Case Law[2020] TZCA 290Tanzania
Victor Rweyemamu Binamungu vs Geofrey Kabaka & Another (Civil Application No. 602 of) [2020] TZCA 290 (10 June 2020)
Court of Appeal of Tanzania
Judgment
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA
AT MWANZA
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 602/08 OF 2017
VICTOR RWEYEMAMU BINAMUNGU ....................................... APPLICANT
VERSUS
1. GEOFREY KABAKA !
2. FARIDA HAMZA (Administratrix of the
Deceased Estates of HAMZA ADAM l .............. ........ RESPONDENTS
i
(Appeal from the Decision of the High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza)
(Mfliqe, 3.)
dated the 14th day of June, 2017
in
Land Appeal No. 155 of 2016
RULING
5th & 10th June, 2020
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KITUSI. J.A.:
The present applicant alleges that he is a purchaser of a house on
Plot No. 246 Block U along Pamba Road in the City of Mwanza. The
house was allegedly sold by public auction in execution of a decree that
had been issued in favour of the first- respondent. It is alleged that
subsequent to the purchase of the house by the applicant, the second
respondent successfully challenged the execution proceedings in Civil
Appeal No 155 of 2016, at the end of which the High Court, Maige J,
nullified the sale. It is the applicant's contention that he was not a party
to those proceedings, and he was therefore not given a hearing.
He intends to apply for a revision, so he applies for extension of
the time within which to do so. In the affidavit that has been taken by
the applicant, he explains the reason for the delay in applying for
revision. It is that he only became aware of the appeal proceedings and
order nullifying the sale on 2n d August, 2017 when he was served with
notice of eviction. He filed Civil Application No. 26 of 2017 for revision
but on 4th December, 2017 it was struck out for being time barred.
The second respondent resists the application and has
demonstrated her resistance by an affidavit in reply which chiefly avers,
under paragraph 3, that the applicant's affidavit does not disclose the
cause for the delay.
At the hearing of the application all parties entered personal
appearance without legal representation. The applicant adopted the
contents of the affidavit as well as the written submissions which he had
earlier filed, and so did the second respondent. The first respondent did
not resist the application, which I think is natural, him being the holder
of the decree whose execution underlies the intended application for
revision.
The second respondent had earlier raised points of Preliminary
Objection although she w as.unable to address them when she was
«
invited to. The said points which must have been drawn by a lay hand
given their tone, challenge the following;
i) The supporting affidavit for being defective.
ii) The certificate of urgency for being defective.
iii) Lack of locus standi on the part of the applicant.
As intimated above, the second respondent did not shed light on
these points when it was her time to argue them. She simply referred to
her written submissions. It turns out that the written submissions attack
the affidavit, the Certificate of Urgency and the applicant's locus standi
for referring to the applicant as Victor REYEMAMU Binamungu instead of
Victor RWEYEMAMU Binamungu. She added that the applicant is not
competent to apply for revision because he was not a party in the
proceedings that he indents to challenge.
The applicant and the first respondent did not, earnestly, address
these points. The applicant submitted that the difference in names is a
typing error which he urged me to disregard.
First of all, the fact that the applicant did not feature as a party in
the proceedings intended to be revised, rather than being a hindrance,
does qualify him to make that application because it is settled law that
such a person may not impugne the decision otherwise than by revision.
See the case of Amani Mashaka (applying as Administrator of the
estate of Mwamvita Ahmed deceased) v. Mazoea Amani
Mashaka and 2 Others, Civil Application No. 124 of 2015
(unreported). In that case the Court quoted the following passage from
its earlier decision in Mgeni Seif v. Mohamed Yahaya Khalfani, Civil
Application No. 104 of 2008 (unreported);
«
"...because she was not a party to the said suit, but she is
contesting ownership of the house in dispute, not having a
right o f appeal\ the only avenue for the applicant would be
revision"
Secondly the issue of the names is, in my view, designed to get a
mountain out of a molehill, because the applicant's argument that it is a
i
typing error makes sense and as the Court's eye is more fixed on
substantive justice than technicalities, the second respondent's
contention on the names can hardly find purchase. More so when two of
the three names are correct, and the third only misses a syllabe.
Consequently, I find the points of preliminary objection lacking merit
and overrule them.
I now turn to the application. Rule 65 (4) of the Rules requires an
application for revision to be filed within sixty days of the decision. The
decision intended to be revised was delivered on 14th June, 2017. Since
the applicant contends that he became aware of the decision on a later
date, the duration of the delay will have to run from that date, and the
account for the delay will be similarly assessed.
In the affidavit, paragraph 6, the applicant alleges that he became
aware of the decision on 2n d August, 2017 but in his written and oral
submissions he maintained that it was on 15th July, 2017. Be it as it
may, he first applied for revision which was however struck out on 4th
December 2017 on account of time limit. This period from the date of
the decision intended to be revised to the date of striking out Civil
Application for revision No. 26 of 2017, is what has acquired the name
of technical delay which cannot be blamed on the applicant. There are
many decisions on that position such as, Ally Ramadhani Kihiyo v.
The Commissioner for Customs and the Commissioner General
Tanzania Revenue Authority, Civil Application No. 29/01 of 2018
(unreported) Kabdeco V. Wetco Limited, Civil Application No. 526/11
of 2017 (unreported)]. Salim Lakhani and 2 Others V. Ishfaque
Shabir Yusufali (As an Administrator of the Estate of the Late
Shabir Yusufali), Civil Application No. 455 OF 2019 (unreported).
I am disposing of this matter on the basis of the foregoing
principle, that is the period from 14 June 2017 when the impugned
decision was rendered, to 15th July or 1s t August 2017 when the
applicant became aware of that decision, constitutes actual delay.
However, that period has been accounted for because the applicant was
not aware of the decision. The period thereafter to 4th December 2017
when the application for revision was struck out, constitutes technical
delay which should not be blamed on the applicant. The applicant
lodged this application on 11th December, 2017, barely seven days later.
In my conclusion the applicant has made a case for extension of time
because he has accounted for the actual delay and took prompt steps in
pursuing the matter. The rest of the period was merely technical delay.
Consequently, I grant the application. I order the applicant to file
the intended application for revision within sixty (60) days from the date
of delivery of this order. I order costs to be in the main course.
DATED at MWANZA this 9th day of June, 2020.
I. P. KITUSI
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
i The Ruling delivered this 10th day of June, 2020 in the presence of
applicant and respondents in person is hereby certified as a true copy of
the original.
B. A. MPEPO
DEPUTY REGISTRAR
COURT OF APPEAL
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