Christopher Madole Paul vs The Guardian Limited (Civil Appeal No. 642 of 2024) [2025] TZCA 1055 (10 October 2025)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT DODOMA (CORAM: NDIKA, J.A., KIHWELO. J.A., And NGWEMBE. J.A.^ CIVIL APPEAL NO. 642 OF 2024 CHRISTOPHER MADOLE PAUL ................................................. APPELLANT VERSUS THE GUARDIAN LIM ITED ......................................................... RESPONDENT (Appeal from the Judgment and Decree of the High Court of Tanzania at Dodoma) (Masabo. J.^ dated the 24th day of November 2023 in DC Civil Appeal No. 35 of 2022 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 7th & 10th October 2025 NDIKA. J.A.: The appellant, Christopher Madole Paul, won a libel action in the District Court of Dodoma against the respondent, The Guardian Limited, the publisher of the local daily newspaper, Nipashe. His success was short lived, as it was overruled on appeal to the High Court of Tanzania at Dodoma. He is now appealing to this Court on two grounds. Essentially, the appellant sued in the trial court for libel published in the appellants issue of Nipashe of 31s t August 2018. The words complained of, which appeared as a headline on the front page, are pleaded in paragraph 4 of the plaint as follows: "Askofu kortini tuhuma wizi wa mahindi ya watoto yatima."

The above words roughly translate as "Bishop in court accused o f stealing orphans' maize ” The story with the above headline was published on page 3 of the newspaper as follows: "Taasisi ya Kuzuia na Kupambana na Rushwa (Takukuru) imemfikisha Askofu wa Kanisa fa Gospel Ministry, Christopher Madole, katika Mahakama ya Hakimu Mkazi Dodoma kwa kukabiliwa na mashitaka mawili likiwamo ia uchepushaji wa mahindi ya watoto yatima. Katika shitaka iingine anakabiiiwa na kosa ia kujipatia maii kwa njia ya udanganyifu. Akisoma hati ya mashitaka mbeie ya hakimu Mary Senapee, Mwendesha Mashitaka wa Takukuru, Biswaro Biswaro, aiisema kati ya Januari na Machi 2016, Askofu Madole, aiichepusha mahindi tani 360 kutoka katika Wakaia wa Taifa wa Hifadhi ya Chakula (NFRA), aiiyochukua kwa ajiii ya kupeieka kwa famiiia maskini za wiiaya za Bahi na Chamwino na badaia yake akayauza kwa mtu mwingine na hivyo kujipatia fedha kwa njia ya udanganyifu." Roughly translated, the above story portrays that the appellant, a bishop of the Gospel Ministry Church, was arraigned before the Resident

Magistrate's Court in Dodoma on two counts, including the diversion of maize intended for orphans. The second count concerned obtaining goods under false pretences. It was alleged that between January and March 2016, the appellant took 360 tonnes of maize from the National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA) intended for distribution to poor households in the Bahi and Chamwino areas, but sold it to another individual, obtaining money under false pretences. According to the respondent, the story covered the content of a press conference held by the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau ("the PCCB"). That the respondent reported exactly what was relayed by the PCCB's officials to have transpired in court following the appellant's arraignment. While the appellant did not contest the veracity of the story that he was arraigned in court on charges of diversion and obtaining goods under false pretences, he strongly objected to the story's headline claiming that he was accused of theft of maize meant for orphans. It was contended that the words lowered the appellant's reputation amongst his church followers and the public in general by portraying him as a deceitful and fraudulent person. On that premise, he successfully sued the respondent in the trial court for general damages totalling TZS. 200,000,000.00, punitive

damages, and an apology from the respondent. The trial court awarded him TZS. 150,000,000,00 in general damages and ordered the respondent to publish an apology to the appellant on the front page of its newspaper. The respondent's appeal to the High Court raised four questions for determination: one, whether the appellant pleaded the actual defamatory words sufficiently in the petition. Two, whether the newspaper headline alone (severable from the body) qualified as a defamatory statement referring to the respondent. Three, whether the publication was privileged since it arose from a press conference held by the PCCB and so protected by absolute or qualified privilege. Finally, whether the published words were false and injurious to the respondent's reputation and whether the trial court rightly awarded TZS. 150,000,000.00 in general damages. On the first issue, the High Court determined that the appellant had sufficiently pleaded the alleged defamatory words by stating the exact headline in paragraph 4 of the petition and annexing the newspaper. So, the pleading complied with authorities requiring libel words to be stated verbatim. As regards the second issue, the court held that the severable headline did not identify or refer to the appellant by itself. Given that it did not disclose his name, church or location, no reasonable reader of the headline alone would have associated it with the appellant. As a result, the

headline alone was insufficient to establish defamation against the respondent. The court could have concluded there, but for the interest of thoroughness, it addressed the other two questions. On the third issue, it found that the respondent's defence was within qualified privilege under section 39 (a) of the Media Services Act, Cap. 229 RE 2023 ("the Act"). That the news report was a fair account of matters revealed at the PCCB press conference regarding court proceedings, and the media outlet had a duty to inform the public. Thus, the publication was conditionally protected because it was not motivated by malice. The court additionally found that the technical legal distinction between "diversion" and "theft" was irrelevant to the common reader because both imputations implied crime. Finally, the court decided that the trial court's judgment could not be sustained based on the evidence on record. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed with costs. Discontented with the above outcome, the appellant, through his counsel, Mr. Cheapson L. Kidumage, has appealed to this Court on two grounds as follows:

1. The first appellate court erred in holding that the words complained o f did not refer to the appellant, despite correctly

determining that they were defamatory in their naturai and ordinary connotation. 2. The first appellate court's decision sustaining the respondent's defence o f qualified privilege was incorrect in both fact and law. Mr. Kidumage prosecuted the appeal on behalf of the appellant, whereas Messrs. Emmanuel Matondo and Xavier Rumisha, learned advocates, opposed the appeal on the respondent's behalf. The first ground of grievance poses no difficulty. However, ahead of dealing with it, we find it necessary to observe that the High Court rightly held that the words complained of were defamatory in their natural and ordinary meaning. The court reasoned as follows: "Admittedly, the defamatory nature o f these words is not hard to locate. That being a criminal offence imputes criminality and immorality. It is not expected that a clergyman o f any level would indulge in theft. Being God's servants, priests are roie models to their followers and the community at large and are always expected to be o f impeccable character and reputation, A priest suspected o f indulging [in] theft would certainly have his name in disrepute, lose followers and risk being defrocked. The risks may be even higher where a high-ranking priest such as a bishop is involved and

where the victim o f the offence is in the spectrum o f the most vulnerable groups such as orphans." Then, the court evaluated whether the defamatory headline was actionable against the respondent. It concluded that because the heading did not disclose the purported bishop's name, the church to which he belonged, or its location, it did not allude to the appellant. With due respect, we believe that the court erred in separating the title on the front page of the newspaper from the news narrative on page 3. We agree with Mr. Kidumage that the story, which the appellant accepted as true and accurate, offered context for the attention-grabbing headline. It served as proof that the headline referred to the appellant. Once a reader looked at its content after reading the headline, he would obviously learn that the statement referred to the appellant. That he was charged in court with stealing maize intended for orphans. We find merit in the first complaint. However, we must underline at this point that this ground of appeal does not, by itself, dispose of the appeal. We turn to the second ground, faulting the High Court for sustaining the respondent's defence of qualified privilege. First and foremost, qualified privilege is a legal principle that provides a defence against a defamation claim in certain contexts. It applies when

an individual makes a statement that may harm another person's reputation but is deemed justified if he was not motivated by malice. The concept aims to strike a healthy balance between free expression and the right of individuals in public life to protect their reputation. In the instant appeal, the High Court was aware that the defence is governed by section 39 (a) of the Act. This provision stipulates the following: "39. A publication o f defamatory matter is privileged on condition that it was published in good faith , if the relation conditionally between the parties by or to whom the publication is made privileged is such that the person publishing the matter is under some legal, moral or social duty to publish it to the person to whom the publication is made or has a legitimate personal interest in publishing it and the publication does not exceed either in extent or matter what is reasonably sufficient for the occasion ; and in any o f the following cases, namely- (a) the matter published, is in fact, a fair report o f anything said, done or shown in a civil or criminal inquiry or proceedings before any court, if however the court prohibited the publication o f anything said or shown before it, on the ground that it is seditious, immoral or 8

blasphemous, the publication shall not be privileged ;"[Emphasis added] In a nutshell, the above provision establishes the defence of qualified privilege for any defamatory publication made in good faith by a person who has a legal, social, or moral duty in making it to the person to whom it is made, and the person to whom it is made has a reciprocal interest or duty to receive it. As correctly observed by the High Court, the defence does not lie if the author of the statement simply asserts that "the matter he published concerned a criminal inquiry or proceeding." He must demonstrate that he had an obligation to publish it, and that the publication was reasonably sufficient for the occasion. Mr. Kidumage submitted on the second ground that the defence in question did not lie because the headline characterised the appellant's allegation as theft rather than diversion of maize, and the respondent made no effort to balance the story. We interpreted him to indicate that diverting maize was a lesser evil than theft. Mr. Matondo disagreed with his learned friend. He emphasised that diversion of maize and obtaining goods by false pretences were both larcenous because they included the element of permanent deprivation of property from the owner or intended beneficiary thereof. 9

As previously noted, the appellant appeared in court on 29th August 2018 for arraignment on two charges of diversion and obtaining goods under false pretences. On the same day, DW3 Sosthenes Wenceslaus Kibwengo, the PCCB Regional Bureau Chief in Dodoma, gave a media briefing on what happened in court. His testimony tallied with that of DW1 Biswaro B. Biswaro, a PCCB officer, and DW2 Paul Mabeja, the respondent's journalist who attended the press conference. We previously stated that the appellant did not question the truth of the story. He was solely furious about the headline, which portrayed him as a thief of goods intended for orphans even though the actual allegations against him in court did not entail stealing. To be fair, the headline may have been worded in such a way that it was both eye-catching and spectacular. Nonetheless, it was not implied that it was done in bad faith or that the respondent was motivated by malice. Most significantly, it covered a story that was largely accurate. The respondent who published it is a media outlet with a legal, social and moral obligation to notify the public about crimes and criminal proceedings in court. As rightly determined by the High Court, the public has a reciprocal interest in being informed about crimes and their prosecution in court. It is worth noting that the narrative drew from the content of the briefing by the PCCB's 10

Regional Bureau Chief. Indeed, the PCCB has a statutory duty under section 4 (2) (b) and (d) of the Prevention and Combatting of Corruption Act, Cap. 329 RE 2023 ("the PCCB Act") to "disseminate information to the public on the evils and effects of corruption and corrupt practices" as well as "promoting and fostering public support in combating corruption." We recall that Mr. Kidumage was adamant that the portrayal that the appellant was booked for "stealing" not "diversion" was essentially inexcusable. We are aware that, whereas stealing entails permanent deprivation of the owner of his property, the gravamen of diversion under section 29 of the PCCB Act is deviation by a person of any property belonging to the Government or its agencies to an independent agent, for purposes unrelated to those for which it was intended, for his own benefit or that of a third party. The official must have received the property by virtue of his position. In our opinion, the High Court correctly dismissed that argument on the ground that in an ordinary person's view, the distinction between the two phrases is so "minute and fanciful considering that both offences involve deprivation of the intended beneficiaries or owner." Even though diversion is punished less severely, it may still be classified as theft. Finally,

we are satisfied that the disputed publication was an occasion of qualified privilege. As a result, the second ground of appeal fails. In the end, we find no substance in the appeal, which we hereby dismiss with costs. DATED at DODOMA this 10th day of October, 2025. G. A. M. NDIKA JUSTICE OF APPEAL P. F. KIHWELO JUSTICE OF APPEAL P. J. NGWEMBE JUSTICE OF APPEAL The Judgment delivered this 10th day of October, 2025 in the presence of the Mr. Cheapson Kidumage, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Xavier Rumisha and Mr. Emmanuel Matondo both learned counsel for the respondent connected via video conference and Ms. Christina Mwanaj^^S*CS§fr.Clerk, is hereby certified as a true copy of the original. 'H

— lS s. £11 R. W. CHAUNGU J*/ DEPUTY REGISTRAR V ' COURT OF APPEAL 12