Case Law[2018] TZCA 927Tanzania
Interbest Investment Company Limited vs Standard Chartered Bank (T) Limited (Civil Application No. 190 of 2015) [2018] TZCA 927 (18 September 2018)
Court of Appeal of Tanzania
Judgment
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IN THE-COURTOF APPEAL OF TANZANIA
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AT DAR ES SALAAM
(~ORAM: MMILLA. l.A .. MWANGESI.l,A .. And NDIKA. J.A .. )
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 190 OF 2015
INTIERBEST INVESTMENT COMPANY LIMITED ...... ...... ............... APPLICANT
VERSUS
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK (T) LIMITED ......................... RESPONDENT
{Application for striking out the notice of appeal from the judgment and
decree of the High Court of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam)
{Rugazia, J.)
dated 16
th
day of June, 2010
Civil Case No. 463 of 2002
RULING OF THE COURT
21
st
August, & 27
th
September, 2018
MMILLA, J.A.:
In this app1ication, Interbest Investment Company Ltd. (the
applicant), is seeking the Court's indulgence to make an order striking out
the notice of appeal lodged by the respondent, Standard Chartered Bank
(T) Ltd. on 15.5.2015, aimed at challenging the judgment of the High
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Court, Dar es Salaam Registry, dated 16.6.2010 in Civil Case No. 463 of
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2002. ThE;.application is brought under Rules 89 (2), 48 (.1), (2) and 49 (1)
of the Tanzania Court of.Appeal Rules, 2009 (the Rules). It is supported by
an affidavit sworn by Mr. Mutakyamirwa Philemon, who is one of the
applicant's advocates.
The application is contested by the respondent through the services
of .Juriconsultants Advocates, Dar es Salaam. They filed an affidavit in reply
through which they are firm that the instant application is without merit.
At the hearing of this application on 21.8.2018, Mr. Audax
Kahendaguza Vedasto, learned advocate
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represented the applicant;
whereas the respondent company enjoyed the services of Mr. Sylivanus
Mayenga, learned advocate. Both sides filed written submissions in support
of their respective sides and successfully asked for their adoption.
Oh his part, Mr. Vedasto informed the Court that he had nothing
more to add from what he submitted in his written submissions. We hav€
carefully gone through his submissions; he has canvassed the matter from
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five angles on the basis of which he is asking the Court to find and hold
that some essential steps in the proceedings have not been taken, thus
entitling it to strike out the notice of appeal under focus.
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Mr. Vedasto's startjng point is that the respondent ought to. have
lodged her intended appeal within 60 days from the date he filed the notice·
of appeal as envisageti by the, provisions of Rule 90 .(1) of the Rules, but
that she failed to do so. He clarified that the decision of the High Court
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which is the subject of the intended appeal was delivered on 16.6.2010,
.and that the notice of appeal thereof was filed on 15.5.2015. He adds that
up to 22.9.2015 however, the respondent had not instituted the appeal,
therefore that in terms of Rule 90 (1) of the Rules, the latter's right to
lodge the record of appeal expired on 15.7.2015. He relied on the case of
Francis Itengeja v. Kampuni ya Kusindika Mbegu za Mafuta Ltd.
[1997] T.L.R. 148.
Mr. Vedasto pointed out similarly that in computing the 60 days, he is
aware that the time required for obtaining copies of the proceedings is
excluded, provided that the· proceedings were applied for in writing within
a period of 30 days from -the date of the decision sought to be appea1ed
against, of course, on condition that the said letter was copied to the
opposite side. Here, he cited the case of The Principal Secretary,
Ministry of Defence-· v:· Devram Valambhia [1992] T.L.R. 387
·(particular reference to page 393).
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Mr. Vedasto has likewise submitted that there were two letters- which . ;.,
were served on them vide which the respondent applied for proceedings,
_ judgment and decree~,t,~·-~ of which was annexture AA6. That ·letter, he
says, was submitted to the High Court on 18.7.2010 but was served on the
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applicant on 21.7.2010. That was, he adds, after 32 days had elapsed
counted from 16.6.2010, hence outside the statutory duration of 30 days.
He also points out that it took 35 days for the said letter to be served on
the applicant. Once again, re-lying on the case of Francis Itengeja v.
Kan,puni ya Kusindika Mbegu za Mafuta Ltd. (supra), Mr. Vedasto
contended that the respondent failed to take essential steps in the
proceeding, therefore warranting the Court to strike out the notice of
appeal under focus.
On another point, while focusing -on annexture AAS, a letter
which was submitted to the High Court on 12.5. 2015 and served on the
applicant on 18.5.2015 (almost 5 years after the date of the judgment of
the High ~ourt) applying for copies of proceedings, judgment and decree
after the first appeal was struck out, Mr. Vedasto has submitted that
-, except for the written -submissions tiefore the trial court which were found
missing in the record of appeal that was struck out; the respondent had no
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_ ~aqse Jo re-apply for those documents because be already had them. He _
argued that since the act of re-applying for those documents was uncalled
for, the exclusiorrr:ffle"- cannot save the notice of appeal from the
consequences of being struck out. He implored the Court to strike out the
notice of appeal with costs.
On his part, Mr. Mayenga submitted that after their first appeal was
struck out by the Court, -it was necessary for the respondent to start
everything afresh, including -applying for necessary documents from the
High Court. He submitted that the respondent applied for and was granted
an order for extension of time from High Court and also applied for the
necessary documents from that court which are yet to be supplied to them.
Relying in the case of DT- -Dobie & Company (T) Ltd. v. N. B.
Mwatebele [1992] T.L.R. 152, he maintained that -all what has been done
by the respondent cannot easily be ignored; to the contrary it strengthens
her position that she was actively pursuing her appeal. Mr. Mayenga urged
the Court to refuse the applicant's contention that the respondent failed to
take essential steps to the appeal.
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M~. Mayenga ... submitted further that the case of Francis.J:tengeja v.
·Kampiuni ya · Kusindika ·_ Mbegu za Mafuta Ltd. (supra) is
distinguishable to the present matter. He contended that while in that case
the essential steps were never taken by the respondent, the respondent in
the present case has taken alL the necessary steps including reminding the
High Court to supply him with those necessary documents. He therefore
asked the Court to dismiss the application with costs.
In a brief rejoinder, . Mr. Vedasto reiterated his concern that except
for the missing written submissions which were filed in the high Court, it
was improper for the respondent to re-apply to be supplied with the
proceedings, judgment and. decree because she already had them,
therefore that she should be held to have instituted the appeal out of time.
That fact, he maintains, shows that she has failed to take -essential st€ps in
instituting her appeal. He once more pressed the Court to strike out with
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costs the notice of appeal under focus.
We have soberly considered the rival submissions ·by the parties. The
main issue is whether the respondent has failed to take essential steps to
institute her appeal.
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To begin with, we have •. carefully gone through the case. of Francis
Itengeja v. Kampuni. ya Kusindika Mbegu za Mafuta · Ltd. (supra)
which has been relied upon by Mr. Vedasto. In that case, the applicant's
complaints were that the respondent had failed to take essential steps in
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instituting the appeal because she did not serve the applicant with the
notice of appeal and the letter to the Registrar of the High Court applying
for copies of proceedings, judgment and a decree. After satisfying itself
that the respondent did not copy the notice of appeal, and serve a copy of
that letter to the applicant, the Court stated that:-
"The net result, therefore, is that the respondent has failed to prove
the allegation that the two documents i.e. a copy of the notice of
appeal and a copy of the letter to the Registrar applying for the
proceedings of the .:ca~e, were duly served on the applicant or his
counsel. Since there has been no application for extension of time to
serve these documents on the applicant, the present application must
succeed. As Mr. Kambamwene rightly pointed out, the respondent
company cannot in terms of the exception under Rule 83 (1) of the
Rules claim protection against the time running against it because
the applicant was not duly served with a copy of the letter to the
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Registrar applying .for court proceedings in the case. That is to say,
· the time for lodging the appeal has long elapsed, and there is
nothing to salvage that situation.
Thus/ failure to serve the applicant with a copy of the notice of
appeal within seven days of the notice as required by Rule 77 (1) of
the Rules/ and failure to lodge the appeal within 60 days of the notice
as required by Rule 83 (1) are/ in the absence of any evidence of
extension of time by the Court to do these things/ grounds which
warrant the striking out of the notice of appeal which I hereby do. N
Ipso facto, from the above holding, the respondent in that case did not
take the required essential steps to institute her appeal.
When we relate what transpired in the above discussed case to the
.present one, we hasten to state that we agree with Mr. Mayenga that
!Francis .!tengeja's case (supra) is distinguishable to. the present case
because the circumstances herein are different from that case. We will
illustrate.
Our starting point is· paragraph 5.-1 to 5.7 of the respondent1s
affidavit in reply. Under that paragraph, the latter has outlined the steps
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which were being taken in ·order to file an appeal in Court. It is clear from
those sub-paragraphs that -following an order of the High Court granting
the respondent an· extension of time to appeal, they immediately lodged
the notice of appeal, and also lodged a letter requesting for copies of
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proceedings, judgment and a. decree. As it were, the respondent served
the same on the applicant, on time. And to be particular, since the first
appeal was struck out for-want of the written submissions which were part
and parcel of the proceedings at the trial court, a letter was written to the
Registrar of the High Court requesting to be supplied with the certified
copies of her final submissions in the High Court. Nonetheless, she is yet to
receive those submissions. Mr. Mayenga indicated likewise that the
respondent has been following up the said documents and, as shown
under paragraph 5.4 of the affidavit in reply, they wrote a reminder letter
to the High Court on 7.11.2015 but so far no response.
We pose here to say that the respondent and her advocate were on
the right track. We wish to revert to the case of The Registered
Trustees of Kagera Farmer's Trust Fund v. CRDB Bank Ltd., Civil
Application No: 58 of 2015 CAT (unreported) in whicri thef Court was faced
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with a more _or less -SimJlar situation to the present matter. "It was stated in
that case that:-
''.As this Court has clearly stated in Transcontinental Forwarders
Lirnited v. Tanganyika Motor Limited, once the respondent has
shown that he had .applied to the Registrar for a copy of proceedings
sought to be appealed against, and he had not been furnished with
any, he had complied with the Rules. It is evident from the
correspondences between the respondent and the Registrar of the
High Court that not all documents were furnished to the respondent
and some of the documents supplied to him were problematic. "
In the Registered Trustees of Kagera Farmer's Trust Fund's
case, the Court relied on its earlier decision on the point in the case of
Foreign Mission Board of the Southern Baptist Convention v.
Alexander Panomaritis [1984] T.L.R. 146 where it was stated that:-
"Since · the inordinate delay in furnishing a certified copy of the ·
proceedings of the High Court cannot be blamed on the respondent
no cause of action existed on his part to bar him from instituting and
prosecuting his appeal. "
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In the premises, the respondent in the present case has so far done no.... ..
dereliction of what he ought to have done to deserve any blames.
We note also that Mr. Vedasto aired his views that the nature of the
respondent's appeal did not require the respondent to apply afresh for the
proceedings, judgment and decree of the High Court after the striking out
of his prior appeal. According to him, the Court should consider the fact
that the respondent's first letter applying for the copies of those documents
was submitted to the High -Court beyond the required 30 days from the
date of the judgment, also that the same was served to the applicant out
of time.
Once again, we do- not agree with Mr. Vedasto. The reason is dear
that even if the respondent's letter to the Registrar prior to the striking out
was lodged and served on the applicant out of time, that situation was
cured by the fact that the respondent successfully applied for extension of
time in which to still appeal. -What matters therefore, is what was done
thereafter.
Equally important, the law is, clea_r that once the appeal is struck out
as it were in the case at hand, that implies the striking out of the record of
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qppeal as a whole. Under suc:h circumstances,. the appellant will be duty
bound to re-file the appeal afresh having in mind the requirements of the
Rules of the Court - See the case of Dhow Mercantile (EA) Ltd &
Others v. Registrar of Companies & Others, Civil Appeal No. 56 of
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2005 CAT (unreported). In that case the Court emphasized that:-
Furthermore, it is also to· be observed that it is now settled that
after an appeal has been struck out upon the ground that it
is incompetent, there is nothing as it were, saved with
regard to the appeal including the notic{;! of appeal. That is,
the order striking out the appeal also had the effect of striking out
the notice of appeal as well. Where, as happened in this case, after
striking out the notice of appeal, it is left open for the appellant to
reinstitute the appeal if it is so desired, it is expected that due
compliance with the- requirement of the rules would be observed ...
To recapitulate, we agree with Mr. Kilindu, learned counsel, that after
the initial record of appeal was struck out on 23.3.2005 in Civil
Appeal No. 86 of 2004, no valid notice of appeal remained as urged
· by Mr. Ukwong 'a. It was · imperative Cipon · the appellant to apply
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afresh.to.the High Court-for extension of time in J!Vhich to file notice
of appeal. //
On the basis of the above, we find and hold that the application is
without merit and we dismiss it with costs.
Order accordingly.
DATED at DAR ES SALAAM this 18
th
day of September, 2018.
B. M. MMILLA
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
S. S. MWANGESI
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
G. A. M. NDIKA
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
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