturn the decision of the High Court of Tanzania (the first appellate court), following a dismissal of his appeal against conviction and sentence of life imprisonment imposed on him by the District Court of Mbozi District, at Vwawa (the trial court). The brief facts of the case, as may be discerned from the record of appeal, are that, on the 29/11/2021, the appellant was arraigned before the trial court facing a charge of rape contrary to sections 130 (1), 2 (e) and 131 (3) of the Penal Code, Cap. 16 of the Revised Edition of the Laws i (the Penal Code). The particulars of his charge were that, on 11/10/2021, while at Itepula Village, within Mbozi District in Songwe Region, the appellant had unlawfully carnal knowledge of "ABC" a girl aged eight (8) years old. On the 29/11/2021, having been arrested and arraigned before the trial court, the charge was read over and explained to the appellant. The reading and explanations were all in Kiswahili language, the language he well understood. When he was called upon by the trial court to plead to the charge, the appellant admitted to have sexually assaulted the victim as stated in the charge sheet. Following his own plea of guilty to the charge, the trial court recorded a "plea of guilty". His admission of the charge necessitated a full disclosure of the facts constituting the offence. The facts read over to the appellant disclosed the place where the offence was committed, the name and age of the victim, the circumstances under which the offence was perpetrated, the condition in which the victim was left, and how, upon reaching home, she informed her mother of what had transpired. The facts further revealed that, the victim's mother reported the incident at Halungu Police Station, where she was issued with a PF3 and subsequently took the victim to Isansya Health Centre for medical 2 examination. The medical findings confirmed that, the victim had been sexually assaulted. It was also disclosed that, upon interrogation, the appellant confessed to committing the offence and was thereafter arraigned before the trial court, where he again pleaded guilty to the charge after it had been read over and explained to him. After the full facts had been read over and explained, the appellant was asked whether they were correct. He admitted the facts without reservation and did not object to the production of the PF3 in evidence. The PF3, together with his cautioned statement, were admitted collectively as exhibit PI. Upon his plea of guilty and admission of all the facts constituting the offence, which plea the trial court found to be unequivocal, the appellant was convicted of the offence of rape as charged and sentenced to life imprisonment. After the right of appeal had been explained to him, he appealed to the High Court against both conviction and sentence, raising six grounds of appeal, which we need not recount here. Following a viva voce hearing, the first appellate court dismissed the appeal, thereby affirming the decision of the trial court. Undeterred, the appellant preferred this appeal before the Court. He filed two memoranda of appeal. The first, lodged on 12/05/2023, raised two grounds. Subsequently, on 16/02/2026, he filed a supplementary memorandum advancing four additional grounds. However, ground one in the supplementary grounds was a completely new issue never considered by the first appellate court. In Amos Masasi v. Republic [2020] TZCA 1906 (17 December 2020-TANZLII), the Court, relying on its previous decision in Nurdin Musa Wailu v. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 164 of 2004 (unreported), emphasized that, it usually looks into matters which came up in lower courts and were decided. As such, a new matter will not be entertained, unless it is a legal issue, which is not the case in this appeal, and, in that regard, we shall ignore the first ground which the applicant raised in his supplementary memorandum of appeal. Having stated so, the remaining grounds in both memoranda of appeal may be conveniently grouped into four, namely: First, that, the first appellate court failed to consider and evaluate the appellants grounds of appeal and thereby wrongly dismissed the appeal. Second \ that ■ the first appellate court erred in dismissing the appeal without addressing the alleged failure by the prosecution to produce the victim's birth certificate or any other documentary proof o f age. Third, that the first appellate court erred in law in dismissing the appeal despite the admitted facts recorded by the trial court not having been signed by the appellant, contrary to section 192 of the Criminal Procedure Act, [Cap. 20 R.E. 2019]. Fourth , that, the first appellate court erred in law and in fact in upholding the conviction and sentence notwithstanding the equivocal nature of the appellant's plea. When the appeal was called on for hearing, the appellant appeared in person. He elected to have the respondent Republic, respond first to his grounds of appeal, reserving his right of reply, if necessary. For the respondent Republic, Messrs. Joseph Mwakasege and Ignas Urban, both learned State Attorneys, entered appearance. It was Mr. Urban who addressed the Court. His submissions were brief. In opposing the appeal, Mr. Urban gave an overview to the effect that all the grounds were devoid of merit and ought to be dismissed. He submitted that the appellant was convicted on his own plea of guilty, which was unequivocal. He further contended that, under section 381 of the Criminal Procedure Act, [Cap. 20 R.E 2023] (the CPA), an appeal arising from a plea of guilty is circumscribed by statutory conditions, which must be strictly satisfied. Addressing the first ground of appeal, Mr. Urban maintained that it lacked merit. Referring to pages 24 to 28 of the record of appeal, he submitted that the first appellate court duly considered all the grounds advanced before it and concluded that, the appellant had been properly convicted and sentenced on the basis of his own unequivocal plea of guilty. He accordingly, urged this Court to uphold the concurrent findings of the two courts below. We have carefully examined the first ground of appeal and are in agreement with Mr. Urban's submissions. The record of appeal, particularly at pages 25 to 28, shows that, the first appellate court distilled the several grounds advanced before it into a single decisive issue — whether the appellant's plea of guilty was unequivocal. Upon evaluating the circumstances of the case and the applicable law, it was satisfied that the plea was indeed unequivocal and consequently dismissed the appeal. As correctly argued by Mr. Urban, therefore, the mere dismissal of an appeal does not, without more, signify that the grounds advanced were not considered. That position was affirmed by this Court in Kelvin S.O. Kelvin Nyondo v. Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 528 of 2021) [2024] TZCA 1255 (11 December 2024, TANZLII). We reiterate that principle here. Accordingly, the first ground of appeal is dismissed for want of merit. Concerning the second ground of appeal, the appellant's complaint is about failure by the prosecution to tender documentary evidence proving the age of the victim. Mr. Urban submitted that, this complaint is misconceived, as the conviction was founded on the appellant's own unequivocal plea of guilty, thereby obviating the need for further proof. He relied on the decision in Joel Mwangambako v. Republic [2020] T7CA, 1880 (27 November, 2020 -TANZLII) to bolster his submission. For our part, we find Mr. Urban's submission to correctly state the law. Where an appellant is convicted on his own plea of guilty, no further proof is required. That position was affirmed in Joel Mwangambako v. Republic (supra), where the Court stated that: "... the applicable procedure when an accused person pleads guilty to a charged offence, as stated in numerous decisions o f the Court, involves no production o f proof o f the charge but a procedure for ascertaining if the appellant's plea is unequivocal - see the leading case of Adan i/. Republic [1973] EA 445 decided by the Court of Appeal for East Africa. See also this Court's decisions in John Faya v . RepublicCriminalAppeal No. 198 o f2007; and Constantine Deus @ Ndinjai v . RepublicCriminal Appeal No. 54 o f 2010 (both unreported). The fifth ground of appeal is unmerited. It falls by the wayside". Form the above stated position, it is settled that, an unequivocal plea empowers the court to record a conviction and proceed to sentence accordingly. Based on the above excerpt from the Court's previous decision, it follows that, the appellant's second ground of appeal cannot stand. It is misconceived and, is accordingly dismissed. We now turn to the third ground of appeal. The appellant's principal complaint under this ground is that, the first appellate court erred in law in dismissing the appeal notwithstanding that the admitted facts recorded by the trial court were not signed by him, allegedly contrary to section 192 (now section 198) of the CPA. This ground should not detain us. As rightly submitted by Mr. Urban, the provision relied upon by the appellant does not apply where an accused person has pleaded guilty under section 245(2) of the CPA. In Ndaiyai Petro v. Republic [2016] TZCA 210 (5 February 2016-TANZLII) the Court considered and rejected a similar ground of appeal. For that reason, we likewise dismiss the third ground. The fourth ground of appeal challenges the appellant's plea as having been equivocal. The issue for our determination, therefore, is whether the plea was, indeed, equivocal as contended. As earlier noted in his submissions, Mr. Urban maintained that the plea was unequivocal and, relying on section 381 of the CPA, urged us to dismiss this ground as well. We have carefully considered the appellant's contention. Section 381 of the CPA bars appeals in cases where an accused person has pleaded guilty and been convicted on that plea, save as to the legality of the sentence. Nonetheless, it is settled that an appeal may lie in exceptional circumstances. In Amani Onesmo @ Rume v. Republic [2023] TZCA 17677 (29 September 2023- TANZLII), the Court cited with approval the decision in Lawrence Mpinga v. Republic [1983] T.L.R. 166, which, at page 168, set out the criteria under which a conviction based on a plea of guilty may be assailed by way of an appeal. In that decision, it was settled that, if a plea of guilty is to be considered unequivocal, it must be free from the following: 1. That, even taking into consideration the admitted facts, the piea was imperfect\ ambiguous or unfinished and for that reason, the low er court erred in iaw in treating it as a piea o f guilty; 2. That, the appellant pleaded guilty as a result of mistake or misapprehension; 3. That, the charge laid at the appellant's door disclosed no offence known to law; and 9 4. That, upon the admitted facts the appellant could not in law have been convicted of the offence charged. The above four criteria have been consistently adopted by this Court in numerous decisions. See, for instance, Amos Masasi v. Republic [2020] TZCA 1906 (17 December 2020: TANZLII) and Charles s/o Samwel Mbise v. Republic [2021] TZCA 151 (29 April 2021: TANZLII), among others. Guided by the foregoing criteria and upon consideration of what transpired before the trial court, the issue that arises is whether the appellant's plea was unequivocal. At the outset, we reiterate that, an accused person may only be convicted on his own plea of guilty where the court is satisfied that the plea is unequivocal. As this Court stated in Charles Mbise v. R (supra), citing its earlier decision in Ndaiyai Petro v. Republic (supra), the trial court must ascertain not only that the accused understood the charge, but also that, he accepted as correct the facts constituting all the ingredients of the offence charged. In the present appeal, we entertain no doubt that, the appellant's plea was unequivocal. First, as earlier observed, he pleaded to the charge after it had been read over and fully explained to him in Kiswahili, a language with which he is conversant. This is borne out by page 3 of the record of appeal, where the trial court recorded as follows: Court: Charge read over to the accused and fully explained to him in Swahili language, well understood to him and asked to plead thereto as follows: Accused Reply: It is true. I did have carnal knowledge o f the victim stated in the charge unlawfully". Furthermore, at page 4 to 5 of the same record, the brief facts of the case were read over and explained to the appellant by the prosecution. The appellant response to the facts was as follows: " What the public prosecutor has said is true and correct and I have no objection over the PF3 and the cautioned statement tendered". Considering the evidence on record in this appeal, we are satisfied that, the appellant not only understood the charge as laid before him, but also that it disclosed an offence known to law and, he had no defence to it. Moreover, the brief facts, which were read over and explained to him, contained all the necessary ingredients of the offence with which he was charged, and he accepted them as accurately stating what transpired. li In the circumstances, it cannot be argued that his plea was equivocal. We find that the plea was unequivocal and, that, the appellant was therefore properly found guilty, convicted, and sentenced by the trial court. Accordingly, we dismiss the fourth ground of appeal. In the upshot of all that, we find the entire appeal to be devoid of merit. We consequently dismiss it, in its entirety. DATED at MBEYA this 27th day of February, 2026. Judgement delivered this 27th day of February, 2026 in the presence of the Appellant in person, Ms. Mwajabu Tengeneza, learned Principal State Attorney for the respondent/Republic via virtual court and Ms. Christina Mwanandenje, Court Clerk; is hereby certified as a true copy of the origmal,-. R. J. KEREFU JUSTICE OF APPEAL L. G. KAIRO JUSTICE OF APPEAL D. J. NANGELA JUSTICE OF APPEAL W. A. HAMZA DEPUTY REGISTRAR COURT OF APPEAL 12