Sospeter Juma vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 170 of 2023) [2025] TZCA 1124 (16 October 2025)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT ARUSHA ( CORAM: LILA, J.A., FIKIRINI. J.A. And RUMANYIKA. CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 170 OF 2023 SOSPETER JUMA......................................................................APPELLANT VERSUS THE REPUBLIC.....................................................................RESPONDENT (Appeal from the Judgment of the Resident Magistrate's Court of Manyara at Babati-Extended Jurisdiction) (Lusewa, PRM-Ext. Jurist dated the 30th day of August, 2022 In Criminal Appeal No. 11 of 2022 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 1st & 16th Oct, 2025. FIKIRINI, J.A.: This is the second appeal, after the appellant unsuccessfully challenged the trial court conviction and sentence on one count of rape contrary to section 130 (1) (2) (e ) and 131 (1) of the Penal Code. It is alleged that on 24th February, 2019, at 18:00 hrs at Songambele Village within Kiteto District in Manyara Region, the appellant had carnal i

knowledge of one VR or PW1 or the victim, a girl of eleven (11) years old, a pupil at Songambele Primary School, whose name we have concealed to protect her dignity. From the five prosecution witnesses and the sole defence witness (the appellant himself), the trial court found him guilty, convicted and sentenced him to thirty (30) years imprisonment. His appeal to the High Court vide Resident Magistrate's with Extended Jurisdiction in Criminal Appeal No. 11 of 2022, containing seven (7) grounds as intimated earlier, was dismissed, hence the present appeal containing a total of ten (10) grounds, seven (7) from the main memorandum of appeal and three (3) from a supplementary memorandum of appeal. To appreciate the would be decision, a summary of the case is necessary. It was the PWl's testimony that on the fateful day, she and her sibling, PW2, were coming from a farm at around 18:00 hours. On their way, they met the appellant, whom they knew before and could identify on the dock, who was a watchman at Laban's cassava farm. The appellant started chasing them. The two girls ran away. The appellant caught up with PW1, who had run into the wilderness. He threatened her with a machete (panga), stopping her from screaming. The latter proceeded to strip her naked, starting with her shirt, which he covered

PWl's face with, then stripped her of her skin-tight. While she was naked, the appellant undid his trousers zip and took his male organ and inserted it in the victim's female part. From the victim's account, she felt pain. While the ravishing was going on, the appellant heard people talking. Out of fear, he fled and left the victim at the scene. PW1 pulled herself up, picked up her clothing and went home. At home, she found her father, to whom she shared the information. Her father asked her to wait until the following day, when the matter could be reported to the school administration. Indeed, the following day, the matter was reported to Mwalimu Tesha, who asked them to report the matter at Olgine Police post, which they did. From the Police post, PW1 was issued with PF3 and escorted to Engusero Health Centre. Escorting PW1 were PW2, their mother and PW3. At the Health Centre, she was examined by Hassan Mkwachu (PW5), a medical doctor, who confirmed that PW1 had been raped as he physically examined her and found semen, bruises and a hole. He also stated that upon touching the victim on the labia majora (outer margin of the female genitals), she complained of feeling pain. PW5 prescribed some medication for PW1. A PF3 secured from the Police and filled by PW5 after examining the victim was tendered without

objection and was admitted as exhibit P2. Unfortunately, it was not read out loud in court. PW2's account was similar to that of PW1 except for what transpired when they ran in different directions. She, however, informed her father that the appellant caught PW1. While PW2 was explaining to their father what happened, PW1 appeared crying, complaining that the appellant had raped her. Likewise, PW3 gave the same account as PW1 after the matter was reported to the school authority. She also responded to the Office Commanding Station (OCS), Olgine, as they had requested her presence. In his sole witness defence evidence, the appellant, who testified as DW1, denied having committed the offence and prayed to be set free. However, in cross-examination by the Prosecutor, he admitted knowing the victim and that they were living in the same village and on the fateful day, he was in Songambele at the stated hours. While he claimed to have no grudges with PW1, he stated to have grudges with her mother. When asked about the relationship between the case and grudges with PW2's mother, he admitted that there was no relationship.

As stated earlier, the two lower courts were convinced by the evidence adduced. The trial court convicted and sentenced him, and the 1s t appellate court upheld the trial court's finding. This resulted in the following paraphrased grounds of appeal from the memorandum of appeal filed on 15th November, 2024: one, the failure by the prosecution to call material witness, grounds two and five are the same both complaining that the prosecution case was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, ground three from memorandum of appeal and two from the supplementary memorandum of appeal, are of the same complaint on poor identification at the scene of crime, ground four, that exhibits PI and P2 were wrongly admitted and exhibit PI was not read out loud in court, ground six, that the allegation was never reported to the Village Authority and seven, that the defence case was not properly considered. From the supplementary memorandum of appeal filed on 27th September, 2025, the grounds were: one, that the testimonies of PW1 and PW2 were taken contrary to Section 127(2) of the Tanzania Evidence Act; and three, that the victim's credibility was not assessed. On the date set for the hearing of the appeal, present in Court was the appellant, fending for himself and on the Republic/respondent's side, were Mr. Benedict Kivuma Kapela, learned Senior State Attorney, team

leader, assisted by Messrs. Jackson Mayeka and Michael Peter Martin, both learned State Attorneys. The appellant adopted his grounds of appeal, supported by a written submission he submitted to the Court. Countering the grounds of appeal, Mr. Mayeka addressed the Court on behalf of the Republic/respondent's team. His planned submission was to argue the 2n d , 3rd , and 5th grounds from the memorandum of appeal and the 2n d ground from the supplementary memorandum of appeal would be discussed jointly. All the remaining grounds, namely, 1st, 4th , 6th and 7th from the memorandum of appeal and 1s t and 3r d from the supplementary memorandum of appeal, were argued separately. The learned counsel commenced his address by tackling the 7th ground that the appellant's defence was not adequately considered. Dismissing the complaint, the learned State Attorney referred the Court to page 30 of the record of appeal (ROA), where the appellant totally refuted committing the offence. Upon reflection, the learned State Attorney acknowledged that the evaluation was not thorough, as both the trial court and the 1s t appellate court did not exhaustively evaluate the appellant's defence. With that shortcoming, he invited the Court, with the powers bestowed upon it, to step into the shoes of the two lower courts

and re-evaluate the defence case, which he submitted would still result in the defence case not weakening the prosecution case. Specifically responding to the defence that the appellant had issues with PWl's mother, the learned State Attorney contended that the claim was without weight as PW1 named the appellant to his father and not his mother. And even if his claim had legs to stand on, the question would still be why he would transfer the malice to the victim. Referring to the evidence on record, he argued that it was the victim's father, who reported the incident to the school authorities, not the mother. Therefore, the claim that the charge against him was fabricated has no support, as the issue between the mother and the appellant had nothing to do with the victim. All that is on record was that the appellant and the victim were both residents of Songambele village and on the fateful day, she was coming from the farm heading home, when the appellant chased after her and her sibling, only to catch and raped her. This ground had therefore no merit, praying that it be dismissed. The 6th ground is that the issue was not reported to the village authority. Admitting the fact, the learned State Attorney submitted that PW1 reported the incident to her father, who later reported to the school authorities, who advised the father to report the matter to the Police. This

is not the first time the Court has faced such a scenario; thus, the learned State Attorney cited the case of Kidai Magembe v. R (Criminal Appeal No. 228 of 2021) [2022] TZCA 346 (13 June 2022; TANZLII). In that case, the Court acknowledged that the matter was not reported to the Village Authority, but went on stating that there was no legal requirement that the matter must be reported to the Village Authority. He urged us to dismiss the ground as meritless. On the 1s t ground from the memorandum of appeal, that the material witness was not summoned, was dismissed by the learned State Attorney as meritless. This dismissal was based on the fact that the appellant did not specify the identity of the material witness, despite having named the victim's father and a teacher from Songambeie Primary School before the High Court. Prompted by the Court, on page 3 of his submission, the appellant also complained of the arresting officer not being summoned before the court. His quick response was that there was no dispute about the appellant's arrest. Therefore, there was no need to call the arresting officer, as his or her role was only to arrest the appellant. All the other information from the arresting officer would have been hearsay, the same way would have been that of the victim's father and a teacher. To him, the ground is meritless and deserves dismissal.

Coming to the 3rd ground from the supplementary memorandum of appeal, that the victim's credibility was not assessed. His take was that the victim's credibility was considered with that of the other prosecution witnesses. On page 30 of the ROA, the trial Magistrate heavily relied on PW1 and PW2's evidence and gave reasons for so doing, though without stating whether the witnesses were credible or not. Cementing his position, the learned State Attorney contended that each witness should be believed unless there is a cogent reason not to. To fortify his submission, he cited the case of Goodluck Kyando v. R [2006] T. L. R. 363. He also further submitted that, upon examining the record and considering all the evidence, the witnesses were credible, as their testimony was coherent. Turning to the 1s t ground from the supplementary memorandum of appeal, the failure to comply with the requirement under section 127(2) of the Evidence Act, he contended that the provision was complied with, as both witnesses promised to tell the truth. However, they gave their evidence on oath. This, according to the learned State Attorney, did not affect their testimonies, and it cannot be said that section 127 (2) was contravened. Pressed by the Court whether it was correct to apply both, he admitted it was not, but was prompt to say the testimonies of those

two witnesses were not affected. Buttressing his submission the learned State Attorney argued that even if there was an omission, still in terms of section 127 (6) of the Evidence Act, the court, after assessing the credibility of the child, could admit the evidence. However, in the instant case, it is not on record that the trial Magistrate did so. Apart from Goodluck Kyando's case (supra), the learned State Attorney urged the Court to step into the shoes of the two lower courts and assess the credibility of the two witnesses and whether they were trustworthy. The 2n d , 3rd , and 5th grounds from memorandum of appeal and the 2n d ground from supplementary memorandum of appeal, that the prosecution's case was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The learned State Attorney started elaborating on the three ingredients of the offence subject to proof, which are a) penetration, b) age of the victim and c) if the appellant was the one who committed the offence. On penetration, he submitted that there was evidence of PW1 and that of PW5, even without the aid of the PF3; the doctor's account is sufficient and could be relied on as credible. In support of his submission, he referred the Court to the case of Maligile Maingu v. R, (Criminal Appeal No. 432 of 2021) [2023] TZCA 17303 (5 June 2023; TANZLII), in which 10

the Court held that the doctor's evidence could be admissible even in the absence of the document to support it. Still at it, the learned State Attorney contended that the appellant did not cross-examine the witness, which, to the Republic/respondent, reads as the appellant agreeing to what has been said. The second ingredient is the age of the victim. The learned State Attorney admitted that nowhere in the ROA has the age of the victim been stated. He, however, referred the Court to section 122 of the Evidence, which is currently section 130 of the same, that the court can guess the age of the victim, guiding itself that the victim was a child. In the present situation, PW3 testified that the victim was her student in standard V, a testimony which was also received from PW1. Besides, the charge sheet revealed the age of the victim. Also, PW1 promised to tell the truth and not lies; her testimony must therefore be considered affirmatively. And that all these examined together suggest that PW1 was a child. The last ingredient, on who is a perpetrator, PW fs evidence had substantiated that. She named the appellant, whom she could identify as the incident occurred at 18:00 hours. She explained how she knew him, li

that he works as a watchman at Laban's farm. PWl's identification, is that of a person she recognized and not a stranger. Asked by the Court as to what was the environment when they met, the learned State Attorney, averting reliance on Waziri Amani v. R [1980] T.L.R. 250 case, cited by the appellant in his submission, submitted that each case should be decided on its peculiar circumstances. The standards applied in Waziri Amani (supra) should not be used in the present appeal. In the present case, PW1 and the appellant knew each other before and after the chase, during which he caught up with her. He undressed her, which was at zero distance. Inquired by the Court on the failure to summon the victim's father, to whom the incident was reported first, as it would have added credence to PW1 and PW2's evidence, the learned State Attorney replied that it is not necessary that all elements are satisfied, citing the case of Eliapenda Zephania Zakaria @ Kicheche v. R, (Criminal Appeal No. 675 of 2021) [2024] TZCA 728 (14 August 2024; TANZLII). He concluded by submitting that both PW1 and PW2 knew and hence recognized the appellant. On what happened after the chase, PW2 heard it from PW1 that he raped her. Therefore, for the victim's father not being summoned is not fatal, as PW2 was informed and she came to testify. Moreover,

PWl's account of what transpired after the appellant's chase gave her ample time and close proximity to see and recognize the appellant. Finally, Mr. Mayeka prayed for the appeal to be dismissed for lack of merit and the trial court conviction and sentence be upheld as did the 1s t appellate court. In rejoinder, the appellant had little to add, apart from urging the Court to investigate the matter further, as he was not satisfied. We shall determine the grounds of appeal as listed by the appellant, as well as argued by the respondent in reply, whereby some have been discussed jointly. On the 1s t ground from the memorandum of appeal, the appellant's complaint is failure by the prosecution to call material witnesses. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in convicting him without the testimonies of "material witnesses," specifically PWl's father (Raphael Ndahaniel) and the headmaster of Songambele Primary School, to whom the incident was reported first and the arresting officer, as reflected on page 3 of the appellant's written submission. This complaint is unfounded. We say so because, under section 143, which is now section 152 of the Tanzania Evidence Act (R.E. 2023), there is no specific number 13

of witnesses required to prove a particular fact. More so, the prosecution is at liberty to call any witness whom they think is material to prove their case. In the present appeal, the witnesses summoned by the prosecution adequately linked the appellant with the commission of the offence. Thus, the prosecution was not under any obligation to call the victim's father and headmaster. See Martin Jacob Mlila v. Republic (Criminal Appeal No 434 of 2021) [2024] TZCA 447 (11 June 2024; TANZLII). Notably, the victim's father and the headmaster would have offered only corroborated evidence, which PW1, PW2, PW3, PW4, and PW5 already adduced. As for the arresting officer, since there was no dispute that the appellant was arrested, the calling of the arresting officer was thus unnecessary. It follows that their absence does not create a gap in the prosecution's case. The High Court thus correctly dismissed the complaint, as this Court would do, that the ground is meritless. On the 2n d , 3r d and 5th grounds from memorandum of appeal and the 2n d from supplementary memorandum of appeal, the prosecution's case was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Starting with the appellant's complaint that there was poor identification of who committed the offence. The appellant claims that PW1 and PW2 could not reliably identify him in the wilderness at 18:00 hours. Our review of the evidence 14

adduced before the trial court, PW1 and PW2 knew the appellant prior to the incident day, as the watchman at Laban's cassava farm. This evidence is found on pages 7 and 10 of the record. Moreover, the offence occurred at 18:00 hours in an open wilderness. Both witnesses identified the appellant. The appellant's cross-examination on page 22 of the record admitted knowing PW1 from the village and that on the fateful day he was at Songambele, further bolsters the evidence of PW1, who is the victim. The appellant was not a stranger to PW1 and PW2, but a person known to them before. Therefore, the identification is that of recognition. The appellant, in his submission on page 3, invited the Court to rely on the identification requirements as established in the case of Waziri Amani (supra). He contended that the victim and PW2 identification that he was working at Laban's farm without a proper or elaborate description on the incident day was lacking. Dismissing the argument, the learned State Attorney urged the Court to determine the present case on its own peculiar circumstances. Therefore, the requirements in Waziri Amani should not apply in the present case. We are convinced that PW1 and PW2 positively identified the appellant. The victim and the appellant were from the same village and knew each other before. However, on the fateful day, after the appellant 15

successfully chased and caught up with her, he undressed her, which we believe was at close proximity and face-to-face. The closeness by any means would have allowed the identification of the appellant by PW1. This was followed by the sexual assault, which placed the two even closer to each other. Without hesitation, we concur with the two lower courts that found the appellant was positively identified by PW1 and PW2, without any possibility of mistaken identity. This proves one of the three ingredients of the offence for which the appellant was charged. Turning to the two other elements, it is a trite law to prove the offence of rape involving a girl below 18 years of age, the prosecution must establish at least the penetration of the victim's female parts by the accused person, and that the victim of rape was below the age of 18. As for the first ingredient, it is settled law that the best evidence in sexual offences comes from the victim herself. See Godi Kasenegala v. Republic (Criminal Appeal 10 of 2008) [2010] TZCA 5 (2 September 2010; TANZLII). In the case at hand, PW1 gave a detailed and straightforward account of the sexual act. She narrated how the appellant opened his trousers zip, took his male organ, and inserted it into her female organ, causing her pain. PWl's evidence was clear and unshaken on cross-examination. The evidence was corroborated by PW2, her 16

sibling, who witnessed the chase and PW5, the Doctor, who confirmed penetration via physical examination, noting semen, bruises, a "big hole," and pain in the labia majora. PW3 further corroborated the post-incident sequence by testifying to receiving the report at school and escorting PW1 for medical examination. The Exhibit PI (the PF3), which would have supported the evidence of penetration, was incorrectly included in the court record. The first appellate court, rightly so, expunged it from the record of proceedings. Nevertheless, even without the PF3, PW5's account could be admitted as credible and reliable evidence, which, in this case, we find so that the doctor's evidence sufficiently supplements that of PW1 and PW2. See: Maligile Maingu v. R, Criminal Appeal No. 432 of 2021 As to the age of the victim, it is unfortunate that none of the prosecution witnesses testified on this aspect. Apparently, in the particulars of the offence in the charge sheet and before she testified, the age was indicated to be 11 years. Despite being 11 years old in those two places, particulars of the offence and her statement before testifying are not part of the evidence. See the case of Peter Bugumba @ Cherehani v. Republic (Criminal Appeal 251 of 2019) [2023] TZCA 221 (4 May 2023; TANZLII). PW3 in her evidence stated that the victim was a 17

standard five student at Songambeie Primary school. Again, that in itself cannot be sufficient evidence to eliminate the possibility that she could also be above 18. See Ezra John v. Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 51 of 2021) [2023] TZCA 17687 (2 October 2023; TANZLII). Notwithstanding the above position, there is equally a dissimilar Court's decision on the contrary. Though it required strict proof of age, it did not allow the culprit to walk scot-free. In those cases, the Court directed its attention to examining the evidence pragmatically, considering the unique circumstances of each particular case. One example is the case of Isaya Renatus v. R, Criminal Appeal No. 542 of 2015. In that case, an 11-year-old girl was brutally assaulted by Isaya Renatus, who threatened her with a knife and raped her. The assault was interrupted when two women arrived after hearing the victim's cries; however, Isaya Renatus threatened them too before fleeing. He was later convicted of rape. On appeal, one of the grounds was that the victim's age, a critical factor in the case of statutory rape, was not sufficiently proven. Despite no direct testimony about her age, the court noted she was a class five pupil and thus likely under the age of eighteen. After thorough consideration, the Court found sufficient circumstantial evidence to affirm

the conviction, dismissing the appeal as lacking merit. This is what the Court stated " We are keenly conscious o f the fact that age is o f great essence in establishing the offence o f statutory rape under section 130(l)(2)(e), the more so as, under the provision, it is a requirement that the victim must be under the age o f eighteen. That being so, it is most desirable that the evidence as to proof o f age be given by the victim, relative, parents, medical practitioner or, where available, by the production o f a birth certificate. We are, however, far from suggesting that proof o f age must, of necessity, be derived from such evidence. There may be cases, in our view, where the court may infer the existence o f any fact, including the age o f the victim, on the authority o f section 122 o f the Evidence Act (now section 130 o f the Evidence /^../'[Emphasis added] In the case under consideration, PW3 led evidence that the victim was a class five pupil at Songambele Primary School, without stating PWl's age. Since there is no direct evidence in that regard, we have opted to go by what PW3 stated that PW1 was in standard V and the record on page 7, which indicates that PW1 promised to tell the truth before testifying. Thus, given the circumstances of this case, it is at least deducible that the victim was within the ambit of a person under the age 19

of eighteen. Based on our evaluation, we conclude that the victim was, by any means, below 18 years of age, thereby rendering the requirement of consent inapplicable. The trial court's failure to assess PWl's credibility is another grievance by the appellant. He complained that PW1, in her evidence, testified that while the appellant was ravishing her, people were heard talking, which made the appellant flee. Nowhere in PWl's testimony does she state that she informed those people; instead, she went home and told her father. The appellant questions the credibility of this evidence. The learned State Attorney submitted that PW1 was a credible witness who was highly relied on by the two lower courts. PWl's evidence was assessed in comparison to that of PW2 and PW5. Assessment of witness credibility and demeanour is an exclusive domain of the trial court before whom witnesses' testimonies are recorded after examination in chief, cross-examination and re examination. The advantage they enjoy is unfortunately not extended to the appellate courts. It is therefore significant for the trial court to ensure that this noble duty is thoroughly done and reflected in the record. However, failure to comply with that does not mean the availed evidence could not be relied on. As rightly submitted by the learned State Attorney 20

relying on the decision of this Court in Goodluck Kyando (supra), the position we stand for is that each witness deserves to be believed unless there is a cogent reason not to do so. So far, there is no doubt that PW1 was not telling the truth or that her evidence and that of PW2 differed significantly. Upon examining all these factors together, we find that PWl's evidence was credible, despite the trial record being silent on the assessment of PWl's credibility and other prosecution witnesses. We thus see this ground without merit. On the 4th ground from the memorandum of appeal, that exhibits PI (the attendance register) and P2(PF3), as rightly intimated by the appellant, were wrongly admitted in evidence. As for exhibit PI, the record indicates that the same was not read out in court after its clearance for admission, while for exhibit P2 as shown on page 15 of the record, PW3 is the one who identified it, but wrongly tendered by the public prosecutor. See the cases of Bashiru Salum v. Republic (Criminal Appeal 379 of 2018) [2020] TZCA 196 (1 April 2020; TANZLII) and Chora s/o Samson @ Kiberiti v. Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 516 of 2019) [2021] TZCA 628 (1 November 2021; TANZLII). The findings in the two decisions were that these exhibits were irregularly admitted, or contents were not read out; such exhibits could be expunged, but oral 21

corroboration may survive. The two questionable exhibits were, however, correctly expunged from the record by the first appellate court, as shown on page 56 of the record. Another appellant's grievance is that PW1 and PW2 evidence was taken in contravention of section 127 (2) of the Evidence Act, which is the first ground from supplementary memorandum of appeal. The essence of taking an oath or affirmation is to place credence on what the witness is about to say. In the present appeal, as indicated at pages 7 and 9 of the record, both PW1 and PW2 were processed the same way before their testimonies were received. Of course, it was incorrect to have them promised to tell the truth and later on administer oaths. The anomaly, in our view, has not prejudiced the appellant. Guided by our previous decision in the case of Ally Ngozi v. R (Criminal Appeal No. 216 of 2018), that in sexual offences, the best evidence comes from a credible victim who is better positioned to give an account of what befell her and who is responsible. Visiting PWl's evidence, if it aligns with the above principle, we are content with her narration on how the appellant chased after her and when he caught up with her, how he unzipped his trousers and undressed PW1. She was plain naked, and that is when he sexually assaulted her. PWl's account 22

was almost the same as that of PW2, except for the part of when the appellant ravished PW1, in the absence of PW2, as when he chased them, they ran in different directions. Wearing the two lower courts' shoes, we find PW1 a credible witness. She could explicitly explain what the appellant, whom she recognized as an employee at Laban's farm and a resident of Songambele, did to her. We thus dismiss the appellant's complaint since we do not find that the failure to assess PWl's credibility had prejudiced him. On the 6th ground, the appellant complains that no report was made to the Village Authority. The appellant faults the trial court for convicting without evidence of a report to the village authority. This is respectfully baseless. No law mandates reporting sexual offences to village offices before the police. PW1 reported to her father, then school (PW3), and the police, standard procedure. PW3's testimony confirms this chain of incident reporting as shown on page 9 of the record. This ground lacks a legal foundation. See the case of Kidai Magembe (supra). On the 7th ground, that the defence was not adequately considered. The record belies this. As rightly argued by the respondent, the trial court considered the appellant's defence, summarized DWl's testimony, which was a denial and lack of grudge with PW1, as could be read on page 3 of 23

the judgment found on page 30 of the record and evaluated it against the prosecution's "straightforward" evidence, finding it unconvincing. The High Court noted the defence's brevity and lack of challenge to prosecution witnesses during cross-examinations. An accused's denial must raise a reasonable doubt, but here it did not. The defence was considered and rejected for good reason. The ground is also meritless. From the above discussion, we find the appeal is without merit and is hereby dismissed entirely. DATED at ARUSHA on this date of 15th October, 2025. S. A. LILA JUSTICE OF APPEAL P. S. FIKIRINI JUSTICE OF APPEAL S. M. RUMANYIKA JUSTICE OF APPEAL Judgment delivered this 16th day of October, 2025 in the presence of Appellants in person, Mr. Philbert Msuya, learned State Attorney for the respondent and Ms. Jasmin Kazi, Court Clerk; is hereby certified as a true copy of the original.