Case Law[2025] TZCA 1257Tanzania
Laban Raphael Lupatu & Another vs Irene Simon Lupatu (Civil Application No. 202511070002227 of 2025) [2025] TZCA 1257 (11 December 2025)
Court of Appeal of Tanzania
Judgment
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA
AT DODOMA
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 202511070002227 OF 2025
LABAN RAPHAEL LUPATU
ALLEN R. LUPATU ............
1 st APPLICANT
2 nd APPLICANT
VERUS
IRENE SIMON LUPATU (Adm inistratrix o f
the Estate o f the /ate SIMON ABISAY LUPATU) RESPONDENT
(Application for Stay of Execution of the Judgment and Decree of the
Kinondoni District Land and Housing Tribunal, at Mwananyamala)
24th Nov & 11th Dec, 2025.
FIKIRINI. 3.A.:
The applicants, Laban Raphael Lupatu and Allen R. Lupatu, had
moved this Court by way of notice of motion in terms of Rule 11 (3),
11(4), 11(5) (a) and (b), 11(6), 11 (7) (a) (b) (c) (d) and Rule 51 (1) of
the Tanzania Court of Appeal Rules, 2009 (the Rules). The gist of the
application is seeking for stay of execution in Application for Execution
No. 118 of 2025, originating from the judgment and decree of the
(Mbilinvi. Chairperson1 )
dated 28thday of February, 2025
in
Land Application No. 31 of 2022
RULING
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Kinondoni District Land and Housing Tribunal in Land Application No. 31
of 2022. A joint affidavit of the applicants supports the application.
In response, the respondent Irene Simon Lupatu (the
Adm inistratrix o f the Estate o f the Late Simon Abisay Lupatu) filed an
affidavit in reply contesting the application.
Briefly, the background leading to the present application can be
stated as follows: that the late Simon Abisay Lupatu sued the applicants
(his siblings) for encroaching on his land measuring 45 meters by 25
meters, which is within his 3 acres land, which was given to him by the
Tanzania Portland Cement Company Limited, in 1984. He cleared the
land (suit land) and, in 2000, invited the applicants to assist him in
supervising it. To his surprise, in 2021, the applicants claimed that the
land was theirs on the pretext that the 1st applicant bought it from the
2n d applicant.
The controversy led the late Simon Lupata file Land Application
No. 31 of 2022, before the District Land and Housing Tribunal (DLHT).
After hearing from the parties, their witnesses and exhibits, the DLHT
decided in favour of the applicant.
Discontented, the applicants unsuccessfully appealed to the High
Court in Land Case No. 000007298 of 2025. Following the dismissal of
the appeal on 11th June, 2025, Simon Lupatu filed Execution Application
No. 118 of 2025. However, he passed away on 26th June, 2025. On 28th
October, 2025, the Tribunal was formally notified of his demise.
Subsequently, Probate and Administration Cause No. 22106 of 2025 was
instituted, and on 6th October, 2025, Irene Simon Lupatu was appointed
as Administratrix of the estate of the late Simon Abisay Lupatu. In light
of these developments and the appointment of the Administratrix, the
applicants sought and were granted leave of fourteen (14) days to
comply with Regulation 23(3) of GN No. 174 of 2003. The matter was
adjourned to 12th November, 2025.
Subsequent to the above order, on 7th November, 2025, the
applicants lodged the present application.
At the hearing of the application, the applicants enjoyed the
services of Mr. Shukran Mzikila, learned advocate whereas Mr. Mtumwa
Kiondo, learned advocate as well, appeared for the respondent.
Addressing the Court, Mr. Mzikila prefaced his submission by
adopting the notice of motion and the joint affidavit deponed to form
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part of his oral submission in support of the application. In addition, he
invited the Court to grant the application since the applicants had
satisfied all the requirements. Itemizing them, he started with Rule 11
(4) of the Rules, contending that the present application was brought
within the fourteen (14) days prescribed by the law and averred in
paragraph 9 of the affidavit in support.
On the requirement under Rule 11 (5) (a) and (b), he argued that
a substantial loss has been demonstrated in paragraph 12 of the
affidavit. As for security for the due performance of the decree, the
applicants were ready to furnish security in the form of the Residential
Licence N. LM-250-Land No. 239/325/74 located at Wazo Ward,
Mivumoni Street, and any other security which may be ordered by the
Court need be furnished.
Besides, the learned counsel contended that Rule 11 (7) (a) - (d)
of the Rules has equally been satisfied. As indicated in paragraph 6, a
copy of the notice of the appeal has been annexed,whereas in
paragraph 5, a copy of judgment and decree thereofhave been
annexed. Finally, a notice of the intended execution has also been
availed as averred in paragraph 9.
Winding up his submission, the learned counsel addressed the
concern raised in paragraph 5(f) of the affidavit in reply, disputing the
allegation that the applicants are abusing the judicial process. The
learned counsel intimated that the applicants had timely lodged their
application and dismissed the claim on the ground of abuse of the
judicial process.
In reply, Mr. Kiondo, besides adopting the affidavit in reply,
vehemently contested the grant of the application. His reason was that
the present application was lodged out of time. According to him the
applicants were aware of the Execution proceedings before the DLHT
since 22n d April, 2025, therefore, counting from that date the fourteen
(14) days prescribed under Rule 11 (4) of the Rules, were long gone
before 7th November, 2025 when the present application was filed,
which filing was done without seeking or getting an extension of time.
He further contended that the applicants had been extensively
developing the land, though at their own peril, and insisted that the
application be declined.
Rejoining Mr. Mzikila reiterated his earlier submission and
maintained that the present application was timely lodged. This is
because, when the application for execution was lodged, the notice of
appeal had not yet been received by the Court. The notice of appeal was
lodged on 16th June, 2025 and served on the respondent on 27th June,
2025. As for the date in April, he argued that on 22n d April, 2025, the
case was before the High Court on appeal and there was also an order
for stay of execution as averred in paragraph 4 of the affidavit, the fact
never challenged by the respondent, at most noted in the affidavit in
reply.
In addition, he contended that in between all these the respondent
(the late Simon Lupatu) passed away, therefore, it was not possible to
stay execution against a deceased person. Otherwise, the information on
execution was received on 28th October, 2025, when the respondent's
counsel informed the tribunal that the respondent was reviving his
application for execution. The information was followed by the present
application, which was within fourteen (14) days prescribed by the
Rules.
Responding to the substantial loss, the learned counsel opposed
the submission resisting the grant of the stay of execution, arguing that
the applicants will suffer substantial loss, if evicted from the landed
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property. He dismissed the submission that there are ongoing
developments, contending that could not be substantiated at this stage
of the matter.
He wound up by urging the Court to grant the stay of execution
pending hearing and determination of the intended appeal.
The issue for determination is whether the applicants have fulfilled
the requirements guaranteeing the grant of the application for stay of
execution. Pursuant to Rule 11(3), this Court has the power to order a
stay of execution once the conditions prerequisite as stipulated in
various provisions have been complied with cumulatively.
Amongst the conditions to be complied with is the lodging of a
notice of appeal showing the intention of challenging the impugned
decision as per Rule 11 (3) of the Rules. Once the respondent has
applied to execute the decree in his favour within fourteen (14) days
from the date of notice to show cause or be aware, the applicants must
apply for a stay of execution.
Another requirement is that of annexing documents as illustrated
under rule 11 (7) of the Rules, comprising the following: (i) a copy of a
notice of appeal; (ii) a decree or order appealed from; (iii) a copy of the
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judgment or ruling appealed from; and (iv) a notice of the intended
execution.
Besides the above, the applicants are required mandatorily in
terms of rule 11 (5) (a) and (b) of the Rules to show that a substantial
loss may result if the Court grants no order granting a stay of execution.
This is to be accompanied by the requirement to provide security for the
due performance of the decree, as might ultimately be binding upon the
applicants.
To test the satisfaction of the stated conditions against the
application, I shall start with the first part of the conditions. These are
those conditions found under Rules 11(3), 11 (4), 11 (7) (a)-(d) of the
Rules. It is without a doubt that the applicants, after being aggrieved by
the High Court decision delivered on 11th June, 2025, a notice of appeal
was lodged on 16th June, 2025, in compliance with Rule 83 (1) and
within thirty days (30) as prescribed under Rule 90 (1) of the Rules.
There was a slight twist in the present application, that before the
lapse of forty five (45) days, within which a losing party could appeal, to
be precise on 4th April, 2025, the respondent applied for the execution of
the decree in Execution Application No. 118 of 2025. The applied order
was on 22n d April, 2025, stayed pending hearing and determination of
the appeal before the High Court.
The High Court judgment was delivered on 11th June, 2025,
followed by a notice of appeal on 16th June, 2025. Unfortunately, the
respondent passed away on 26th June, 2025. On the one hand, as rightly
contended by Mr. Mzikila, no stay of execution application could have
been preferred against the deceased person. On the other hand, the
execution proceedings could not proceed without the appointment of an
administrator or administratrix of the deceased estate.
Essentially, the matter was stayed pending its revival at a later
stage. The respondent's counsel has not challenged the assertion that
there was a stay of execution pending hearing and determination on
Land Appeal No. 202511070002227 of 2025 and that there was stalling
of the process after the passing away of the respondent.
The matter was revived on 28th October, 2025, and that is when
the DLHT was informed of the respondent's passing on and appointment
of Irene Simon Lupatu (as Administratrix of the Estate of the Late Simon
Abisay Lupatu). On the same day, the applicants prayed for 14 days
within which to lodge any objection to the application before the DLHT,
the prayer, which was granted
Within the fourteen days prescribed under rule 11(4) of the Rules,
the present application was filed on 7th November, 2025. The
application was accompanied by copies of all the listed documents to be
annexed as illustrated under rule 11 (7) (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the
Rules.
The respondent's averment in paragraphs 5 (a) - (d) is not
supported by the record. There is nowhere on the record showing that
the applicants had failed to comply with the order dated 28th October,
2025, allowing the applicants to file an objection, if any, within fourteen
(14) days. Indeed, the present application was filed on 7th November,
2025, which was before the next scheduled hearing date, which was
fixed for 12th November, 2025. The present application was filed five (5)
days before the lapse of fourteen (14) days given.
I have also considered the respondent's claim in paragraph 7 of
the affidavit that this application is an abuse of the judicial process.
Although no further explanation was given, however, based on the
history, that the Execution Application No. 118 of 2025, had already
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been lodged since April, 2025, the respondent might be considering
filing this application for a stay of execution as frivolous, vexatious, and
an abuse of the court/judicial process.
The assertion is incorrect in the absence of evidence in that
regard. The rationale behind the conclusion is that when the appeal was
before the High Court, there was an order for stay of execution. After
the High Court judgment, the applicants were dissatisfied and preferred
an appeal. A notice of appeal was filed on 16th June, 2025. As stated
earlier in this ruling, the respondent's demise halted the proceedings,
including the intended execution. It is after the appointment of the
administratrix of the late Simon Lupatu's estate that the proceedings,
including the execution, resumed on 28th October, 2025. The applicants
prayed and were granted leave to file their objection within fourteen
(14) days, which they did. However, instead of filing their objection
before the DLHT, the law required them to do so before this Court, since
their notice of appeal had already been lodged with the Court. Under the
circumstances, it cannot be said that the present application is frivolous,
vexatious or an abuse of the judicial process.
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The conditions set in Rules 11 (3), 11 (4) and 11 (7) (a) - (d) of
the Rules have been satisfactorily complied with.
The only snag so far is compliance with rules 11 (5) (a) and (b) of
the Rules, which require demonstration of substantial loss to be faced if
no order for a stay of execution is granted. The applicants under
paragraph 12 of the affidavit in support had portrayed substantial loss to
be suffered. Under paragraph 12, this is what is stated:-
"That the respondent intends to evict the 1st
applicant from his landed property and there is
reliable inform ation that she intends also to sale
the disputed property to a third party owner o f a
petrol station nearby who intends to demolish
ten (10) frame shops owned and b u ilt by the 1st
applicant which w ill result to substantial loss
thereof More so, once the said property has
been sold to a third party it w ill com plicate more
the m atter between the parties therein."
Although the applicants' affidavit does not provide sufficient
evidence of substantial loss, and the respondent's affidavit in reply does
not strongly challenge the alleged fact, one matter remains uncontested:
the applicants are currently in occupation of the disputed property,
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where ongoing development is taking place. This fact has not been
disputed by the respondent.
Guided by the principle in Sudi Seif Ngota (Administrator of
the Estate of Seif Mohamed Ngota) v. Aloyce John Kazimbaya,
(Civil Application No. 262/17 of 2019) [2021] TZCA 26 (18 February
2021; TANZLii), in which the Court discouraged declining a stay of
execution where the applicant is in occupation of the disputed property,
I am persuaded that the applicants merit the grant of a stay of
execution pending determination of their intended appeal.
Similarly, in Mapius Otieno v. Machimu Mayara, (Civil
Application No. 279/8 of 2024) [2024] TZCA 515 (2 July 2024; TANZLii),
the Court, while referring to Tanzania Motor Service Ltd v. Tantrack
Agencies Ltd, (Civil Application No. 86 of 2004) [2005] TZCA 22 (12
May 2005; TANZLii), held that eviction of an applicant from the suit
property amounts to substantial loss, particularly where the applicant
was in occupation at the time of the decree. This factor must be
carefully considered when determining whether to grant a stay of
execution.
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In the present matter, the applicants have undoubtedly remained
in occupation and have lodged an intended appeal. Against this
backdrop, it would be illogical to decline their application. Accordingly, I
find that the applicants deserve a stay of execution pending the
outcome of the appeal.
What I have to grapple with now is the security for the due
performance. Given that the respondent has twice previously secured
decisions in her favour, consequently, the failure to gain vacant
possession of the disputed property is likely to affect both her income
and enjoyment of the decree adversely. Additionally, since the intended
appeal could take several more months or even years to resolve, there is
a risk that the respondent may end up with a judgment that is
essentially unenforceable without proper security.
The applicants have pledged their readiness to furnish security for
the due performance, as averred in paragraph 14, though the
respondent had, under paragraph 6, contested that demanding a strict
proof. In the circumstances of this case, I am leaning more towards
agreeing with the applicants, since there is tangible security pledged.
Their pledge on the landed property known as Residential Licence No.
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LM-250-Land No. 239/325/74 located at Wazo Ward, Mivumoni, is, in
my view, sufficient to secure the respondent if the appeal is in her
favour.
I thus grant the prayer for stay of execution pending the hearing
and determination of the intended appeal. Meanwhile, the applicants are
ordered not to dispose of or alienate in any way the property registered
under the Residential License No. LM-250-Land No. 239/325/74 located
at Wazo Ward, Mivumoni Street. The said Residential License should be
deposited with the Registrar of the Court of Appeal within thirty (30)
days from the date of this Ruling.
DATED at DAR ES SALAAM this 11th day of December, 2025.
Ruling delivered this 11th day of December, 2025 in the presence
of Mr. Shukran Mzikila, learned counsel for the applicants also holding
brief for Mr. Mtumwa Kiondo and Ms. Jenikisa Bukuku, Court Clerk; is
hereby certified as a true copy of the original.
P. S. FIKIRINI
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
R. W. CHAUNGU
DEPUTY REGISTRAR
COURT OF APPEAL
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