Ultimate Security Tanzania Limited vs Karoli Francis Morandi (Civil Application No. 1750 of 2025) [2025] TZCA 1304 (18 December 2025)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT DODOMA CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1750 OF 2025 ULTIMATE SECURITY TANZANIA LIMITED ....... ........................ APPLICANT VERSUS KAROLI FRANCIS MORANDI ......... .............................. ....... RESPONDENT (An application for stay of an award of the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration) ( Makanvaga, 1 .) dated the 24th day of June, 2024 in Labour Dispute No. CMA/DSM/KIN/250/2023/117/2023 RULING 25th November & 18th December, 2025. MGONYA, 3.A.: In this application, Ultimate Security Tanzania Limited (the applicant) is inviting the Court to stay execution in respect of an award of the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration (the CMA) in Labour Dispute No. CMA/DSM/KIN/250/2023/117/2023 which she lost to Karoli Francis Morandi (the respondent). The application has been brought by way of Notice of Motion and is founded under rules 11 (3), (4), (5), (a) (b) (c), (7) (a), (b), (c), (d) and 48 (1) of the Tanzania Court of Appeal Rules, 2009 (the Rules). It is i

supported by an affidavit sworn by Tatu Elias, the applicant's Human Resources Officer. From the affidavit supporting the application for stay of execution pending appeal, it is evident that the applicant, having been dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the High Court (Labour Division), intends to lodge an appeal to this Court. In the interim, the respondent has initiated execution proceedings in the High Court (Labour Division) at Dar es Salaam. Aggrieved by these developments and desirous of challenging the said decision on appeal, the applicant has moved this Court by way of the present application for stay of execution pending the determination of the intended appeal. The application was heard through virtual proceedings. The applicant was represented by Mr. Hassan Mwemba, learned advocate, while the respondent, Mr. Karoli Francis Morandi, appeared in person. In his submissions on behalf of the applicant, Mr. Mwemba urged the Court to adopt the contents of the supporting affidavit previously filed. His oral arguments substantially mirrored the averments therein. He identified three principal grounds warranting the grant of the prayed relief: first, that substantial loss would ensue to the applicant if the application is refused; second, that the application has been instituted without unreasonable delay; and third, that the applicant is prepared to

furnish adequate security for the due performance of the decree in accordance with any directions this Court may issue. On the aspect of timeliness, learned counsel emphasized compliance with rule 11(4) of the Rules, noting that the application was lodged on 2n d September, 2025 well within the prescribed period of 14 days following service of the summons in the execution proceedings issued by the High Court (Labour Division) on 21s t August 2025. Regarding irreparable or substantial loss, Mr. Mwemba contended that execution would occasion grave prejudice and loss to the applicant. Moreover, should execution proceed and the decretal sum of TZS 2,664,000/= be realized in favour of the respondent, the applicant would be unable to recover the same in the event of a successful appeal, given the respondent's unknown whereabouts and lack of identifiable immovable assets amenable to attachment. As to security for due performance, counsel assured the Court of the applicant's willingness to provide such security in whatever form this Court deems appropriate. Upon the foregoing, learned counsel prayed for an order to stay execution of the award of the CMA dated 21s t June 2024. In his response, the respondent opposed the application on the following grounds: firstly, that a mere intention to appeal does not, of 3

itself, constitute sufficient cause for stay of execution; secondly, that the application is calculated to frustrate the realization of his vested rights under the decree; and thirdly, that the applicant has failed to establish, to the requisite standard, the likelihood of substantial or irreparable loss in case the grant of stay is denied. Accordingly, the respondent urged the Court to dismiss the application in its entirety for want of merit. At the outset, I deem it expedient to reiterate the settled position of the law as enshrined in Rule 11(3) of the Rules, to the effect that the mere lodging or intention to lodge an appeal does not operate as an automatic stay of execution of the decree or order appealed from. The Court is vested with discretionary power to grant a stay of execution upon good cause being shown, subject to the cumulative satisfaction of the conditions stipulated thereunder. The law under the Rules states; "11 (3) In any civil proceedings, where a notice o f appeal has been lodged in accordance with Rule 83, an appeal shall not operate as a stay o f execution o f the decree or order appealed from except so far as the High Court or tribunal may order, nor shall execution o f a decree be stayed by reason only o f an appeal having been preferred from the decree or order; but the Court may, upon good cause shown, order stay o f execution o f such decree or order."

Further, the Court before granting an order to stay execution, has to satisfy itself that the legal requirements are met in accordance with subrules (4) and (5) of rule 11 of the Rules as stipulated hereunder: "11(4): An application for stay o f execution shall be made within fourteen days o f the service o f the notice o f execution on the applicant by the executing officer, or from the date he is otherwise made aware o f the existence o f an application for execution. 11 (5): No order for stay o f execution shall be made under this rule unless the Court is satisfied that- (a) substantial loss may result to the party applying for stay o f execution unless the order is made; (b) security has been given by the applicant for the due performance o f such decree or order as may ultimately be binding upon him," From the foregoing, it is evident that the Court retains a discretionary power to grant an order for stay of execution pending appeal, provided the applicant demonstrates satisfaction of the requisite conditions stipulated under Rule 11(3), (4), and (5) of the Rules. See - Laurent Kavishe v. Enely Hezron, Civil Application No. 5 of 2012 (CAT) and Mantrac Tanzania Ltd v. Raymond Costa, Civil Application No. 11 of 2010 (CAT) (both unreported).

The pivotal issue in the instant application is whether the applicant has satisfied the statutory prerequisites for the grant of a stay of execution, as stipulated in the relevant provisions, particularly the requirement that substantial loss may result to the applicant unless such order is made. The averments in paragraph 1 of the Notice of Motion and paragraph 11 of the supporting affidavit, the applicant contends that refusal of the prayed relief would occasion her substantial loss of a nature incapable of adequate remediation by an award of damages or monetary compensation. With respect, I find that the applicant has not discharged the evidential burden of persuading the Court, by way of cogent particulars or demonstration, as to the precise manner in which she would suffer irreparable harm or substantial loss in the absence of the order sought. This conclusion is fortified upon consideration of the contents of paragraphs 12 and 13 of the supporting affidavit, which provide as follows: "12. That the applicant is a reputable company able to satisfy thejudgment at any time should the intended appeal fail. ..........

13. That, on the balance o f convenience and "common sense , " the applicant stands to suffer more if the decree is not stayed pending the intended appeal." In my considered opinion, having applied the requisite "common sense" approach as enunciated in the applicant's affidavit, I hold that the applicant has failed to satisfy the legal threshold in relation to this particular condition. The next condition pertains to whether the application has been preferred without unreasonable delay. I find that this requirement has been met, which accounts for the fact that the respondent has raised no objection on this ground. Accordingly, I have no issue or reservation in respect of this aspect. In relation to the third mandatory condition for the grant of a stay of execution namely, the furnishing of security for the due performance of the decree that may ultimately be binding upon the applicant, this requirement, akin to the condition pertaining to irreparable loss, presents similar difficulties in the present application. Under this condition, the applicant is obliged to propose adequate security to ensure due performance of any decree that may ultimately be upheld against her. Regrettably, the applicant has failed to tender any such proposal. Rather, she has merely indicated an intention to provide security, without specifying or demonstrating the nature or form of

security she is capable of furnishing to cover the decretal sum of TZS 2 , 664 , 000 / = in favour of the respondent. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the applicant has not complied with this third condition, thereby rendering the application for stay of execution untenable on this ground as well. As a result, the applicant has failed to persuade this Court to grant the relief sought in the application. Accordingly, I hold that the application lacks merit and cannot succeed. The application is hereby dismissed. As this is a labour dispute, no order as to costs is made. DATED at DODOMA this 17th day of December, 2025. Ruling delivered this 18thday of December, 2025 in the presence of Mr. Hassani Mwemba, learned counsel for the Applicant and in the presence of the respondent in person, via virtual Court and Mr. John Gervas, Court Clerk; is hereby certified as a true copy of the original. L. E. MGONYA JUSTICE OF APPEAL