Case Law[2019] TZCA 224Tanzania
Kenedy Owino Onyachi & Another vs Republic (Criminal Application No. 26 of 2019) [2019] TZCA 224 (1 August 2019)
Court of Appeal of Tanzania
Judgment
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA
AT DAR ES SALAAM
CRIMINAL APPLTCATTON NO. 26101 OF 2019
KENEDY OWINO ONYACHI
CHARLES JOHN MWANIKA NJOKA.,.,. APPLICANTS
VERSUS
THE REPUBLIC RESPONDENT
(Application for Extension of time to file Reyiew from the decision of the
Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam)
(Munuo, Nsekela, And Luanda, J.J.A.)
dated 22nd day of December, 2009
in
Criminal Appeal No. 48 of 20O6
RULING
10s luly & 1d august, 2019
MKUYE, J.A.:
By a notice of motion taken under Rule 10, 48(1) and 66(1) (a) and
(b) of the Tanzania Court of Appeal Rules, 2009 (the Rules), the applicants
Kenedy Owino Onyachi and Charles John Mwanika Njoka are seeking an
extension of time within which to file an application for review of the
decision of this Court dated 2211212009 in Criminal Appeal No. 48 of 2006.
The grounds canvassed in the notice of motion are that:-
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1) The copy of judgment was served to the applicant on the 2nd
day of November, 2011 and the prescribed period had already
expired.
2) The applicants are laymen who are in custody and the prison
authorities who are their guardians did not advise them
accordingly.
inform them the process of review.
4) The intended Review shall strictly be launched under the
provisions enumerated in Rule 66(t) (a) and (b) of the Couft of
Appeal Rules, 2009.
5) Thus, the delay was attributed by reasons that were beyond
our control as we needed a copy ofthe judgment to peruse and
come up with proper grounds of review as enumerated by Rule
66(1) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2009
The notice of motion ls supported by affidavits deposed by each
applicant respectively and the respondent/Republic did not file any affidavit
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in reply.
3) The Court of Appeal Registrar who read the judgment did not
When the application was called on for hearing before me, the
applicants appeared in person and were unrepresented and the respondent
Republic was represented by Ms. Grace Mwanga, learned State Attorney,
Arguing in support of the application, the 1$ applicant who also
argued on behalf of the 2nd applicant reiterated what is contained in the
Notice of Motion and submitted that the judgment of this Court sought to
be challenged was delivered on 2211212009. They received the copy of the
said
judgment
on 2ltu2lll after the time prerequisite for filing
application for review had expired. That, they had filed several applications
for extension of time but they did not go through. When prompted by the
Court as to whether such applications were attached to the applications, he
said, they were not.
contents of his affidavit, added that the efforts made to enable the
application for review to be filed proved futile.
On her paft, Ms. Mwanga resisted the application. She prefaced by
arguing that rule 10 of the Rules requires good cause for the delay to be
shown. She contended that the applicants have not shown such good
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On his part, the 2nd applicant who in the first place adopted the
cause for the delay. She elaborated that the applicants' have not shown
what they were doing from 2llll2011 when they received the copy of
judgment
to 161512019 when this application was filed which is almost a
period of 8 years. She said they ought to have given explanation on that.
She added that the applicants' claim that they had made several
applications for extension of time, was not supported by any evidence as
they ought to have attached such applications to the application.
Otherwise, she said, since the applicants have failed to show good cause
for the delay, the application should be dismissed in its entirety.
In rejoinder, the 1s appellant stressed that, as they were late to
receive the copy of judgment, it was obvious that they would need to seek
extension of time. The 2nd applicant also insisted that there were efforts
which were made except that they did not attach such documents, They,
therefore, urged the Court to grant the application.
Having heard the parties form either side, I think the issue for
determination is whether or not the applicants have shown good cause to
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warrant the Court to exercise its discretion to extend time.
As was hinted by Ms. Mwanga, under Rule 10 of the Rule, an
application for extension of time within which to do something, can be
granted if the applicant established good cause for the delay. The said
Rule provides as follows:-
"The Court may/ upon good cause shown, extend
the time limited by these Rules or by any decision
of the High Court or tribunal, for the doing of any
ad authorized or required by these Rules, whether
before or after the doing of the act; and any
reference in these Rules to any such time shall be
construed as a reference to that time as so extend."
I also wish to underscore here that, under the above cited provisions,
what the applicants are required to do is to show a good cause for delay in
filing the application for review they are seeking to file. This stance has
been taken in a number of decisions. lust to mention a few, they include
Kalunga & Company Advocate v. National Bank of Commerce Ltd,
(2006) TLR 235; Wankira Benteel v. Kaiku Foya, Civil Reference No. 4
of 2000 (unreported).
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In exercising its discretion of whether or not to grant extension of
time the Couft is required to exercise its judicially while being guided by
such factors which may not be exhaustive such as:-
1) The applicant must account for all the period of
delay;
2) The delay should not be inordinate;
3) The applicant must show diligence, and not apathy,
negligence or sloppiness of the action that he
intends to take;
4) If the court feels that there are other sufficient
reasons, such as existence of a point of law of
sufficient importance such as the illegality of the
decision sought to be challenged."
(See Lyamuya Construction Company Ltd v. Board of Registered
Trustees of Young Women's Christian Association of Tanzania, Civil
Application No. 2 of 2010 (unreported).
In this application the reason for the delay that has been adduced by
both applicants is that they were furnished with the judgment sought to be
impugned while the time to file an application for review had lapsed.
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In paragraphs 12 and 17 of their respective affidavits the applicants
inform them of the process of review and that they had filed several
applications for extension of time to file review but were struck out for lack
of grounds for review.
My perusal of the court record has revealed that indeed the decision
sought to be impugned was handed down on 221t212009 whereby the
applicant's appeal was dlsmissed and the judgment was delivered by Hon.
Chusiacting under her capacity as a Deputy Registrar.
One of the applicants claim for the delay is that they were 'hof
accordingly informed another chance within sixty (60) days to file Review
of the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Tanzania either by the Court of
Appeal Registrar who read the judgment or the prison authorities who are
our
[theirJ
guardians". However, with due respect, I find this claim to be
very interesting. I say so because there is no law which requires the
person pronouncing judgment
on behalf of the Court to explain a right or
review to the parties. It should be noted that an application for review is
not an automatic right to be exercised by whoever wishes to do so. It has
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have deposed that the Registrar who delivered the judgment
did not
been stated in times without number by this Court that review of this Court
judgment is not
a routine procedure but a procedure of its own kind (sui
generis) and that it is exercised very sparingly and with great
circumspection. (See BIue line v. East African Development Bank,
Civil Application No. 21 of 20L2 (unreported). And, this is so because of
the settled cardinal principal which was propounded in the indian case of
Devender Pa! Sigh v. State N.C.T. and Another, Review Petitions No,
497,626 and 629 of 2002 which was adopted with approval in the case of
Blue line (supra) that:
"a judgment
of the final Court is ftnal and a review
of such
judgment is an exception".
It is important to emphasize here that the above stance is very
impoftant because of other crucial reasons. One of such reason is the
requirement for litigation to come to the end (finality of litigation) and the
certainty of the law. (See Tanzania Transcontinenta! Co. Ltd v.
Design Partnership Ltd, Civil Application No. 62 of 1996 (unreported);
Mathias Rweyemamu v. General Manager (KCU) Limited, Civil
Application No. 3 of 2014 (unrepofted). The other reason is that the Court
cannot sit as a court of appeal on its own decision just because one of the
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parties was not satisfied/or is not happy with its decision. (see-
Chandrakant Jushubhai Patel v. Republic,
[2004]
TLR 2181. So in
view of the above authorities the claim that the Deputy Registrar or Prison
Authority did not inform them or the review process does not stand.
As regards the second reason of delay, the appllcants have urged the
Court to find that they had been making efforts to have the time for fillng
their application for review extended but in vein. They, however, admltted
that they did not attach any such applications for extension of time in their
application. Ms. Mwanga urged the Court to find such argument to be not
tenable as the applicants failed to attach the said applicatlons to support
their argument.
Indeed, my perusal in the court record has revealed that no such
copies of applications for extension of time were attached to the
application as they readily conceded. I am, therefore not definite as to
whether or not the applicants made such efforts. This Court has, In times
without number, taken the view of not giving credence on to the
arguments from the bar.
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For instance, in the case of Tanga Cement Company Limited v.
Yahaya Athumani Mruma and 4 Others, Civil Application No. 1 of 2017
(unreported) when the Court was confronted with a similar situation stated
as follows:-
"...1n his obviously belated effoft from the Bar, Mr.
Zaharan contended that he could not lodge the
application earlier than... because he had to prepare
the relevant papers or documents at his office in
Dar e salaam and have them dispatched to this
Coutt's sub registry in Tanga for filing. I give no
credence to that argument from the Bar. It ought
to have been deposed in Mr. Zaharan's affidavit for
it to be cogent and plausible..."
AIso in the case of Zuberi Nassor Moh? v. Mkurugenzi Mkuu
Shirika la Bandari Zanzibar, Civil Application No. 93/75120t8
(unrepofted) the Court refused to rely on mere statement from the Bar and
it stated as follows:
"...1 agree with Mr. Rajabu that a mere
statement from the bar without substantiation that
indeed the bicycle was stolen with some
docu m e n ts, ca n n of co n sti tu te s u fficie n t rea so n. "
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On the basis of the above cited authorities, therefore, the applicant
claim that they had taken efforts by filing several applications for extension
of time cannot be given credence for having failed to attach them to their
respective affidavits. Similarly, I find them not to constitute good cause to
warrant this Court to grant extension of time.
Having so said, I agree with Ms. Mwanga that the applicants have
not been able to show good cause for their delay in filing the application to
warrant this Court to extend the time sought.
Hence, the application for extension of time to file an application for
review is hereby accordingly dismissed.
DATED at DAR ES SATAAM this 16th day of July, 2019.
R.K. MKUYE
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
I ceftifu that this is a true copy of the original.
B. MPEPO
DEPUTY REGISTAR
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