Ferdinand Sanga vs Titho Mwinuka (Civil Application No. 561/13 of 2024) [2025] TZCA 957 (11 September 2025)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT DODOMA CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 561/13 OF 2024 FERDINAND SANGA...................................................................... APPLICANT VERSUS TITHO MWINUKA...................................................................... RESPONDENT (Application for Extension of Time to apply for Revision against the decision of the High Court of Tanzania at Iringa) (Kalunde, 3.1 dated the 13th day of October, 2022 in Misc. Land Application No. 31 of 2021 RULING 8th & 11th September, 2025 MANSOOR. J.A.: By a Notice of Motion filed under the provisions of Rule 10 of the Tanzania Court of Appeal Rules, 2009 (the Rules), the applicant, Ferdinand Sanga, seeks an order for extension of time to apply for revision against the decision of the High Court of Tanzania at Iringa, delivered on 13th October, 2022 by Hon. Kalunde, 1 in Misc. Land Application No. 31 of 2021. The application is supported by the affidavit of the applicant himself, sworn on 15th April 2024. The respondent's whereabouts were unknown and this necessitated service to him through publication in the Mwananchi Newspaper on 3rd September 2025. Despite the service, the respondent i

did not surface, as a result, the hearing of the application proceeded ex parte under Rule 63(2) of the Rules. Briefly, the dispute originates from Land Application No. 13 of 2018 in the District Land and Housing Tribunal of Njombe (the Tribunal), whose judgment was delivered on 14th April 2021 in favour of the respondent. Aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal, the applicant intended to appeal and had requested for copies of judgment, decree, and proceedings from the Tribunal and these were supplied on 7th June 2021. By the time the applicant received the documents, he was already out of time, thus he filed in the High Court, Land Application No. 15 of 2021, applying for extension of time within which to file the appeal out of time. The application before the High Court was dismissed as the court found that the applicant had failed to provide proof that he indeed applied for copies of proceedings at the Tribunal as he did not furnish to the court the relevant letter. The applicant filed Misc. Land Application No. 31 of 2021, for review as he was adamant that the letter was already filed and available on record. The application for review was dismissed on 13th October 2022. After the application for review was dismissed, the applicant lodged Civil Application No. 397/13 of 2022, which is an application for revision.

That application was struck out on 15th March 2024 as the High Court proceedings on the review were not attached to the application. Still adamant to pursue for revision, the applicant now seeks for extension of time to file a fresh application for revision, as the 60-days period prescribed under Rule 65(4) of the Rules has lapsed. In his affidavit in support of the application, the applicant accounts for the delay as follows: The period from 16th to 22n d March 2024 was spent waiting and making follow ups for obtaining the Court's order in relation to Civil Application No. 397/13 of 2022. From 22n d to 25th March 2024, his advocate, Mr. Moses Ambindwile, attempted to contact him unsuccessfully due to phone defects. From 25th to 28th March 2024, he consulted his counsel for preparation and filing of the present application. 29th March to 1s t April 2024 were public holidays (Good Friday, Easter Saturday, Easter Sunday, and Easter Monday). The applicant accounts the dates from 2n d to 9th April 2024 and 12th to 15th April 2024, as the days spent by his counsel for preparation of the present application. That 10th and 11th April 2024 were also public holidays (Eid al-Fitr) and 13th-14th April 2024 was a weekend. The application proceeded for hearing in the absence of the respondent, and on behalf of the applicant Mr. Moses Ambindwile, learned

advocate adopted the affidavit in support of the motion and had submitted that he had filed the application for revision on time, but due to technicalities, the application was dismissed. He submits further that he could not contact the applicant as the applicant's phone had some defects and had spent most of the days in consultation and preparation of the present application. He buttressed his arguments relying on the case of Fortunatus Masha vs William Shija and Another [1997] TLR 154 (CA), emphasizing that where an application is struck out on technical grounds and the applicant has accounted for each day of delay, sufficient cause is established. He prayed for the Court to grant the extension, allowing the applicant to pursue the application for revision on the merits. Having considered the application, the supporting affidavit, the annexures, and the submissions made by the learned counsel, I shall determine whether there was a sufficient cause to warrant the Court to exercise its discretion provided under Rule 10 of the Rules. Rule 10 of the Rules empowers this Court to extend the time prescribed by the Rules or by any decision of the Court for doing any act, upon showing sufficient cause. The provision is couched in wide terms, reflecting the Court's inherent jurisdiction to prevent injustice or abuse of process. The principal question for determination is whether the applicant

has established "sufficient reason" for the delay in filing the intended revision. This question lies at the heart of any application for extension of time under Rule 10 of the Rules. The provision bestows upon this Court an unfettered discretionary power to extend time, provided that the applicant demonstrates a sufficient reason for the delay. The term "sufficient reason" has been a subject of extensive interpretation by this Court. It has been held in a plethora of cases that what constitutes "sufficient reason" depends on the unique circumstances of each case. In the case of Philimon Mang'ehe t/a Bukine TRAders vs Gesbo Hebron Bajuta (Civil Application No. 8 of 2016) [2016] TZCA 577 (20 October 2016), this Court held that: " Black's Law Dictionary (Ninth Edition) defines good cause as legally sufficient reason. The term good cause is a relative one and is dependent upon the prevailing circumstances o f each case. There are no hard and fast rules to what can constitute good cause." In the instant case, the delay in filing the fresh application for revision stems from the striking out of the previous one on 15th March 2024. The applicant has meticulously accounted for each day thereafter,

demonstrating diligence in pursuing the matter. The period immediately following the striking out was used to obtain the Court's order, a necessary step before proceeding further. Moreover, the intervention of public holidays and weekends, as detailed in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the affidavit, constitutes valid excuses. This Court has consistently recognized such factors as contributing to sufficient cause. For instance, in Mechmar Corporation (Malaysia) Berhard vs VIP Engineering and Marketing Ltd (Civil Application No. 9 of 2011) [2011] TZCA 490 (8 June 2011), the Court held that; "It has to be born in mind that during court vacation days the Court registries are open for service. It is only during Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays where court registries are dosed, hence a party can not be able to file his/her documents. We do not think that it was ever intended that all court vacation days be excluded from the computation of the period provided for in the Rules." 6

See also ACCESS Bank Tanzania Limited & Another vs Thobias John Mwacha (Civil Application No. 24 of 2023) [2024] TZCA 547 (11 July 2024) and Costantine Victor John vs Muhimbili National Hospital (Civi! Application 188 of 2021) [2022] TZCA 646 (24 October 2022 ) The technical nature of the defect that led to the striking out of the previous revision application also weighs in the applicant's favour. As submitted, the missing documents (High Court proceedings) rendered the application incompetent, but this was not due to the fault on the applicant’s part. In Fortunatus Masha vs William Shija and Another [1997] TLR 154 (CA), this Court underscored that striking out on technicalities should not bar a party from re-filing if good cause is shown, particularly in land disputes where substantive rights are at stake. This Court in the case of Ali Abdallah Abdi vs Selemani Said Marshed (Civil Application No. 794/17 of 2023) [2025] TZCA 570 (6 June 2025), my learned brother, Justice Mdemu held that; "As slotted during the factual background, the sole ground calling for the exercise of that discretion is the technical delay. I understand that technical delay, if proved, is a sufficient cause to enlarge time

as was held in Fortunatus Masha v. William Shija and Another [1997] T.L.R. 154." The applicant's case, as supported by the affidavit and the proceedings, hinges on the fact that his previous application was struck out on a technicality. This Court has consistently heid that where a previous application or appeal has been struck out on a technicality, the time taken to re-file may be excused. The rationale behind this position is that the applicant has demonstrated a clear intention to prosecute his case and has done so diligently, only to be thwarted by a procedural irregularity. This is fundamentally different from a situation where an application is dismissed on the merits or due to a litigant's sheer negligence. The applicant has indeed shown that he has not been sleeping on his rights. See Samwel Kobelo Muhulo vs National Housing Corporation (Civil Application No. 302/17/2017) [2018] TZCA 957 (24 July 2018) and Swalehe Juma Sangawe & Another vs Hussein Ally Sangawe (Civil Application No. 1374 of 2025) [2025] TZCA 925 (3 September 2025). I am mindful that the respondent has not opposed the application, having failed to appear despite service. While this does not automatically entitle the applicant to relief, it indicates no demonstrable prejudice would 8

arise from granting the extension. The underlying dispute concerns land rights, a matter of significant importance under Article 24 of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977, which protects the right to property. Denying the extension would perpetuate potential injustice, as the applicant alleges errors in the High Court's handling of the review, including failure to consider evidence of the record of the Tribunal. Based on the foregoing analysis, I am satisfied that the applicant has established sufficient reason for the delay. The previous application having been struck out on a technicality is, in the eyes of this Court, a compelling reason for the delay. The applicant's diligence in accounting for the delay also weighs heavily in his favour. The overriding objectives of the law mandate that this Court should not shut out the applicant from pursuing his right to be heard on the merits of his case. In the final analysis, I find that the applicant has satisfied all the legal requirements for this application to be granted. It is clear that the ends of justice would be better served by granting this application and allowing the applicant to pursue his intended revision. The application is therefore meritorious and is hereby granted. The applicant is granted a period of thirty (30) days from the date of this ruling to file his application

for revision against the decision of the High Court of Tanzania at Iringa in Misc. Land Application No. 31 of 2021. As the hearing was held ex-parte, I make no order as to costs. DATED at DODOMA this 11th day of September, 2025. L. A. MANSOOR JUSTICE OF APPEAL The Ruling delivered this 11th day of September, 2025 in the presence of Mr. Moses Ambindwile, learned counsel for the Applicant, and Mr. Elias Nkwabi, Court Clerk in the absence of Mr. Titho Mwinuka the Respondent via virtual Court is hereby certified as a true copy of the original. 10