Case Law[2022] TZCA 419Tanzania
Leonard Dominic Rubuye t/a Rubuye Agrochemical Supplies vs Yara Tanzania Limited (Civil Appeal No. 219 of 2018) [2022] TZCA 419 (13 July 2022)
Court of Appeal of Tanzania
Judgment
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA
AT PAR ES SALAAM
( CORAM: LILA, J.A.. MWANDAMBO. J.A. And MASHAKA. 3.A .)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 219 OF 2018
LEONARD DOMINIC RUBUYE t/a
RUBUYE AGROCHEMICAL SUPPLIES ........................................ APPELLANT
VERSUS
YARA TANZANIA LIMITED..................................................RESPONDENT
(Appeal from the Judgment and Decree of the High Court of Tanzania
(Commercial Division) at Dar es Salaam)
(Mruma. J.)
dated the 26th day of June, 2018
in
Commercial Case No.29 of 2016
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
9th February, 2022 & 13th July, 2022
LILA. JA:
The appellant and Rubuye Agro Business Company (then 2n d
Defendant) who is not a party to this appeal were jointly sued before
the High Court of Tanzania (Commercial Division) by the respondent
claiming for, among others, breach of contract and payment of TZS
727,346,800.46 being unpaid balance arising from fertilizers supplied
and delivered to them. Rubuye Agro Business Company was found not
being privy to the agreement hence no liability could arise against them.
That resulted in being discharged from liability. The appellant was found
to have breached the contract and was condemned to settle the debt,
pay interest and costs. The decision aggrieved him, hence the present
appeal.
The appellant and the respondent have been in a long time
business relationship. The respondent supplied, upon request by the
appellant, various kinds of fertilizers. The practice was that the appellant
issued Local Purchasing Orders (LPOs) to the respondent who, upon
delivery of the requested consignments, raised invoices for payments.
Delivery of the goods was either in Dar es Salaam or Njombe
warehouses and was signified by issuance of Delivery Notes (DNs).
Trucks authorised by the appellant were used to collect the
consignments. Payment for fertilizers delivered was either through
Tanzania Interbank Settlement System (TISS) or direct internal transfers
from NMB Bank to the respondent's account. Come March, 2015, the
respondent conducted an audit on the appellant's account and realised
that the appellant had defaulted payment of the purchase price to the
tune of TZS 847,346,800.00 which, upon sending to him a demand
notice, payments were made totalling TZS 120,000,000.00, leaving TZS
727,346,8000.00 unpaid. This prompted the respondent to institute
Commercial Case No.29 of 2016 before the High Court of Tanzania
(Commercial Division) alleging that the appellant had, by such default,
breached the contract and claimed payment of the outstanding debt,
damages, interest and costs.
The respondent's claims were strongly disputed by the appellant
and the then 2n d defendant in their joint written statement of defence in
which they asserted that not all the fertilizers were ordered, dispatched
and delivered to them and further that all claims for the otherwise
supplied fertilizers were settled and, to verify so, asked for a
reconciliation of the accounts. They claimed that through TISS, a total of
TZS 539,958,000.00 was paid and later TZS 120,000,000.00 was paid
making the total amount paid to be TZS 659,958,000.00 besides other
payments.
The High Court (Mruma 1), at the conclusion of the trial, apart
from exonerating the then 2n d defendant from liability holding that she
was not a party to the arrangements between the parties herein, found
the claims established against the appellant and ordered payment of the
claimed amount with interest at 16% per annum from the time of
instituting the suit to the date of full payment and at court's rate from
the date of judgment to the date of full payment. He also awarded costs
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to the respondent. Aggrieved by the decision, the appellant preferred
the present appeal.
Before the High Court, the respondent's case rested on two
witnesses, namely; January Fabian (PW1) and Hillary Dickson Pato
(PW2) who filed their respective witness statements ahead of the
hearing date. They introduced themselves respectively, as being Head of
Accounting and Reporting and Head of Marketing and Distribution of the
respondent. Apart from their witnesses' statements, they also featured
in court to testify. Common in their testimonies is that the parties were
engaged in business relationship whereby the respondent supplied the
appellant with fertilizer as and in accordance with the LPOs after which
an invoice was raised by the former for the latter to pay. Delivery was
done to trucks' drivers instructed by the appellant at either Njombe or
Dar es Salaam warehouses. The respondent claimed that it was a term
of their agreement that payment of the supplied fertilizers was to be
done within thirty (30) days of the delivery of the consignment.
However, in May, 2014, the respondent realised that a total amount of
fertilizers worth TZS 897,346,800.46 remained unpaid which prompted
them to write a reminder to the appellant to clear the debt. PW1 also
alleged that the appellant, through his letter and e-mail
correspondences, not only admitted being indebted to the respondent,
but also promised to pay it following which TZS 50,000,000.00 was paid
thereby reducing the debt to TZS 847,346,800.46. The debt was later
reduced by payment of TZS 120,000,000.00 thereby remaining an
outstanding balance of TZS 727,346,800.46, the subject matter of the
suit.
In the course of his testimony, PW1 tendered various invoices
together with LPOs, DNs and some weigh-bridge receipts as exhibit PI
collectively and a list of paid and unpaid invoices (exhibit P2). According
to PWl's witness statement found at page 440 of the record of appeal,
the unpaid invoices were singled out to be those bearing Nos.
YTZ009270, YTZ009283, YTZ009319, YT7009322, YTZ009327,
YTZ009360, YTZ009376, rT7009383, YTZ9389, YTZ009412,
YTZ009544, YTZ009608, YTZ009654, YTZ009830, YTZ009948,
YTZ009993, YTZ010136, YTZ010256, YTZ010292, YTZ010379,
YTZ010381, YTZ010408. During his testimony in court, he tendered
invoices, DNs and LPOs (exhibit P3) which he claimed were not paid for
by the appellant. Discussion on the relationship between the list of
unpaid invoices above and exhibit P3 will come later. Suffice it to state
here that, in law, only the listed unpaid invoices constituted the pleaded
claims by the respondent. PWl's evidence was substantially supported
by PW2 regarding the parties' business relationship and the outstanding
debt.
For the appellant's side, it was only the appellant (DW1) who
testified. In both his oral evidence and witness statement lodged, he
admitted having a business relationship with the respondent based on
supply of fertilizer upon placing an order after which, as opposed to
what PW1 stated, he effected payments as and when he sold the
fertilizer. As shown above, he denied being indebted to the respondent
claiming that he paid all the claims. Detailing how the payments were
made, in his witness statement, he stated thus:-
"11. That further to my testimony and deposition
in paragraph 10 above, results thereof confirmed
at NMB Bank that indeed twelve payment
instructions by way o f the second defendant's
agricultural vouchers totalling TZS
335,430,000/= were made in favour o f the
plaintiff between 26/08/2013 to 30/10/2013.
12. I add and to be precise, the following funds
transfer payments in TZS were directly made to
the plaintiff through the second defendant's
agricultural vouchers scheme benefits with
respective dates in brackets thus 720,000/=
(26/8/2013), 2,130,000/= (28/8/2013),
1,410,000/= (29/8/2013), 3,930,000/=
(2/9/2013), 2,160,000/= (4/9/2013),
50,640,000/= (6/9/2013), 96,900,000/=
(9/9/2013), 17,310,000/= (10/9/2013),
29,430,000/= 11/9/2013), 74,880,000/=
(28/10/2013, 44,220,000/= (29/10/2013 and
12,510,000/= (30/10/2013) thereby totalling TZS
335, 430,000/=."
He tendered the Transfer Requests Nos. 0108253, 0064578,
024687, 0132448, 019219, 93301, 019303, 0132518, 019693, 52008,
520020 and 018273 and were admitted as exhibit D2 collectively. To
verify that the money was deducted from the appellant's account, DW1
tendered the NMB Bank letter dated 29/3/16 and the plaintiff's letter to
them as exhibit D3.
Having made the aforesaid payments and following the
respondent's demand for payment of TZS 727,346,800.46, the appellant
claimed that he unsuccessfully asked for a reconciliation of accounts
with the respondent as reflected in their letter exhibit P6. Besides, in his
witness statement, he disowned various LPOs and the respective
amounts claimed for want of proof of authorisation and delivery to them
of the respective consignments of fertilizers. Under that category are
LPOs Nos. 00730 (TZS 30,000,000.00), No. 00731 (TZS 33,990,000.00),
No. 00739 (TZS 5,635,000.00), No. 00740 (TZS 30,960,000.00), No.
00736 (TZS 33,507,000.00), No. 00742 (TZS 26,350,000.00), No. 00745
(TZS 39,454,600.00), No. 00742 (TZS 2,600,000.00), No. 00749 (TZS
40,568,800.00), No. 01453 (TZS. 31,039,000.00), No. 01451 (TZS
42.240.000.00), No. 01455 (TZS 32,550,000.00), No. 01475 (TZS
29.440.000.00), No. 01479 (TZS 58,880,000.00), No. 01485 (TZS
58.880.000.00), No. 01496 (TZS 32,760,000.00), No. 01476 (TZS
32.280.000.00), No. 01500 (TZS 31,960,000.00), No. 1499 (TZS
25.640.000.00), No. 00658 (TZS 114,000,000.00)
When DW1 was cross-examined on the outstanding balance, he
denied the claims on the ground that no reconciliation of the accounts
was done. As for the modality of payment, he stated at page 616 of the
record of appeal that:-
"It is true that we were taking fertilizers on
credit. We were paying to the supplier's Account
much as we sell. I would pay after the invoice
has been issued..."
In disparaging the contention that payment was required to be
made within 30 days after delivery of fertilizer, DW1 claimed that there
was a written agreement showing terms of payment and everything. He
did not, however, produce any in court.
In his determination of the suit, the learned trial judge addressed
at length the issue whether the claim for the outstanding liability was
sufficiently proved. He was, at the end, of the view that the evidence by
PW1 was supported by PW2 and in evaluating the evidence by both
sides, he stated at page 1007 of the record of appeal that:-
"The witness tendered in evidence exhibit PI
which is a bunch o f documents containing
Defendant's local Purchase Ordert \ Weighbridge
Certificates, delivery Notices and Tax invoices for
transactions done mostly in 2013. He also
tendered in evidence statement o f account o f the
1st Defendant (exhibit P2). In exhibit P2 it is
shown that the 1st Defendant didn't pay for
supplies made under the listed Local Purchase
orders in exhibit PI. For instance in Local
Purchase Order No. 00740 the amount stated
tallies with that which is stated in Statement o f
Account (exhibit PI). The amount indicated in
both documents is Tshs 30,960,000/=. There is
also Local Purchase Order No. 0744 in which
Tshs 5,112,000/= is claimed, Local Purchase
Order No. 0742 for Tshs 26,350,000/=, Local
Purchase Order No. 0736 for Tshs 33,507,000/=,
Local Purchase Order No. 01455 for Tshs
32,550,000/=, local purchase Order No. 01453
for Tshs 31,039,000, Local Purchase Order No.
01476 for Tshs 33,280,000/=, Local Purchase
Order No. 0419 for Tshs 60,000,000/= and other
purchase orders which were tendered as exhibit
P3. In all these Purchase Orders there are
corresponding delivery Notices and Tax
Invoices."
As for the appellant who claimed to have paid monies in excess of
the respondent's claims exhibited in the invoices hence not indebted to
the respondent, the learned trial judge went on to state at pages 1008
to 1009, in part, that:-
"At the end o f that testimony, PW1 was asked
questions on whether or not local Purchase
Orders indicate the person who received goods
delivered which he answered in the negative. He
was not asked any single question on the
genuiness or otherwise o f Purchasing Orders and
Tax Invoices in exhibits PI, P2 and P3.
On the other hand the defendant didn't lead any
evidence to controvert the said Local Purchase
Orders, Delivery Notices and Tax Invoices as
tendered by PW1. Similarly no evidence was
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available to show that the defendants paid the
outstanding balance after the Demand note o f
23d March 2015 which indicated that the
outstanding balance was Tshs 847,376,800.46
which the defendants acknowledged in their
letter to the plaintiff dated 4h April 2015 (exhibit
P6). I f the defendant payments o f Tshs
539,958,000/= allegedly made prior to March
2015 were for liquidation o f the said outstanding
balance o f Tshs 847,376,000.45 that would have
been indicated in exhibit P6. The fact that the
said payments are not stated in that letter is
evidence that the amount demanded in 23d
March 2015 letter did consider all payments
made before that date which means that the
amount was actually pending."
Convinced that the claims were proved, the learned trial judge
entered judgment in favour of the respondent. The appellant was
thereby ordered to pay the respondent TZS 727,346,800.46, interest on
the decretal amount at 16% per annum from the time of instituting the
suit to full payment and an interest at court rate from the date of
judgment to the date of full payment and costs.
The finding by the High Court aggrieved the appellant who now
seeks tofault the learned trial judge on a seven grounds of grievances
ii
memorandum of appeal after ground 8 was dropped by the appellant's
counsel. The seven points may, however, be categorised into two
groups thus:-
1. The High Court was not properly constituted for failure to
involve assessors or expressly dispense with them. Here we
have in mind ground 1 of appeal.
2. The finding in favour of the respondent was unjustified.
Relevant here are grounds number 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7.
Mr. Dickson Mtogesewa, learned counsel represented the appellant
and Mr. Ayoub Mtafya, also learned counsel represented the respondent
before us during the hearing of the appeal. Both counsel filed written
submissions in terms of, respectively, Rules 106(1) and (7) of the
Tanzania Court of Appeal Rules, 2009 ahead of the hearing date which
they fully adopted as part of their submissions and clarified some few
issues. We have formed the view that instead of reciting their respective
elaborate arguments both oral and written, we should refer to them in
the course of the judgment whenever we shall find them relevant and
compelling.
Before we dwell onto considering the grounds of appeal, we wish
to put some few things in its proper perspective. Upon our serious
12
examination of the evidence on record of appeal including exhibits PI
and P3, we have realised that the invoices in exhibit PI indicated
payment due date which in effect was one months' time after issuance
of the invoices as was claimed by PW1. There was, however, no
indication, even for the paid invoices, that there was compliance with
that condition in any of the claims raised. To the contrary what we have
noted is that there were simply payments effected for some of the
invoices. In the circumstances, we see no reason to disagree with the
evidence of DW1 that payment for the supplied fertilizer was being
effected according to sales. The more so, neither of the parties
produced in court as evidence the alleged written agreement regulating
the parties' business relationship to support its side of the case. Even
DW1 who claimed existence of such agreement did not do so. But
having read the evidence by both sides as a whole, it seems clear to us,
as we shall demonstrate a little later, that there existed a contract of
sale of goods between them which was based on exchange of
documents. Whereas the respondent supplied various kinds of fertilizers
to the appellant upon issuing LPOs, the appellant loaded the fertilizers in
trucks engaged by him and it was the drivers of the respective trucks
who signed the delivery notes.The LPOs and DNs were received as
exhibit PI collectively. It is also a fact that the LPOs did not show the
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names of truck drivers and that, upon delivery of fertilizers to the trucks'
drivers, it was upon the appellant to trail the trucks up to his stores.
Although neither of the parties produced a written agreement and
much as the trial judge did not bother to make a finding on the nature
of the agreement between the parties, it is trite that terms of any
contract may be deduced from the conduct of the parties and the nature
of transactions made between them. The evidence by the parties, in no
uncertain terms, shows that the respondent supplied the fertilizers to
the appellant upon request (an order being placed) and then raised an
invoice requiring the appellant to pay and actually paid. The issue that
was before the High Court was whether the appellant paid for all the
fertilizers supplied. Plain as it is, the parties were involved in supply of
goods upon demand on the one hand and then payment by the other
upon an invoice being raised by the supplier. Such a business
relationship is governed by the Sale of Goods Act, Cap. 214 R. E. 2002
(now 2019) (the SGA). To be specific, the provisions of section 3(1) of
the SGA are very relevant here. The section stipulates that:-
"3 (1) A contract o f sale o f goods is a contract
whereby the seller transfers or agrees to transfer
the property in goods to the buyer for a money
consideration called price, and there may be a
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contract o f sale between one part owner and
another."
In the circumstances that obtained in the present case, it is
ludicrous to hear any of the parties contending that there was no
contract between them and the terms thereof simply because there was
no written contract for, in law, it is not necessary that an agreement
should be in a written form. We are reinforced in this view by the
provisions of section 5 (1) of the SGA, which states:-
"5 (1) Subject to the provisions o f this Act and or
any other written law in that behalf, a contract o f
sale may be made in writing (either with or
without seal) or by word o f mouth , or partly in
writing and partly by word o f mouth or may be
implied from the conduct o f the parties."
The conduct of the parties and the transactions involving the
parties, in the present case, meant that there existed an oral contract of
sale of fertilizers between the parties [See Engen Petroleum (T)
Limited v Tanganyika Investment Oil and Transport Limited,
Civil Appeal No. 103 of 2003 (unreported)]. Any conduct adversely
affecting or frustrating the transactions amounted to a breach of
contract. As stated above, the respondent claimed that the appellant
failed to pay for some of the supplied fertilizers valued at TZS.
727,346,800.46 hence breached the contract which claim was
vehemently disputed by the appellant. We shall address the issue later
in this judgment.
In ground one (1) of appeal, the appellant complained that the
High Court was not properly constituted for conducting the trial of the
suit without the aid of assessors or an express waiver thereof. The legal
hooks on which the appellant sought to hang his arguments are the
provisions of Rule 51(1) of the High Court (Commercial Division)
Procedure Rules, 2012 (the Com Rules). After citing Order XVIII Rule 1A
and Order XX rule 3A & B of the Civil Procedure Act, Cap. 33 R. E. 20002
(now R. E. 2019) (henceforth the CPC) which have provisions which
enacted the requirement of the trial judge in the High Court
(Commercial Division) to sit with assessors; it is the appellant's
contention that in the absence of assessors, the trial court was not
properly constituted a defect which vitiated the trial. In reply, the
respondent argued that in terms of Rule 2(1) and (2) of the Com Rules,
the CPC applies in trial of suits in the Commercial Court only where there
is a lacuna in the Com Rules which is not the case on issues about
assessors. He also submitted that Rule 51 leaves it at the discretion of
16
the trial judge to involve assessors only when he finds it necessary
hence he cannot be faulted for not involving them.
Without any hesitation, we agree with the appellant that the cited
provisions of both the Com Rules and the CPC enact the requirement for
the judge to sit with assessors but the application of the provisions of
the CPC adjudicating cases in the Commercial Court is restrictive and
limited to situations where there is a lacuna in the Com Rules. Rule 2(2)
of the Com Rules is explicitly clear on that. Further, looking at the
manner Rule 51 of the Com Rules is couched in respect of involvement
of assessors during the trial of a suit, we note that there is no significant
lacuna calling for invocation of the provisions of the CPC in that respect.
It is self-sufficient and in this appeal the appellant has failed to
demonstrate any lacuna in the Com Rules that could have prompted the
trial judge to resort to the provisions of the CPC. That said, we can now
proceed to determine the issue whether the trial court was properly
constituted when it heard and determined the suit.
The record is vivid that the trial of the suit proceeded without the
aid of assessors. There was, also, completely no mention of assessors
and whether or not it had dispensed with them as rightly submitted by
the appellant's counsel. Was that fatal? To resolve the issue, a serious
17
examination of the import of the provisions of Rule 51(1) of the Com
Rules is inevitable. The Rule provides:-
"51 - (1) Where the trial judge finds it necessary
that the trial o f a suit shall be conducted with the
aid o f assessors, the court shall summon
assessors from a list submitted by the
Commercial Court users Committee ."
Given the wording of the Rule, it is plain that use or non-use of
assessors in a trial of a suit is a matter left to the discretion of the trial
judge to determine. We are of a considered view that generally the Rule
imposes a duty on the presiding judge to peruse the pleadings before
him so as to decide whether or not the issues involved and which may
arise during the trial of the suit would require any inputs from assessors
so as to arrive at a just decision. That is cognizant of the fact that the
assessors permitted to be involved in the trial are only those who are
knowledgeable of the field on which the suit is founded (see Rule 51(3)
of the Com Rules). That notwithstanding, Rule 51 of the Com Rules left
it at the prerogatives of the presiding judge to determine whether or not
assessors should be involved in the trial even without necessarily
involving the parties. Where he considers it unnecessary, then he would
not direct summons be issued to them and vice versa. As the law now
stands, the decision and or choice is left at his absolute discretion.
Read closely, the appellant's complaint is grounded on the failure
by the trial judge to indicate, on the record, that he saw no need to
involve assessors. Admittedly, that might be proper in terms of
transparency, but it is not the requirement of the law. On this basis, we
are of a settled view that by not ordering summons to be issued, the
trial judge decided not to involve the assessors in the trial of the suit.
After all, the appellant did not suggest or indicate how that omission
prejudiced him and we see none. In the final analysis we find the
complaint unfounded and we dismiss it. This takes us to the second
ground of complaint.
In ground two (2) of appeal, the learned trial judge is basically
being attacked for making a finding that the respondent had established
the claims. It is contended that he failed to properly evaluate the
statement of account (exhibit P2) and other evidence on record as a
result of which he wrongly found that it exhibited the appellant's default
and hence the suit for indebtedness of TZS 727,346,800.46 contrary to
its accounting evidence. It is the appellant's submission that the trial
judge relied on the supplies made by the respondent as per exhibit P2 to
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determine the appellant's liability in the exclusion of the payments made
by the appellants. It is his further contention that, in exhibit P2 there is
a total of TZS 1,765,978,700 unaccounted money deposited by the
appellant in the respondent's account with no reciprocal delivery notes
and invoices and there was a further TZS 879,279,701.54 as opening
balance by 27/01/2013 which was not supported by delivery notes and
invoices making accumulative credit deposit of TZS 2,552,236,700.00.
Not surprising therefore, before us, Mr. Mtogesewa argued that the
appellant paid more than he was supposed to. To verify that, Mr.
Mtogesewa argued, the appellant through their letter exhibit P6
requested for reconciliation of the accounts which was however turned
down by the respondent through a demand letter (exhibit P4). For this
reason the appellant sought indulgence of the Court to step into the
shoes of the trial High Court and re-evaluate or reconsider the evidence
particularly exhibit P2 and establish the appellant's actual liability to the
respondent.
Mr. Mtafya was of a different view. He refuted the appellant's
contention that exhibit P2 formed the sole base for the learned trial
judge's findings. To the contrary, he submitted that exhibits PI, P2, P3,
P5 and P6 of the respondent's side and exhibits D2 and D3 were
20
considered by the learned judge in arriving at the conclusion that the
appellant is liable. He submitted that in exhibit P4, the respondent
acknowledged payment of TZS 5,719,354,700 which reflected their
earlier or past supplies and payments made and indicated that there was
an outstanding balance of TZS 847,346,800.00 by 23/3/2015 which,
after the subsequent payment of TZS 120,000,000.00 the liability
remained to be TZS 727,346,800.46 which amount was not disputed by
the appellant in his reply letter to the demand notice (exhibit P6) and
reply e-mails by the respondent (exhibit P5). In the upshot, the
respondent contended that the appellant admitted the liability. Based on
the above evidence, the respondent was not in favour of the view that
the Court should re-evaluate the evidence and come up with its own
findings.
The pertinent issues the appellant has raised in this ground of
appeal are whether the learned trial judge properly evaluated the
evidence by both sides and whether his findings were justified. In
answering these issues we shall start by citing a few authorities
expounding the legal positions which shall form the basis of our
determination.
We begin by acknowledging the well settled position that the onus
of proving existence of any fact lies on the party asserting its existence
and in civil cases proof is at balance of probabilities. That is in
accordance with the provisions of sections 110 and 111 of the Law of
Evidence Act [CAP 6 R. E. 2019]. See the case of Attorney General
and two Others v Eligi Edward Massawe and Others, Civil
Appeal No. 86 of 2002 (unreported). Of course, this is construed to
mean that the one with heavier or stronger evidence will have the case
decided in his favour. Applying this principle to the matter at hand, it
was therefore upon the respondent to lead evidence to the effect that
fertilizers worth the suit amount was actually ordered by the appellant,
delivered to him, a claim for payment (invoice) was raised and that the
appellant did not honour it by effecting payment for the same. Having
already held that the contract was based on exchange of documents,
such a claim by the respondent required to be substantiated by
production of documentary evidence. In that accord, the trial judge
ought to have satisfied himself that there was such evidence from the
respondent.
As shown above, it is evident that while the respondent produced
what the learned trial judge termed them as a "bunch of documents"
22
comprising invoices accompanied with the LPOs and DNs and a
statement of account of the appellant (exhibit P2), the learned trial
judge had an eye on only a few of the LPOs, DNs and invoices in
exhibits PI and P2 and out of that sample he concluded that the claims
were proved. We do not think that such an approach was proper in the
circumstances of this case. The same way the respondent bore the duty
to prove each and every claim constituted in each transaction, the
learned trial judge was equally obligated to satisfy himself that such
duty was sufficiently discharged by examining each transaction. In
contracts of this nature where there were various orders and of different
amounts no one transaction may be taken to represent another or the
rest of the transactions. The manner the trial judge treated the evidence
before him could not guarantee him of not occasioning an injustice
particularly on the quantity of the fertilizers actually ordered and
delivered, on the one hand, and the validity of the amount claimed, on
the other hand.
As a first appellate court and in situations of this nature, we have
the power under Rule 36(l)(a) of the Rules to revisit and re-evaluate
the entire evidence in an objective manner and come up with our own
findings of fact. (See Siza Patrice v Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 19
of 2010 cited in Kaimu Saidi v Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 391 of
2019 (both unreported) and Pandya v R (1957) EA 336). Exercising our
mandate, we accordingly step into the shoes of the trial High Court so
as to reconsider the evidence availed in an attempt to satisfy ourselves
on how the figure claimed was arrived at.
We have examined each of the 42 items in exhibit P2 which the
respondent claimed to have not been cleared by the appellant (unpaid
invoices). In the first place, it is clear that this list formed the basis to
the respondent's claims. Secondly, we have noted that it is not in
harmony with the list of unpaid invoices singled out by PW1 in his
witness statement in which he itemised 22 invoices only as shown
above. That notwithstanding, documents supporting unpaid claims were
tendered as exhibit P3 collectively. These are, in law, the ones which
shall form the basis of our determination of the appellant's liability. In
saying so, we are alive to the settled law that documents not tendered
and admitted in court as exhibits cannot be relied upon as evidence and
cannot be the basis of a decision. There is a plethora of precedents to
this affect. To mention few are; Japan International Corporation
Agency (JICA) v Khaki Complex Limited [2006] TLR 343, Abdalla
Abass Najim v Amini Ahmed AM [2006] T.L.R. 55; Shemsa Khalifa
and 2 Others v Suleiman and Hamed Abdalla, Civil Appeal No. 82 of
2012 (unreported). Similarly, documents, although tendered in court, if
no explanation is availed as to its purpose are of no assistance to the
court. The duty lied on the party relying on them to demonstrate their
significance. That said, much as we appreciate that a bunch of
documents were tendered in court (exhibit PI), there was need for
explanation as to their relevance. We shall therefore not consider any
document falling under those categories. Instead, we shall examine
whether exhibit P2 is supported or substantiated by exhibit P3 which
comprises of documents duly tendered and evidence led that is to say; if
the unpaid invoices in exhibit P2 are supported by Local Purchasing
Orders (LPO) and Delivery Notes (DO). Upon doing so, we have realised
that Invoice No. YTZO10292 for TZS 33,280,000.00 is fully supported by
LPO No. 01476 and a DO; Invoice No. YTZ10136 for TZS 58,880,000.00
is fully supported by LPO No. 01485 and a DO; Invoice No. YTZ009376
for TZS 39,503,000.00 is fully supported by LPO No. 00745 and a DO;
Invoice No. YTZ009327 for TZS 363,000.00 is fully supported by LPO
No. 00745 and a DO; Invoice No. YTZ010256 for TZS 32,760,000.00 is
fully supported by a LPO No. 01496 and a DO; Invoice No. YTZ010381
for TZS 31,960,000.00 is supported by LPO No. 01499 and a DO;
Invoice No. YTZ009322 for TZS 5,112,000.00 is fully supported by LPO
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No. 00744 and a DO; Invoice No. YTZ09319 for TZS 15,650,000.00 is
supported by LPO No. 00742 and a DO; Invoice No. YTZ009283 for TZS
33.507.000.00 is supported by LPO No. 00736 and a DO; Invoice No.
YTZ009703 for TZS 40,568,800.00 is not in exhibit P2 and in PWl's
witness statement; Invoice No. YTZ010261 for TZS 29,440,000.00 is not
in exhibit P2 and in PWl's witness statement; Invoice No YTZ009360 for
TZS 39,454,600.00 has no LPO; Invoice No. YTZ009947 for TZS
32.550.000.00 is not in exhibit P2 and inPWl's witness statement;
Invoice No. YTZ010302 for TZS 58,880,000.00 00 is not in exhibit P2
and in PWl's witness statement; Invoice No. YTZ009841 for TZS
31.039.000.00 is not in exhibit P2 and in PW1' witness statement;
Invoice No. YTZ009270 for TZS 30,960,000.00 is fully supported by LPO
No. 00740 and a DO and lastly, Invoice No. YTZ009904 for TZS
42.240.000.00 is not in exhibit P2 neither in PWl's witness statement. It
is significant to also note that the LPOs had the appellant's official stamp
affixed on them proving that they originated from the appellant.
In view of the nature of the contract between the parties as
demonstrated above, the LPOs, DNs and Invoices are crucial documents
in proving that the goods (fertilizers) were ordered, delivered and a
claim for payment was made the absence of which adversely affects the
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claimant's case. Once there is no LPO and a DN it means no order was
placed by the appellant and there was no delivery of the fertilizers hence
no claims may arise (no invoice can be issued) on that particular
consignment. Further to that, no liability on the part of the appellant
would also arise where the invoice is not raised. Production of these
documents in court as exhibits was, in particular case, indispensable in
substantiating the claims [See Engen Petroleum (T) Limited v
Tanganyika Investment Oil and Transport Limited (supra)]. In a
like oral contract of sale of petroleum which was founded on exchange
of documents, no invoices and delivery notes were produced to prove
that petroleum products supplied to the respondent were not paid for
and the Court held that the claims were not sufficiently proved. By
analogy, in our present case, no claim would also arise where a certain
invoice is listed as unpaid invoice in PWl's witness statement but was
not among those listed by the respondent in the list of unpaid invoices in
the plaint and in exhibit P2 as, it is trite law, that they shall be caught up
in the web of unpleaded claims (invoices) in the plaint for which courts
are barred from considering and granting the reliefs thereof. Claims
falling under those categories, as indicated above, are in respect of
Invoices Nos. YTZ009703 for TZS 40,568,800.00, YTZ010261 for TZS
29,440,000.00, YTZ009947 for TZS 32,550,000.00, YTZ010302 for TZS
27
58,880,000.00, YTZ009841 for TZS 31,039,000.00 and YTZ009904 for
TZS 42,240,000.00. We hold them not to have formed part of the claims
hence cannot form part of the appellant's liability. The effect of this is
that they reduce the respondent's claims to the extent of their total,
which is TZS 234,717,800.00 which we hold to have not been proved.
The appellant's liability, based on the documents tendered as exhibit P3
and which we have satisfied ourselves that it was sufficiently proved
stands at TZS 281,975,000.00 only.
This brings us to another pertinent issue calling for our resolve
whether the appellant cleared the aforesaid amount. Both before the
High Court and before us through the learned counsel, the appellant
claimed to have paid more than was due.
We shall start our discussion with whether the appellant admitted
to the respondent's claim of TZS 847,346,800.46 alleged in the demand
letter (exhibit P4) by his reply letter (exhibit P6) dated 04th April, 2015.
Plain as exhibit P4 is, it cannot be taken to have been an unequivocal
admission of the claim. We let the relevant part of it tell it all:-
"...We acknowledge receipt o f your letter dated
23d , March 2015 regarding the outstanding
amount TZS847,346,800.46/=.
Nevertheless we now trade as Rubuye
Agrobusiness Co. Ltd, and since the receipt o f
the aforementioned letter we have made
payments o f TZS 120,000,000/= to Yara
Tanzania Ltd Account.
Meanwhile we request the following;
1. Reconciliation of Account
2. There should be no interest o f 2%
3. Yara Tanzania Ltd to allow loading o f fertilizer
in the sense that, upon deposit o f particular
amount to Yara Tanzania Ltd account, half o f
the said amount to honour the outstanding
balance while the other half be cash payments
for the new order... "(Emphasis added)
It is discernible that the appellant simply acknowledged receipt of
the demand Notice (exhibit P4) and indicated that he had made some
payment to reduce the liability. There would definitely be no need to ask
for reconciliation of account if there was nothing disturbing him about
the validity of the claim. That request, which the appellant has
maintained all along, suggested nothing but doubts on the amount
claimed as opposed to the thinking that he had admitted the whole
claim. Whilst that is the case, the record of appeal at page 589 bears
out that when he was cross-examined by Mr. Mtogesewa on 8/5/2017,
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the appellant admitted in court that reconciliation was made. Such
assertion defeated his earlier request for reconciliation of accounts. But
there was no follow up question whether or not the reconciliation came
up with the amount claimed. We accordingly hold that the appellant
admitted liability save for the extent which we have determined above.
We now revert to the substantive issue whether the appellant
discharged his duty of paying for all the fertilizers supplied. In answering
this issue, we shall also determine the appellant's complaint that the
judge did not accord due weight to his defence. We have seriously
examined the appellant's testimony that he effected payments through
the defendant's agricultural voucher scheme and directly into the
respondent's bank account and he tendered the Transfer Requests in
court as exhibit D2. Given the fact that the respondent had denied
receiving any payment from the appellant's end in either of the ways
contended by the appellant, the burden shifted to the appellant to prove
the respondent wrong as was rightly observed by the learned trial
judge. Like the trial judge, we are of the considered view that transfer
requests and the oral contention that payments were made, in the
circumstances of this case, was not enough to prove actual payments.
As the transfer requests were made to the NMB BANK, then the issue
remained whether they were honoured and the said money was actually
transferred into the respondents account. Production of a bank
statement of either the appellant or the respondent reflecting
respectively such money transfers or any other payments done and
credited into the respondent's account was crucial. In effect, that was
the gist of the letter from the NMB to the appellant (exhibit D3). It was
not proof of payment as contended by the appellant but a request to the
appellant to urge the respondent obtain a Bank Statement so as to
verify the payments done as per his request. At its bottom, it states
that:-
"Hivyo unaombwa kuwasiliana na mhusika wa
YARA TANZANIA LIMITED awasiliane na Tawi la
NMB lililo karibu naye achukue Banki Statement
yake na kuhakiki malipo hayo kama
yalivyoorodheshwa hapo juu kwa tarehe zake za
malipo ..."
Unfortunately, there is no evidence that the appellant heeded to
the NMB's request and what was the response from the respondent's
end. In the absence of such evidence we hold that he did not do so.
Otherwise, in our view, the defendant's own bank statement reflecting
such transfer and deposit to the respondent's account could still be
sufficient proof. That was not done too and the appellant plainly
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admitted not to have it at page 619 of the record of appeal. The learned
trial judge, as demonstrated above, therefore, evaluated the entire
defence evidence and arrived at the conclusion, rightly in our view, that
there was no proof that the appellant cleared his liability. Accordingly,
we see no justification to fault him.
There was a contention that the respondent's claim of TZS
727,346,800.46 was admitted by the appellant vide e-mail
communication of 27th May, 2014 (exhibit P5). The relevant wording on
which the contention rests are:-
"Attached documents are 7755 documents for the
payment o f fifty million Tsh (TZS 50,000,000) as
part payment for the outstanding balance. We
shall dear the balance in the near future"
Once read in isolation from exhibit P6, one may be tempted to
believe that the said response amounted to an admission of the
outstanding balance. Doing so, in our strong view, will be erroneous and
will amount to engaging the Court onto speculations. That is for very
obvious reasons that there was no mention of the outstanding amount
and whether the appellant had abandoned his former desire or request
to have the bank accounts reconciled. We, therefore, refrain from being
carried away by such a contention. We, consequently, find it baseless
and dismiss it.
Connected to the above, we have had ample time to examine the
evidence on record in regard to the payments allegedly made to the
respondent by the appellant as outlined in items 31 and 32 found at
pages 10 to 16 of the appellant's written submission in support of the
appeal. He claimed that there are 36 credit deposit transactions
amounting to TZS 1,765,978,700.00 done by the appellant which have
not yet been assigned or allocated respective invoices or delivery notes.
Again, this was a matter of evidence. As is the case for bank transfer
requests, nothing was produced to prove that. In all, therefore, it is
apparent that the appellant did not clear his liability with the respondent
for the supplied fertilizer worth TZS 281,975,000.00. As a matter of law,
the appellant's failure to pay the outstanding debt amounted to failure
to perform his part of the contract hence a breach of contract in terms
of sections 37 and 73 of the Law of Contract Act, Cap. 433 R. E. 2019
(the LCA) [see Mexon's Investment Limited v DTRC Trading
Company Limited, Civil Appeal No. 91 of 2018(unreported)].
Accordingly, ground three (3) of appeal succeeds.
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Before we conclude, we wish to address one more issue. In his
witness statement, the appellant disassociated herself from some of the
LPOs alleging that they never authorised them and the drivers whom
they were delivered and or the fertilizer did not reach at her
warehouses. The disowned invoices and LPOs were twenty in number.
We had ample time to seriously examine them and we realised that only
seven of them were tendered in court as part of exhibit P3 and which,
as shown above, constituted part of the unpaid invoices in exhibit P2.
The respective LPOs were Nos. 00740, 00736, 00742, 00745, 00742,
01485 and 01476. Like the rest of the LPOs in exhibit P3, they bore the
appellant's official stamp the authenticity of which was not challenged
by the appellant. Their reliability could not therefore be displaced by the
mere assertions by the appellant. In that accord we hold that the said
LPOs originated from the appellant's office. In all, therefore, it is our
finding that there is no proof that the appellant cleared his liability.
All said and for the foregoing reasons, by failure to clear the debt
amounting to TZS 281,975,000.00 for the ordered and supplied
fertilizers, the appellant breached the contract.
For the foregoing reasons, the appeal, therefore partly succeeds
to the above shown extent. For avoidance of doubt, the appellant has to
34
pay the respondent TZS 281,975,000.00 only which shall carry interest
as was ordered by the High Court as the same was not challenged save
that interest on the decretal amount at 16% shall be from the date of
instituting the suit to the date of judgment instead of the date of
instituting the suit to the date of full payment as was ordered by the
learned trial judge. Given the outcome of the appeal, we order each
party to bear its own costs.
DATED at DAR ES SALAAM this 11th day of July, 2022.
S. A. LILA
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
L. J. S. MWANDAMBO
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
L. L. MASHAKA
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
This Judgment delivered this 13th day of July, 2022 in the presence
of Mr. Dickson Mtogosewa, learned counsel for the Appellant and Mr.
Ally Hamza, learned counsel for the Respondent, is hereby certified as a
35