Joseph Moroswa Chacha vs Tanzania Railways Corporation (Civil Appeal No. 662 of 2024) [2025] TZCA 1135 (15 October 2025)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT TABORA (CORAM: GALE BA, J.A., MG EYE KW A, J.A., AND MLACHA, J.A.) CIVIL APPEAL NO. 662 OF 2024 JOSEPH MOROSWA CHACHA ............................................. APPELLANT VERSUS TANZANIA RAILWAYS CORPORATION ........................ RESPONDENT (Appeal from the Judgment of the High Court of Tanzania (Labour Division) at Tabora) (Kadilu, J.) dated the 20th day of October, 2023 in Labour Revision No. 02 of 2023 JUDGM ENT OF THE COURT 8th & 15th October, 2025 MGEYEKWA, J.A.: The appellant, Joseph Moroswa Chacha has appealed against the decision of the High Court of Tanzania at Tabora in Labour Revision No. 2 of 2023 dated 20th October, 2023 (Kadilu, J.), reversing the decision of the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration at Tabora (the CMA) dated 8th February, 2021, which was decided in favour of the respondent. The appeal arises from an employment relationship between the appellant and the respondent. The appellant was employed by

the respondent on 19th May, 2016, as a Health Laboratory Assistant Technologist Grade II under a permanent employment contract. He was stationed at Tabora until the termination of his employment. On 20th July, 2020, the respondent wrote a letter to the appellant, informing him that he had been removed from the payroll pending submission of his Form Four Certificate, a requirement which the appellant failed to meet. Consequently, the respondent withheld his salary for a period of eight months, and on 21s t October, 2020, the appellant was served with a charge sheet. Aggrieved by the outcome of the decision of the respondent, on 30th October, 2020, the appellant lodged a labour dispute claiming that he was unfairly terminated from employment by the respondent. He prayed to be paid the accumulation of salaries, overtime, arrears, and disturbance allowances. The application could not, however, proceed to a hearing on merit. It was dismissed by the arbitrator, on 25th February, 2021 following a preliminary objection raised by the respondent that the CMA had no jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Still having the intention of challenging the CMA's decision, the appellant filed a revision on 3r d July, 2023 at the High Court

(Kadilu, 1) in Labour Revision No. 2 of 2023. This revision could not proceed to a hearing. It was dismissed 20th October, 2023 after the learned Judge determined two issues: one, whether the CMA had jurisdiction to determine the dispute, and two, whether the appellant who was the employee of the respondent, was a public servant under the Public Service Act. The learned Judge agreed with the CMA's findings that the appellant was a public servant and thus bound to first exhaust remedies provided under sections 25 and 32A of the Public Service Act (the Act) before lodging a dispute at the CMA. As such, the learned Judge sustained the CMA decision and dismissed the revision in its entirety. The appellant was again dissatisfied with the decision of the High Court and thus preferred an appeal to the Court. In the memorandum of appeal, filed on 10th June, 2024, the appellant raised three grounds of grievance as follows:

1. That, the honorable Judge erred in law for failing to consider that not every public servant is subject to the Public Service Act.

2. That, the Honorable Judge erred in law for holding that the Appellant referred the dispute to the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration prematurely. 3

3. That, the Honorable Judge erred in law for holding in favour o f the Respondent without having the records o f the lower court, especially CMA/ TAB/TBR-MJN/109/2020. At the hearing of the appeal, the appellant appeared in person without legal representation. On their part, the respondent was represented by Mr. Lameck Merumba, learned Principal State Attorney, assisted by Mr. Samuel Mahuma and Ms. Beatrice Manyori, both learned State Attorneys. Having heard the submissions of the parties, we invited learned counsel to address us on the first ground of appeal, which faults the learned High Court Judge for failing to consider that not every public servant falls within the ambit of the Act. In our considered view, the determination of this ground is dispositive of the entire appeal. Taking the floor, the appellant commenced his submission by adopting his written submissions filed in Court on 12th July, 2024 as part of his oral arguments in support of the appeal. Nevertheless, he highlighted and clarified few points by faulting the learned Judge of the High Court for erroneously proceeding on the assumption that the Act applies to all persons in public employment. It was his

contention that, properly construed, the Act does not apply indiscriminately to every individual employed in the public sector. In support of his argument, he cited a decision of the High Court, Labour Division in Jeremiah Mwandi v. Tanzania Posts Corporation, Labour Revision 6 of 2019) [2020] TZHC 1051 (TanzLII). It was, his further argument that, section 3 of the Act explicitly excludes certain categories of public offices, including employees of statutory bodies. In his view, such employees are governed by their respective enabling legislation and are not subjected to the procedural or substantive framework of the Act. To fortify this proposition, he cited the decision of this Court in Saida Kaumo v. Tanzania Telecommunication Corporation, Civil Appeal No. 10 of 2020 [2023] TZCA 17276 (TanzLII), and argued that not all individuals employed in government entities are public servants within the meaning of the Act. It was his position that, by virtue of the Tanzania Railways Corporation Act, the respondent's employees fall outside the ambit of the Act. Particular reliance was placed on section 9 (3) of the Act, which, he argued, excludes such employees from its application.

The appellant further contended that, upon exhaustion of the internal grievance resolution mechanisms, the proper legal framework for seeking redress, is the Employment and Labour Relations Act, Cap. 366, which, in his view, governs employment related disputes involving employees of public corporations not falling within the scope of the Act. In conclusion, the appellant reiterated his prayer that the appeal be allowed. In reply, Mr. Mahuma, learned State Attorney first adopted the respondent's reply written submissions as part of his oral submission before the Court. He went on to argue that the appellant's interpretation of the Act is fundamentally flawed. He contended that the Act was enacted to regulate the broad framework of public service, and its provisions are intended to apply to a wide spectrum of public offices. While he acknowledged that the Act contains exclusions, he emphasized that these are specific and narrowly defined, and the appellant's position does not fall within those exceptions. The learned State Attorney went on to submit that the CMA and the High Court properly applied the law in finding that the appellant was subject to the Act. In particular, he referred to section 32A of

the Act, which requires a public servant to exhaust internal remedies before seeking recourse under labour laws. To bolster his submission, he cited the case of Joseph Kivuyo v. Tanzania Ports Authority, Civil Appeal No. 78 of 2016 [2019] TZCA 64 (TanzLII), in which this Court emphasized the obligation to comply with internal disciplinary mechanisms. Mr. Mahuma maintained that the High Court was correct in finding that the appellant had failed to exhaust remedies under the Act, including appeals to the Public Service Commission and, where applicable, to the President. He relied on Tanzania Posts Corporation v. Jeremiah Mwandi, Civil Appeal No. 474 of 2020 [2023] TZCA 17317 (TanzLII), Tanzania Posts Corporation v. Dominic A. Kalangi, Civil Appeal No. 158 of 2020 (unreported), and Tanzania Posts Corporation v. Salehe Komba and Revocatus Rukonge, Civil Appeal No. 128 of 2020 (unreported), to support the view that employees of public corporations are public servants within the meaning of the Act, and are thus bound by its disciplinary framework. He concluded by praying that the appeal be dismissed for lacking in merit.

In his rejoinder, the appellant reiterated his earlier submissions and sought to distinguish the authorities cited by the respondent. He contended that the cited cases failed to appreciate that statutory bodies established under specific legislation, such as the respondent, are excluded from the application of the Act under section 3. He further submitted that the respondent is neither an executive agency nor a government institution, and thus falls outside the scope of the Act. He urged the Court to adopt the reasoning of the High Court in Jeremiah Mwandi v. Tanzania Posts Corporation (supra), and allow the appeal. We have carefully considered the rival submissions for the parties. With respect, we find the learned State Attorney's position to be both persuasive and well-grounded in law. It is trite law that jurisdiction of courts is foundational and cannot be assumed. As rightly submitted by the learned State Attorney, section 32A of the Act requires public servants to exhaust internal remedies before seeking redress under labour laws. For ease of reference, we reproduce it hereunder: " 32A.- A public servant shall, prior to seeking remedies provided for in the labour

taws, exhaust all remedies as provided under the Act." The above provision of law is unequivocal. It imposes a mandatory obligation on public servants to first exhaust internal remedies under the Act before seeking redress under labour statutes. There is no exception in the Act permitting otherwise. From the parties' submissions, it is not disputed that the appellant did not challenge the respondent's decision within the ambit of the Act. That omission alone ousted the jurisdiction of the CMA. See for instance, Fanuel Martin Ng’unda v. Herman M. Ng'unda [1995] T. L. R 155 and Elizabeth Mpoki & Others v. Maf Europe Dodoma, Civil Application 436 of 2016 [2020] TZCA 379 (Tanzlii), among others. This Court has had occasion to pronounce itself on the jurisdictional requirements under the Act. See Tanzania Posts Corporation v. Dominic A. Kalangi (supra) and Tanzania Posts Corporation v. Jeremiah Mwandi (supra). In the Kalangi's case, the Court held that: "...the import o f the above-quoted provisions together with a more elaborate exposition attached to it, is that the employees o f the Tanzania Posts Corporation are public servants."

While section 31 (1) of the Act provides that executive agencies and government institutions may be governed by their own establishing statutes, subsection (2) makes it abundantly clear: 'Without prejudice to sub-subsection (1), public servants referred to under this section shall also be governed by the provisions o f this Act.' In the context of the instant case, the CMA is further kept at bay from entertaining labour disputes involving public servants by the provisions of section 32A of the Act. In both Kalangi (supra) and Jeremiah Mwandi (supra), the Court categorical held that employees of public corporations such as Tanzania Posts Corporation are public servants employed in public offices. Consequently, upon termination, they must exhaust the internal remedies under the Act. Therefore, the appellant's argument that he falls outside the ambit of the Act is, with respect, misconceived. The appellant's contention that the Tanzania Railways Corporation, being a statutory corporation, is excluded from the scope of the Act is equally without merit. This argument was rejected in Kalangi (supra) and Mwandi (supra), where the Court

made it clear that employees of such bodies are public servants within the meaning of the Act. In our view, the authorities cited by the appellant, namely; Jeremiah Mwandi (supra) and Saida Kaumo (supra) are not relevant t:o his case. The decision in Jeremiah Mwandi (supra) was subsequently overturned by this Court in Tanzania Posts Corporation v. Jeremiah Mwandi, Civil Appeal No. 474 of 2020 [2021] TZCA 311 (TanzLII), and, therefore, no longer reflects good law. As for Saida Kaumo (supra), that case is clearly distinguishable. The labour dispute in that matter arose in 2007, before the enactment of the labour law reforms, which introduced significant changes to the regulatory framework governing public servants. Thus, we find that both cases do not support the appellant's position. Having found that the appellant was a public servant who failed to exhaust the remedies provided under the Act, we affirm the finding of the High Court that the CMA lacked jurisdiction to entertain the dispute. Accordingly, the first ground of appeal lacks merit. In light of this finding, we find it unnecessary to consider the n

remaining grounds; it will not serve the purpose in determining them. In the result, the appeal is hereby dismissed. Given the nature of the dispute, we make no order as to costs. DATED at TABORA this 15th day of October, 2025. Z. N. GALEBA JUSTICE OF APPEAL A. Z. MGEYEKWA JUSTICE OF APPEAL L. M. MLACHA JUSTICE OF APPEAL The Judgment delivered this 15th day of October, 2025 in the presence of appellant in person unrepresented, Mr. Samwel Mahuma, Learned State Attorney for the Respondent and Janekisa Bukuku, Court Clerk, is hereby certified as a true copy of the 12