Case Law[2005] UGSC 30Uganda
Kabuye v Uganda (Criminal Appeal 2 of 2002) [2005] UGSC 30 (1 November 2005)
Supreme Court of Uganda
Judgment
./t/
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA
AT MENGO
CORAM: ODOKI, CJ; TSEKOOKO, KAROKORA' MULENGA'
KANYEIHAMBA JJ.S.C.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2 OF 2OO2
KABUYE SENVEWO: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : i : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :APPELLANT
UGANDA: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :RESPONDENT
(Appeal
from iudgment
of the Court of Appeal (Mukasa
-
Kikonyogo DCJ; Engwau'
Byamugisha, IJ.A) at Kampala in Criminal Appeal No'26/02 doted 16'1'01)
JUDGME NT OF THE COURT.
The High Coun of Uganda (Mwangusya J') sitting at Masaka on 8th
November 2002 convicted the appellant for manslaughter and rape of
Nakanwagi Agnes, the deceased, sentenced him to imprisonment for 8 and
l0yearsrespectively,andorderedthatthesentencesshallrunconcurrently'
on l6,h April 2004, the court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal
\
I
I
t
I
BETWEEN
AND
7
against both conviction and sentence; hence this second appeal to this Court
also against both conviction and sentence'
2
The facts on which the appellant's conviction was based are brief. The
deceased,amarriedwoman,wasahawkerofsecondhandclothes'andthe
appellant,anAssistantBankManagerofMasakabranchoftheUganda
Commercial Bank was her customer along with other bank staff. On 21"
August 2001 , at about 4.30 p.m., the
deceased went to the bank' Outside the
bank, Harriet Iga, an office attendant who had earlier bought clothes on
credit paid her debt and informed the deceased that the appellant whom she
wanted for the same purpose, was inside the bank. The deceased decided to
wait for him outside his residential flat on top of the bank' She stayed
chatting with Matovu Matiya who
was painting the flat. subsequently, the
appellant came out of the bank and together with the deceased entered the
flat and locked the door. The
two stayed inside the flat alone until 8.30 p.m.'
when the appellant called for medical help because the deceased was in bad
condition.Threedoctorsturnedupattheflatandfoundthedeceasedonthe
appellant's bed. she was dressed in only a half-slip and stripped shorts. she
was gasping for breath, and in coma' Blood stained froth was coming from
her mouth and nostrils. Because of her critical condition the doctors rushed
her to hospital where efforts to resuscitate her failed. She died at 9.20 p.m.
Dr. Sewankambo, DW2, issued a certificate stating the cause of death to be
cerebralvascularaccident.Subsequently,however,Dr.KibukaMusoke,
PW4, who carried out a post-mortem examination, found external and
internalinjuriesonthedeceased'sbodyandcertifiedthecauseofdeathtobe
shock resulting from severe bleeding of intemal organs. The police arrested
the appellant on a charge of murder'
In his charge and caution statement to the police' the appellant stated that he
had dealt with the deceased for two years when she used to sell secondhand
clothes to him, sometimes on credit; and that during that period they
developed a love relationship and
got to know each other intimately'
Through that intimacy, he learnt from the deceased that she had had two
accidents from which she sustained body pains' In the first accident she was
squeezed between two motor vehicles and in the second she fell down and
hit her chest against a chair' According to him' up to the time of her death
she was still undergoing treatment for the body pains'
Hesaidthatonthefatefulday,afterenteringtheflatwiththedeceased'they
first discussed purchase
ofclothing for his children and then agreed to have
sexual intercourse. They had an uneventful first round' However' when they
resumedtheintercourseafteraninterval'thedeceasedstartedbreathingvery
fast. He asked her what was wrong, but she did not respond and when he
saw froth forming at her mouth he stopped sex' He cleaned
her mouth with a
wetfacetowelwhereuponhenoticedwhatappearedtobebloodinthefroth.
He was alarmed and called for medical help'
J
At his trial, he was indicted for murder and rape' On the charge of murder'
the trial court found that the prosecution had proved,
through circumstantial
evidence, that the appellant
unlawfully killed the deceased' but had failed to
prove that he did so with malice aforethought' hence
the conviction for
manslaughter.
The court, however, held that
the charge ofrape was proved
beyond reasonable doubt' The Court ofAppeat upheld both convictions' The
appeal to this Court is on four grounds drawn in argumentative form
contrary to rule 81 of the Supreme Court Rules' In essence' however' the
or after death as surmised by counsel for the appellant. Nor could they have
beensustainedduringearlieraccidentsassuggestedbytheappellantbecause
her husband and her son testified that she was never involved in any
accident.
ItappearstousthatthecriticismoftheCourtofAppealbylearnedcounsel
fortheappellantwasmisconceivedand/ormadeoutofcontext'Inits
judgment,theCourtofAppealreviewedallthecircumstantialevidence
adduced at the trial and concluded that it inesistibly pointed to the appellant
as the person who inflicted the injuries that caused the death ofthe deceased'
It based the conclusion on what
it referred to as three
,.factors,';
which in
summary were that
-
l.Dr.Sewankambo'sexaminationofthedeceasedwascasualand
hurried,andhiscertificateastothecauseofdeathwasreliantonthe
history given by the appellant that the deceased had had a fit;
2.Theappellant'sclaimthatthedeceasedhadhadtwoaccidentswas
falseasitwasnegatedbythetestimonyofhernextofkinwhowould
have known if she had been involved in such accidents;
3.Anexpertwitnessissupposedtoprovidescientificcriteriaonwhich
hisconclusionisbased'andiftheexpertevidenceisnotsatisfactory
or different experts give different criteria, the court can rely on other
evidence.
After outlining those "factors", the
court made the observation thal 'the
medical evidence lended to lean towards the theory that was advanced by
theappellantthatthedeceasedwasinvolvedinaccidents'.Weappreciate
that if one takes that part of the
judgment in isolation, as counsel for the
appellant did, the said criticisms by counsel would carry weight' First' the
)
firsttwogrounds,whichrelatetotheconvictionformanslaughter,arethat
the Court of APPeal erred
-
in upholding the trial courl finding'
on wrong grounds' that the
appellant infticted the iniuries that caused death; and
in
failing
to evaluate evidence, which supported the appellant's case'
Mr. Ayigihugu, leamed counsel for the appellant' argued the two grounds
together. He submitted that
there was no proof that the appellant inflicted the
injuriesthatcausedthedeathofthedeceased,andcriticizedthereasons
relied on by the Court of Appeal to hold that the evidence
irresistibly pointed
to the appellant as the one who inflicted the fatal injuries. He stressed that
twodoctorswhosawthedeceasedattheflattestifiedthatshehadnoinjuries
on her and he contended that this meant that the injuries found on her during
the post-mortem examination
were inflicted after she was removed from the
flat. He also criticized the Court of Appeal for failing to evaluate that
testimony, and give to the appellant the benefit of doubt despite its finding
that
-
"The medical
evidence lended to lean towards the lheory that was
advanced by the appellanr hat the deceased wos involved in
accidents."
In reply, Mr. Okwonga, Ag. Senior Principal State Attomey' submitted that
the circumstantial
evidence proved beyond reasonable doubt that the
appellantinflictedthefatalinjuriesonthedeceasedwhiletheywereinside
the flat. He argued that the deceased had entered the flat in apparent good
health, stayed inside the flat with the appellant alone' and eventually came
outwiththefatalinjuries.Theinjurieswereinflictedwhilethedeceasedwas
still alive and could not have been sustained during the resuscitation efforts
a
a
4
said
.'factors"
tend to suggest that the court reached the conclusion of the
appellant'sguiltonlybecausehistheorywasdisbelieved.Secondly,thesaid
observationgivesamisleadingimpressionthatthecauseofdeathwasin
doubt. However, the court did not stop there. The rest of the
judgment
clearly shows that the court outlined the said factors in the course of
evaluating the evidence, and not as the only reasons for concluding that the
appellant inflicted the injuries on the deceased' On the other hand' we think
that the observation that the medical evidence
leaned towards the appellant's
theory,wasanover-statement,whichunnecessarilybutinevitablyattracted
the criticism by learned counsel for the appellant'
There are two sets of medical evidence. The first set comprises the evidence
ofDr.KibukaMusoke,thepathologistwhocarriedouttheautopsy.The
second set comprises the evidence of Dr' Mulokola and Dr' Sewankambo'
the two doctors who saw the deceased at the flat and participated in efforts
to resuscitate her before she died. The former set did not lean towards the
appellant's theory but rather destroyed it. Even the latter set did not lean
towards the theory in any positive or direct sense' The most suPport that the
appellant can draw from the testimony of the two witnesses is that they did
not observe any injuries on the deceased' Their testimony did not'lean'
towards the theory as to previous accidents let alone
as to the cause of death.
Nor indeed were the two witnesses categorical about their opinion on the
causeofdeath.PWl0agynecologist,whoseapparentprimaryrolewasto
check if the deceased was pregnant, testified that after she died he asked the
colleagues to examine her, and he added
-
,,Wedidnotfindanysignofinjury.Kabuyehadtolduslhedeceased
had had an occident a month or so befote""'
6
During our interview wilh the accused he had told us the deceased
had afit (convulsions). So in our conclusion we had indicated on
the death certificate that the cause of death could have been
ce r e b ral vasc ul ar acc i dent' This con
clusion wa s reached iven the
istorv of ts and
p revious hi, storv of an accidenl.
frot, hv dis charse, h I
We recon, mended a s, mortem bv a tr, ained
potholosist...,.
DW 2, the signatory ofthe death certificate, testified inter
alia'that they did
the clinical assessment during the resuscitation
efforts' and went on to say
-
"I based medical certiftcate of
cause of death on history given by
Mr. Kabuye and a rough clinical assessment' Idi dnoldoa
ended os I mortem to ascertain
thorouEh e-Y0 mination we recomm
cause o f death."
These excerpts from the two witnesses' own testimonies' clearly raise do'ubt
on the examination
undertaken by them' and in particular discredit their
opinion as to the cause of death' We think therefore' that it was inaccurate to
consider their opinion on the cause of death as expert evidence in conflict
with the expert opinion of PW 4' Despite that inaccuracy' however' we are
satisfiedthattheCourtofAppealevaluatedthecircumstantialevidenceasa
whole, and that its observation that medical evidence leaned towards the
appellant's theory,was not
made as a definitive finding' but in the process
ofthatevaluation.Inthatprocess,thecourtunequivocallyfoundthatthe
evidence appearing to lean towards the appellant's theory
was not credible
anddisbelievedit.Thecourttherefore,wasnotleftinanydoubtinrespect
ofwhich it could have given benefit to the appellant' This is evident in the
following excerpt from the court's
judgment -
,,Counselforrheappellanlinhissubmissionsstotedlhatthedeceased
7
had no iniuries at all before she died' He was referring lo the
evidence of Drs. Sewankambo and
Daniel Mulokola
(PW'10)' This
witness
(Mutokola) tesrified that he and his colleagues examined the
deceased and sow no iniuries ftesh
or old' llith respect' this witness
was being economical with the truth because his colleague Pll 4
found
iniuries on the deceased both externol and internal although
he dtd t ot state the age of those iniuries' His evidence that the
caused a r uplur e of th C SDIC en ond lace ration of the
internol in lurtes
able
pa rts of the bodv, and that th e deceased
ti ver. which are vulner
with thos e lnlurres for lonp, tno ur vrcw,
could not have lived
orv that th e deceased had been li vins trith
destroved the defence the
hose iniuries.... t,
..... h'e rhink thar the trial Judge reached the right conclusion (that
the deceased's death) was caused by the injuries inJlicted on her by
the appellant, The circumstanliol evidence is such that it
ptoduced
tv bevond reasonable doubl thal it is the ADDC llanl who
moral ce rttin
In our view. lhere ore no co-exrs lins
c0n, mitted lhe offence.
circumsla nces that would deslr
'ov lhe in feren ce of suilt.." _(Emphasis
WeagreewiththeCourtofAppealthatthecircumstantialevidenceleadsto
the irresistible inference that the
deceased sustained the fatal injuries while
she was with the appellant in his flat and that only the appellant could have
inflicted the injuries. The
evidence does not support the theory that the
deceased went to the flat with the injuries. Pw 4, the pathologist, did not
ascertain how old the internal injuries were, but he was categorical that
-
8
is added)
"A
person cannot live with a ruptured spleen and a laceraled liver
for
long- It would be a question of hours"'
Althoughhesaidthatthesubduralhaematomacouldhavebeensustainedin
an accident some months before, we find no evidence from which to infer
thattheinjuriesmighthavebeensustainedatdifferenttimes,particularly
having regard to the pattem of the injuries, namely bruises on the chin' chest
wallandabdomenontheexteriorandsubduralhaematoma'ruptureofthe
spleen and laceration of the liver, intemally' Furthermore' we think that the
suggestion by learned counsel for the appellant that the injuries found on the
deceasedduringthepostmortemexaminationcouldhavebeeninflictedafter
she left the flat is farfetched' In the first place' the pathologist' PW 4'
testifiedthatthedeceasedsustainedtheinjurieswhileshewasalive,andthat
resuscitation could not cause any of the injuries he found' Secondly' the
suggestionwasnotputtoanyofthemedicalwitnesseswhoattendedtoher
throughout, from the time they found her at the flat till she died' What is
more,thesuggestionisinconsistentwiththeappellant'schargeandcaution
statement that he adopted as his defence at the trial, in which he implicitly
said that the cause of death was before or during the sexual intercourse' We
also uphold the rejection of that defence and for the reasons we have
outlined reject grounds I and 2'
In the third ground of appeal the appellant complains that the Court of
Appeal confirmed the conviction of rape on speculation' and that it failed to
considerthelegalimplicationofthechargeandcautionstatement,which
was produced in evidence by the prosecution'
Mr' Ayigihugu submitted that
itwaserroneousonthepartoftheCourtofAppealtoaccepttheappellant's
Statementthathehadsexualintercoursewiththedeceased,andyetrejecthis
9
assertion that it was with her consent, merely on the speculation that he
failedtopersuadeher.Hestressedthattheonlyevidencethattheappellant
hadhadsexualintercoursewiththedeceasedwashissaidstatementtothe
police. Mr. Okwonga submitted that the appellant's statement' coupled with
the medical evidence of injuries found on the deceased, including a cut on
the labia majora, was
sufficient evidence that the sexual intercourse
was not
consensual but forcefu l.
onthisissuetheCourtofAppealagreedwiththetrialcourtthattheextemal
and intemal injuries found
on the deceased and her tom knickers found in
her handbag at the flat, proved that the sexual intercourse was forceful' It
opined that because the police did not promptly visit the scene' the appellant
re-arranged the bed where they had
sex and erased incriminating evidence
"Like
the trial
judge rightly stated, the injuries both internal and
external spoke volumes of what happened in lhe
tlat'
Although
Dr. Kibuka-Musokefound
a small cut wound on the labia majora
which he claimed might have been caused by a general ulcer
decease that alone is insufficient in our view to rule out
forceful
sexual intercourse.....There
is no reasonable explanalion of how
the deceased could have received such
fatal
injuries especially the
rupture of rhe spleen d
she had consenled
" ' " '
One
foctor'
which
did come (not) oal during the trial but that was mentioned during
the senlencing Process,
x'as that lhe oppellant has been on aids
palient
for
the last 15 or so years' The deceased was a
married
woman. The possibility that he might have
failed
to persuade her to
have consensual sex cannot be ruled out
-
/lrns (sic) the use of
10
Ihereon. It went on to say
-
ll
force."
With the greatest respect to the Court of Appeal' we find that in this part of
its
judgment it erred on several aspects' First' Dr- Kibuka-Musoke did
not
simply..claim,,,butincross-examinationwasexplicitthatthecauseofthe
cutwoundhefoundonthelabiamajorawasduetoagenitalulcerdisease'
rather than violent sexual intercourse. secondly, it is apparent that the court
indirectlyshiftedtheonusofprooftothedefencewhereitobservedthat
forceful sexual intercourse and failure of the appellant to persuade the
deceased to consent were not ruled out' The onus was on the prosecution to
adduceevidencethatwouldruleoutpossibilityofconsent'Thirdly,wethink
that the court also erred in speculating that because the appellant was an aids
patienthefailedtopersuadethedeceasedtohavesexwithhim.Therewas
no iota of evidence on her knowledge of his affliction or attitude towards it'
The only evidence from which the court could
lawfully deduce that the
appellant used violence on the deceased, and on which the trial court mostly
relied, was that the
deceased sustained injuries. There is, however' a lack of
nexus between those injuries and sexual intercourse' True they may have
been inflicted in the course of forcing her to have sex' Equally they may
have been inflicted in an assault unrelated to sex' We do not find any weight
in the evidence of a tom knickers found in the handbag as no attempt was
made to describe the nature of the tear' Much as the circumstantial evidence
raisesstrongsuspicionthatthesexualintercoursewasnotconsensualas
asserted by the appellant,
we are unable in the circumstances to say that it
leadstoonlyoneirresistibleinferencethatthesexualintercoursewas
through force. Therefore, ground
3 succeeds'
InthelastgroundofappealtheappellantcomplainsthattheCourtofAppeal
erred in upholding the sentence, which the trial court imposed without taking
theperiodSpentonremandintoconsideration.Counselfortheappellant
argued that the constitutional requirement to take such period into
consideration is mandatory and must be complied with irrespective of the
length of the period. In reply, counsel for the respondent submitted that
the
court ofAppeal had taken the remand period into consideration and thereby
cured the irregularitY.
The appellant spent less than two months on remand before his trial. The
appeal against sentence in the Court of Appeal was on the ground that
the
sentences were harsh. On its own initiative, the Court of Appeal observed
that Article 23(8) of the constitution enjoins a trial court, when sentencing,
to take the period spent on remand into consideration, and noted that the trial
court in the instant case had omitted to do so, but that the omission was not
criticized. The court then went on to say
-
,,Theomissiontotakeinloaccounltheperiodlhatlheappellant
spent on remand in our view did not occasion any miscarriage of
justice. The sentences imposed, were within the range of similar
sentences that this Court and lhe Supreme Court have imposed
from
time to time
fot
offences of this nature'"
Undoubtedly, the Court of Appeal regarded the said omission to be an error,
whichitoughttorectiff.However,uponconsideringtheperiodthatthe
appellantspentonremanditconcludedthatthesentencesimposedbythe
trial court were
just. we are unable to fault that. The constitutional
requirement ranks the period
spent on remand among the several factors to
be weighed in assessing the term of imprisonment to impose on a
Person
l2
convicted of a criminal offence' It must not be construed as a provision of a
formula of discounting
the sentence' This ground also fails'
In the result, we allow the appeal partially' We quash the conviction of rape
and set aside the sentence of 10 years imprisonment' We dismiss the appeal
against conviction for manslaughter and confirm the sentence of 8 years
imprisonment.
Mengothi,
/'Ad"y s1
"llDua-*'[ar
2005'
DA
B.J. oki
Chief Justice,
SC kooko,
J ustlce o f Supreme Court
A.N. Raiokora
J
t^
J.N ulenga
Justice of SuPreme Court
(anyei
ba
Justice of SuPreme Court.
w.N.
l, tl- oi
13
7'.*
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9
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Supreme Court
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aania Coutl c f
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rHE REPWLTC OF I]GAND;A.
IN TTTE SrJPREI.'E COI'RT OE UGAIID]I
AT MEIIGO
UGANDA:
RESPOIfDEN?
JUD@4ENT OF THE COURT
The appellant was indicted, tried and convicted of rape
c/ss 1.17 and 1. 18 of the
penal
Code Act. The particulars of
the offence were that on l6-07-g5, at Jenba Village in
Mpiqi District, he had unlawful carnaL knowJ.edge of
Nanyenga Tereza who was
pvtz
at the appellant, s trial . He
appealed against his convicticn to the Court of Appeal .
That appeal failed. He has now appea].ed to this Court.
There are 2 grounds of appeal, the second one of which was
against the severity of
sentence of 15 years imprisonment
imposed on Ehe appellant by the triaL court. The
appellant, s learned Counsel abandoned this ground, rightly
so in our view, because it is incompetent.-
The remaining
ground which was argued by the appellant,q learned Counsel
was that the learned Justices of Appeal erred j.n law and
fact by finding that there wa-< prool of forcefur sexuar.
intercourse.
1
CORAM: oDoKI
-
C,J, ODER
-
JSC, K3jROKORA _
,lsc
MITLDTGA - ,'SC, KAT]IE'IITAMBA
- JSC
CRI,4NAT, APPEAL NO. 50 OF 2OOO
BTITEEN
OWKT CHARI,E,S: :
APPELI,AN!
ys
The triaL court accePted the
corroboratj.ve of the comPlaint's
intercoulse took Place
and that it
raped her.
evidence
evidence
was the
of PW3 as
that sexual
appellant who
vle are unable to say that tshe Court of Appeal erred in that
respect. Ptd3's evidence was sufficient corroboration of
Pw2's evidence of sexual intercourse and that the appellant
was the culPrit. Consequently we see nc merit in the
appeal . It is accordingly dismissed'
A. fl,. O. ODE8,
JVSTZCE OE TEE SI,PREME @I'RT
A. N. IAROKOR'T
JUSTICE OE T'TE S'I,PREI'IE @VRT
I Ccrulv
Cqy of r,,,
cn.e
Cor, i t i Ltio, ,tu
J. I,,IJT,EIIGA
JUS|Z@ OF rEE satPRtx*tE CoURI
G . I{. I{AIIYEIHA.I{BA
JVS?Z@ OF THE SOPREME COURT
2
,
The thlust of the argument by the appellant's learned
Counsel was that the evidence cf the comPl-ainant'
(PVl2) was
not sufficiently corroborated'
we think thaE this argument
has no merit, because the evidence shows that the
complainant's daughter Nakayima Se.foroza
(PW3) responded to
the scene when her mother was attacked by the appellant and
she raised an alarm. PW3 found the appellant on top of her
mother having sexual intercourse with her (the
compfainant). She then ran to where her mother and herself
had been t.o a party and called others, including the
victim, s son
(Musata) . They found the apPeIlant stilI on
top of the complainant having sexual intercourse with her'
B. ODoKI
CU,TS.E JVSTICE
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