Case Law[2019] TZCA 222Tanzania
Mateso Nguruwe & Another vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 168 of 2016) [2019] TZCA 222 (25 July 2019)
Court of Appeal of Tanzania
Judgment
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA
AT DAR SALAAM
(CORAM: MUSSA. J.A., KITUSL J.A.. And KEREFU, J.A)
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 168 OF 2015
1. MATESO NGURUWE 1. APPELLANT
2. FUKIA LIGANGA 2. APPELLANT
VERSUS
THE REPUBLIC RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
17th & 25h July, 2019
MUSSA, J.A.:
In the District court of Kilombero, at lfakara, the appellants were
jointly
arraigned for armed robbery, contrary to sections 285 and 286 of
the Penal Code, Chapter 16 of the Laws (the Code) as amended by Act No.
10 of 1989. For purposes of clarity, we propose to extract the relevant
1
portion of the charge sheet in full:-
(Appeal from the decision of the High Couft of Tanzania
at Dar es Salaam)
(Rugazia, J)
Dated the 17th June, 2011
In
HC. Criminal No. 63 of 2OO9
"OFFENCE SECTION AND LAW: Armed robbery
c/s 285 and 286 of the Penal Code, Cap. 16 of the
Laws, as amended by the schedule to written laws
amendment Act No. 10 of 1989.
PARTICUIARS OF THE OFFENCE: That the
above named persons are
jointly and together
charged on the 1* day of March 2000, at or about
16:00 hrs at Mahutanga Wllage, Ifakara, within
Kilombero District in Morogoro Region, did steal
cash money TShs. 70,000/= the property of
MASANJA s/o KIPARA and immediately before such
stealing, did used actual violence by using firearm
in order, to obtain the said stolen property."
The appellants refuted the accusation on the charge sheet,
whereupon the prosecution lined up three witnesses to establish its claim.
On their part, both appellants resisted the case for the prosecution through
unsworn testimonies to which they did not wish call any witnesses in
effect that the alleged victim of the robbery, namely, Masanja Kipara
(PW3) and his younger brother, who answers to the name of Juma kipara
(PWl), operated for gain as cattle herders at Nakasisi Village, Kilombero
2
support.
From its three witnesses, the case for the prosecution was to the
District. It was in evidence that, at the material time, their father owned a
flock of three hundred cattle.
On the fateful day, PW1 and PW3 took two cows from the family
kraal and drove them to a certain Bwawa la Mamba cattle market for the
purpose of having them sold. From the sale of the cows, they realized a
sum of TShs. 140,000/= out of which they bought some cattle medicine
and, after dividing the residue amongst themselves, the elder brother
(PW3) eventually remained with a take home sum of TShs. 70,000/=.
Having accomplished their business at the cattle market, PW1 and
PW3 headed towards home, as it were, on a bicycle which was ridden by
the former. They, however, had to briefly stop midway at Mahutanya
Village in order to fix minor repairs on the bicycle. They resumed the
journey around
5:30 p.m but, soon after, they could see several persons
who were lying on the grass ahead of them. A moment later, those
persons, who were seven in number, stood up and way
-
laid PW1 and
PW3.
Speaking of the roadside intruders, PW1 who claimed to have
previously known the appellants, told the trial couft that, at the scene, the
first appellant was clad in a green coat and pair of tennis shotts (bukta),
whereas the second appellant wore a combat trouser resembling a
Tanzania Peoples Defence Forces (T.P.D.F) uniform and a dangris
jacket.
He recognized a third person, namely, Saibogi, who was clad in a complete
T.P.D.F. uniform. PW1, further testified that one of the intruders was
armed with a gun, whereas the others had machetes and spears. On his
part, his brother (PW3), conceded that he saw the appellants for the first
time during the roadside confrontation. Neveftheless, apparently, in the
wake of a dock identification, he told the trial couft that the first appellant
was wielding a machete just
as he was also in possession of bricks. The
second appellant, he further claimed, was wielding a shot gun.
To resume the roadside encounter, on the spur of the moment, PW1
apprehensively abandoned the bicyle and ran clear of the scene.
Unfortunately, PW3 could not follow suit as he had one of his legs
physically disabled and he was, therefore, constrained to face the group of
seven singlehandedly. It was the first appellant who initiated the attack on
PW3 by hitting him twice with the flap of the machete and telling him to
give them money. Next, another assailant kicked him and, as PW3 fell to
the ground, the man dispossessed him of the sum of TShs. 70,00Q/= fpe6
4
assailants made a bolt for it, wheupon PW3 shouted loudly to attract
assistance.
In the meantime, PW1 apparently heard his sibling's yelling and
decided to return to the scene so as to help his brother. He arrived at a
him the detail about being dispossessed of the money. From there, PW1
and PW3 reported the occurrence at Ifakara Police Station where,
according to PW1, they told the police that they identified the appellants
along with a ceftain Saibogi to be amongst the group of the seven robbers.
The police, in turn, told PWl and PW3 to organize themselves to arrest the
culprits and take them to the police station.
Back home, PW1 and PW3 disclosed the occurrence as well as the
police instructions to their paternal uncle, namely, Elias Meshaki (PWz).
Thus, on the following day, PW1, PW2 as well as two other persons,
namely, Kichiba and Lucas mounted a search for the culprits. The mission
led them to Luwemo Village, where they located and apprehended the
second appellant. They took him to the police station where they were
informed that the first appellant had already been arrested. On the 28th
5
his trouser's pocket which was all the money he had. Soon after, the
time when the bandits were no longer at the scene, but PW3 disclosed to
March, 2000 the appellants were formally arraigned in the District couft of
Kilombero and, that concludes the version which was unveiled by the
prosecution witnesses.
In his unsworn statement, the first appellant completely disassociated
himself from the alleged robbery occurrence which, he said, was unknown
to him. The first appellant accounted to an urelated incident in which he
assaulted a certain Maka and was, in consequence, arrested, tried and
denying the accusation at hand, the appellant did not quite assert his
whereabouts on the fateful day although he recalled that on the 15th
March, 2000 he travelled to Mbeya and returned on a date he could not
recollect, but within the ides of March, 2000.
On his part, the second appellant, similarly, completely disassociated
himself from the robbery occurrence. His account was to the effect that,
on the fateful day, he left Luwemo, his Village of residence, around 4:00
p.m. to make a follow up of a customer who was indebted to him at
Viwanja Sitini area, Ifakara. It is, perhaps oppoftune to interject the
second appellant's telling that he operated for gain as a brewer (Mgemaji)
of a local brew popularly known as tembo. His further telling was that he
6
jailed for three years effective from the 31* March, 2000. As he was
met his customer, got paid and, eventually, returned home around B:00
p.m. or so. On the morrow of his uneventful mission, he was arrested and
implicated for the Mahutanya robbery which he denied involvement. With
so much in denial, on the 18th September, 2000 both appellants rested
their respective defence cases and the judgment delivery was slotted for
the 2nd October, 2000 but, for some obscure cause, on the scheduled date,
the judgment delivery was pushed to 11th October, 2000.
On the latter date, it was only the second appellant who entered
appearance and, as it were, a certain No.
21451
Cpt. Fadhili, a Prison
officer, informed the trial court that the second appellant had escaped
from custody and was still beyond reach. In the circumstances, the
judgment was pronounced in the absence of the first appellant.
If we may now cull from the judgment,
on the whole of the evidence,
the learned trial Magistrate was impressed by PWl and PW3 whose
testimonies were, according to him, truthful and reliable. The respective
defence cases of the appellants were considered but rejected. In the
upshot, both appellants were found guilty, convicted and each was
sentenced to thifi (30) years imprisonment.
7
A good deal later, on the 19th August 2002, apparently, from some
obscure source, the trial couft made this order with respect to the first
appellant:-
commence today.
Both appellants were aggrieved by the convictions and the sentences
meted by the trial court and preferred a
joint
appeal to the High Court.
Having heard them as well as the respondent Republic, the High Court
(Rugazia, J.) found no cause to fault the decision of trial court. In fine, the
appeal was found to be without merits and it was, accordingly, dismissed
in its entirely.
The appellants are still discontented and, presently, they seek to
impugn the decision of the first appellate court in a
joint
memorandum of
appeal which comprises six (6) points of grievance, namely:-
"1. That, your lordship the learned first appellate Judge
grossly erred in law and in fact by sustaining the
conviction and sentence meted out to the
appellants based on defedive charge as the person
8
Court: The accused has been arrested. His sentence to
to whom the threat and violence was directed to
was not mentioned in the particulars of the offence.
2. That, your lordship the learned first appellate judge
ened in law and in fad to uphold the trial court
decision in a case where the police ofllcer to whom
the offence was first reported never testified to the
effect that the appellants were the prime culprits.
3. That, your lordship the learned first appellate Judge
grossly misdireded himself in law and in fact to
uphold the trial court decision in a case where none
of the police officer (s) from where the culprits were
handed over testified to establish the course of the
appellant's re-a pprehension.
4. That, your lordship the learned first appellate Judge
erred in law and in fad in upholding the appellants'
conviction by relying on incredible and unreliable
visual identification evidence of PWl and PW3 at
the scene of crime as the same did not establish the
time duration which the appellants were put under
their obseruation, the distance from the identifying
witnesses to the alleged suspecB and the vantage
point visa-vis the scene of crime due to the fad that
the robbery incident took place amidst many trees
and grasses.
9
5. Thal your lordship the learned first appellate Judge
erred in law in failing to find that the appellants'
conviction was wrongly based on unjustified and
u ncorroborated prosecution evidence.
6. Tha| your lordship the learned first appellate Judge
erred in law and fact by sustaining the appellants'
conviction in a case where the prosecution failed to
prove their case beyond any speck of doubt as
charged."
When the appeal was placed before us for hearing, the appellants
were fending for themselves, unrepresented, whereas the respondent
Republic had the services of two learned State Attorneys, namely, Ms.
Janeth Magoho and Ms. Gloria Mwenda. From the very outset, both
appellants fully adopted their joint memorandum of appeal as well as the
list of authorities to which they desired to rely on. They deferred the
elaboration of the memorandum of appeal to a later stage in a rejoinder to
the submissions of the Republic.
On her paft, Ms. Magoho who took the floor to argue the appeal
resisted it on account that the memorandum of appeal is bereft of merits.
Starting with the first ground of the appeal, the learned State Attorney
conceded though that, indeed, the person to whom the threat or violence
10
was directed at was not mentioned in the particulars. She was, however,
quick to rejoin that the shortcoming is curable under the provisions of
section 388(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, chapter 20 of the Laws (CPA)
which goes thus:-
"Subject to the provisions of section 3BZ no
finding, sentence or order made or passed by a
court of competent
jurisdiction shall be reversed or
altered on appeal or revision on account of any
error, omission or irregularity in the complaint,
summons, warrant charge, proclamation, order,
judgment or in any inquiry or other proceedings
under this Act; save that on appeal or revision, the
court is satisfied that such error, omission or
irregularity has in fact occasioned a failure of
justicq
the court may order a retrial or made such
other order as it may consider
just and equitable."
We asked the learned State Attorney to avail to us an authority to
fortify her curative contention of such a shortcoming akin to the one at
hand, but she availed none and left the matter to our consideration and
resolve.
11
Ms. Magoho then advanced to the second and third grounds of
appeal which, she said, were intertwined. On the complaint about the non-
featuring of police officers to buttress the robbery and identification claims
by PW1 and PW3, Ms. Magoho had a short answer: Under section 143 of
the Evidence Act no pafticular number of witnesses was, in any case
required for the proof of those facts. Thus, to her, the police officers
would not have added anything, of material substance, to the testimonies
of PW1 and PW3.
Finally, on grounds 4, 5 and 6, the learned State Attorney contended
credibility of PW1 and PW3 which was their prerogative and, in sum, Ms.
Magoho urged us to dismiss the appeal in its entirely.
In reply, both appellants reiterated their grievances which are
comprised in the joint
memorandum of appeal. Through them, both
protested innocence and invited us to allow the appeal and to set them at
liberty.
arguments from both sides but, as will shortly become apparent, this
1,2
that the two courts below made positive and concurrent findings on the
We have, on our part, dispassionately considered the competing
appeal is disposable upon a very narrow compass which is premised in the
first ground of appeal. In this regard, we have purposely extracted the
charge sheet to palpably demonstrate that, although the owner of the
stolen sums of money is named in the particulars of the offence, the
not disclosed. First and foremost, this is contrary to the sample prescribed
for preferring the offence of robbery as provided under Form No. B in the
second schedule to the CPA which goes thus:-
"ROBBERY
PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE
A. B. on the ......... day of ...... of ....... in the region
of stolen a watch and at or immediately
before or immediately after the time of such
stealing did use perconalviolence to C. D.'
It is notewofthy that section 135 (a) (iv) of the CPA directs that
related charges must conform to such forms as nearly as may be, making
the necessary changes.
13
identity of the person against whom the threat or violence was directed is
From numerous decisions of the Court, it is now trite that the
pafticulars of the offence in the charge sheet have to disclose the essential
elements or ingredients of the offence charged. With pafticular reference
to the offence of robbery, the Court, for instance, in the unreported
Criminal Appeal No. 31 of 2003
-
Zubeli Opeshutu vs The Republic,
made the following observation:-
'A pre-requisite for the crime of robbery is that
there should be violence to the person or the
complainant."
More elaborately, in another unrepofted Criminal Appeal No. 78 of
2011 Kashima Mnadi vs The Republic, the Court made a
corresponding observation :-
"Strictly speaking, for a charge of any kind of
robbery to be proper, it must contain or indicate
actual personal violence or threat to a person on
whom robbery was committed. Robbery as an
offence, therefore, cannot be committed without
the use of actual violence or threat to the person
targeted to be robbed. So, the particularc of the
offence of robbery must not only contain the
violence or threat but also the percon on
l4
whom the adual violence or threat was
di rected. "IEmphasis supplied].
In yet another unreported Criminal Appeal NO. 299 of 2009
-
Charles Nyamasero vs The Republic, the particulars of the robbery
were akin to the ones at hand, in that they simply alleged:-
"...immediately before such stealing, did use gun
point in order to obtain the stolen properties."
In its judgment, the Court made the following observation:-
"...the particulars of the offence failed to disclose or
indicate as to whom the adual violence or threat
was directed to. We are of the view that such an
omission of an essential ingredient of the offence of
armed robbery has led to a failure of
justice on
the
part of the appellant."
Having so held, the Court nullified the entire proceedings of the trial
(2) of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, Chapter l4l of the Laws (AJA).
We are minded to take a similar stance and, in fine, we likewise find
that the shortcoming on the particulars of the charge sheet led to a failure
15
court as well as those of the High Couft upon the invocation of section 4
of
justice and, accordingly/ the proceedings of both coufts below leading to
the appeal at hand are nullified under the provisions of section 4 (2) of
AJA.
Having found that the shortcoming on the particulars of the charge
sheet led to a miscarriage of justice,
the vexing issue is whether or not a
retrial, under the rider to the provisions of section 388 (1) of the CPA, is
fitting in the circumstances. On this subject, this court at least, took a firm
stance in the unreported Criminal Appeal No. 490 of 2015
-
Mayala
Njigailele vs The Republic, where it was observed:-
"Normally an order of retrial is granted, in criminal
cases, when the basis of the case, namely the
charge sheet is in this case, the charge sheet is
incurably defedive, meaning it is not in existence,
the question of retrial does not arise."
Of recent, the foregoing statement of principle was followed with
corresponding remarks in the unrepofted Criminal Appeals Nos. 119 of
2016
-
Swalehe Ally vs The Republic; 302 of 2016
-
Meshaki
Malongo @ Kitachangwa vs The Republic; and 68 of 2077
-
Samwel
Lazaro vs The Republic.
16
charge, which was the foundation of the trial, to be incurably defective,
then there is no charge in existence on which the appellants can be retried.
As we have hinted upon, the defectiveness of the charge will suffice to
dispose the appeal and, for that matter, we need not belabour on the
merits of the other grounds of appeal. Thus, in the final event, we order
the immediate release of the appellants from prison custody unless they
DATED at DAR ES SALAAM this 23'd day of July, 2019
K. M. MUSSA
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
I. P. KITUSI
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
R. KEREFU
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
I certify that this is a true copy the original.
E.F.F SI
DEPUW RE STRAR
F PEAL
L7
We take the same position and hold that since we have found the
are held there for some other lawful cause. Order accordingly.
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