Wankuru Morenda @ Rhobi Sanga Isaya vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 676 of 2023) [2026] TZCA 130 (26 February 2026)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT MUSOMA fCORAM: NDIKA. J.A.. FIKIRINI. J.A.. And ISMAIL, J.A.^ CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 676 OF 2023 WANKURU MORENDA @ RHOBI SANGA ISAYA ........................ APPELLANT VERSUS REPUBLIC ............................................................................. RESPONDENT (Appeal from the Ruling of the High Court of Tanzania at Musoma) (Mahimbali, J.) dated the 14th day of July 2023 in Criminal Appeal No. 1 of 2023 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 16th & 26th February 2026 NDIKA, J.A.: In the District Court of Tarime, Wankuru Morenda, also known as Rhobi Sanga and Isaya, was on trial for the offence of unlawful possession of government trophies. This offence was laid out under the Wildlife Conservation Act, Cap. 283 R.E. 2023, henceforth "the WCA", paragraph 14 of the First Schedule to, and sections 58 (1) and 61 (2) of the Economic and Organised Crime Control Act, Cap. 200 R.E. 2023, henceforth "the EOCCA." He received a thirty-year prison term after being found guilty as charged. He has now appealed to this Court following a failed attempt at the High Court of Tanzania at Musoma. The prosecution's account, founded on the evidence of fourteen witnesses and eight exhibits, was succinctly as follows: Acting on information received by PW5 Lameck E. Matungwa, a conservation officer, from a confidential informant regarding the appellant's alleged involvement in the trafficking of government trophies, a team of rangers and police officers, led by Joseph N. Mpangala (PW2), posed as buyers to apprehend the appellant. On 19th May 2019, they travelled to Nyamotambe village, adjacent to the Kenyan border, where they encountered the appellant at approximately 19:30, riding as a pillion passenger on a SANLG motorbike. Upon disclosing the material he intended to sell for TZS 150,000.00 per kilogram, he was placed under restraint. The motorcyclist was fortunate to evade capture at that moment, abandoning his motorcycle, which had the chassis number LBRSPJB59K9015917, but lacked a registration number plate. All the events transpired in the presence of PW2, PW5, and Ezekiel K. Petro (PW1), together with No. F.5564 Corporal Hussein (PW6), Julius Ngapa, and Corporal Mohamed. Msafiri M. Tutuki (PW1), a bystander, was enlisted to observe the search and seizure. Two polythene bags, containing five alleged elephant tusks, two of which were large were seized. PW2 presented the certificate of seizure, the five confiscated tusks, the abandoned motorbike, and the chain of custody record detailing 2 the movement of the tusks post-seizure (exhibits PI, P2, P3, and P4 respectively). The appellant and the confiscated material were then transported to Gibaso Police Post. Subsequently, the tusks were conveyed to a store of Tanzania National Parks (TANAPA) at Seronera for safe keeping. On 22n d May 2019, PW3 Njonga Marko William, a wildlife officer, evaluated the confiscated items and issued a trophy valuation certificate (exhibit P6). In addition to verifying that the five confiscated items were elephant tusks, classified as government trophies, he attested that the total weight was 21.3 kilograms, valued at TZS. 26,475,900.00. In addition to refuting the accusation, the appellant claimed he was shocked when the police apprehended him in the evening of May 19, 2019, and began to assault him without justification. He submitted a medical examination record (PF3) as exhibit Dl, demonstrating the beatings, which said that he was examined by Dr. Gamaga G. Ngonyani on 22n d May 2019. Nevertheless, the report indicates that he was assessed as clinically stable and exhibited no bruising. The trial court found the charge to be substantiated. Consequently, it convicted the appellant as charged and sentenced him to thirty years' imprisonment. Upon appeal, the High Court determined that the 3 prosecution witnesses, specifically PW1, PW2, PW3, PW4, and PW5, were credible. The expert testimony of PW3 regarding the seized trophies and associated evidence confirmed possession and identification of the trophies. The court dismissed the assertion that the trial magistrate disregarded the defence and medical evidence (PF3) on the injury purportedly inflicted by the rangers and police. The complaint was deemed unpersuasive. Consequently, the court affirmed the conviction and the thirty-year sentence, which it deemed to be within the permissible statutory range under the EOCCA. The appellant, representing himself, implored us to allow his appeal based on eleven grounds outlined in two self-prepared memoranda of appeal. He refrained from expounding on the said grounds, allowing the respondent to address the Court first. After separating the wheat from the chaff, we believe that the main points of his concerns can be distilled into the following: first, exhibit P6 was admitted in an irregular manner. Secondly, there was no guarantee of the tusks' identity or the integrity of the chain of possession. Thirdly, his defence evidence was not properly considered. Finally, the crime was not proven to the required standard. Ms. Sabina Choghoghwe, learned Senior State Attorney, supported by Mses. Agma Haule and Natujwa Bakari and Mr. Jonas Kivuyo, learned State Attorneys, vigorously contested the appeal. We commence with the first grievance. The crux of this issue is that exhibit P6 - the trophy valuation certificate - was admitted into evidence despite the appellant's objection to its inclusion. It is indeed correct, as indicated on page 70 of the appeal record, that the trial court recorded the appellant's objection to its admission, citing that during its preparation, the rangers and police officers communicated in English, a language he did not comprehend, leading him to sign the certificate without understanding its content. The court accepted the exhibit without issuing a verdict on whether the objection was upheld or dismissed. In this regard, we concur that the trial court's approach was erroneous. It should have explicitly adjudicated the issue prior to admitting the exhibit. Nonetheless, we are confident that the exhibit was destined for acceptance, as the appellant's objection lacked a legal foundation for determining the exhibit's admissibility. The issue that he did not understand its content was an evidential question. We now turn to the queried identity of the tusks and the chain of custody. Addressing us on this issue on behalf of the respondent, Ms. Bakari referred us to page 67 of the record of appeal, showing that PW3 giving description of the seized substance as tusks based on their weight and features. As regards the chain of custody, she referred us to exhibit 5 P4, which documents the movement of the tusks. She urged us to hold the chain unbroken. Regarding the tusks' identity, Ms. Bakari is right when she says that PW3, a wildlife officer, gave a thorough description of the material that was seized and expressed the opinion that it was elephant tusks, suggesting that they were government trophies. That much is confirmed by the trophy valuation certificate he issued and presented as evidence (exhibit P6). Crucially, the WCA's section 114(3) stipulates that such a certificate serves as prima facie evidence of the issues mentioned therein, including the fact that the subject item is a government trophy: "(3) In proceedings for an offence under this section , a certificate signed by the Director or wildlife officers o f the rank o f wildlife officer, shall be admissible in evidence and shall be prima facie evidence o f the matters stated therein including the fact that the signature thereon is that o f the person holding the office specified therein ." Furthermore, we believe that in this case, the prosecution had adequately demonstrated that the material was a government trophy, and that the appellant failed to fulfil his burden of proof. This is especially true when the above provision is read in conjunction with section 100(3)(d) of the WCA, which places the burden of proof on the accused to demonstrate that the trophy in question is not a government trophy. Regarding the integrity of the chain of custody, it is instructive to stress that, the Court has maintained in its numerous decisions, such as Paulo Maduka & Others v. Republic [2009] TZCA 69, that the seizure, custody, control, transfer, analysis, and disposition of evidence cannot be guaranteed to be relevant to the alleged crime in the absence of chronological documentation or paper trail. We should also mention that this criterion has recently been loosened to permit the use of oral testimony to explain the movement in cases when injustice cannot be committed. In light of the above perspective, we have carefully examined the record of appeal, the certificate of seizure, and the chain of custody record (exhibits PI and P4, respectively). In our opinion, in addition to exhibit PI, which was properly signed by the appellant and PW4 (the independent witness) to record the seizure, exhibit P4 shows the chain of custody record, which details the entire movement of the tusks from 19th May 2019, when they were seized, to 14th March 2022, when PW2 took them and later tendered them in court on 14th March 2022. Furthermore, all witnesses who handled the exhibit were presented as witnesses and guaranteed its integrity. These included PW2, PW3, and PW5. Additional witnesses were PW7 Balsco Charles Kapesa, who measured the material and provided a weight report dated 22n d May 2019 (exhibit P7), PW8 Deogratius Kadendura, the custodian of government trophies, No. H.5262 Police Constable Lazaro (PW12), and No. E.6435 Sergeant Daudi (PW13). Based on this information, we are convinced that the identity of the tusks was flawlessly established and that the integrity of the chain of custody was unassailable. Ultimately, we address the final two grounds collectively. They culminate in the assertion that the charge was unsubstantiated, and the appellant's defence was inadequately evaluated. According to the preceding discussion and as accurately asserted by Ms. Bakari, the testimonies of PW1, PW2, PW4, and PW5, corroborated by the certificate of seizure, which was duly signed by the appellant and an independent witness, unequivocally demonstrate that the appellant possessed the tusks on 19th May 2019 at the time of his arrest, as stated in the charge. Furthermore, considering the testimony of PW3 and the trophy valuation certificate he gave under section 114 (3) of the WCA, along with the appellant's failure or neglect to meet his burden of proof as stipulated in section 100 (3) (d) of the same statute, we concur that 8 the items in question were government trophies. Finally, in addition to PW1, PW2, and PW5 asserting that the appellant confessed to lacking authorisation for possessing the trophies upon his arrest, it is noteworthy that he did not endeavour to fulfil his obligation to elucidate the legality of his possession in accordance with section 100 (3) (a) to (c) of the WCA during his testimony. Regarding the appellant's defence and the assertion of torture by the rangers and police, we subscribe to the High Court's reasoning and conclusion, articulated on pages 205 and 206 of the record of appeal, that these allegations were thoroughly evaluated but ultimately dismissed by the trial court. We are not astonished. The appellant asserted a broad denial of liability, which is simple to invoke but fundamentally feeble and self-serving. It could not undermine the prosecution's case. In the premised, we dismiss the two grounds of appeal and hold that the impugned conviction is unassailable. Now we turn to the sentence. Section 61 (2) of the EOCCA provides punishment for a corruption or economic offence with the range of between twenty years' imprisonment and thirty years' imprisonment: "(2) Notwithstanding provision o f a different penalty under any other law and subject to subsection (7), a person convicted o f corruption or economic offence shall be liable to imprisonment for a term of not less than twenty years but not exceeding thirty years ; or to both such imprisonment and any other penal measure provided for under this Act: Provided that, where the law imposes penal measures greater than those provided by this Act, the Court shall impose such sentence. "[Emphasis added] In considering the appropriate sentence to impose within the prescribed range, the trial court must be guided by subsection (7) of that section, which stipulates that: "In considering the propriety o f the sentence to be imposed, the Court shall comply with the principle that- (a) a proved offence which is in the nature o f an organised crime or one that is endangering the national economy or public property, in the absence o f mitigating circumstances, deserves the maximum penalty; (b) any other economic offence may be sentenced with a sentence that is suitably deterrent; and (c) a child shall be sentenced in accordance with the provisions o f the Law o f the Child Act ." 10 Certainly, section 61 (2) (a) of the EOCCA above directs the trial court to impose the maximum penalty on two conditions. First, where offence in issue is an organised crime or one that is endangering the national economy or public property. Secondly, where the offender does not offer any mitigating circumstances. In justifying the sentence he issued, the trial magistrate appeared to have not been guided by the above provision. He simply argued that a deterrent sentence was necessary for protecting wildlife, which is one of the tourist attractions. On appeal, the High Court upheld the trial court's reasoning, desisting from interfering with the trial magistrate's sentencing discretion. We harbour little doubt that both lower courts were profoundly in error for two reasons. It would be implausible, considering the specifics of this case (involving 21.3 kilogrammes of tusks), to assert that the offence constituted organised crime or posed a threat to the national economy or public safety. We observe no exacerbating factors beyond those present in a typical poaching case. Secondly, the appellant presented his mitigating circumstances, asserting that he was a first-time offender, aged twenty-five, with a family dependent on him. This was not a situation characterised by an absence of mitigating circumstances contemplated by 61 (2) (a) of the EOCCA. Consequently, we are l i compelled to intervene and reduce the appellant's sentence to the statutory minimum of twenty years' imprisonment. In the upshot, we conclude that the appeal lacks substance except as regards sentence, which we have reduced above. Otherwise, the appeal stands dismissed. DATED at MUSOMA this 25th day of February 2026. The Judgment delivered this 26th day of February, 2026 in the presence of the appellant via video link from Musoma Prison, Mr. John Samwel Kivuyo, learned State Attorney for the respondent/Republic and Mr. Shabani Kanyai, Court Clerk; is hereby certified as a true copy of the G. A. M. NDIKA JUSTICE OF APPEAL P. S. FIKIRINI JUSTICE OF APPEAL M. K. ISMAIL JUSTICE OF APPEAL original 0. H. KINGWELE DEPUTY REGISTRAR COURT OF APPEAL 12