International Livestock Research Institute & Another vs Dr. Guiseppe Di Giulio (Civil Appeal No. 36 of 2023) [2025] TZCA 1120 (15 October 2025)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT ARUSHA (CORAM: SEHEL, J.A.. MAKUNGU. J.A. And FELESHI. J.A.^ CIVIL APPEAL NO. 36 OF 2023 INTERNATIONAL LIVESTOCK RESEARCH INSTITUTE.......................................................... 1 . st APPELLANT GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR LIVESTOCK VETERINARY MEDICINES ..................................................... 2 nd APPELLANT VERSUS DR. GUISEPPE DI GIULIO ..................................................... RESPONDENT (Appeal from the decision of the High Court of Tanzania at Arusha) (Kamuzora, J.^ dated the 17th day of August, 2022 in Civil Appeal No. 36 of 2021 RULING OF THE COURT 8th & 15th October, 2025 SEHEL, J.A.: This second appeal has been preferred by International Livestock Research Institute, a non-profit livestock research organization commonly known as ILRI and Global Alliance for Livestock Veterinary Medicines, a charitable organization and a company limited by Guaranteed registered in England and Wales, commonly known as GALVmed (hereinafter to be referred to as the first and second appellants respectively). The first appellant dealt with the improvement of food security and reduction of poverty in developing countries

through research. The second appellant dealt with product development and livestock value chain. On the other hand, the respondent was the director of the VETAGRO (T) Limited and he was registered as veterinary practitioner in Tanzania dealing with research on the deceases affecting livestock in different parts of Tanzania. This second appeal is against the decision of the High Court of Tanzania at Arusha (the first appellate court) in Civil Appeal No. 36 of 2021 that overturned the decision of Court of the Resident Magistrate of Arusha at Arusha (the trial court). During the pendency of this appeal, the respondent (the defendant by then before the trial court and the first appellate court) died. Perhaps, it will be prudent to give the contextual facts leading to the present appeal in order to understand well the issue at hand. The appellants instituted a defamation suit against the respondent seeking for a restraining order against the respondent from further publishing or causing to be published defamatory words, removal order of the defamatory clips uploaded on the internet, payment of general and punitive damages and costs of the suit. 2

According to the second appellant, on 12th December, 2014, the respondent circulated an email accusing it of fraudulent vaccination and illegal importation of vaccines in Tanzania, the said email was copied to the first appellants' officials and key donors including the World Bank, FAO, IFAD, UNICEF and Gates & Melinda Foundation. That, the second appellant had partners worldwide and funded by donors such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Further, around May and June, 2015, the respondent uploaded two videos on the internet alleging that the appellants were responsible for the death of 90,000 cattle in the Maasai community, and they supported illegal vaccination. The first appellant stated that it appointed VETAGRO (T) Limited to register with the regulatory authority, Tanzania Food and Drug Authority (TFDA), its vaccine known as the East Coast Fever (ECF). That, the respondent posted via a newspaper in Kenya of which injured the first appellant's reputation and caused donors to investigate the claim and created distrust among partners. The Registrar of the Veterinary Council of Tanzania who testified before the trial court for the appellants, said that the respondent was deregistered in 2018 for misconduct. That, the Council conducted investigation on the allegations and found that some untrained 3

vaccinators from Nairobi misled farmers by using different vaccines while claiming it was an ECF vaccine. On his part, the respondent admitted sending the emails and videos but denied defaming the appellants. He insisted that the publication was not defamatory but exposed fraudulent vaccination practices for the benefit of the Maasai community. He alleged that the vaccinators administered only half doses of the ECF vaccine to double profits, causing the death of between 50,000 to 90,000 cattle in Monduli, Simanjiro and Kiteto. He blamed the appellants for supplying vaccines to distributors such as Ronheam, who allegedly misused them. The trial court found the respondent's emails, videos and publications were defamatory. Accordingly, it issued a permanent injunctive order restraining the respondent from further defamatory publications, ordered the removal of the videos from the internet and awarded general damages of TZS. 100,000,000.00 and punitive damage of TZS. 20,000,000.00. It also awarded costs to the appellants. The respondent was dissatisfied with the decision of the trial court. He appealed to the first appellate court where it was observed that there was evidence of illegal vaccination which the appellants were connected to. It further found that most of the statements of the respondent were 4

justified and well proven to be true by the respondent. That, the comments made by the respondent, such as, "the appellants caused members o f the Maasai community to lose their livelihood on account o f the death o f the cattld' or " the first appellant allowed illegal importation o f vaccination in Tanzanid' or "the first appellant supported the company that was importing the vaccine for fraudulent vaccination!' were justified comments and legitimate criticism by the respondent as he established that the allegations claimed were true. That, the respondent's publication and comments of the ongoing illegalities about ECF vaccines was within the ambit of a qualified privilege which was subject to public disclosure in order to protect those who were affected or were to be affected by illegal vaccination. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court. Hence, this second appeal. We stated earlier on that the respondent died while the appeal was still pending. Therefore, the issue before us is whether the appeal abates on the death of the defamer. At the hearing of the appeal, Mr. Luka Elingaya, appeared for the appellants. The respondent was absent but Ms. Patricia Eric, learned advocate of the appointed legal administrator of the estates of the late Dr. Guiseppe Di Giulio appeared. 5

Mr. Elingaya confirmed that the respondent is no more. Nonetheless, he referred us to rule 105 (1) (2) (3) and (4) of the Tanzania Court of Appeal Rules (the Rules) and contended that the rule permits for the appointed legal representative of the deceased person to be joined in the apppeal proceedings in place of the deceased person. He added that, on 3r d May, 2023, they were notified of the ultimate death of the respondent and on 17th September, 2025, they were further served with a letter from the appointed legal administrator through the counsel for the respondent of his intention to be joined in the appeal proceedings. He contended that the appellants have no objection for him to be joined in the appeal. He asserted that given rule 105 of the Rules allows the appeal to proceed through the administartor of the deceased person, hearing of the appeal could proceed even though it was a subject to a personal action. He further asserted that there were actions which the legal representative can undertake in case the appeal succeds and the decree is issued against the legal representative. He listed the actions which can be performed by the legal representative, such as, the withdrawal of the publication posted through social media. Having heard the submissions from the learned counsel for the appellants, the Court invited Ms. Eric, learned advoacte, to address it on the issue, as amicus curae. 6

Ms. Eric submitted that, generally, under the normal civil suits, a cause of action survives on the death of any party. Nonetheless, she argued that the proviso to section 9 (1) of the Law Reform (Fatal Accidents and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (henceforth "the Fatal Accidents Act") is categorically clear that certain actions, including defamation, are excluded from surviving the death of any of the parties to the case. Responding to the argument that a legal representative would be able to remove the posted publication on the social media, she contended that the administrator of the deceased would not have the password used by the deceased to upload the publication in the social media. She stressed the actions were done by the respondent in his personal capacity. We have followed the parties' submissions and essentially, we do agree with Mr. Elingaya that rule 105 of the Rules provides the procedure related to the abatement of appeal upon the death of parties and its consequences. For ease of reference, we reproduce the said rule as hereunder: "105.-(1) An appeal shall not abate on the death o f the appellant or the respondent but the Court shall, on the application o f any interested person, cause the legal representative o f the 7

deceased to be made a party in place o f the deceased. (2) Where an application under subrule (1) is not made within twelve (12) months\ the appeal shall, if the deceased person is the appellant, abate and if the deceased person is the respondent, proceed in the absence o f the respondent. (3) Any person claiming to be the legal representative o f a deceased party or any other interested person, may apply to revive the appeal; and, if it is proved that he was prevented by good cause from continuing the appeal, the Court shall revive the appeal upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as it deems fit." The above quoted rule provides that an appeal shall not abate upon the death of a party however obliges a Court, upon an application being made by an interested party, to cause joinder of the legal representative of the deceased as a party in place of the deceased. The rule further provides that where no application to apply for a joinder of the legal representative of the deceased is made within twelve months renders the appeal abated if the dead person is the appellant and if the deceased person is the respondent, the appeal proceeds in the absence of the legal representative. In addition, the legal representative of the

deceased is entitled, upon good cause being shown, to apply for revival of the proceedings. In essence, that is a general rule that all rights of action and all demands existing in favour of or against a person at the time of his death survive to and against his representatives for the benefit of his estate. Nonetheless, this general rule has an exception which is provided under section 9 (1) of the Fatal Accidents Act. The section provides: "Subject to the provisions o f this section , on the death o f any person after the commencement o f this Ordinance , all causes o f action subsisting against or vested in him shall survive against, or as the case may be for the benefit o f his estate: Provided that this subsection shall not apply to causes o f action for defamation or seduction or for inducing one spouse to leave or remain apart from the other or to claims for damages on the ground o f adultery. "[Emphasis added]. The catching words in the above provision of the law is "all causes of action". That means, when a plaintiff files a suit against a defendant claiming for damages for defamation and such a defendant dies before the establishment of his liability, the cause of action can hardly be extended to his legal heirs, who cannot reasonably be held 9

answerable for a wrong allegedly committed by him at his personal capacity. The legal heirs or representatives had no involvement in the alleged occurrence that gave rise to the claim for damages as they were neither involved in, nor can they defend the alleged wrong. This is so because, defamation is a personal tort. It is not transmissible to heirs or against legal representatives. The cause of action, being inherently personal, dies with a person. This principle has its origin in the Latin maxim "actio personalis moritur cum persond' (a personal action dies with the person) - see the case of Saidi Kibwana & Another v. Rose Jumbe [1993] T.L.R. 175. In the appeal before us, we are dealing with the claims of the appellants who want to enforce their legal right to sue for damages caused by defamatory publications made by the deceased respondent. Unfortuntaely, there is no any authority in Tanzania on the liability of the deceased defamer on appeal. In the case of Melepurath Sankunni Ezuthassan v. Thekittil Geopalankutty Nair (1986) 1 SCC 118 : AIR 1986 SC 411, the Supreme Court of India addressed this issue in the following terms: "When an injured sues or makes an application to a Claims Tribunal seeking compensation, the right to sue does not survive if, during the life time o f the injured, proceedings do not 10

culminate into an award in his favour. I f the claim for compensation results into an award in favour o f an injured and an appeal is preferred by the person > who is directed to pay compensation awarded to such an injured, the appeal against such an award would not abate and the legal representatives o f such an injured can be substituted\ for, the award, rendered in favour o f such an injured-daimant, forms part o f the estate left behind by the deceased. If, however, the High Court allowed the second appeal and dismissed the suit, the present appeal by special leave must abate, because what the appellant was seeking in this appeal was to enforce his right to sue for damages for defamation. This right did not survive his death and accordingly the appeal abated automatically on his death and his legal representatives acquired no right in law to be brought on the record in his place and stead." We find the above position of the law highly pursuasive and we adopt it in this appeal that since the appeal by the appellants was against the decision of the High Court which allowed the respondent's appeal by setting aside the awarded decree, this second appeal abates because the appellants were trying to enforce their right to sue for damages for defamation. That right did not survive on the death of the

respondent. Accordingly, we agree with Ms. Eric that the legal representative of the respondent acquired no right in law to be made a party in place and stead of the deceased defamer. In view of what we have endeavoured to explain, we mark this second appeal as to have been abated on the death of the respondent. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs. DATED at ARUSHA this 15th day of October, 2025. B. M. A. SEHEL JUSTICE OF APPEAL 0. 0. MAKUNGU JUSTICE OF APPEAL E. M. FELESHI JUSTICE OF APPEAL The Judgment delivered this 15th day of October 2025 in the presence of Mr. Luka Elingaya, learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. Patricia Eric, learned counsel for the respondent and Mr. Musa Amry, Court Clerk; is hereby certified as a true copy of the original.