Case Law[2009] UGSC 40Uganda
Ibero (U) Ltd v Mbale Importers and Exporters Ltd (Civil Appeal 10 of 2007) [2009] UGSC 40 (22 October 2009)
Supreme Court of Uganda
Judgment
THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA
AT MENGO
(CORAJW: ODOKI, C, J., TS.EKOOKO, KAIiNEIIIAMBA,
I{ATUREEBD, OKELLO, J. J. S. C.
)
CIVTL APPEAL NO. 10 OF 2OO7
BETWEEN
rBERO (Ul LTD APPELLANT
AND
MBALE IMPORTERS AND EXPORTERS LTD::::::: RESPONDENTS
[Appeal
arising
from
the judgment and orders of the
Court of Appeal at Kampala (Twinomujuni, Kitumba,
Engwau, J.J.A.) dated 28tn March,2OO7, in Ciuil Appeal
No. 84 of2OO5l
JUDGMENT OF I{ANYEIHAMBA J.S.C. t
This is an appeal from the judgment and orders of the Court of Appeal
allowing the respondent's appeal from the judgment and orders of the trial
judge (Arach-Amoko, J), who dismissed the respondent's claim with costs in
Civil Case No 609 of 2000.
The background to this appeal is well set out in the judgments of both
the High Court and Court of Appeal but may be summarized as follows:
The respondent is a company based in Mbale and is in the business of
buying and selling coffee. The appellant is another company which engages
in the export business of coffee and is based in Kampala. Whereas the
respondent buys unprocessed coffee directly from farmers, the appellant
I
1
buys partly processed coffee from the likes of the respondent and exports it
outside Uganda. The two parties had had coffee deals together before the
present one which became the subject of litigation.
The dispute arose from a contract between the parties under which
the respondent had agreed to supply the appellant with some 2000 bags of
coffee of various types and grades of coffee for which the latter would pay
agreed sums of money. It was a term of the contract that the respondent
would deliver the contracted coffee at the appellant's warehouse in
Kampala. The procedure for delivering and receiving the coffee contracted
for was well known to both parties. Apparently, following the fixing of the
price of coffee, it was a condition precedent that the quality, quantity and
the date of delivery must be known and agreed to by the parties. On
delivery by the supplier, samples from the bags would be obtained by use of
a spear and removed and tested to ensure compliance with the terms,
conditions and traditions of coffee markets.
The respondent claims that it delivered 65O bags of coffee for which it
should be paid. The appellant denies that such amount of coffee or any
other was delivered to its warehouse and denies liability.
The Memorandum of Appeal in this court contains six grounds framed
as follows:
1. The l*arned &stices of Appeal erred ln laut and ln
fact
uhen theg
held that the cofJee, the subJect ,rtdtter of the Appeal uas
dellaered. to the Appellant hereln ln accord.ance ulth the contract
entered, tnto bg the tuo partles.
2. The Learned.ftrstlces of Appeal erred ln
fact
uthen they held that
the Respondent hereln co;nnot be sald. to han:c cont lbuted to the
dlsappearance oj the toss oJ lts lorry.
3. The Learned,,ltrstlces of Appeal erred ln laut and ln
fact
when theg
held that the Appellant hereln ra,rrs ballee and thol. as bailee lt
talled
to dlscharge tts dutg of care.
4. The Lcaraed nftrstlces of Appeal mlsconstnred. the law on ballment
ln relatlon to the clrcttmstances,
facts
and euldence leadlng to an
erroneous
findlng
tl@t the Appellant hereln breached. tts dutg of
cate,
5. Alternatttnlg and wlthout derogatlon
from
the aboue grounds, the
Lcanted &stlces of Appeat mlsconstnted the laut on bdllment and
ln consequence erred ln prlnclple ln orderlng the Appellant to pag
the contract tnlue of the coflee.
6. The Learned &stlces oJ Appeal dld not lrct
Judlctouslg
ln
auardlng damages o'nd lnterest as theg dtd ho;ulng regard to the
clrcumstances oJ the case.
Messrs Nangwala, Rezida & Co. Advocates who represent the appellant
filed written submissions in support of the appeal. Messrs KGN, Advocates,
for the Respondent also filed written submissions in opposition to the
appeal. Counsel for the appellant argued ground 1, 2, 5 and 6 separately
and grounds 3 and 4 together.
On ground I counsel for the appellant contend that the Court of Appeal
erred in both law and fact in holding that coffee of the contractual
description was delivered by the respondent in accordance with the terms
and conditions of the contract. In counsel's view, the terms and conditions
of the contract were not complied with and further there is no evidence that
any coffee was delivered at the appellant's warehouse. Counsel contend that
whereas the respondent claimed that the truck allegedly carrying the coffee
left Mbale on Friday the 17d, December, 1999, the truck covered with
tarpaulin apparently originating from the respondent's premises did not
appear at the appellant's premises until three days later, that is on the 19ttr
December, 1999 which happened to be a Sunday. Counsel contend that
there is no evidence that the truck broke down between Mbale and
Kampala. Counsel for the appellant further contend that, when the truck
arrived at the appellant's gates, it was covered in tarpaulin and it
4
disappeared that same night without the appellant having opportunity to
find out what that truck contained.
On ground 2, Counsel for the appellant contend that the finding by the
learned Justice of Appeal that the respondent cannot be said to have
contributed to the loss of the truck is erroneous. It is Counsel's further
contention that the respondent failed to deliver coffee by the contractual
date, namely the 17s of December, 1999, which was a working day and
chose instead to deliver it on Sunday the 19e which was a non-working
day. It is therefore the contention for the appellant that anything that
occurred to the truck or coffee, if any, outside the contractual hours cannot
be blamed on the appellant. According to counsel for the appellant, the
respondent should not be rewarded for being in breach of the contract.
On ground 3 and 4, counsel for the appellant denied that liability could
arise under the principles of bailment because there was no contract of
bailment between the parties either by agreement or ostensible. Counsel
contend therefore that the Court of Appeal erred in holding that once the
appellant accepted the coffee it became a bailee of the coffee and therefore
owed a duty of care to the respondent. Counsel further contend that the
appellant did not, at any time accept in bailment the coffee or the truck.
The act of the security guards in letting the covered truck enter the
appellant's premises was a decision of their own without actual or
ostensible authority to imply a contract of bailment on behalf of the
appellant. Counsel distinguish this case from those in which a servant's
acts may bind his or her master. Counsel pointed out that the evidence of
the security guard who was called to testify at the trial denied that he was
authorized to allow the truck into the premises of the respondent. He
testilied that he only opened the gates out of sympathy with the truck driver
who said that he, the driver, had run out of money and had nowhere else to
park. Counsel further pointed out that throughout the years the
respondent had been in the business, no coffee had even been delivered on
a Sunday, weekend or public holiday and therefore there was no precedent
that the appellant's security guards had any authority they could exercise
on a Sunday to bind the appellant.
On ground 5, counsel for the appellant submit that the Court of Appeal
erred in holding that the market value of 650 bags of coffee was not
disputed. Counsel contend that for a price to be fixed on any quantity of
coffee, it is important that certain criteria, such as quality and moisture of
the coffee must be measured first before the price can be determined.
Quantity
of the coffee alone is not enough.
On ground 6, counsel for the appellant contend that the Court of
Appeal erred when it awarded general damages in the sum of Shs.
5,000,000 and interest by using incorrect criteria and without taking into
account the circumstances of this case.
Counsel cited Itostey v Hgman (1920) 3K8,475, Annaga Ltd v
Mundogas S.A. (1986) 2 ALL ER 385, @urer,s Prlnclples o! Modern
Compang laur, No. 6.Vol. 1), Wrlghtson v McAr-thur and Hutclurlsons
Ltd, The Sale of Goods Act, Cap 82 and Halsbury's Laws of England, No
1 Vol. 1.
For the Respondent, Counsel argued grounds I and2 separately 3 and 4
together and grounds 5 and 6 together.
On ground 1, counsel for the respondent support the findings and
decisions of the Court of Appeal. They contend that the learned Justices of
Appeal were entitled to assume and believe as the Respondent did, that
considering the past business relationships between the parties, once the
appellant admitted that a truck was driven and allowed into its premises, it
must have contained the amount of coffee as claimed by the respondent.
In counsel's opinion, the fact that the truck was covered with tarpaulin
and no one could see what was inside and therefore it contained no coffee is
wrong and misleading.
On ground 2, counsel for the respondent support the holding of the
Justices of Appeal and justify the same by citing a number of cases
including Sectlon 19(2) of the Sale of Goods Act and tlnlversal Cargo
)
Carrlers Corpora'tlon a CltatT,(19571 2Q8,436, No. 13. They conclude that
the contract was not repudiated by the appellant.
On grounds 3 and 4, counsel for the respondent agree with the
contention by the appellant that bailment is based on the contract between
the parties but contend that in this particular case, bailment arose
constructively following the appellant's security guards' acceptance of the
truck carrying coffee from the respondent to the appellant's premises.
Counsel contend that the act of opening the warehouse gate and directing
the truck where to park was within the course of the guards' employment
and gave rise to the contract of bailment.
In further submissions, counsel for the respondent state that by writing
a letter after the theft entitled " Re Coflee Thefr, at lhero Premlsesl the
appellant was admitting liability and it cannot be heard afterwards to deny
responsibility. It is liable by the doctrine of estoppel.
On grounds 5 and 6, it was the contention of counsel for the respondent
that the Court of Appeal correctly awarded the sum of US
g.
B4,2O6,9OL.6
as the value of the coffee that was stolen. Counsel also supported the
findings and conclusions as well as the awards of the general damages and
the rate of interest on the compensation and damages awarded as both
being in the discretionary powers of the court and commercial transactions,
respectively. Counsel for the respondent cited a number of authorities in
support of their submissions including provisions of the SaIe of Goods Act
(supral, Hasteg v Hgmans (192O)3KB 4>5, Iuuronge u Attonteg @nera,l
(1967)E.A. 17, Uganda Llmlted. u Tanzanlte Corporatlon (2002) 2 EA.33,
Mutekanga u Dqudtor Growers (U)Ltd, 1995
-
t999l, 2 E.A .219, unlted
Garmcnts Industry Ltd v Notco (Kla) Ltd., (1977 HCB 128, and Masembe
v Sugar Corporatlon & Anor (2OO2) 2 E.A. 434.
In my opinion, this appeal hinges on two issues namely, whether the
contract for the sale of coffee was ever performed and whether there was
ever any contractual relationship between the appellant and the respondent
to bring them within the principles of bailment.
6
7
Although none of the grounds is framed specifically to challenge the
manner in which the learned Justices of Appeal reevaluated the evidence, it
is my view that grounds 7 and, 2 of this appeal raise the question of whether
their Lordships reevaluated the evidence properly.
At the commencement of the trial in the High Court, the learned judge
framed, correctly in my view, issues upon which judicial determination was
called for. These were:
(a) Whether 65O bags of coffee were delfinred bg thre platntlfl
fiout
respondent) to the premlses of the defendant (nout appellant) ln
a'ccorda,nce wlth tle contract the pa;rtles had entered. lnto earller.
(b) Whether the traller and the coffee utere kept at the appellant's
premlses wlth lts consent/sd,nctloft .
(c) Whether the thefi, of the traller and. the colfee uas as a result oJ
the appellant's serttant's negllgence.
(Q Whcther the appellant oued. the respondent a dutg of care and tf
so, uthether that duty of eare was dlscharged.; a:nd
(e) Whether the defendant ls llabte
for
the damages sought
lor
bg the
respondent.
Counsel for both parties filed le ngthy submissions littered with
authorities in support or against the listed issues.
On issue 1, in her judgment, the learned trial judge having cited Sectlon Zz
oJ the Sale of Good.s Act that provides:
olt
ls the dutg of the seller to dellver the goods, and the
buger to accept and. pag
tor
them, ln accord,ance wlth the
tenns of the contract", held that it was clear from the
evidence that the respondent had not delivered coffee in
accordance with the contract. She therefore answered issue No
I in the negative.
On issue No2, again having thoroughly considered and reviewed the
evidence and submissions of counsel, the learned trial judge found that
there was no contract of bailment between the two parties.
It appears to me that the learned Justices of Court of Appeal ignored
the findings of the learned trial judge and relied heavily on past contractual
relationships between the appellant and the respondent. In his lead
judgment, TWinomujuni J.A, states:
"I thlnk there ls no doubt uhatsoeoer that the appellant and the
respond.ent entered lnto a contract wherebg the appellant
underaook to delluer speclfied 650 bags of cofJee. The cotJee
uas to be dellaered betureen 3,4 a,nd 77h Decem.ber, 7999. At the
beglnnlng of the trlal, the partles agreed tha,t the appellant's
lorry was drluen lnto the respondent's premlses on Sunda,g 79th
December, 7999. Whetler the lorry contalned coflee or not utc's
acknoutledged bg the respondent (appellant) and Group 4
Securltg Ltd, a compdng hlred bg the respondent (appellant) to
guard hls (slc) premises crs.,foltorus:
uDear
Slr,
We ho:ue been advlsed to hold gou responslble
for all
the
costs, damdges o,nd consequences due to thefi of the tntck
and cargo
Jrom
Ibero
M
Ltd pretnlses, Vh Street Industrlal
A?ed, Ka;ryro'lrr on the nlght of 7 &hfigth' December,7999."
I am afraid this message alone illustrates quite clearly that the
learned Justice of Appeal failed to appreciate the facts as presented by the
parties and found to be material by the learned trial judge in her judgment.
The truth of the matter is that the contract between the parties was
dated 3rd December, 1999 marked Exhibit "A" in the record of proceeding by
which the respondent undertook to deliver not just 650 bags of coffee, but
over 2O00 bags. These were to be delivered by 17.t, December, 1999, and
not on the Sunday of 18th/ 19tt', December. The contract indicates that no
sale would be effected unless the following conditions were fulfilled namely,
delivery as per contract, moisture content of the coffee at maximum l3%o,
application of UCDA standards and quality of each type sample. The coffee
had to be fully handpicked.
tt
The learned trial judge correctly in my view, applied these contractual
requirements and concluded that the contract had not been performed by
the respondent (then plaintiff) and that is why she dismissed the claim and
in my view rightly so.
With great respect, learned Justice TWinomujuni, J.A, erred in finding
that the respondent then (now appellant) actually acknowledged liability.
The letter the learned Justice of Appeal cited was not written by the
appellant who was the addressee but by the plaintiff who is now the
respondent, attempting to make a demand against the then respondent and
hoping to pin liability on the same. It is therefore, erroneous on the part of
the learned Justice to suggest that the respondent (who is now the
appellant) accepted a liability.
The learned Justice of Appeal continues to assert that it was right to
assume that the truck contained coffee and that the respondent delivered at
the premises of the appellant a lorry full of coffee on facts not admitted or
proven. It is not true either for the learned Justice of Appeal to surmise
that any of the appellant's security guards testified that they were expecting
the coffee or indeed, that by the time the truck disappeared from the
premises the appellant had already received and accepted coffee from the
respondent. With the greatest respect, these observations and conciusions
are either conjectural or based entirely on the claims of the respondent. In
any event, it cannot be said seriously, that the learned Justices either
reevaluated the evidence or took the findings of the trial judge into account.
They do not fault her either.
For these reasons I have given I would allow ground 1 of this appeal. I
now turn to ground 2.
The evidence presented by counsel for the appellant and conceded by
counsel for the respondent is that there was no any contractual
arrangements between the parties to give rise to any obligations under the
principles of bailment.
9
The evidence in support of the appellant's case is, in my opinion,
overwhelming. The contracted coffee should have been delivered on Friday,
the 17tL of December which was a working day. The respondent must have
known or ought to have known that officials of the appellant do not work on
Sundays. Nor did the respondent make any effort to ascertain whether its
coffee would be received on a Sunday which apparently had never occurred
before. Nor did it give any notice that it had altered the agreed date of
delivery.
In my opinion, if any issue of bailment were to rise at all, it was
overwhelmingly shut out by the clear and credible evidence of the
appellant's security guard, who testihed thus:
$When
I told. the drfinr that
for
us we do not allout vehlcles on
Sundag, he requested me to
forglae hlm
because eoen the truoney
tleg had gloen them ho,d got finlshed,
dnd they had also slept
on the wag. Mbale lrryrorters Ltd ha,d brought coffee
for
about 3-
4 tlmes. ?hat is how I got to knout hlm. That ls uthg I dldn't
doubt the drluer uhen he told me that he uas
trom
there. That
vehlcle has neuer brought any colJee betore. The uehlcles that
used. to brlng coffee were d{Jerent. I had neter seen the drlaer
and the turn bog before. Euen the coffee theg used to brlng lt
durlng worklng dags not ueekends or publlc holldays. I d.ld not
see the co,ffee because the traller utas coaered ulth tarpaulln.
When the dritrer explalned to me the problem.s on the wag, and
tltat they uould abandon the uehlcle lf I retused to allout them
ln the prernlses, He uas supposed to reuerse the uehlcle o.nd.
park lt near the store. It mdkes the offloadlng easg, We do not
olfload coffee on Sundags. Afier parklng the rlehlcle he locked
the doors of the oehtcle as he uas golng autag. I asked hlm
for
hls tdentitg card. He refused. He dld not glve m.c the kegs oJ the
tlehlcle. In
fact
the man didn't glve me or ang of mg securltg
l0
personnel angthlng beJore lea vlng. I personallg checked on the
vehlcle and.
found that
the doors were securelg locked,"
This evidence was hardly contradicted.
In my view, if there had been any speculation as to whether this
transaction and its strange episodes could be the subject of bailment, the
evidence of this witness dispels it entirely.
In my opinion therefore, ground 2 of this appeal ought to succeed.
With the success of grounds 7 arrd 2, the other grounds which are
essentially consequential, should succeed also. I will therefore not endevour
to deal with them as I believe such an exercise would be unnecessary.
I would allow this appeal and restore the findings and orders of the
learned trial judge.
I would award costs in this Court and in the Courts below to the
appellant with interest in this Court and in the Court of Appe al at 6Vo
Dated at Mengo ,n*.23.ll.ary ot...O.
7.......2OO9
,b
G.W.
JUSTICE OF THE SUPRME COURT
ll
,
THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA
AT MENGO
(CORAM: ODOKI C.J., TSEKOOKO,
KATUREEBE AND OKELLO, JJ.SC)
KANYEIHAMBA,
CIVIL APPEAL OF NO 1O OF 2OO7
BETWEEN
rBERO (U) LTD APPELLANT
AND
MBALE IMPORTERS AND
EXPORTERS LTD RESPONDENT
{Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal at Kampala (Twinomujuni,
Kitumba and Engwau, JJA
)dated
2* March 2007, in Civit Appeat No.O4 of ZOOS)
JUDGMENT OF ODOKI, C.J.
I have had the benefit of reading in draft, the judgment prepared by
my learned brother, Kanyeihamba JSC. I agree with him that this
appeal ought to be di mt with orders he has proposed.
As the other members of he Court also agree, this appeal is
r_(!n,
Crsmbsed with orders proposed by the learned Justice of Supreme
Court.
go this 3""-\ day of.
od-ba---
.. .2009
Dated at Men
B oki
CHIEF JUSTICE
THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA
AT MENGO
ICORAM: ODOKI,
C,J, TSEKOOKO, KANYEIHAMBA, KATUREEBE AND
0KELLO, Jl.S.Cl.
CIVIL APPE,AL NO. 10 OF 2OO7
BETWEEN
IBERO (U) LTD::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::!:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::APPE,LT,ANT
AND
MBALE IMPORTERS & EXPORTERS LTD: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 3RESPONDENT
[Appeal from
declslon of the Gourt of Appeal at Kampala (Engwau,
Twtnomujunl and Kltumba, JJA) dated 2g fitfarah, 2OO7 ln Clvll Appeal
No.84 of2ooif.
Delivered at Mengo this ay of ..cE1p.h..?eooe.
F.'.+
J TSEKOOKO
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
J U DGM ENT O_E fSEKOOKO.JSC
I have had the benefit of reading in draft, the
judgment of my learned
brother, Kanyeihamba, JSC, which he has just delivered' I agree with his
conclusions and orders.
,A
THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA
AT MENGO
GIVIL APPEAL OF NO 10 OF 2OO7
BETWEEN
IBERO (L) LTD:: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :: : : : :: : : : : : : : : :: : : : : : : APPELLAIT{T
AND
MBALE IMPORTERS AND
EXPORTERS LTD RESPONDENT.
(Appeal
from
the decision o{ the Court of Appeal at Kampala (Twinomujunt, Kitumba
and Engwau, JJA) dated 2gh March 2007, in Civil Appeal No. 84 of2005).
JUDGMENT OF KATURCEBE. JSG.
I have had the benefit of reading in draft the
judgment
of my learned
brother, Kanyeihamba, JSC. For the-reasons he has given, I agree with him
that this appeal ought to U i#ffiCl I also agree with the orders he has
7-../f---4'
proposed.
nd
day or. . 19.q:t$gg>2009. Dated at Mengo this ....
A{z;:
Bart M. Katureebe
Justice of the Supreme Court
a
(cone*t:
IBERO
(U)
LTD:
MBALEIMPORTERS&
EXPORTERSLTD:
REPUBLTC OF UGANDA
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA
AT MENGO
oDot<t, C.l, TsEKooxo, t(AtrrEil4A*rBA,
I(ATUREEBE AND OT(EIJ-O JJSC).
CI\/IL APPEAL NO. I O OF 2OO7
BETWEEN
APPELI-ANT
RESPONDENT
AND
IUDGMENT OF OKELLO, JSC:
G. M- OKELLO
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
_)
{Appeol from
the decision of the Court of Appeal at
Ktmpala (Engwtu, Twinomujuni, ond Kilumbu, JJA)
ilated 2tt' Mtrch 2007, in Civil Appeal No. 84 ttf 2005j.
I have had the opportunity to read in draft, the judgment of my leamed
brother, Justice Kanyeihamba, JSC, and for the reasons he has given therein,
I agree that the appeal must succeed. I also concur with his orders as to
costs.
I
Dated at Menso *ir, .*Vl?doy of, ..QClelzo"-- ....., 200s.
rt,
-l
L- u.-+,\-U-r.-*--O
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