Masunga Ndilanha @ Kitambala vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 321 of 2023) [2025] TZCA 1018 (6 October 2025)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT MUSOMA fCORAM; KEREFU. J.A.. MWAMPASHI. J.A. And AGATHO, J.A/ 1 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 321 OF 2023 MASUNGA NDILANHA @ KITAMBALA APPELLANT VERSUS THE REPUBLIC RESPONDENT (Appeal from the decision of the High Court of Tanzania at Musoma) 30th September & 6th October, 2025 KEREFU, J.A,: The appellant, MASUNGA NDILANHA @ KITAMBALA was married to his wife Shida Maduhu (the deceased), who was killed after she refused to continue with the second-round of conjugation, upon cqmpletion of the first-round show, claiming that she was tired. Thus, the appellant was charged with the offence of murder contrary to section ?1 9 6 of the Penal Code, Chapter 16 of the Revised Laws (the Renal Code) before the High Court of Tanzania at Musoma (the trial court) in Criminal Sessions Case No. 83 of 2022. It was alleged that, on 1s t,November, 2020 at Manchimeru Village within Bunda District in Mara Region, the .appellant murdered his wife one Shida Maduhu. fMahimbali, J.^ dated the 6th day of March, 2023 in Criminal Sessions Case No. 83 of 2022 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT i l t

It is noteworthy that, when asked to plead before the trial court, the appellant replied that he had no malice aforethought when he killed his wife, as he was only claiming for his conjugal rights. Thus, the trial court entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. However, after a full trial, he was convicted and sentenced to suffer death by hanging. A brief background of the matter leading to this appeal," as obtained from the record of appeal indicates that, the appellant and'the deceased were husband and wife who celebrated their customary marriage in 2014, in Simiyu Region. After the said marriage the couple went to live at Mpanda in Katavi Region. During the subsistence of their marriage*-they were blessed with three issues and acquired several properties. .It was the testimony of Suzana Sopi (PW1), the young sister of the deceased that, the marriage life between the appellant and the deceased was encountered with quarrels and misunderstandings which were not resolved. However, in the course of their living and for the purposes of(looking for greener pastures, the appellant decided to move to Zanzibar to seek for economic opportunities, while leaving his wife at Mpanda running their mini- retail business (mini-shop). Subsequently, the wife made up her mind by selling all their domestic properties at their home (Mpanda) including the shop goods

and returned to her parents at Manchimeru Village in Bunda without informing her husband who was still in Zanzibar. Having received the information of his wife's relocation, the appellant, on 28th October, 2020, decided to travel to Bunda to meet his wife to settle their disputes. However, the settlement of the said disputes did not work out well, as in Bunda, the appellant was separated from sleeping with his wife, the, act which offended him as he had been away from her for a long time. He thus, unsuccessfully, kept on demanding for his conjugal rights from her., - - • Subsequently, on 31s t October, 2020, one day before the incident, the wife allegedly consented to have sexual intercourse with the appellant but on condition that he should find condoms as she was no longer trusting him. That, he may not be free from sexual and venereal diseases. The appellant complied with the said condition and he bought three condoms ready for the said act, but later, his wife changed her mind as she did not offer herself to him on that day. It was PWl's testimony that, on the following day, that is 1 s t November, 2020, the deceased told them that she was going to the farm. The appellant joined her. A moment later, Dawe Maduhu, the deceased's mother, went after them. Suddenly, PW1 heard her mother 3

crying. She rushed to the farm where she found the deceased lying on the ground and her neck was cut but was still alive. PW1 asked her on what had happened and the deceased told her that she was cut by the appellant. PW1 also saw the appellant naked, his penis cut and his two testicles were hanging. That, Josiah Maduhu (PW2), her uncle and other people, came to the scene of crime to offer assistance.. They took ;her sister to the hospital, but later, on the same day, she, was returned home dead. PW1 recalled that, when the deceased went to the farm she carried a hoe and a small knife. That, since at the farm there were mangoes, she thought the said knife was for peeling mangoes and not otherwise. In his testimony, PW2 supported the narration by PWi and added that, on' 1 s t November, 2020 at around 10:00 hours, while at the marriage ceremony, he received a phone call from one Shida John informing him about the murder incident at his home. PW2 rushed to the scene where he found the deceased lying down with a cut wound bn her neck and many people gathered. PW2 also saw the appellant in a critical condition as his private parts were injured. PW2 said that, they topk the deceased to the hospital but she died on the way.

No. E. 9222 D/SGT Chrisant (PW3), the investigation officer testified that, he was involved in the investigation of the incident. That, on 1s t November, 2020, in a company of other police officers and Dr. Tambwe Almasi, he visited the scene of crime where they found villagers gathered and the deceased's body was lying on the ground with cut wound on the neck. PW3 stated that, they also saw the appellant who was naked, his penis cut and testicles hanging. Dr. Almasi conducted an autopsy on the deceased's body and concluded that the cause of death was severe bleeding due to the cut wound on her neck. A postmortem report to that effect was admitted in evidence as exhibit PI and the sketch map of the scene of crime, which was prepared by PW3, was admitted in evidence as exhibit P2. PW3 stated further that they arrested the appellant at around 17:00 hours and placed him under the guard of CPL. Fidelis. They, then took him to the hospital for treatment. On the next day, i.e 2n d November, 2020, upon recovery of his conscience, PW3 interviewed him and recbrded his cautioned statement (exhibit P3). That, the appellant was discharged on 4th November, 2020 and sent to the Justice of Peace where he also recorded his extra judicial statement and admitted to have committed the offence. 5

In his defence, the appellant, who testified as DW1, changed his version by stating that, he killed his wife on self defence after she slashed off his testicles in the course of conjugation. He contended that, when they were having sexual intercourse at the farm and in the course of undressing herself, a knife dropped from her clothes. Having asked her as to the use of the said knife, she told him that it was for mangoes' peeling. Soon thereafter, they started conjugation. That, just after the first-round show, the deceased told him to lay 'back down' to clean his genital organs ready for the second-round. On the compliance, he suddenly wondered his testicles being cut off by a knife. That, in the course of rescuing himself, the said knife, accidentally, and in the panic mood, stabbed his wife on the neck. Thereafter, he became unconscious and later found himself at the hospital. That, he remained with the penis which it is only functioning as a urinary pipe and no longer for conjugation. He thus, completely dissociated himself from the accusations levelled against him. At the conclusion of the trial and after having considered the evidence adduced by both parties, the learned trial Judge was satisfied that the case against the appellant was proved to the required standard. He relied on the appellant's cautioned statement and the doctrine of the last person to be seen with the deceased as testified by PW1. He found

that, the appellants defence did not raise any reasonable doubt against the prosecution evidence, rather, he was of the view that, the same was an afterthought. Thus, the appellant was found guilty, convicted and handed down the mandatory death sentence. Aggrieved by both, the conviction and sentence, the appellant has come to this Court challenging the decision of the High Court. It is noteworthy that, on 25th July, 2023, the appellant lodged a memorandum of appeal comprising four grounds of appeal and on 27t h June, 2024, he lodged a supplementary memorandum of appeal with three grounds. However, on 29th September, 2025, Mr. Leonard Elias Magwayega, learned counsel, who was assigned to represent the appellant, lodged a supplementary memorandum of appeal comprising the following grounds: (1) That, the learned trial Judge erred in law and facts in holding that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt while the same did not; (2) That, the learned trial Judge erred in law and facts to admit and solely rely on exhibit P3 to convict the appellant while the same was improperly admitted in evidence thus lacked the weight for a safe conviction; and (3) That, the learned trial Judge erred in law and facts to convict the appellant while the prosecution failed to establish malice aforethought

When the appeal was called on for hearing, the appellant was represented by Mr. Leonard Elias Magwayega, learned counsel, whereas the respondent Republic was represented by Ms. Monica Alex Hokororo, learned Principal State Attorney, assisted by Mses. Agma Aggrey Haule and Beatrice Timothy Mgumba, both learned State Attorneys. Upon taking the floor and before advancing his arguments in support of the appeal, Mr. Magwayega prayed to abandon the original memorandum of appeal and the supplementary memorandum of appeal initially lodged by the appellant. He then intimated that he would argue the grounds of appeal indicated above, starting with the second ground which touches on procedural irregularities. Submitting on that ground, Mr. Magwayega faulted the learned trial Judge to have relied on the appellant's cautioned statement (exhibit P3) which, according to him, was recorded out of time contrary to the mandatory requirement of section 51 (1) (a) and (b) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Chapter 20 of the Revised Laws (the CPA). To clarify, he referred us to page 50 of the record of appeal and argued that, according to the evidence of PW3, the appellant was arrested on 1s t November, 2020 at 17:00 hours but his statement was recorded on 2n d November, 2020 at 07:19 hours which was beyond the prescribed time 8

of four hours and no extension was sought and obtained to justify the delayed recording of the said statement. Pursuant to section 52 (1), (a) and (b) of the CPA, time can be extended to eight (8) hours and the accused must be informed. That, if the time extends to over eight (8) hours, a permission of a magistrate must be sought and not otherwise. That,.since that was not done, the omission had rendered the,said statement invalid subject to be expunged from the record. To support his proposition, he cited the cases of Adinardi Iddy Salim & Another v. Republic [2022] TZCA 9 and Joseph Shabani Mohamed Bay & 3 Others v. Republic [2017] TZCA 178. He then argued that, as exhibit P3 formed the basis of the appellant's conviction, then after being expunged the remaining evidence is insufficient to ground the appellant's conviction. Upon being referred to page 53 of the record of appeal where PW3 testified that they could not interrogate the appellant within the prescribed period because he was unconscious, although, he admitted to that fact, he still challenged the prosecution for failure to summon the doctor who attended the appellant and certified that he was well and fit for the interrogation. He equally challenged the prosecution for failure to tender the PF3 used at the hospital for the appellant's treatment. He

faulted the learned trial Judge for not drawing an adverse inference against the prosecution for the unexplained omission. As for the first and third grounds, Mr. Magwayega argued that the prosecution failed to prove the case against the appellant to the required standard because, among the three witnesses summoned, there was no witness who managed to testify that the appellant killed the deceased with malice aforethought. It was his argument that the appellant might have killed the deceased out of confusion after he was denied his conjugal rights. He added that, the deceased was the author of her own death because, even the weapon used at the scene of crime belonged to her and not the appellant In totality, Mr. Magwayega contended that, the prosecution had failed to prove malice aforethought on the part of the appellant. Based on his submission, he urged us to allow the.appeal and set the appellant at liberty. In response, Ms. Hokororo from the outset, declared the respondent's stance of opposing the appeal and intimated that, she would argue the grounds of appeal in the same manner proposed by her learned friend. Starting with the second ground, she contended that, although, the recording of the cautioned statement was delayed, reasons for the delay were sufficiently explained by PW3 including the 10

circumstances surrounding the arrestat of the appellant at the scene of crime. To amplify on this point, she referred us to pages 50 to 53 of the record of appeal where PW3 testified that, they could not interrogate the appellant within the prescribed period because, when he was arrested, on 1 s t November, 2020, he was unconscious and had to be taken to Bunda Hospital where he was admitted. That, on the 2n d November; 2020, at 05:00 , hours he, became conscious and his statement was recorded within time from 07:19 to 09:19 hours. To support her proposition, she cited the case of Juma Warioba Kisangure v. Republic [2025] 7ZCA 215. She also blamed Mr. Magwayega for raising this issue at this level; She argued that, the appellant and his advocate did not raise the said issue during the trial when exhibit P3 was admitted in evidence. It was her argument that, the act of Mr. Magweyega raising that issue at this stage, is nothing but an afterthought. On the failure by the prosecution to summon the medical doctor, she argued that, since in his own confession the appellant clearly narrated on how he was arrested and admitted at the hospital, there was no need to call the doctor and or to tender the PF3 as the appellant

himself was the best witnesses in this case. As such, Ms. Hokororo urged us to find that the second ground is devoid of merit. On the first and third grounds, she argued that, at the trial, the prosecution managed to prove the case against the appellant and established that the appellant attacked the deceased with malice aforethought due to the nature of weapon used, the amount of force he applied to injure the deceased and the part of the body where the harm was inflicted. To support her proposition, she cited the case of Enock Kipela v. Republic [1999] TZCA 39. She then added that, in convicting the appellant, the learned trial Judge relied on the evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW3 who were credible and reliable witnesses as found by the trial court. That, the evidence of these witnesses was supported by the appellant's confession contained in his cautioned statement in which he clearly narrated on how he killed the deceased with malice aforethought On that basis, she urged us to dismiss the appeal, in its entirety for lack of merit. In a brief rejoinder, Mr. Magweyega reiterated what he submitted earlier and insisted for the appeal to be allowed. Having duly considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties in the light of the record of appeal before us, the 12

main issue for our determination is whether the appellant killed the deceased with malice aforethought. We shall however, consider the grounds of appeal in the manner they have been argued by the learned counsel for the parties. However, before doing so, it is crucial to state that, this being the first appeal, it is in the form of a re-hearing, therefore the Court, has a duty to re-evaluate the entire evidence on record by reading it together and subjecting it to a critical scrutiny and if warranted arrive at its own conclusion of fact - see D.R. Pandya v. Republic [1957] EA 336 and Demeritus John @ Kajuli & 3 Others v. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 155 of 2013 (unreported). Starting with the second ground, upon a thorough perusal of the record of appeal, we agree with Ms. Hokororo that though, the appellant's cautioned statement was recorded beyond the prescribed time, reasons for the delay were sufficiently explained by PW3 as reflected at pages 49, 50 and 53 of the record of appeal in the following terms: "At the scene, we saw the dead body o f one female which had her neck cut by sharp object... The doctor remained with the dead body ; Others (myself Inclusive) had gone to a nearer 13

place where we saw the accused person by name o f Masunga who was naked (half-dressed below the knee), and his penis cut and hanging. .. FoUowing that situation, we had taken him to Bunda Hospital DDH. By that time, it was 17:00 hours. At the hospital he was admitted and put under guard.,.On the next day around 05:00 hours (i.e 2/11/2020) he was in recovery of his conscience...The doctors who were attending his health also certified well on his condition. I started recording his cautioned statement from 07:00 to 09:19 hours of 2/11/2020 . We could not interrogate him within 4 hours as he was unconscious." [Emphasis added]. Moreover, in his own words found at page 59 of the same record, the appellant testified that: "While at the farmf my wife said as we had not had sexual intercourse for a long time, she proposed that we do it there at the farm... Then, we went to the bush she had chosen . There she had undressed, but in the course of undressing a knife dropped off. I inquired, o f what use was the said knife. She replied that was for mango peeling. Soon thereafter, we started conjugation. After we had reached the second round, (the second ejaculation), my wife said she wanted to 14 i

dean me. In the course o f cleaning, as I had laid back down, I just noted serious pain on my penis . I got up sharply only to find that my penis has been injured by a knife cut In efforts of rescuing myself, the said knife chopped her neck...Thereafter, I was unconscious and later found myself at hospitaL.I had found my both testicles off. I have just remained with my penis which only functions as urinary pipe but no longer for conjugation [Emphasis added]. From the above excerpts, there is no doubts that the delay to record the appellant's statement was clearly explained and justified as required by section 52 (1), (a) and (b) of the CPA which provides that: 51 (1) For the purpose of this Act, the period available for interviewing a person who is in restraint in respect o f an offence is - (a) subject to paragraph (b), the basic period available for interviewing the person, that is to say, the period of four hours commencing at the time when he was taken under restraint in respect o f the offence; (b) where the basic period available for interviewing the person is extended under section 52, the basic period as so extended. (2) In calculating a period available for interviewing a person who is under 15

restraint in respect of an offence, there shafi not be reckoned as part of that period any time while the police officer investigating the offence refrains from interviewing the person, or causing the person to do any act connected with the investigation of the offence- (a) while the person is, after being taken under restraint, being conveyed to a police station or other place for any purpose connected with the investigation" [Emphasis added]. See also our previous decisions in Juma Warioba Kisangure (supra) and Juma Omary Kibwana Msabila & 2 Others v. Republic [2025] TZCA 731. In terms of the above cited position and the account given by PW3 and the appellant's himself, we are satisfied that the delay to record his statement was justified. We thus find no justification to fault the finding of the learned trial Judge on that aspect. We therefore find the second ground devoid of merit. Having disposed of the above complaint on the procedural irregularity, we now move to deal with the issue as to whether the prosecution case was proved beyond reasonable doubt. As intimated 16

above, there is no doubt that the deceased died an unnatural death. It is also clear to us that, the evidence proving that it was the appellant who caused the death of the deceased came first, from the preliminary hearing where the appellant categorically pleaded at page 33 of the record of appeal that: "7F is true that I killed her without malice, "Again, in his cautioned statement, the appellant admitted that he killed his wife. For the sake of clarity, we find it apposite to reproduce the relevant part in his cautioned statement found at pages 82 to 84 of the record of appeal, that: 1 1 Tarehe 1/11/2020 muda was aa 07:00 asubuhi niliamka kama kawaida na kumsalimia mama mkwe wangu na watoto, ndipo mke wangu akaja na kusalimiana naye. Na yeye kuchukua jembe na kwenda shambani kupalilia mahindi. Siku zote huwa ananiambia twende iakini siku hiyo hakuniambia ndipo nilimfuata kwa nyuma yeye mbeie mimi nyuma huku nikiwa na jembe. Ndipo ghafla akageuka na kurudi nyumbani Nikamuuliza mbona unarudi? Akasema nisubiri naenda kuchukua kisu Hi tukang'oe mihogo wakati tunapafilia mahindi tuwe tunatafuna mihogo. Ndipo aiirudi na kuchukua na kufika shambani na kula wote mihogo na kile kisu atichokuwa nacho mke wangu akanikabidhi nakuwa nacho mimi mfukoni kwani ni kisu kidogo 17

tu chenye mpini wa mti...Wakati napaiiiia nikamwambia mke wangu, jana ulinitelekeza na kondom zangu na ninazo hapa mfukoni. Akaniambia tupalilie tukifikisha eneo tufflopanga kupa!ilia tunaenda kufanya mapenzi feo usiwe na wasiwasi mme wangu . Tuiipomaiiza kuiima ndipo tuiiingia kwenye vichaka watu wasituone...Akavua chupi yote akabaki na gauhi la juu...akatandika khanga yake na mimi nikavua surua/i yote Ha pensi ya ndani sikuvua yote, na kuvaa kondom na kufanya naye tendo fa ndoa mara moja . Ndipo niiivaa kondom nyingine Hi niendeiee kufanya mapenzi ndipo mke wangu aiikataa...niiipata hasira ambazo sikufahamu zimetokea wapi. Nikawaza ameuza vitu, nimemtumia pesa kwa roho safi ieo ananinyanyasa kwa kiasi hiki na ananifanyia matendo haya. Ndipo iiiichukua kisu na kumkamata mikono yake yote nikambana koo lake na kulegea kabisa. Alipo/egea ndipo niiichukua kisu na kumchinja kabisa shingoni na kufa muda sio mrefu. Ndipo niiipoona kuwa sasa nimeua, ndipo niiipochukua kisu hicho hicho na kujikata mapumbu yangu kwa 18

lengo la kujiua lakini sikufanikiwa kufa..." [Emphasis added]. In his impugned judgment, the learned trial Judge considered the above confession at length and found an established fact that the appellant killed the deceased with malice aforethought. Section 200 of the Penal Code provides for circumstances under which malice aforethought can be inferred. It reads: "Malice aforethought shall be deemed to be established by evidence proving any one or more of the following circumstances; a) an intention to cause the death of or to do grievous harm to any person, whether that person is the person actually killed or not; b) knowledge that the act or omission causing death will probably cause the death o f or grievous harm to some person , whether that person is the person actually killed or not, although that knowledge is accompanied by indifference whether death or grievous bodily harm is caused or not, or by a wish that it may not be caused; c) an intent to commit an offence punishable with a penalty which is graver than imprisonment for three years; or d) an intention by the act or omission to facilitate the flight or escape from custody o f any person

who has committed or attempted to commit an offence." In several occasions, this Court has pronounced itself on the applicability of the above provision. See for instance the cases of Enock Kipela (supra) and Ibrahimu Dawa v. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 260 of 2016 (unreported). Specifically, in the former case, the Court listed some of the circumstances which shall, in law, manifest malice aforethought:

1. the type and size of the weapon, if any, used in the attack;
2. the amount of force appiied in the assault;
3. the part or parts of the body the blow or blows were directed at or inflicted on;
4. the number of blows, although one blow may, depending upon the facts of the particular case, be sufficient for this purpose;
5. the kind o f injuries inflicted;
6. the attacker's utterances, if any, made before, during or after the killing; and
7. the conduct o f the attacker before and after the killing." In the instant appeal, the utterances by the appellant before the killing, the part of the deceased's body he inflicted, the amount of force he applied in the assault together with the kind of injuries he inflicted by 20

slashing the neck of the deceased manifested an intention to kill which, in our view, amounts to malice aforethought within the meaning of section 200 of the Penal Code as correctly found by the learned trial Judge. We are mindful of the fact that, in his submission, Mr. Magwayega argued that, the deceased was the author of her own death because the knife used by the appellant to kill her at the scene belonged to her and not the appellant. While we agree with Mr. Magwayega that, according to the evidence of PW1 and the appellant's confession, the deceased was the one who carried the said knife to the farm, in that morning, for purposes of peeling mangoes and or cassava for the two to enjoy at the farm. However, the appellant, in his own words, he later on took the said knife from the deceased and kept it in his trousers' pocket. Subsequently, after having enjoyed the conjugation for the first-round show and denied the second one, he used the same knife to kill the deceased by starting with strangulation of her neck and upon seeing that she was weak and helpless, he slashed her neck to death. In the circumstances, Mr. Magweyega tried to convince us that the defence of provocation was available to the appellant as he may have killed because of denial of his conjugal rights. With profound respect, we 21

are unable to agree with Mr. Magweyega on this aspect. Provocation as a defence is provided for under section 201 of the Penal Code, which states that: "When a person who unlawfully kills another under circumstances which, but for the provisions o f this section would constitute murder, does the act which causes death in the heat o f passion caused by sudden provocation as defined in section 202, and before there is time for his passion to cooi, he is guilty o f manslaughter only ," In addition, section 202 defines the term "provocation to mean: "...any wrongful act or insult of such a nature as to be likely, when done to an ordinary person, or in the presence of an ordinary person to another who is under his immediate care or to whom he stands in a conjugal, parental, filial or fraternal relation or in the relation of master or servant, to deprive him o f the power o f self-control and to induce him to commit an assault of the kind which the person charged committed upon the person by whom the act or insult is done or offered ." In terms of the above provisions, the defence of provocation can only sail through once the court is satisfied that the words uttered or the

conduct demonstrated by the deceased were provocative to an ordinary person of the community to which the appellant belonged. See for instance, the cases of Moses Mungasiani Laizer Alias Chichi v. Republic [1994] TLR 222, Nyakua Orondo v. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 141 of 2002 (unreported) and Saidi Kigodi @ Side v. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 281 of 2009 [2011] TZCA 137: [1. July 2011: TanzLII]. In the latter case, this Court held that: "We are o f the firm view that the defence of provocation is available to a suspect who kills at a spur o f the moment, in the heat o f passion before he has time to cool down ." Now, in the instant appeal, we have carefully considered the entire evidence on record, together with the circumstances surrounding the appeal like, the events which occurred before the incident, and specifically, on how the appellant and the deceased went to the farm together, cultivated and enjoyed the cassava and finally the conjugation where they went and enjoyed the first-round show till to the end. From all these, we fail to find that there were words uttered or conducts demonstrated by the deceased which were provocative to the appellant, at that moment, to the extent of being killed. We equally find the words uttered by the appellant in his confession referring to their long-time 23

conflicts and the processes he used to kill his wife, unfit for the said defence. In Jacob Asegelile Kakune v. The Director of Public Prosecutions, Criminal Appeal No. 178 of 2017 [2020] TZCA 75: [24 March 2020: TanzLII] when faced with an akin situation, where the appellant referred to a long-standing conflict, we stated that: "...for provocation to be a defence it is not enough for one to cite a iong existing conflict or provocation as it has been done in this case ; because that will not suffice if there is no last and sudden act ofprovocation ." See also our decisions in Said Kigodi @ Side (supra), Rutu Qamara @ Qares v. Republic [2021] TZCA 732 and John Daniel Munda v. The Director of Public Prosecutions [2023] TZCA 17510. With profound respect, and following the Court's reasoning in the above cited cases, we find the submission by Mr. Magweyega on this matter an afterthought. On that basis, we also find the first and third grounds of appeal devoid of merit. Consequently, and looking at the totality of the evidence, we entertain no doubt that with the available evidence, the trial court adequately evaluated the evidence adduced before it and correctly held

that the case against the appellant was proved beyond reasonable doubt. For the foregoing reasons, we find the appeal devoid of merit and hereby dismiss it in its entirety. DATED at MUSOMA this 3r d day of October, 2025. R. J. KEREFU JUSTICE OF APPEAL A. M. MWAMPASHI JUSTICE OF APPEAL U. J. AGATHO JUSTICE OF APPEAL Judgment delivered this 6th day of October, 2025 in the presence of the Appellant in person and Mr. Jonas Samwel Kivuyo, learned State Attorney for the Respondent/Republic, Shabani Kinyai, Court Clerk; is hereby certified as a true copy of the original. 25