Oyeru v Namuli (Civil Appeal 7 of 2008) [2009] UGSC 31 (22 October 2009)

# Oyeru v Namuli (Civil Appeal 7 of 2008) [2009] UGSC 31 (22 October 2009) [ Share this document on WhatsApp opens in new tab __](https://api.whatsapp.com/send?text=Oyeru+v+Namuli+%28Civil+Appeal+7+of+2008%29+%5B2009%5D+UGSC+31+%2822+October+2009%29+-+https%3A%2F%2Fulii.org%2Fen%2Fakn%2Fug%2Fjudgment%2Fugsc%2F2009%2F31%2Feng%402009-10-22) [ Share this document on X opens in new tab __](https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?text=Oyeru+v+Namuli+%28Civil+Appeal+7+of+2008%29+%5B2009%5D+UGSC+31+%2822+October+2009%29+-+https%3A%2F%2Fulii.org%2Fen%2Fakn%2Fug%2Fjudgment%2Fugsc%2F2009%2F31%2Feng%402009-10-22) [ Share this document on Facebook opens in new tab __](https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=https://ulii.org/en/akn/ug/judgment/ugsc/2009/31/eng@2009-10-22) [ Share this document on LinkedIn opens in new tab __](https://www.linkedin.com/sharing/share-offsite/?url=https://ulii.org/en/akn/ug/judgment/ugsc/2009/31/eng@2009-10-22) [ Share this document by email __](mailto:?subject=Take%20a%20look%20at%20this%20document%20from%20ULII:%20Oyeru%20v%20Namuli%20\(Civil%20Appeal%207%20of%20%E2%80%A6&body=https://ulii.org/en/akn/ug/judgment/ugsc/2009/31/eng@2009-10-22) [ Download DOC (127.5 KB) ](/en/akn/ug/judgment/ugsc/2009/31/eng@2009-10-22/source) Toggle dropdown * [Download PDF](/en/akn/ug/judgment/ugsc/2009/31/eng@2009-10-22/source.pdf) Report a problem ##### Is there something wrong with this document? Problem category *Incorrect informationMissing informationNo PDF downloadDocument is emptyDocument is not accessible on my deviceOther What's the problem? * Your email address * CancelReport problem __ * Share * [ Download DOC (127.5 KB) ](/en/akn/ug/judgment/ugsc/2009/31/eng@2009-10-22/source) * [Download PDF](/en/akn/ug/judgment/ugsc/2009/31/eng@2009-10-22/source.pdf) * * * * * Report a problem __ ##### Oyeru v Namuli (Civil Appeal 7 of 2008) [2009] UGSC 31 (22 October 2009) Copy citation * __Document detail * __Related documents * __Citations 1 / 3 Citation Oyeru v Namuli (Civil Appeal 7 of 2008) [2009] UGSC 31 (22 October 2009) Copy Media Neutral Citation [2009] UGSC 31 Copy Court [Supreme Court of Uganda](/en/judgments/UGSC/) Case number Civil Appeal 7 of 2008 Judges [Odoki, CJ](/en/judgments/all/?judges=Odoki%2C%20CJ), [Tsekooko, JSC](/en/judgments/all/?judges=Tsekooko%2C%20JSC), [Kanyeihamba, JSC](/en/judgments/all/?judges=Kanyeihamba%2C%20JSC), [Katureebe, JSC](/en/judgments/all/?judges=Katureebe%2C%20JSC), [Okello, JSC](/en/judgments/all/?judges=Okello%2C%20JSC) Judgment date 22 October 2009 Language English Summary Whether a registered co‑name on title is protected where only the applicant supplied the purchase money and oral evidence rebuts the written transfer. ###### Flynote * Land Law — Registration of Title — Bona Fide Transferee for Value — Application of RTA ss.56 and 176 and effect of absence of contribution on resulting trust * Evidence — Documentary Evidence and Parol Exceptions — Admissibility under Evidence Act ss.91-93 and exceptions in s.92 to prove want or failure of consideration * Limitation — Account Claims — Six‑year limitation for actions for an account under the Limitation Act Read full summary __ ##### Ask AI Ask questions and understand this document faster using AI. __Ask AI * * * Skip to document content **REPUBLIC OF UGANDA** **IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA** **AT MENGO** **CORAM: ODOKI, CJ; TSEKOOKO, KANYEIHAMBA, KATUREEBE AND OKELLO, JJSC.** **CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7 0F 2008** **BETWEEN** **HELLEN OYERU :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: APPELLANT** **AND** **FLORENCE NAMULI MATOVU :::::::::::::::::::: RESPONDENT** [Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal at Kampala {Mpagi-Bahigeine, Twinomujuni and Byamugisha, JJ.A.} dated 6th June, 2008 in Civil Appeal No.15 of 2006] _**JUDGMENT OF TSEKOOKO, JSC.**_ This is an appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal which reversed a High Court judgment (Okumu-Wengi, J.,) awarding to the appellant exclusive ownership of a house whose joint ownership was in dispute between the present parties to this appeal. The Court of Appeal reversed the Judgment of the trial court; therefore it is necessary to set out the facts fully as proved at the trial. Hellen Oyeru, the appellant, is a retired former Permanent Secretary and comes from West Nile. In 1973, a relative of the appellant called Noah Doka together with one Nasur Fadhimula co-owned property comprised in LRV 422 Folio 23 and known as plot No.29 Malcom X Avenue Kampala the “suit property”. In 1977 the two apparently mortgaged the suit property to the Grindlyas Bank International (U) Ltd (the Bank). They defaulted to repay the loan. During the liberation war of 1979 Noah Doka and Fadhimula abandoned the suit property and fled to an unknown place. In order to protect the suit property, the appellant took it over and made it habitable and resided in it. Later she learnt of its impending sale by the bank to recover the loan and sought to redeem the property. On 13th September, 1979, the appellant wrote a letter instructing the late M. B. Matovu of Mugerwa & Matovu, Advocates, to handle the purchase of the property at a fee. By another letter (Exh.P.6) dated 29th September 1979, the appellant wrote to the Bank confirming that she wanted to purchase the property by private treaty and indicated that she wished to get a loan for that purpose from either the same Bank itself or the Bank of Baroda (U) Ltd. She copied that letter to late Matovu whom she authorized to negotiate the price. On 7th February 1980, by a letter (Exh.P9), Hunter and Greig, the lawyers for the Bank, offered to sell the suit property to the appellant at a sum of Shs. 1,500,000/=. She was also to pay legal fees. In April, 1980 the appellant got a loan from Baroda Bank and paid it to Hunter and Greig as evidenced by her cheque Exh. P12 (ii) drawn on her personal A/c No.2992 operated by her in the same Baroda Bank. She was then advised by the late M. B. Matovu, that because of her origin of West Nile, in order to protect her property, the same should be registered in the joint names of herself and Matovu’s nominee. She accepted the idea. All these facts are not disputed. Subsequently, a sale agreement (Exh.P15) was executed between the Bank (Grindlays Bank International) as mortgagee/vendor and the appellant and Matovu’s nominee called Florence Namuli as “tenants in common.” In some parts of the agreement they are both referred to as purchasers. According to the appellant, when she signed that document, the space where Florence Namuli name appears was blank. On 11th November, 1980, the transfer was effected in certificate of title (Ext. P 16.) It seems that in 1980s Ministry of Finance and the Departed Asians Property Custodian Board (DAPC Board) laid some claim on the suit property. The claim was successfully fought off by the appellant alone. This is clear from correspondence from the Ministry and the Board of May and June 1982. The letters were admitted in evidence as Exh. P17 to P20. Two months before Matovu died, the respondent demanded for rent from the appellant. According to the respondent “**Oyeru objected strongly. She said that Matovu never bought the house”.** Following the death of Matovu in 1991, the firm of Binaisa and Co., Advocates, wrote a letter on 30th October, 1991, on behalf of the respondent, claiming for the first time that the respondent was a co-owner of the suit property. This was when the appellant knew the respondent as Florence Namuli. The appellant through the firm of Kayondo & Co., Advocates challenged and denied the respondent’s interest in the property. According to the appellant, Kayondo as one of the executors of Matovu’s estate advised the respondent to call on Kayondo. The respondent kept quiet until 23rd June, 1998, when Ruyoka Agencies, on the instructions of Katende, Ssempebwa & Co. Advocates, for the respondent, attempted to evict appellant’s tenants from the suit property. Consequently the appellant instituted a suit in the High Court against the respondent. In para 11 of her plaint, she averred that the respondent neither paid any money to have her name registered on the Title Deed, nor was she a bona fide transferee. In para 12 she averred that the respondent’s claims to the suit property were fraudulent and set out particulars of fraud. In para 13 she averred that any fraudulent or dishonest action by Matovu be visited on the respondent. In her written statement of defence and counter-claim the respondent pleaded that Matovu had arranged with the Bank of Baroda for money to be paid from his account. She denied fraud. Appellant filed a rejoinder in which she averred that neither Matovu nor the respondent contributed money to purchase the property. During the trial the appellant testified and produced 21 documentary exhibits which were all admitted without any objection whatsoever. The respondent testified as DW1 and called a Matiya Kagwa a former driver of her late husband as DW2. No credible evidence was adduced in proof of contribution of money by either the late Matovu (RIP) or the respondent. The trial judge believed the appellant, upheld her claim and dismissed the respondent’s counterclaim. The respondent successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal. Hence this appeal, which is based on 14 grounds of appeal. The appellant filed a written statement of arguments through two firms, namely: _**Alaka & Co, Advocates and the Law Associates Advocates. Messrs Sebalu & Lule**_, Advocates, filed a reply on behalf of the respondent. In their statement, appellant’s counsel argued the grounds in six batches, beginning with ground 1 alone; grounds 2, 3, and 7 together; 4, 8, and 9; 10 and 11; then 12, 13 and 14 and lastly grounds 5 and 6 together. Counsel for the respondents followed that order. **1****ST****Ground** _The complaint in the first ground is that the learned Justices of Appeal erred in law and fact when they failed to re-evaluate all the evidence on record before reaching their decision._ Counsel for the appellant contended, correctly, in my considered opinion, that although the appellant gave detailed oral evidence and tendered in evidence 21 documentary exhibits to prove how she personally purchased the suit property, the learned Justices of Appeal hardly referred to her evidence and the exhibits except where exhibits were favourable to the respondent such as exh. P15 and exh. P16. Counsel argued that: * The appellant proved by oral and documentary evidence that she alone raised the money to purchase the suit property and relied, inter alias, on Exh. P12 (ii), the appellant’s personal cheque which was evidence of payment for the purchase of the suit property. * When the late M. B. Matovu was alive any correspondences he wrote (and many were admitted in evidence) in relation to the suit property he always referred to the appellant as the only purchaser and never mentioned the respondent as purchaser or proprietor of any sort. Likewise he copied such correspondence to only the appellant but never copied any to the respondent. * When in 1980’s the DAPC Board attempted to take over the suit property, it was only the appellant who successfully fought to retain the suit property. Learned counsel argued that had the Justices of Appeal reevaluated the evidence properly, as they ought to have done, they would have not decided the appeal in favour of the respondent, let alone ordering for the partition of the suit property for which the respondent, as appellant in Court of Appeal, never prayed. Counsel relied on the case of **Fr. Nakisensio Begumisa & 3 Others Vs E. Tibebaga **(Supreme Court Civil Appeal No.17 of 2002) (unreported) for the view that the Court of Appeal as a first appellate Court was duty bound to re-evaluate evidence. In response the respondent’s counsel (in effect adopted arguments in the trial court and Court of Appeal) submitted that the Justices of Appeal discharged their duty by reappraising the evidence from which they drew their own inferences of fact. Learned counsel contended that the Justices of Appeal relied only on Exh.P.15 and Exh.P16 **because these exhibits were the only relevant ones to the issue** :- “**Whether on the evidence as presented during the trial, the learned judge was justified to hold that the appellant was not a bona fide transferee for value of the suit property”.** Counsel rubbished exhibits Nos. P1 to 12 by arguing that the appellant produced these during the trial only to prove sole purchase of the suit property through correspondence. Counsel seems to argue that reliance on Exh.P15 and P16 led the learned Justices of Appeal to make their conclusions in accordance with S.176 of RTA and Ss.91 and 93 of the Evidence Act. Counsel relied on paragraph 3 of Exh.P15 for the opinion that the respondent provided consideration. Counsel supported the decision of the Court of Appeal for the erroneous view that no fraud was pleaded yet the plant is very clear on fraud. He also contended that fraud was not proved against the respondent. Learned counsel relied on the decision of this court in **Kampala Bottlers Ltd Vs Damenico (U) Ltd (Sup. Court Civil Appeal No. 11 of 1992)** and the decision of the**High Court of Australia in Stuart & Another Vs Kingston and Others** (1923)32CLR 309 for the views, respectively, that fraud must relate to and be attributable to the transferee either directly or by necessary implication and in the **Stuart** case that the respondent in present case provided consideration. In rejoinder appellant’s counsel pointed out, correctly in my opinion, that in her pleadings and in her evidence at the trial, the case for the respondent was that her late husband gave her the suit property. She did not plead that her husband (Matovu) provided any consideration or how he did it, if he had provided any consideration at all. Learned counsel relied quite properly on S.92 of the **Evidence Act** to show that the appellant was entitled to adduce evidence to prove that she alone paid for the suit property. Counsel also relied on another Australian case of **Calverly Vs Green (1984)** 155 C**LR** 244 and S.56 of Registration of Titles Act (RTA) in support of appellant’s case that the respondent had no interest in the suit property. With respect I am not persuaded by the arguments of counsel for the respondent. First and foremost I can not agree with learned counsel for the respondent that exhibits P1 to P12 were irrelevant to the issue to be decided by the Court of Appeal. Nor is it correct to assert that no fraud was pleaded. Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the plaint clearly pleaded fraud. Prime facie Exhs. P15 and P16 are in some respects relevant documentary evidence but they are not the only relevant ones nor are they relevant to the exclusion of the other documentary exhibits in this case. They in fact form part of a series, and are an integral part, of the sale transaction. The suit property was acquired through purchase. It must therefore follow that the evidence (oral and documentary) relevant to the transaction, i.e. negations for the sale, the sale itself, who provided the purchase money and the ownership is relevant and has to be evaluated. It has long been accepted that a first appeal is in the nature of a rehearing and if a first appellate court feels certain that a trial judge has come to a wrong conclusion because of failure to take into due account important facts or has drawn incorrect inferences from the evidence adduced, it should reverse the decision : See **Lewin Vs Neylan** (1934) IEACA.5. So to my mind the question to answer is whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal as a first appellate court properly reevaluated the evidence on the record before they decided that the trial judge reached wrong conclusions before they reversed his decision. What is the evidence which was adduced before the trial judge which the learned Justices of Appeal had to evaluate? First it is not disputed that it was the appellant who identified the suit property. She moved into and occupied it and carried out repairs. It is not disputed that Grindlays Bank International advertised the property for sale to recover its debt from previous owners, Doka and Fadhimula : See Exh.P1. She intervened and stopped the sale. There is incontrovertible evidence adduced during the trial to prove that it was the appellant who personally approached the bank and sought to purchase the property. This is clear from Exhs.P2, P3, P5, P6, P13 and exh. P14. There is evidence that the bank agreed to sell the property to the appellant. There is no dispute that the late Mr. Matovu, or his firm of advocates, came into the picture to process the purchase of the property for a fee. See Exh.P2 and P7. The former is appellant’s letter dated 13th September, 1979 to Matovu instructing his firm to, inter alia, handle the purchase issue at a fee. The appellant’s letter (Exh.p8) dated 1st February 1980 shows how she personally negotiated with the bank the agreement to purchase the suit property. All available oral and documentary evidence including her personal account cheque, Exh.P12(ii) and her letter (Exh.P13 dated 17th April, 1980) show that it is only the appellant who alone raised the loan of Shs.1,552,600/= from Baroda Bank on her personal Account No.2992 to pay for the suit property and the legal fees and other expenses. Exh.P15 relied on by the respondent’s counsel merely shows that consideration for sale of the property was Shs.1,500,000/=. There is no other credible evidence whatsoever to suggest that Matovu or any other person contributed money to purchase the suit property. There is no admissible evidence whatsoever (direct or indirect) to show that that money was raised in whole or in part by the late Matovu. Indeed in her oral and un-contradicted evidence, she testified that she paid shs.39,000/= to Matovu’s firm {see page 136} as advocates fees. Indeed in her evidence in chief the respondent testified that when she demanded, for rent from the appellant in 1991 two months before Matovu died, the appellant asserted that Matovu never purchased the house. Exh.P13 speaks volumes and reads as follows: P O Box 6532” KAMPALA. 7th April, 1980 _The Manager_ _Grindlays Bank International (U) Ltd_ _KAMPALA_ _Dear Sir_ __**PURCHASE OF PLOT 29 MALCOM X AVENUE KOLOLO**__ _I refer to letter addressed by your Lawyers Hunter and Greig reference CKK/SK/40288 dated 7_ _th_ _February, 1980 to my Lawyers M/s. Mugerwa and Matovu, Advocates, copied to you requesting me urgently to pay 1.5 million for the above property in a few days. Indeed I complied by payment of 1.5 million to your lawyers on 14_ _th_ _February, 1980 plus some 39,000/= to cover costs._ _**Having borrowed the money for the purchase from my Bankers M/s. Bank of Baroda – they are anxious to have the title deeds of the property as security**_ _. As a banker no doubt you realize the importance of this. Since my lawyers have had no further communication on the matter. I feel it fit once again to inform you that I am anxious to finalise the matter of the purchase specially so now when my bankers wish to have the title deed.__**I am now in process of paying the loan with interest.**_ _I would be most grateful if the matter receives your attention._ _Yours sincerely_ _HELEN OYERU_ _c_.c. M/s Hunter Greig Kampala c.c. The Manager Bank of Baroda Kampala c.c. M/s Mugerwa & Matovu Advocates Kampala There is no credible evidence on the record to contradict the contents of this letter. It is only the respondent who gave absolutely hearsay evidence that Mr. Matovu said he had purchased the property. The trial judge did not believe this. Further if it is true or is assumed that the respondent and the appellant as women shared the late Matovu and that the respondent had accepted that fact, how come that there was no involvement at all of the respondent at all the important stages of the transaction except the surreptitious signing of the sale agreement and the transfer form. There is no credible evidence to explain why the late Matovu could have chosen to purchase the property and then do so stealthily through the appellant before quietly bringing in his own wedded wife by not even putting in her official name of Mrs. Matovu instead of her presumably maiden name Namuli. From the evidence of the respondent herself it is clear that the appellant did not know who Namuli was. I think that the 2nd issue framed in the trial court which was in effect the same issue framed in the Court of Appeal is imprecise. The issue framed for consideration by the learned Justices of Appeal _“whether on the evidence as presented during the trial, the learned trial judge was justified to hold that the appellant was not a joint bona fide transferee for value of the suit property”_ is similar to the 2nd issue framed for determination by the trial judge. The Judge framed issue as follows: “ _Whether the defendant is a joint bona fide transferee for value in respect to the suit property_.” The learned trial judge considered all the relevant evidence adduced by both parties including all the documentary exhibits before he found, correctly in my opinion, the issue in the negative. In the Court of Appeal, Lady Justice Mpagi-Bahigeine, JA., wrote the lead judgment with which the other two members of the panel agreed. In that court, Mr. Mutawe referred to appellant’s evidence such as exhibits P1 to 21 including her cheque Book Exh. P12(1), her cheque leaf Exh.P12 (ii), her bank account statement (Exh.P11) and argued that the property was purchased by only the appellant and not jointly with Matovu (page 21 to 23). He argued that the evidence of the respondent suggested that she was only a donee and that the trial judge was right when he allowed oral evidence to contradict or show the circumstances under which exh.P15 was executed. Counsel further argued in effect that S.176 of RTA did not protect the respondent and that the respondent was put in title through fraud. The learned lady Justice of Appeal, at page 7 of her judgment, referred to Mr. Mutaawe’s arguments. She then quoted a passage from the judgment of the trial judge where the judge had made findings to the effect that: * The respondent relied on the doctrine of advancement to counterclaim part of the suit property. * That this proved that the respondent never paid any or her own money for the purchase of the property. * The late Matovu did not pay money for the property. * He believed the appellant about the name Namuli’s inclusion on the title deed. * That the appellant could not have purchased property for her co-wife, the respondent. In her own judgment, the learned Justice of Appeal does not dispute these facts. The learned trial judge concluded that on the evidence he was _“satisfied that the (respondent) did not acquire the property for value or love and that the action by her advocates_ _amounted to a serious mistake or misrepresentation amounting to a breach of trust akin to fraud_ ”. I do not appreciate how the Court of Appeal concluded that the respondent was entitled to a share of the property. The lead judgment of the Court of Appeal included suggestions, which are contrary to the evidence adduced at the trial, that - * The appellant was co-wife to the respondent. This was based on allegations in respondent’s defence which was denied by the appellant both in her reply to the defence and to the counter-claim and when she gave oral evidence. Indeed no issue was framed on it for determination. This matter was dragged in for the purpose of bolstering the respondent’s claim based on hearsay evidence by the respondent that her husband (Matovu) told her that he had purchased property for her to share with the appellant. The appellant’s credible evidence which the trial judge believed wholly rebuts this claim. * Then the court rejected, without sound basis or evidence except speculation, that the appellant’s story that Florence Namuli’s names were put on the certificate of title merely to protect her because of her West Nile origin. The court rejected the appellant’s story and allowed the appeal because: * * She sought the assistance of the late Oyite Ojok (the Army Chief of Staff) who, on the basis of speculation, was described as “ _the most feared person in recent memory”._ * * Transfer was effected on 11/11/1980 presumably because it was over a year after the liberation war. * * The fear of being a West Nile ceased to be of any relevance after the NRM took over power in 1986 and tried to reconcile different groups. * * Appellant is faulted because she allowed the respondent’s names to remain on the certificate of title till Matovu died in 1991. * * Fraud attributed to the Respondent’s husband cannot be visited upon the respondent. * * The trial judge did not find actual fraud against the advocate. With respect, I think that the conclusion of the Court are erroneous. Even if it were assumed that the fraud against the respondent was not proved, the other reasons are without foundation. For instance, there is no evidence on the record to prove that Oyite Ojok was the most feared person. Secondly delay in effecting transfer was due partly to retrieval of the certificate from the Bank. Thirdly there is no basis for rejecting appellant’s explanations that Namuli was put on the title to safe guard the suit property. Lastly since the title was provided as security for the loan and was kept by Baroda Bank, Namuli could not be deleted from it while the title was in that Bank. The title deed was only released in 1996. Again even if it is assumed that the appellant was a mistress of Matovu, which she denied in her pleadings and by oral evidence, I cannot appreciate how a lawyer of Matovu’s stature who as it is implicit in the respondent’s evidence, was apparently wealthy, could purchase property in the joint names of his proper and lawful wife and an alleged mistress. There is no evidence to show that the two ever lived for once under the same roof. If, as claimed by the respondent, she and appellant respected each other, were more or less neighbours and shared a man and other facilities, how come, as it is clear from her own evidence, that the Respondent only visited the suit property twice in 1991, 11 years after its purchase and when Matovu was ill and hospitalized? Where is the explanation for this as well as for the fact that after the initial claim on 30/10/1991, the respondent kept quiet for 7 years till 1998 when she resurrected her claim. Indeed on the basis of the respondent’s own evidence (page 156 of record) “ _The second time I went to ask her for rent two months before my husband died.------- I did not get the rent. Oyeru objected strongly. She said that Matovu never bought that house”._ In my opinion the claim that the late Matovu kept some minerals in one wing of the suit property proves nothing. In the absence of evidence of proprietary ownership, it is arguable that the appellant, as a client, gratuitously permitted Matovu to store the minerals. In any case, it is not known as to how long the minerals were kept and under what conditions. Lady Justice Byamugisha in her supporting judgment stated, “ _The evidence of the (appellant) was that she was advised by her advocate which advice she accepted that as some one from West Nile she needed protection_ _from victimization, needed a co-owner._ **Therefore whatever name was put on the title, there was consideration for it. There was a price for her being on the title although not a monetary one.”** Let me point out that the protection suggested by Matovu in 1980 was not illusory. Exhs.P17, P18, P19 and P.20 produced by the appellant without objection show that as late as May and June, 1982 the Custodian Board and the Ministry of Finance harassed the appellant about the ownership of the house. Her fears as a person from West Nile were brought out very clearly when she was cross examined. She had to put another person is one wing of the property for security reasons. Although she was a Permanent Secretary she had political fears. With the greatest respect the learned Justice of Appeal. I think that she stretched the meaning of consideration in this case too far. She held that on the basis of S.176 of RTA and S.91 and 93 of the Evidence Act, the appellant is estopped from proving that she purchased the property using her loan of Shs.1,500,000/=. **S.176 of RTA reads as follows** :- _No action of ejectment or other action for the recovery of any land shall lie or be sustained against the person registered as proprietor under this Act, except in any of the following cases_ – 1. \--------------------- 2. \---------------------------- (c) the case of a person deprived of any land by fraud as against the person registered as proprietor of that land through fraud or as against a person deriving otherwise than as a **transferee bona fide for value from** or through a person so registered through fraud; (d) the case of a person deprived of or claiming any land included in any certificate of title of other land by misdescription of the other land or of its boundaries as against the registered proprietor of that other land not being a **transferee of the land bona fide for value** ; (e) -------- and _in any case other than as a foresaid the production of the registered certificate of title or lease shall be held in every court to be an absolute bar and estoppel to any such action against the person named in that document as the grantee, owner, proprietor or lessee of the land described in it, any rule of law or equity to the contrary notwithstanding._ Clearly, any law or principles of equity would be excluded if the respondent was a bona fide transferee for value without notice which she is not. Counsel for the respondent submits that there is evidence proving that the respondent paid consideration. I have not seen any such evidence any where on the record of appeal. The respondent herself does not say so in her evidence. Secondly, I note that the section talks about action to eject or to recover land from a registered proprietor. The section appears to refer to action by a person who is not himself or herself a registered proprietor or in occupation. My understanding of the section is that it is only the last part of the section (italicised words) which would protect the respondent. It seems to me this section is applicable only where the action is brought by a non registered claimant to eject or recover land from a proper certificate holder. It would probably apply where the holder of the title is the sole owner and in possession of a certificate of title who as I have said acquired property for value. In my opinion the cases of **Kampala Bottlers** (supra) and **Stuart** (supra) are not helpful to the respondent. The relevance of the former case is about pleading and proof of fraud. The latter case deals with circumstances under which fraud may be inferred. Section 56 of RTA permits production of any relevant evidence to rebut joint proprietorship. It is short and reads:- _S.56 Two or more persons who are registered as joint proprietors of land shall be deemed to be entitled to the land as joint tenants, and in all cases where two or more persons are entitled as tenants in common to undivided shares of or in any land, such persons shall,__**IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY**_ _, be presumed to hold that land in equal shares._ The decision of the High Court of Australia in **CALVERLEY** case (supra) is to the point. The facts were as follows: The appellant and the respondent lived together for ten years as though they were husband and wife. At first they lived in a house owned by the appellant. Later they decided to move to another area if they could find a house that the appellant could buy. They found a house, but the appellant had difficulty in obtaining finance, and told the respondent that a finance company required the purchase to be in their joint names. Money was then raised on a mortgage under which the parties were jointly and severally liable to make repayments. It was agreed between them that the appellant would in fact make the repayments; and he did so. The house was purchased, the appellant paying the deposit out of his own funds and balance being raised on a mortgage. The parties were registered as joint tenants. Some years later (in 1978) they parted company. The respondent instituted a suit in Court for the house to be sold and for proceeds to be distributed equally between the two. The appellant counterclaimed that the respondent had no interest in the house and that she should be ordered to transfer her interest to him. The trial judge dismissed the suit and allowed the counterclaim. He ordered the respondent to execute a registerable transfer of her estate and interest in the land to the appellant on condition that he first procures her release and discharge from the mortgage. The judge held that the land was put into the joint names of the parties for the purpose of enabling finance to be raised, and not to confer any beneficial interest on the respondent, and that she had no beneficial interest in the property. The Court of Appeal allowed her appeal and held that the parties were joint tenants of the land in equity as well as in law. The appellant successfully appealed to the High Court of Australia (the final appellate court). The High Court reviewed many cases from Australia and England especially on the principle of presumption of advancement. Gibbs CJ, wrote the lead judgment with which three out of four judges concurred. At page 246, this is what he stated the law to be and because of arguments in these proceedings I propose to quote him in extenso. _Where a person purchases property in the names of another, or in himself and another jointly, the question whether the other person, who provided none of the purchase money, acquires a beneficial interest in the property depends on the intention of the purchaser. However, in such a case, unless there is such a relationship between the purchaser and the other person as gives rise to a presumption of advancement, i.e., a presumption that the purchaser intended to give the other a beneficial interest, it is presumed that the purchaser did not intend the other person to take beneficially. In the absence of evidence to-rebut that presumption, there arises a resulting trust in favour of the purchaser. Similarly, if the purchase money is provided by two or more persons jointly, and the property is put into the name of one only, there is, in the absence of any such relationship, presumed to be a resulting trust in favour of the other or others. For the presumption to apply the money must have been provided by the purchaser in his character as such – not, e.g., as a loan. Consistently with these principles it has been held that if two persons have contributed the purchase money in unequal shares, and the property purchased in their joint names, there is, again in the absence of a relationship that gives rise to a presumption of advancement, a presumption that the property is held by the purchasers in trust for themselves as tenants in common in the proportions in which they contributed the purchase money:__**Robinson V. Preston Ingram V. Ingram**_ _and Crisp V Mullings (a decision of the English Court of Appeal)._ _As I have indicated, the general rule that in the situations mentioned it is presumed that a resulting trust arises in favour of the purchaser, or in favour of two purchasers in the proportions in which they contributed the purchase money, is subject to the exception created by the presumption of advancement. “It is called a presumption of advancement but it is rather the absence of any reason for assuming that a trust arose or in other words that the equitable right is not at home with the legal title”: Martin V. Martin; in other words, it is “no more than a circumstance of evidence which may rebut the presumption of resulting trust”: Pettitt V. Pettitt. The presumption arises when a husband makes a purchase in the name of his wife, or a father in the name of his child or other person to whom he stands in loco perentis._ The appeal was allowed. This decision is of great persuasive authority for the view that in this case as the appellant is the only person who paid the purchase money, she was owner of the suit property alone. The learned Justices of Appeal relied on the provisions of S.91 and 93 of the EAct and ignored the provisions of S.92 of the same Act. **S. 91 reads as follows :** _When the terms of a contract or of a grant or of any other disposition of property, have been reduced to the form of a document, and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence, except as mentioned in section 79, shall be given in proof of the terms of that contract, grant or other disposition of property, or of such matter except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions hereinbefore contained._ This section is affected by its explanation _No._ 3 which states that: “ _The statement, in any document whatever, of a fact other than the facts referred to in this section shall not preclude the admission of oral evidence as to the same fact._ ” This is self-explanatory and I find it unnecessary to elaborate. I should also point out that for an unknown reason the Court of Appeal did not consider the provisions of S.92 of the Evidence Act. It refers to exclusion of evidence of oral agreement. That section reads as follows:- **92** _When the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved according to section 91, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to or subtracting form its terms;_ 1. _any fact may be proved which would invalidate any document, or which would entitle any person to any decree or order relating thereto, such as fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due execution, want of capacity in any contracting party_ , **want or failure of consideration or mistake in fact or law;** _(b) the existence of any separate oral agreement, constituting a condition precedent to the attaching of any obligation under any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved._ This is authority in support of what the appellant did. Moreover during the trial when the appellant adduced oral and documentary evidence of her purchase of the property alone, there was no objection at all to the admissibility of her oral evidence or documentary exhibits. It was therefore too late and without any sound basis for the Court of Appeal to reject or ignore that evidence on appeal, as also the case of **General Industries** __(U) Ltd **Vs Non Performing Assets Recovery Trust** – SCt Civil Appeal No.5 of 1998 clearly illustrates. In my view the Court of Appeal failed in its duty as a first appellate court to properly reevaluate the evidence available on the record, so as to answer the issue before the court namely whether -_“The evidence presented during the trial, the learned trial judge was justified to hold the appellant was not a joint bona fide transferee for value_ ”. In my opinion the learned trial judge was correct in his assessment of the evidence and in the conclusion that the respondent never provided value. It would be contrary to all ideas of justice and reasonableness to hold otherwise. Ground one must succeed. This would really dispose of this appeal. But I will briefly discuss the other grounds. _g_ _**rounds 2 and 3**_ The complaints are words as under: _2\. The learned Justices of Appeal erred in law and fact when they ignored the evidence on record and relied on speculations and /or personal knowledge for (their) decision._ _3\. By relying on the personal relationships among the respondent, her late husband and the appellant, the learned Justice of Appeal erred in law and fact._ In my opinion the complaint in these two grounds is the same namely that the learned justices relied on speculation and not on evidence. In a way while discussing arguments on the first ground, I discussed the matters raised here. Be that as it may, counsel for the appellant referred to the evidence of the appellant and that of the respondent especially how the appellant purchased the suit property, how the name Florence Namuli appeared on Exh.P15. He referred to the evidence of the respondent to the effect that although Matovu made a will in which he mentioned his wife and his mistresses, the appellant is not mentioned there as one of the mistresses (See page 160 of the Record of appeal). Learned counsel submitted that the Court of Appeal did not reevaluate available evidence on the record but ignored it and relied on speculation and perceived personal relationship among the parties. Counsel submitted that the conclusions of the Court of Appeal were contrary to evidence. On the other hand, counsel for the respondent supported the decision of the Court of Appeal contending that the Justices of Appeal considered and reevaluated the evidence on record and came to the correct conclusion. Learned counsel relied on S.56 of the Evidence Act for the view that the appellant’s personal situation (presumably of hailing from West Nile) was not a matter of which the Courts would take judicial notice. Counsel supported the conclusions of the Court of Appeal that since the appellant was able to talk to the late Oyite Ojok, the then Army Chief of Staff, to get soldiers out of the suit property, it could not be true that the respondent’s name was put on the certificate of title to protect the property against soldiers. As stated earlier, in her evidence the appellant established that she alone purchased the property. In cross examination she testified (at page 148 of the record.) “ _I financed the purchase of property from Bank of Baroda. I showed you - there is a document here by which I asked Baroda for release of my title. It is my evidence that the Bank kept my title. It was deposited with the Bank. I had been a customer of Baroda. I was also a Permanent Secretary in the Civil Service so the Bank advanced me the money. I did not sign any mortgage with Baroda. In effect I obtained the Baroda facility just before I wrote the cheque”----- When the title was deposited in my account, I was able to write a cheque. See Exh.P12(ii). It is dated 14_ _th_ _February_ ……………”. Thus, she shows she partly used her position as Permanent Secretary to negotiate the loan. As discussed earlier, the appellant entrusted Matovu (RIP) partly with the processing of the purchase of the suit property and consequential legal matters such as preparation of sale agreement and the transfer of the suit property into the purchaser’s name. She paid fees to Matovu’s firm for his services. Her evidence on this was apparently not challenged in any way. Certainly the respondent stated when testifying at the trial from her own mouth that she was not certain that the appellant knew her name as Namuli. This supports the appellant’s case. Further the evidence available shows that the respondent started to claim her share in the suit property half heartedly just before or after the death of her husband. I say halfheartedly because after the initial claim through the firm of Binaisa and Co., Advocates, in 1991, after the death of Matovu [RIP] there is no other evidence of her asserting her claim, until 1998 when bailiffs attempted to evict the appellant’s tenants. With respect, I do not agree with the Court of Appeal that omission by the appellant to have Namuli’s name removed from the certificate of title should work against her. In the first place, the purchase was done through a mortgage. The certificate of title which was given to Baroda Bank while bearing the names of the appellant and Namuli. The appellant got the certificate back in 1996. We have no evidence indicating when the loan was paid off. I do not want to speculate but I doubt whether Baroda Bank could have allowed one name of the title holders to be removed before the loan was paid off. I have already discussed S. 56 of RTA. I think that the two grounds should succeed. **Ground 4, 8 and 9 complaints are that** : 4. _By deciding that the respondent was a donee in respect of the suit property and then holding that she was a purchaser in the same decision, the learned Justices of Appeal erred in law and in fact._ 8. _The learned Justices of Appeal erred in law and fact to rely on evidence which was not relevant in answering the only issue agreed to by parties on appeal._ 8. _The learned Justices of Appeal erred in law and fact to find and hold that the respondent was a bona fide transferee for value in respect of the same property._ These grounds are framed differently but in effect refer to matters considered already. Counsel for the appellant contended that in the pleadings and evidence the case for the respondent at the trial was that the suit property was a gift to her from her husband, who had bought it for her, whereas during Conference in the Court of Appeal the respondent’s case changed to state that she was a joint purchaser which argument was accepted by the Court of Appeal. There, Byamugisha, JA., further opined that consideration need not be money. Counsel contended that in this case the respondent could not be a purchaser and at the same time a donee. That in exhibit P15 the consideration as required by S.92 of RTA was stated to be Shs.1,500,000/= and that there is not evidence to show that the late Matovu or the respondent paid any money other than the appellant. Counsel submitted that the Court of Appeal erred in reversing the finding of the trial judge, which finding was based on evidence, that the appellant did not acquire the property for value or love. Counsel contended that the case of **Stuart** (supra) upon which the Court of Appeal relied was distinguishable from this case because, unlike here, in the **Stuart****case,** the 1st respondent (Mrs. Kingston) paid money (value). Again counsel criticized the Court of Appeal for its holding and basing its decision on the fact that fraud was not proved because although the appellant pleaded fraud, the respondent did not specifically deny it in her written statement of defence and counterclaim and therefore no issue was framed for determination by the trial judge. Learned counsel for the respondent supported the decision of the Court of Appeal. Counsel contended without evidence that it is common to day for husbands and parents to purchase properties for their spouses and or children but describe them as purchasers in a sale agreement and the certificate of title and that this is what Matovu did. The respondent’s Counsel appears to contradict themselves by contending that on the basis of exhs.P15 and P16 the respondent was **purchaser of the property and not the donee** and so the respondent was a joint bona fide transferee for value. Counsel speculated by claiming that the purchase money could have been procured by Matovu and placed on the appellant’s account. I have in fact discussed much of what is argued in these three grounds. With respect to learned counsel for the respondent, I find it strange that counsel could speculate that Matovu could have procured the purchase money and placed it on the appellant’s account. Learned counsel did not point out any single piece of evidence to support such speculation. On the contrary the appellant adduced incontrovertible evidence to prove that she alone paid for the property out of the loan she got from Baroda Bank. She proved that she repaid the loan. If Matovu had procured the purchase money how come that the appellant had to make efforts to secure title deed from the Grindlays Bank International and make it as security for the loan. The appellant gave evidence at the trial. Her assertion that she alone paid the purchase money by raising the loan was hardly challenged. In my view, there is overwhelming evidence on the record to show that the appellant was the sole purchaser of the suit property and therefore the Court of Appeal erred in holding that the respondent was a bona fide transferee for whatever consideration. The arguments of counsel for the respondent have no basis and I have no hesitation in rejecting them. Accordingly grounds 4,8 and 9 must succeed. **Grounds 10 and 11 complaints are that** : 10 _The learned Justices of Appeal erred in law and fact when they allowed the respondent on appeal to set up a case which was at variance with and a total departure from both her pleadings and evidence in the High Court._ _11 Alternatively the learned Justice of Appeal erred in law and fact to give judgment in favour of the respondent not based on her pleadings and evidence in the High Court._ In my view these two grounds complain about the same thing and to an extent repeat complaints in other grounds especially grounds 2, 3 and 8. This is further illustrated by repetition of arguments of appellants counsel on grounds 4, 8 and 9. Be that as it may, counsel for the appellant submitted that in the Court of Appeal the (respondent’s) case changed from being that of a donee to a joint purchaser relying exclusively on exh.P15 and that this position is reflected in the record of proceedings of the Court of Appeal. Counsel argued that this caused a failure of justice and that in that regard the Court of Appeal misdirected itself and consequently there was a failure of justice. Counsel for the respondent correctly pointed out that the grounds are repetitive of earlier grounds. Learned counsel submitted that it was not true that the Court of Appeal allowed the respondent to change her case from a donee to a purchaser and as such the appellant did not suffer any injustice especially since she failed to attribute fraud on the respondent. I have noted that Mr. Mutaawe, one of counsel who argued this appeal, represented the appellant in the two courts below and opposed the appeal in the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal record shows that he raised before that Court the issues he has raised here first in the so called consent conferencing memorandum which was signed by both sides and subsequently in his submissions during the hearing of the appeal in that court. Merits of these matters were hardly considered by the learned Justices of appeal. Accordingly, these two grounds ought to succeed. The complaints in grounds 12 and 13 are formulated as follows- 12. By relying on sections 91 and 93 of the Evidence Act to the exclusion of the relevant section 92, the learned Justices of Appeal erred in law and fact. 12. The learned Justice of Appeal by ignoring without reason the authorities cited by the appellant erred in law and fact. In effect these grounds are a repetition of earlier ones though worded slightly differently. Counsel for the appellant criticized the Court of Appeal for relying on sections 91 and 93 of the Evidence Act for the view that the appellant was precluded from adducing evidence to contradict Exh.P15, whereas S.92 permits the appellant to adduce relevant evidence as she did. Counsel cited **CD.Field’s Law of Evidence** , 10th Ed, Vol 4, pages 3699, 3703 and 3734 as well as **M Monir, Law of Evidence,** 14th Ed, Vol 2 page 1515. In support, learned counsel again criticized the Court of Appeal for its failure to consider **Calverley’s case** (supra) an Australian decision in which the equitable principle of presumption of advancement by a husband was considered by the High Court of Australia. Learned counsel contended that the **Cleverly Case** illustrates the kind of evidence envisaged under S.56 of RTA to explain the real relationship between the parties. Counsel for the respondent supported the decision of the Court of Appeal and contended strangely that the appellant’s case did not fit within the exceptions stipulated in S.92(a) of the Evidence Act. Learned counsel contended that because of the provisions of section 176, of RTA, **Calverley** case was inapplicable and relied on the case of **Barclays Bank (U) Ltd Vs L Katende Lutu**(Supreme Court Civil Appeal No.22 of 1993) for the view that equitable principles cannot override a statute. Respondent’s counsel relied on section 54 and 50 of the RTA for the view that even if the respondent was a trustee of the appellant such a trust was ineffectual because of non-registration. In rejoinder, appellant’s counsel submitted that explanations in **CD Fields and M. Monir** about provisions corresponding to S. 92 of the Evidence Act and authorities are highly persuasive and it was an error for the Court of Appeal to ignore these. Learned Counsel distinguished the case of Barclay’s Bank (supra) contending that adducing evidence under S.56 of RTA does not override a statute. I have already considered and discussed the implications of sections 91, 92 and 93 of the Evidence Act and sections 56 and 176 of RTA. For the sake of emphasis I wish to state that under S.92(a), the appellant was entitled to adduce evidence to prove absence of **consideration** on the part of the respondent. This she did and the Court of Appeal erred when it did not consider that section and instead relied heavily on the contents of exhibit P15 without taking into account the appellant’s evidence which explains prior circumstances under which Exh. P15 came into existence. I agree that the case of **Barclays Bank** (supra) is distinguishable. This was an interlocutory appeal against the grant by the High Court of an injunction on the basis that the condition in a mortgage to the effect that the mortgagee bank could sell mortgaged property without resort to court _” Would violate the principle of natural justice” The trial judge stated this because he believed that the provision in the mortgage deed amounted to ouster of jurisdiction of courts._ This court held that in that case, the sale without recourse to the court having been agreed to by the parties themselves was sanctioned by section 9 of [Decree No. 17 of 1974](/akn/ug/act/decree/1974/17)” and so “there can hardly be a principle of natural justice which outshines a legislative provision”. Here Lutu had expressly agreed that if there was default in repayment of the loan, his mortgaged property would be sold without resort to court. The Decree of 1974 had provided for such a course. Clearly therefore, **Barclays** case is distinguishable from the present case and does not advance the case of the respondent. In any case, clearly it is the respondent who is in effect relying on the equitable principle of advancement of suit property on the basis that her husband bought the same for her. It is not the appellant. The most relevant part of **Cleverly case** is to the effect that a person registered as a joint tenant or a tenant in common with another person cannot claim to have any beneficial interest in the property where she did not contribute money to purchase the suit property. If I may repeat, I have not seen any evidence anywhere on the record of appeal proving that either the late Matovu, or the respondent herself, contributed any money towards the purchase of the suit property. I should again repeat that it would be contrary to all ideas of justice and common sense to say that the respondent has any interest in the suit property. Grounds 12 and 13 must succeed. **The complaint in ground 14 is that** – _The learned Justices of Appeal erred in law and fact to order the appellant to render an account from 1991 on the counterclaim filed more than 6 years since the cause of action arose_. Appellant’s counsel argued that as the respondent filed her counter claim on 22/7/1998 which was more than six years since the cause of action arose, she could not have the appellant to render an account in as much as the respondent’s claim is barred by S.3(2) of the Limitation Act. On the other hand, counsel for the respondent argued strangely first that as the appellant did not raise the limitation defence in the High Court; she can not raise it now. Secondly counsel contends that the respondent’s counterclaimed for land and the action is not barred till after 12 years and relied on S.5 of the limitation Act. Section 3(2) of the Limitation Act is clear and states thus: – “ _An action for an account shall not be brought in respect of_ _**ANY MATTER**_ which _arose more than six years before the commencement of the action.”_ Learned counsel for the respondent argues that it is S.5 which applies. With respect I can not agree. That section applies specifically to actions to recover land. That is why subsequent S17 applies specifically to actions to recover rent and according to that section, an action to recover rent must be brought within six years. Indeed an action for an account of rent is barred more b y S.17 rather than by s.3 (2). Evidence on the record shows that the respondent first made a formal demand on 30/10/1991. The counter- claim was filed on 22/7/1998. This was over six years and it is therefore caught by S.3(2) (or even S.17) of the Act. Ground, 14 must succeed. **Grounds 5 and 6 state** - _5 By holding that the appellant was not deprived of any land by the respondent the learned Justices of Appeal erred in law and fact._ _6 By finding and holding that the respondent was not guilty of any fraud, the learned Justice of Appeal erred in law._ Both these grounds and arguments of counsel for the appellant are repetitions of contents of other grounds and arguments thereon. I see no need to consider them. In conclusion the appeal ought to succeed. I would set aside the decision of the Court of appeal. I would restore the judgment and orders of the trial judge except as to costs. The problems between the present parties were created by the lawyer who processed the purchase of the suit property. He is no longer with us. I think that the interests of justice will be best served by ordering each party to bear her own costs both here and in the two courts below. I would order accordingly. **Delivered at Mengo this 22****nd****day of October 2009.** **J. W. N. TSEKOOKO.** **JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT.** # **THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA** **IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA** **AT MENGO** _**(CORAM: ODOKI, C.J., TSEKOOKO, KANYEIHAMBA, KATUREEBE AND OKELLO. JJ.SC.)**_ **Civil APPEAL NO. 7 OF 2008** ### BETWEEN **HELEN OYERU:::::::::::::::::::****:::::::::::::::::::: APPELLANT** ### AND ### FLORENCE NAMULI MATOVU ::::::::::::::::: RESPONDENTS _**[Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal at Kampala (Mpagi-Bahigeine, Twinomujuni , and Byamugisha, JJ.A.) date 6****th****June 2008 in Civil Appeal No. 15 of 2006]**_ **JUDGMENT OF ODOKI, CJ** I have had the advantage of reading in draft the judgment prepared by my learned brother, Tsekooko, JSC, and I agree with him that this appeal should succeed. I concur in the order proposed by him as to costs that each party should bear its costs here and in the Courts below. As the other members of the court agree, this appeal is allowed with orders as proposed by the learned Justice of the Supreme Court. Dated at Mengo this 22nd day of October 2009. B J Odoki CHIEF JUSTICE # **THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA** **IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA** **AT MENGO** _**(CORAM: ODOKI, C.J., TSEKOOKO, KANYEIHAMBA, KATUREEBE AND OKELLO. JJ.SC.)**_ **Civil APPEAL NO. 7 OF 2008** ### BETWEEN **HELEN OYERU:::::::::::::::::::****:::::::::::::::::::: APPELLANT** ### AND ### FLORENCE NAMULI MATOVU ::::::::::::::::: RESPONDENTS _**[Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal at Kampala (Mpagi-Bahigeine, Twinomujuni , and Byamugisha, JJ.A.) date 6****th****June 2008 in Civil Appeal No. 15 of 2006]**_ **JUDGMENT OF KANYEIHAMBA J.S.C** I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment of my learned brother Hon. Justice J.W.N Tsekooko JSC and I agree with his findings and conclusions. I gree that this appeal ought to succeed. I also concur with the orders he has proposed. **Date at Mengo this 22****nd****day of October 2009** **G.W. KANYEIHAMBA** **JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT** # **THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA** **IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA** **AT MENGO** _**(CORAM: ODOKI, C.J., TSEKOOKO, KANYEIHAMBA, KATUREEBE AND OKELLO. JJ.SC).**_ **Civil APPEAL NO. 7 OF 2008** ### BETWEEN **HELEN OYERU:::::::::::::::::::****:::::::::::::::::::: APPELLANT** ### AND ### FLORENCE NAMULI MATOVU ::::::::::::::::: RESPONDENTS _**[Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal at Kampala (Mpagi-Bahigeine, Twinomujuni , and Byamugisha, JJ.A.) date 6****th****June 2008 in Civil Appeal No. 15 of 2006]**_ _**JUDGMENT OF KATUREEBE, JSC.**_ I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment of my learned brother, Tsekooko, JSC and I agrree with im, for the reasons he has given, that this appeal ought to succeed. I also concur in the orders he has proposed. **DATED at Mengo this 22****nd****day of October 2009** **BART M. KATUREEBE** **JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT** # **THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA** **IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA** **AT MENGO** _**(CORAM: ODOKI, C.J., TSEKOOKO, KANYEIHAMBA, KATUREEBE AND OKELLO. JJ.SC.)**_ **Civil APPEAL NO. 7 OF 2008** ### BETWEEN **HELEN OYERU:::::::::::::::::::****:::::::::::::::::::: APPELLANT** ### AND ### FLORENCE NAMULI MATOVU ::::::::::::::::: RESPONDENTS _**[Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal at Kampala (Mpagi-Bahigeine, Twinomujuni , and Byamugisha, JJ.A.) date 6****th****June 2008 in Civil Appeal No. 15 of 2006]**_ **JUDGMENT OF G. M. OKELLO, JSC:** I have had the opportunity to read in draft, the judgment of my learned broyther Justice Tsekooko, JSC. I agree with his rasoning, conclusion and the orders he has proposed. I have nothing useful to add. **Dated at Mengo this 22****nd****day of October 2009.** **G. M. OKELLO** **JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT** 44 #### __Related documents #### More documents like this one ▲ To the top >