Pentecostal Assemblies of God Ltd v Transsahara International (U) Ltd and Another (Civil Appeal 10 of 2010) [2012] UGSC 17 (21 November 2012)

- t t ! THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THB SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA CIVIL APPf,AL NO. IO OF 2OIO BETWEtrN PENTECOSTAL ASSEMBLIES OF GOD LTD............. APPELLANT/JUDGMENT CREDITOR AND TRANSSAHARA I NTERNATIONA L (u) LTD. .... RESPONDENT/JUDGMENT DEBTOR 2. TIIE T]NITED NATIONS AFRICAN INSTITUTE FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRIME AND TREATMENT oF OFFENDERS (UNAFRT) RESPONDENT/OB.IECTOR I lApped arisingfrom the Judgntent of the Courl of.Appeol (Mpagi-Blhigeine, Engwott, Kitumba, JJ.A.) dated 4"' Decctnber, 2008 in Civil Appeul No, 23 of 20061. This is a second appeal against the Judgment of the Court of Appeal in Civil Appeal No. 23 of 2006 which upheld the ruling of the High Court releasing from attachrnent a Park Yard belonging to ttre respondent/objector, the United Nations African Institute for Prevention of Crime and'freatlnent of Offenders, (hereinafter referred to as UNAFRI). The appellants, (Pentecostal Assemblies ofGod Ltd), had sought to attach the said Park Yard in satisfaction of a judgrnent debt owed to them by the respondent/judgment 1 / l{'OtUM: ODOKI, C.J., TSEKOOKO, KATaREEBE, TUMWESIGYE, KISAAKYE, JJ.S.C.l JUDGMENT OF DR. KISAAKYE. JSC. I f debtor, Transsahara International (U) Ltd., (hereinafter called the first respondent), in High Court Civil Suit No. 71 I of 2004. On 1'r October 2003, UNAFRI entered into a 5 year lease agreement with the first respondent where UNAFRI agreed to hire out the parking yard to the respondent at a cost of Uganda shillings 5,000,000/: per month. Ln2004, the appellant entered into an agreement with the first respondent for the sale of a Toyota Hilux Double Cabin Pick Up at a cost of 40,000,000/: million Uganda Shillings. The appellant paid the first respondent through 2 cheques, which were acknowledged by the first respondent's lawyers vide a receipt dated 30th June 2004. The first respondent failed to deliver the vehicle. On 22nt September 2004, the appellant filed High Court Civil Suit No. 7 | | of 2004 against the first respondent, seeking recovery ofthe amount paid, costs of the suit and any other relief that the court deemed appropriate. On l6'h November 2004, the parties entered into a consent judgment, where the first respondent agreed to pay the appellant Uganda shilling 44,000,000/= million Uganda Shillings, in three installments. If the first respondent defaulted in paying any installment, the whole amount would become payable plus interest at the rate of lloh per annum. The first respondent failed to pay the first installment of 10,000,000/: mitlion Uganda shillings, which was due on 26'h November 2004. Consequently the appellant applied for a warrant of execution, which the High Court issued on 7'r' December 2004, on following terms:- 2 Backsround to this aDpeal I t "By way of ottachment ond sole ofiudgment debtor's unregistered leose interest in immovuble property lo b,it - Inland Car Depot (ICD) called TRANSSAHARA INTERNATIONAL (U) LTD on Plot 1, Naguru Rood near UNAFRI, plus demurrage, sloroge and allfees due to Transsahara International (U) Ltd., exclusive of Government taxes lo recover Uganda shillings 48,000,000t plus cosls of ereculion eslimaled value of Uganda shillings 50,000,000ts" By the time the warrant of attachment was issued, UNAFzu had issued the first respondent with a letter dated November 17,2004 threatening to terminate the lease agreement for non-payment of rent, which was in arrears. According to the warrant of attachment, no sale could take place until after 14 days from the publication or notification of the sale. There is no evidence on the record ofappeal to show what steps the appellant's counsel took to execute the warrant. On 7'h January 2005, the day that the warrant was retumable to court, UNAFRI filed High Court Miscellaneous Application No. l0 of 2005. Proceeding under Order 19 rules 55 (2),56 and 57 of the Civil Procedure Rules, LTNAFRI sought for the unconditional release from attachment the leased park yard, on grounds, among others, that: " (o) the judgment debtor's leose with the second respondent had been terminated for failure to pay rent and (b) lhe subject property which had been ottached was not the property ofthe second respondenl, who was merely in temporary occupalion." The application was heard by Mukasa J., who ruled in favour of UNAFRI on l3th January 2006. He accordingly released the parking yard from any envisaged attachment and also awarded costs to LINAFRL t The appellant then filed Civil Appeal No. 23 of 2006 in the Court of Appeal, which dismissed the appeal. Being dissatisfied with the Court's decision, the appellant filed this appeal relying on four grounds of appeal whic[r will be reproduced later in this judgment. The appellants prayed to this Court to allow their appeal, set aside the judgment and orders of the Court of Appeal and the High Court and to also award them the costs of this appeal and in the courts below. The appellant was represented by Kasozi, Omongole & Co. Advocates while Munanura- Mugabi & Co. Advocates represented UNAFRI. Both counsel filed written submissions in support and against the appeal. Counsel for the appellant argued each ground of appeal separately while counsel for UNAFRI argued all the grounds jointly. No submissions were filed for the first respondent. I will handle ground I , grounds 2 and,3 together and ground 4 separately. Ground I of appeal was framed as follows ul That the Honouroble learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law and fact in holding that UNAFRI had legal copacity to sue and be sued. 4 Ground I ofAppeal In arguing this ground, counsel for the appellant submitted that the leamed Justices of Appeal erred in law and fact in holding that UNAFRI had legal capacity to sue and be sued. He contended that the UNAFRI Statute was never ratified by the Parliament of Uganda, as was required by the 1967 Constitution of Uganda and that it did not therefore have the effect of law. He disputed the contention of counsel for UNAFRI that the Statute was not a Treaty under the 1967 or the 1995 Constitution, but a Statute adopted by the United Nations pursuant to the United Nations Resolution 1979140. / Counsel for the appellant futher argued that the Cabinet Minutes of 1617l87 minute 320 which UNAFRI sought to rely on, was only a Cabinet decision, where the Cabinet agreed that the Minister of Intemal Affairs should be responsible for the circulation of the relevant pages on the establishment of UNAFRI. He contended that the minute did not amount to ratification, as there was no mention of ratification of the Statute, which was necessary to make it a law in Uganda. On the other hand, counsel for UNAFRI supported the findings and the decision of the Court of Appeal. He argued that while the Uganda Government had not ratified the UNAFRI Statute as was required by Article 76 of the 1967 Uganda Constitution, which was then in force in Uganda, the Ugandan Govemment indeed signed the LNAFRI Statute on May 23,1998. He further argued that it is this Statute that granted LNAFRI the capacity to sue and to be sued. Let me now tum to examine the legal provisions relied on by counsel for the appellant regarding the issue of ratification of the UNAFRI Statute. Article 76 of the 1967 Constitution of Uganda provided as follows: "(l) Subject to lhe provisions ofthis article, the President or a person authorized by him in that behalf mq make trealies, conventions, ogreemefils or other 5 / Counsel for the appellant also reiterated his earlier argument before Court ofAppeal that the process whereby the Minister signed the UNAFRI Statute on 23'd May 1988 was only an accession of the Statute, and that this did not confer any legal rights on LINAFRI in Uganda. Secondly, he argued that Uganda had also signed an agreement agreeing to host the headquarters of UNAFRI in Kampala Uganda. He urged this court to uphold the Court of Appeal's finding that UNAFRI had capacity to sue and to be sued. arrangements between Uganda and any other country or between Uganda and any inlernational organization or body in respect of ony matter. (2) A treaty made under lhe provision of this article shall be in such terms os may be approved by lhe Cabinet and, subject to lhe provisions ofclause (3) of this article, shall be subject lo ratification by the Cabinet. (3) Any lreaty, convention, agreement or olher arrangements made by virtue of this article which relotes to armistice, neulrality or peace shall be subject to ratiJication by the National Assembly signtJied by resolution of the Assembly." It should be noted that this article, under clause (1), differently referred to "treaties, conventions, ogreements or any other arrangements." By so doing, it is evident that the framers of the Constitution envisaged that these four items could mean different things and that the Govemment of Uganda could enter into any one of the mentioned arrangements with either another country or any international organization. It is also important to note that clause (2) of the same article only rnentioned "treaties" made under article 76 as requiring the ratification of Cabinet, unless they were covered by clause 76(3) and yet under clause (3), "all treaties, conventions, agreements or any other arrangements which relate to armistice, neutrality or peace were required to be ratified by the National Assembly (which was then the Parliament of tJganda)." Following the promulgation of the new Constitution of Uganda in 1995, the execurion of treaties, conventions and agreements was provided for in similar terms under Article 123 as follows: "(1) The Presidenl or o person authorized by lhe President moy make treaties, conventions, sgreements belween Uganda ond any international organizotion or body, in respecl of any nraller. 6 / (2) Parliament sholl make laws to govern ratification of treuties, conventions, agreements or other arrongements made under clause (1) of this article.,, In 1998, Parliament passed the Ratification of Treaties Act, Chapter 204, Laws of Uganda, in accordance with the Constitution. Section 2 of the Act provides for ratification of treaties as follows: "All treaties shall be ratified as follows: (a) By the Cabinet in the cose ofany treaty other than a treaty referred to in paragraph(b) ofthis section: or (b) By Parliament by resolution--- (i) ll/here the treaty relates to armistice, neutrolity or peace; or (ii) In the cose of a treaty in respect of which the Attorney General has certiJied in writing that its implementation in Ugonda would require on omendment of the Constitulion.,, Tuming to the present appeal, the question is whether the UNAFRI Statute was a Treaty. Counsel for the appellant did not adduce any evidence before court to prove that the ITNAFRI Statute was aTreaty and hence failed to discharge his burden of proof. But even if this court were to find that indeed the I-TNAFRI Statute was a Treaty, I find that neither articleT6 of the 1967 Constitution of Uganda, nor article 123 of the Ugandan Constitution 1995, read together with section 2 of the Ratification of Treaties Act, required the UNAFRI Statute to be laid before the Ugandan parliament for ratification, as counsel for the appellant argued. This is because the UNAFN Statute does not relate to "armistice, neutrality or peace" and there is no evidence on the record of appeal that was adduced by counsel for the appellant to show that the Attorney 7 Furthermore, Article 287 of the Uganda Constitution saved any treaties and agreements to which Uganda was a party before the coming into force of the 1995 Constitution. It provides as follows: "Where --- (a) Any lreaty, ogreemenl or convention with ony counlry or internationol organization wos mode or af/irmed by Uganda or lhe Governmenl on or ofter lhe ninth day of October, 1962, and was still in force immediately before lhe coming into force of this Constitution; or (b) Uganda or the Government was otherwise a porty immediately before the coming into force of this Constitution; and Ugando or the Government, os tlre cose may be, shall continue lo be a party to it," In light of the above findings, I have found no legal basis for the arguments ofcounsel for the appellant with respect to the issue of ratification of the UNAFRI Statute. I will now tum to examine the issue of whether LTNAFRI had capacity to sue or to be sued. Having disposed of the appellant's Constitutional contentions about ratification, the issue of whether LINAFRI had capacity to sue or not to sue is a legal matter, which can be resolved by examining the legal instrument that set it up, that is, the UNAFRI Statute. The relevant provisions are set out in the lead judgment of Mpagi-Bahigeine, J.A. (as she then was) as follows: 8 "Tlte Institute sholl have the copacily to General had cenified that the implementation of the UNAFzu Statute required an amendment of the Constitution. (a) (b) (c) Enler into contracts; Acquire and dispose of immovable and movable property; and Sue and be sued." Furthermore, the learned Justice of Appeal also relied on Article IV, section 1(a) of the hosting agreement that the Govemment of Uganda signed with UNAFRI on 15'h June 1989, which provides as follows: "The Institule os dn intergovernmental botly operated under the aegis of the ECA, shull have in Uganda, the slalus of o body corporate with the copocity to conlrocl, to acquire and dispose of immovable or movable properly and to institute legol proceedings. " UNAFRI is an inter-governmental organization that was created in 1988 by the member States of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa to promote cooperation of govemments and other actors, such as non-governmental organizations and academic institutions, in the area of crime prevention and crime justice. UNAFRI is therefore a creature of an intergovemmental Statute that derives its nature, mandate and functions from this Statute. The govemment of Uganda signed this Statute and the hosting agreement. By so doing, it recognized UNAFRI with all the features and powers that the UNAFRI Statute bestowed on it. The provisions cited from the UNAFRI Statute show that LINAFRI was given the status of a body corporate, with capacity to enter into contracts and to sue. This agreement was in existence before the 1995 Constitution 9 , Justice Bahigeine not only relied on the above provision to hold that UNAFRI had capacity to sue or to be sued, but also dealt extensively with similar arguments to those that counsel for the appellant made to this Court. 2 came into force. counsel for the appellant never adduced any evidence during the hearing of the objector proceedings to support the appellant,s claims that LINAFRI did not have capacity to sue or to be sued. He merely relied on the cabinet Minutes, which are not on record for this Court's review. He also relied on the admission by counsel for UNAFRI that the Statute had never been ratified, for his contention that uNAFzu did not therefore have capacity to sue or to be sued. Given my discussion above, I am not able to agree with the arguments of counsel for the appellant faulting the decision of the leamed Justices of Appeal on I-TNAFRI's legal status in Uganda. There is no merit in ground I ofappeal and it ought to fail. These grounds were framed as follows: Tltat the Honourable learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erued in law and foct in holtling that the property was subject to artochment though the oltaclrment h,as never properly executed nor wos there any afiempt to have it renewed. J. That the Honourable learnetl Justices of Appeal erred infact in upholding the objection having rightry hetd that rhe judgmenr debtor wos in physical possession oflhe property as of/h December,2004, Counsel for the appellant submitted with respect to ground 2 of appeal that the leamed Justices of Appeal erred in holding that the park yard was not properly attached, after the same court had rightly held that the first respondent was in possession of the park yard, as at 7'h December 2004. Relying on the authori ty of Joseph Mulenga vs. FIBA ((./), Miscelloneous Applicarion No, 308 of 1996, and order 19. rules 55 and 57 of the civil Procedure Rules, counsel for the appellant argued that the court ofAppeal was required 10 1 Ground 2 and 3 of Aprreal counsel for UNATRI argued grounds 2,3 and 4 together. He supported the findings of the court of Appeal to the effect that there had been no attachment of the park yard. He argued that there was no evidence of attachment at all since the appellants had neither posted any advert either in the press or at the parking yard to that effect, nor filed a retum with the Registrar. Regarding the appellant's arguments that the judgment debtor was still in possession of the parking yard, counsel for UNAFRI reiterated their position that UNAFRI had 11 ,, to consider only one question: that is whether the first respondent had been in possession of the attached property at the time the court issued attachment warrant. He argued that once the court found this issue in the affirmative, as it did in this case, it should not have upheld UNAFRI's objection to the attachment. counsel further argued that UNAFRI had not demonstrated that it had actually re-entered the leased premises. with regard to the issue of the appellant's failure to renew the warrant, counsel for the appellants argued that the appellant had intended to renew it. He contended that the appellant was however prevented from doing so by the court vacation which was expiring on l5'h January 2005 and by UNAFRI's action of seeking and obtaining a stay of execution and by the immediate filing of UNAFRI's objector application on 7ih January 2005, the very day the warrant expired. With regard to ground 3 of appeal, counsel for the appellant faulted the learned Justices ofAppeal when they held that the park yard was not properry attached, although the first respondent had been found to have been in possession as at 7,h December 2004. counsel for the appellant relied on the case of charles Kassaja vs. Registrar of ritles, High court Miscellaneous Application No. sI of 1993 in support of his argument that LINAFRI'S letter terminating the respondent/judgment debtor's lease did not amounr to a re-entry in law. terminated the first respondent's lease. He urged the court to take cognizance of the fact that being an inter govemment organization enjoying diplomatic community , LNARI could not have carried out a forceful eviction of the first respondent from the attached park yard other than serving the first respondent with letters of termination. Counsel did not cite any authorities to support his arguments. Lastly, counsel urged the court to dismiss this appeal. I have considered the submissions ofboth counsel on grounds 2 and 3 ofappeal. counsel for the appellant, for reasons best known to him, chose to distort the holding of the court of Appeal on rhe attachment of the parking yard. The Justices of Appeal held that as at 7th December 2004,,the date the warrant of attachment was issued, the first respondent was still in possession ofthe parking yard. The Court ofAppeal however noted that although the park yard was subject to attachment starting on 7'h December, 2004, that did not mean that the park yard had been successfully attached. The court of Appeal rightfully further noted that the appellant did not adduce any evidence whatsoever to show that it or any one acting on its behalf, ever put up the required l4 days'notice indicating the time, place and conditions of the sale before the sale could take place. The Court also noted that there was no evidence to show that the appellant ever made any attempt to renew the warrant of attachment. Given all the above, the leamed Justices of Appeal rightfully held that the warrant was ..neyer properly executed nor was there any attempt to have it renewed.r' Secondly, counsel for the appellant's arguments in respect ofground 3 of appeal were contradictory and self defeating, when considered alongside the arguments counsel for the appellant had earlier made in respect ofground I ofappeal. In the first instance, counsel urged this court to hold, with respect to ground I of appeal, that UNFARI did not have the capacity to sue. The same counsel urged this court to hold, with respect to ground 3 ofappeal, that the attachment ofthe park yard in satisfaction ofthe first ) I 72 respondents' judgment debt was valid. If I were to follow and agree with the main submissions ofcounsel for the appellant on ground I ofappeal, it would follow that LINAFRI did not have the legal capacity to enter into the unregistered lease Agreement whicl.r gave rise to the interest of the first respondent, which the appellant applied to attach in fulfillment of their judgment debt. In that case, it would also follow that the unregistered lease that TINAFRI granted to the first respondent/judgment debtor was not valid either. The court ofAppeal rightly held that the warrant which had been issued in respect of the UNAFRI park yard was never executed and that there was no attempt to renew it. The court also rightly upheld the objection despite its finding that the first respondent was in physical possession at the time the warrant of attachment was issued. There is therefore no merit in grounds 2 and3 of appeal and they too should fail. Ground 4 of a peal This ground was framed as follows: "4. That lhe Honourtble learnetl Justices of the court of Appeal erred in lah, ond fact in not properly evaluating the evidence on record thus arriving at a wrong decision." In arguing this ground, counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Justices of appeal erred in law when they failed to re-evaluate the evidence adduced on the alleged ratification of the UNAFRI Statute. He argued that the evidence on record only proved that the Government of Uganda had signed the UNAFRI Statute on 23'd May l9gg. He further submitted that this accession did not amount to ratification of the Statute as is required by the constitution of Uganda. He argued that had the leamed Justices of Appeal properly re-evaluated the evidence on record, they would have found that UNAFRI had no locus to sue. ,/ 13 counsel for the appellants relied on the decisions of Kifomunte Henry vs. IJgantla Supreme Court, Criminal Appeal No. t0 of 1997 and pandya vs. R., (1957) E.A. 3J6, to support his contentions that the court ofAppeal failed in its duty to re-evaluate the evidence on record and to come to its own conclusion. I have already held in respect ofthe first three grounds ofappeal that the leamed Justices did not err in fact or law in dismissing the appellant's appeal. The leamed Justices of Appeal properly evaluated the evidence on record and reached the right decision. The court of Appeal's evaluation of the evidence appears in the lead judgment of Mpagi- Bahigeine, J.A. (as she then was) on pagez- 6,8 -l l, 14 -16 and 19-21. lhave found no rnerit in this ground and it too ought to fail. I would therefore dismiss this appeal with costs to UNAFRI, in this court and the two courts below. Dated at Kampala this ....... \K day or...N0--sre^*r$$ 0t2. HON. DR. ESTHER KISAAKYE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT 1,4 ) I THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA (CORAM: ODOKI,\ TUMWESIG TSEKOOKO, KATUREEBE, KISAAKYE, JJ. S.C) CIVIL APPEAL NO 1O OF 2O1O BETWEEN c.J, YE AND PENTESCOSTAL ASSEMBLIES OF GOD LTD APPELLANT/JUDGMENT CREDITOR JUDGMENT DEBTOR RESPONDENT/OBJECTOR 2012 AND 1. TRANSSAHARA INTERNATIONAL (u)LrD 2. THE UNITED NATIONS AFRICAN INSTITUTE FOR PREVENTION OF CRIME AND TREATMENT OF B [Appeal from the iudgment the Couft of Appeal at KamPala (Mpagi-Bahigeine' b\i,- ingn"u, KitLmEa JJA) dated 4 Deceiber 2000, in Civil Appeal No 23 of 20061 JUDGMENT OF ODOKI, CJ I have had the advantage of reading in draft the judgment prepared by my learned sister, kisaakye JSC, and I agree with it and the orders she has ProPosed. As the other members of the Court also agree, this appeal is dismissed with costs to UNAFRI, the respondent/objector, in this Court and the Courts below. at Kampala tl.ris ........3,I . day of Nx-*.=*k* CHIEF JUSTICE ./ OFFENDERS UNAFRI st- THE REPUBLIG OF UGA}.IDA !N IHE SUPREME COURIT OF I.JGAI\DA AT I(AT,IPALA [Coram: Odoki, CJ., Tsel<aol<o, Katureebe, Tunrwesigte & Kisaalq,e, JJSC.J CrwlA No. 10 of20l0 Ileoeen o PENTECOSTAL ASSEIVBT -rF..S OF GOD LTD. 1. TRANSSAHARA INTERNATIONAL 2. THE UNTTED NANONSAFRICAN INSTITUTE FOR PR"EVENTION OF CRJMEANDTREATMENTOF OFFHVDERST]NAFRI ,4d APPELI-ANT/ JIJTDGMENTDEBTOR RESPONDENT/ JUDGMENT DEBTOR RESPONDmUT/ OB.'ECTOR {appa! ftwn the judgmant of the hurt ot Appl at l{atnpla @tpgi-khigeine, frigwau & I<itun1tu, JJA)datd@ m,mUr,.W in Ciuil Appat No. 23 ofmO.) JUDGMENT OF J.W.N. TSEKOOKO. JSC. I have had ttre advantage of reading in draft the judgrnent prepared by my learned sister, Dr. r{isaakye, JSC., and I agree with her conclusions a *rd tl-e orders she has proposed tlrat the appear be disrnissed with costs to uNAFRr, the reslrcndenu objector, in this court and tuio coruts below. Delivered at Kampala this -il day of nL*#'{orz. J. Tsekooko. Justice of ttre Supreme Cor.rrt. Pe.t d t / TIIE IIEIDUIILIC 01' UGrtNDrt IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA [CORAM: ODOKI, C.J., TSEKOOKO, KATUR"EEBE, TUMU/ESIGYE, & KISAAKYE, JJ.SC] CIVIL APPEAI.. NO. TO Of 2OIO BETWEEN PENTESCOSTAL ASSEMBLIES OF GOD LTD :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: APPELLANT/JUDGMENT CREDITOR AND T.TRANSSAIIARA INTERNATIONAL (Ul LTD ::::::::r::::::::::::::r:::::::::::::::::::::::: JUDGMENT DEBTOR z.THE. UNITED NATIONS AFRICAN INSTITUTE FOR PREVENTION OF CRIME AND TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS UNAFRI : : :: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :: : : : :: : : RESPONDENT/OBJECTOR [Appeat from the judgment of the Court of Appeal at Kampala (Mpagi-Bahigeine, DCJ, Enguau, & Kitumba, JJ.A) dated 4th December 2OO8, in Ciuil Appeal No. 23 of 20061. JUDGMENT OF KATUREEBE, JSC. I agree with the judgment of my learned Sister, Kisaakye, JSC., that this appeal be dismissed. I also concur that the 2"d respondent, UNAFRI, be awarded costs in this Court and the Courts below. Dated at Kampala this....3. l( day of 0:l*.r*.-.{rot,o t r. Bart M. Katureebe WSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT o o 2_ ,1, THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA I CORAM: ODOKI, C.J., TSEKOOKO, KATUREEBE, TUMWESIGYE, KISAAKYE, JJ.S.C.) CIVIL APPEAL NO. IO OF 2OIO BETWEEN PENTECOSTAL ASSEMBLIES OF GOD LTD....,........ ...........APPELLANT/JUDGMENT CREDITOR AND I. TRANSSAHARA INTERNATIONAL (u) LTD. .......... RESPONDENT/JUDGMENT DEBTOR 2. THE UNITED NATIONS AFRICAN INSTITUTE FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRIME AND TREATMENT oF OFFENDERS (UNAFRT) RESPONDENT/OBJECTOR JUDGMENT OF TUMWESIGYE JSC. I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment of my learned sister, Dr. Kisaakye, JSC. I concur with her in the decision she has made that this appeal is devoid of merit and should be dismissed. I also concur in the orders she has made. d Dated at Kampala this ..... & day of tuJ 2012 JOTHAM TUMWESIGYE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREMB COURT