Mwananchi Communications Limited vs Richard Mgamba & Another (Civil Appeal No. 43 of 2023) [2025] TZCA 904 (29 August 2025)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT PAR ES SALAAM (CORAM: NDIKA. J.A.. KENTE. J.A.. And MANSOOR. J.A.^ CIVIL APPEAL NO. 43 OF 2023 MWANANCHI COMMUNICATIONS LIMITED ............ . ............ . APPELLANT VERSUS RICHARD MGAMBA ............................ ...................... FIRST RESPONDENT KLARE KILEO ......................................................... SECOND RESPONDENT (Appeal from the Judgment and Decree of the High Court of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam) (Mgonva, J.) dated the 10th day of June, 2022 in Civil Case No. 206 of 2017 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 22n d July & 29th August, 2025 NDIKA. 3.A.: Richard Mgamba and Klare Kileo, the first and second respondents, respectively, initiated an action for libel against the appellant, Mwananchi Communications Limited, in the High Court of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam ("the trial court"). Having lost the case, the appellant appeals to this Court on nine grounds of grievance. It is imperative to establish the context of this appeal. The appellant is a prominent media organisation in the nation. It is responsible for the publication and circulation of Kiswahili and English newspapers, which

include a local daily newspaper known as Mwananchi. The first respondent was employed by the appellant as a news editor from July 2013 to June 2015, while the second respondent served as the Debt Collection Manager from 2010 to 2012. The respondents obtained interest-free loans from their employer to purchase vehicles during their employment following the execution of the respective staff loan agreements (exhibit D2). The first respondent was granted a loan of TZS 22,000,000.00, while the second respondent received a loan of TZS 12,500,000.00. The former was required to repay the debt in forty-eight monthly instalments that could be extracted from his salary, whereas the latter was required to repay the loan through thirty-six monthly deductions from her salary. The appellant retained the original registration cards of the vehicles as security for the loan and had the right to seize and sell the cars in the event of default. It is definite that on the 18th August 2017 issue of the Mwananchi\ the appellant published a notice in Kiswahili captioned "Wanatafutwa" with the names and photographs of the respondents below it. The notice was couched as follows: " Watajwa hapo juu wanatafutwa na Kampuni ya Mwananchi Communications Ltd. Kwa yoyote mwenye taarifa nao au atakayewaona watu hawa

atoe taarifa kwenye ofisi za Mwananchi Communications Ltd zffizopo Tabata Reiini, Dar es Safaam au apige simu namba 0757433980." The English rendering of the above notice is as follows: "Mwananchi Communications Ltd. is searching for the above-named individuals. Anyone with information or who happen to see them should report them to the Mwananchi Communications Ltd offices iocated at Tabata Reiini, Dar es Saiaam or call 0757433980." The appellant published a further notice in the same newspaper on 21s t August 2017, with the title "Notisi Kwa Wadaiwa Sugu Waiiokopa M w ananchi meaning "Notice to Delinquent Debtors who Borrowed Money from Mwananchi." This notice too included the names and photographs of the respondents beneath it: "Kutokana na NOUSI iliyotolewa mwezi Machi 2017 na Gazeti fa Mwananchi na The Citizen, Kampuni ya Mwananchi Communications Ltd imeamua kuchapisha majina na picha za wadaiwa sugu waiiokopa na hawajalipa madeni yao hata baada ya notisi ya mwezi Machi. Hivyo, watajwa hapo juu wanatakiwa kufika ofisi za Mwananchi Communications Ltd zilizopo Tabata Reiini. Kushindwa kufanya hivyo kutachukuiiwa kuwa ni

kuipa ridhaa Kampuni ya Mwananchi Communications Ltd kuchukua hatua za kisheria. Ufafanuzi: Ijumaa tarehe 18/8/2017 tutitoa tangazo kuwa watajwa hapo juu wanatafutwa. Maelezo sahihi ni yaliyopo hapo juu. Kwa mawasHiano zaidi wapige s/mu Na. 0757433980." The preceding is equivalent to the following in English: " Following a NOTICE issued in March 2017 by the Mwananchi newspaper and The Citizen , Mwananchi Communications Ltd has decided to publish the names and photographs o f defaulters who have not paid their debts even after the March notice. Accordingly, the above- mentioned persons are required to report to the offices o f Mwananchi Communications Ltd located at Tabata Refini. Failure to do so will be deemed as consenting to Mwananchi Communications Ltd taking legal action. Ciarification: On Friday 18/8/2017 we issued a notice that the above-mentioned persons are being searched for. The correct details are as given above. For further information , they should call No. 0757433980 ."

The respondents filed a lawsuit against the appellant after being offended by the two advertisements, claiming that the notices were defamatory. Regarding the first notice, it was asserted that it implied that they were fugitive criminals wanted for undisclosed crimes and that they could not be located by the traditional methods. It was claimed that the second advertisement indicated that the respondents were delinquent loan defaulters. They were individuals who were dishonest and untrustworthy, failing to fulfil their obligations or keep their word. Both respondents maintained that the release of the information and photographs to enforce debt repayment was neither lawful nor contractual, even though the second respondent admitted to owing the appellant TZS 6,200,000.00 at the time she resigned from her employment. They asserted that the appellant could find their contacts or whereabouts. Because of the publications, they had lost both their personal and professional reputations, and the right-thinking members of society viewed them with disdain and derision. The respondents, therefore, prayed for judgment and decree on the following reliefs: one, an order for retraction of the advertisements. Two, an order for unconditional apology in the same newspaper and in the same manner the notices were made. Three, an order of permanent

injunction restraining the appellant from repeating similar or making any other publications as those sued on regarding the respondents. Four, a declaration that the respondents' outstanding loan amounts (if any) with the appellant are fully discharged because of the appellant's intentional and malicious actions. Five/ an order of permanent injunction restraining the appellant from initiating any recovery measures against the respondents for any outstanding amount that may be due and owing to the appellant. Six, payment of general damages to each respondent in an amount to be assessed by the court. Seven, payment of exemplary damages to be assessed by the court. Eight, interest on the assessed damages at the court rate of 12% per annum from the date of judgment till full and final payment. Nine, costs of the suit and interest thereon at the court rate of 12% from the date of the suit until full and final payment. The appellant, having acknowledged the publication of the contested notices, vehemently refuted their defamatory nature in its written statement of defence. It asserted that the notices were warranted and not issued with malice. Its efforts aimed to search for the respondents who were indebted to it, whose whereabouts were unknown at the material time, and all other methods to find them had been exhausted. Consequently, the appellant moved for the dismissal of the suit with costs. 6

The trial advanced according to three issues formulated by the court with the consent of the parties:

1. Whether the contested publications were defamatory.
2. I f the preceding question is affirmed, whether the publications werejustified.
3. What remedies are the parties entitled to? The first and second respondents provided testimony in support of their combined claim as PW2 and PW1, respectively. To prop up their case, they presented two witnesses: PW3 Brown John Nzimba, a former aeronautical engineer, and PW4 Dennis Busulwa Ssebo, a media personality. Both referenced their acquaintance with the respondents as individuals of impeccable character and reputation. Conversely, the appellant relied on the testimony of its Human Resources Manager, Aika Ebeneza Massawe (DW1). She testified that the advertisements targeting absconding loan defaulters were entirely warranted. The trial court found that the notices were defamatory and unjustified, determining against the appellant on the first and second issues. In response to the third issue, the court rendered judgment and decree in favour of the respondents, which included: one, directing the appellant to publish an unqualified apology in the same newspaper and in the same format as the notices. Two, a permanent injunction prohibiting

the appellant or its agents from making any publications about the respondents that are comparable to or like those complained of. Three, an award of general damages to the first and second respondents in the amounts of TZS 350,000,000.00 and TZS 250,000,000.00, respectively. Four, interest on the decretal sum was to be paid at the rate of 7% annually from the judgment date until full payment. Lastly, an award of costs of the lawsuit. Displeased with the above result, the appellant appealed to this Court on nine grounds but pursued just six of them. Three key concerns arise from the argued grounds;

1. Whether the publications were defamatory.
2. I f defamatory, whether the publications werejustified.
3. Whether the respondents were entitled to general damages and in what quantum. Mr. Ambrose Nkwera, learned counsel, represented the appellant in the appeal. Mr. Michael IT. Ngalo, learned counsel for the respondents, vigorously opposed the appeal. We will begin with the first issue mentioned earlier. The core of Mr. Nkwera's submission regarding the current issue was his insistence that the advertisements in question were not defamatory. The respondents were not implicated in any criminal activities solely because the 8

advertisements suggested that the appellant was searching for them. The respondents were merely listed as individuals who had owed money to the appellant for an extended period. He maintained that the appellant published the advertisements to compel repayment of the outstanding loan. It is necessary to interpose and observe that, the learned counsel deviated from the intended course of action during his submission, as he confounded the question at hand with the content of the advertisements as the truth. As we shall demonstrate later in this judgment, the defamatory meaning of a statement is separate from its truthfulness. Mr. Ngalo strongly disagreed with his learned friend. He contended that the initial advertisement implied that the respondents were fugitive individuals that the appellant was searching for an undisclosed offence, while the subsequent notice was explicit that they were delinquent loan defaulters. Consequently, they were untrustworthy and dishonest. And that they were individuals who were incapable of adhering to their obligations or fulfilling their promises. Section 35 (1) of the Media Services Act, 2016 ("the Act'7 ) defines the phrase "defamatory matter" to mean "any matter whichf if published, is likely to injure the reputation o f any person by exposing him to hatred, 9

contempt or ridicule, or likely to damage any person in his profession or trade by an injury to his reputation." In Felix Gamaliel Mosha v. Editor, Citizen Newspaper & Another [2024] TZCA 460, we stated that the above definition encapsulates the common law definition of defamation as quoted from the (earned authors Edwin Peel and James Goudkamp in Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, 19th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2014, in Para. 13-002 thus: "It has been said that a statement is defamatory if it tends to bring a person into ' hatred, contempt or ridicule'. Another frequently quoted test is that the words must tend to lower the claimant in the estimation o f right-thinking members o f society generally. But to these definitions it is necessary to at least add that words may be defamatory if they tend to cause the claimant to be shunned or avoided...." See also Hamza Byarushengo v. Fulgencia Manya & 4 Others [2022] TZCA 207 where we quoted with approval a similar definition provided by the Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. 28, 4th Edition. As indicated earlier, in determining whether a statement is defamatory in the first place, the issue of truth is irrelevant. In this sense, 10

we excerpted in Felix Gamaliel Mosha {supra) a passage from Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, {supra) (in Para. 13-006) as follows: "Truth is normally a complete defence to an action for defamation. [..] But the issue of whether a statement is true is separate from the question of whether the statement is defamatory, which looks soieiy to the effect o f the statement upon the claimant's reputation."[ Emphasis added] To be sure, section 36 of the Act is pertinent in resolving whether a publication complained of amounts to libel. It provides as follows: "36. -(1) A person shall be deemed to make publication o f a libel if that person causes the print, writing, painting, effigy or other means by which the defamatory matter is conveyed, to be dealt with, either by exhibition, reading, recitation, description, delivery or otherwise, in a way that the defamatory meaning thereof becomes known or is likely to be known to either the person defamed or any other person. (2) It shall not be necessary for defamation that the defamatory meaning is directly or completely expressed. (3) For the purpose o f subsection (2), it shall be sufficient that such meaning and its i i

application to the person alleged to be defamed may be collected either from the alleged libel itself or from any extrinsic circumstances or partly from the one and partly from the other means." [Emphasis added] We find it instructive, at this point, to quote from Felix Gamaliel Mosha {supra) what this Court held to be the import of section 36 (2) and (3) above: "Although subsection (2) above acknowledges that the meaning o f an aiieged libellous publication may or may not be directly or completely expressed in the publication in question, subsection (3) clarifies that the meaning o f such a publication and its application to the person alleged to be defamed may be derived from the alleged libel itself, any extrinsic circumstances, or a combination o f the two. " [Emphasis added] Briefly, a publication may amount to defamation under section 36(3) of the Act if it is disparaging because of the publication itself (ex facie) or any extrinsic circumstances, or a combination of the two. In the present instance, the respondents contended that the publications in question were defamatory by their very natural and ordinary meaning. They made 12

no claims of extrinsic circumstances that would have given the notices a defamatory context. In light of the foregoing, we now examine the first advertisement. It was a public announcement indicating that the appellant was searching for the respondents. The appellant issued a public appeal for information that would lead to the respondents' location. It is evident that the advertisement did not specify the reason for the desire to locate them, nor did it indicate that the issue was related to the previous employment relationship between the appellants and the respondents. Considering these circumstances, we are of the opinion that any fair-minded reader of the notice would perceive the respondents as fugitives on the run, potentially searched for suspected criminal activity. The second advertisement is equally objectionable ex facie. In our view, any impartial reader of the notice would hold the respondents as dishonest and untrustworthy; that being delinquent loan defaulters they were individuals who could not keep their word or fulfil their commitments. The combined effect of the publications was evidently defamatory of the respondents as they directly questioned their professional and personal reputations. 13

We now address the issue of whether the publications were justified. Certainly, section 37 (a) of the Act offers the defence of "truth/' which is also referred to as "justification" in common law, against defamation. It is stipulated that a defamatory publication is not unlawful if it is true and is meant to benefit the public: "37. Publication o f defamatory matter concerning a person shall be unlawful within the meaning o f this Part, unless- (a) the matter is true and it was for the public benefit that it is published." The burden of proof in a defamation action is on the defendant to establish the defence of truth on a preponderance of probabilities. Nevertheless, it is crucial to bear in mind that the law requires the defendant to prove that the defamatory imputations in the publication in question are essentially accurate. In Para. 13-044 of Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (supra), the authors assert that, in fulfilling his burden of proof: '[t]he defendant need not show that the statement is precisely true in every particular: what matters is whether it is substantially true and it has been said that journalists 14

'need to be permitted a degree of exaggeration even in the context of factual assertions'. Subject to that, it is a general principle that the defence must be as broad as the charge, and must cover the precise charge." [Emphasis added] At first, the amount of money the first respondent owed the appellant upon resigning from his position was unclear. However, he acknowledged in his testimony that the District Court of Kinondoni ruled against him in a lawsuit lodged by the appellant. It set the outstanding debt at TZS 800,000.00. For her part, the secondrespondent contested the appellant's assertion that she owed TZS 11,214,064.00. Notwithstanding her contention in her testimony that the debt stood at TZS 6,000,000.00, the loan repayment agreement between her and the appellant (exhibit D2), executed on 19th July 2012 after her resignation, indicates her acknowledgement of an outstanding balance of TZS 11,214,064.00, which she committed to repay within seven months from the execution date of the agreement. We consider this documentary proof unassailable. Crucially, the second respondent presented no evidence of any attempt to settle the debt. Consequently, we find that both respondents were indisputably indebted to the appellant at the time the contested notices 15

were advertised. Given the respondents' default to repay their respective loans for the period ranging from two to five years, their portrayal in the impugned notices as delinquent debtors is true in substance Concerning the imputation that the respondents were untraceable, Mr. Nkwera asserted that the appellant disseminated the advertisements as a final measure and a sincere effort to locate them and compel repayment of the overdue loan. In contrast, Mr. Ngalo argued that the appellant did not establish that the respondents were unreachable and that it was unaware of their whereabouts. Upon examining the testimonies of the respondents, he contended that the appellant was cognisant of the first respondent's affiliation with The Guardian Limited, another prominent media organisation, following his resignation, and that the second respondent had transitioned to The Double Tree Hotel and subsequently to Symbion Power Tanzania Limited. Furthermore, the appellant, as the former employer of the respondents, possessed their contact information—email addresses, postal addresses, telephone numbers, and residential addresses—but failed to send the contested notices to any of these addresses. He implored us to deem it false that the respondents were 16

untraceable following their resignation from employment with the appellant. During her testimony in chief, the appellant's only witness (DW1) first claimed that the adverts were a final measure to obtain information for locating the respondents after the appellant's Human Resources Office had reached out to them via their new employers. She elucidated that to contact the first respondent, they reached out to The Guardian Limited, whilst for the second respondent, they tracked her via The Double Tree Hotel and subsequently Symbion Power Tanzania Limited. Considering the first respondent's assertion that he was employed by The Guardian Limited until his resignation in October 2017, it is perplexing why the appellant issued the advertisements in August 2017, when the first respondent could have still been contacted via his employer. The identical inquiry pertains to the second respondent, who, after her relocation from Symbion Power Tanzania Limited, became affiliated with a Rwanda-based Symbion entity. Given her presence in Kigali when the notices were disseminated, we believe she could have been contacted via the Tanzania- based sister company. Furthermore, it is observed that DW1 made a general assertion regarding the alleged futile attempts to contact the respondents; 17

however, she did not explicitly specify if these attempts encompassed sending any notifications to the respondents via the contact addresses they provided. It appears that, following the debts remaining unsettled after the appellant's Human Resources Office reached out to the respondents via their new employers, the appellant decided to circulate their photographs and personal information to exert social pressure for repayment. This can be derived from DWl's testimony of the events that transpired after they contacted the respondents via their respective employers: "[TJhey did not pay. They were not only these two, but there were others who finally settled their debts. We even used debt collectors, but they were not successful. That is why it was decided to publish their pictures and indicate that we were looking for them through the Mwananchi... '"[Emphasis added] In our view, the above statement unequivocally indicates that the notices were not posted primarily due to the respondents being unavailable or untraceable. They were intended to coerce them into settling the delinquent loans by applying social pressure. Mr. Ngalo also emphasised that there was no contractual provision between the parties permitting the publication of their photographs and 18

personal information in a newspaper to recover the funds in the event of loan repayment default. We fully concur with him. In the same vein, we dismiss Mr. Nkwera's assertion that the provision in Clause 2 of the loan repayment agreement (exhibit D2) between the second respondent and the appellant, which grants the appellant the right "to collect the entire balance through their own means at the debtor's cost," permitted the appellant to use such publications. We do not believe that the stipulation is sufficiently explicit and comprehensive to encompass the practice of displaying a debtor's photograph and personal information publicly to shame them into repaying a loan. Ultimately, we hold that while the appellant has adequately demonstrated that the respondents were delinquent debtors who had defaulted on their obligations, it is implausible to claim that they were unavailable or untraceable, warranting their designation in the contested publications as wanted individuals. As previously stated, pursuant to section 37 (a) of the Act, it is not sufficient for the defendant to prove that a libellous publication was the truth. In addition to being substantially true, the publication must also be for the public benefit. So, the defence of truth must be considered in conjunction with public benefit. It is, therefore, instructive to ascertain in 19

this case, albeit briefly, whether the contested publications, assuming for the sake of argument that they were entirely accurate, were published for the public good. At this stage, it is imperative to enquire about the meaning or implications of the term "public benefit." Certainly, there is no universally accepted criterion for determining when a publication of a defamatory statement is for the public benefit or in the public interest. Judicial decisions on this matter in many jurisdictions have varied based on the specific facts and circumstances of each case - see, for example, a discussion by Kutner, P., in Truth in the Law o f Defamation, The Rabel Journal of Comparative and International Private Law, May 2023, Bd. 87, H.2 https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/48762134 accessed on 20th August 2025. In our opinion, the catchphrase "public benefit" in this context requires the trial court to ascertain whether the public would gain any benefit or advantage from the publication in question. This concept broadly encompasses "public interest," hence targeting publications that "concern the public"or those "in which the public has a vested interest" In this context, it is pertinent to cite the statement by Hefer J.A. in National Media Ltd v. Bogoshi 1998 4 SA 1195, a decision by the 20

Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa, which delineates public interest as "the material in which the public has an interest, as opposed to the material that is merely interesting to the public. "In London Artists Ltd. v. Littler [1969] 2 Q.B. 375, Lord Denning M.R. took the view that the "a matter of public interest" should not be confined within narrow limits. His Lordship elaborated, at page 391, that: Whenever a matter is such as to affect people at large, so that they may be legitimately interested in , or concerned at, what is going on; or what may happen to them or others; then it is matter o f public interest" In this case, it is inexplicable how the public benefited from the contested publications. The advertisements were primarily designed to coerce the respondents into settling their overdue loans. The default to repay the money was clearly a private indiscretion rather than a public wrongdoing. At that time, the appellant was aware that the respondents were gainfully engaged elsewhere and were not on the loose. Therefore, it was unnecessary to issue public warnings against interacting with them or granting them credit. Evidently, the public would not have had any benefit or advantage from being informed of the respondents' private indiscretions.

This case clearly contrasts with the decision of the New South Wales Supreme Court in Floyd v. Taylor (1861) Legge 1402. A newspaper advertisement declaring that the plaintiff had fled, leaving his creditors unpaid, was deemed beneficial to the public. The court recognised the necessity of cautioning against extending credit to an individual who had fled under such circumstances. The existence of a benefit to that segment of the public that could have extended credit to the plaintiff was found to be sufficient. Based on the foregoing discussion, we uphold the trial court's finding that the defence of justification and public benefit was not open to the appellant. The final issue requires us to evaluate and ascertain the tenability of the respondents' award of general damages. Firstly, it is established that general damages are compensatory in nature. In defamation cases, they are intended to provide the plaintiff with compensation for the loss of reputation, emotional distress, and other non-economic losses that were the result of defamation. The award is typically determined by a combination of factors: first, the impact of the defamatory imputations on the plaintiff's reputation. Secondly, the emotional distress and psychological repercussions that resulted from the 22

defamatory statement. Thirdly, damages for the loss of personal relationships or business opportunities because of the defamation. Fourthly, the context and nature of the defamation. In the same manner, learned author Vivienne Harpwood enumerates the following as significant considerations for assessing damages in Modern Tort Law, 7th Edition, Routledge-Cavendish, London, 2009, at page 397: "The seriousness o f the allegation. The breadth o f the circulation. Whether any financial losses were suffered by the claimant Whether the claimant suffered real and tangible injury to his or her reputation. The conduct o f the defendant (which might in serious cases lead to an award o f aggravated damages). Whether there was an element o f truth in what was said. Information provided to the jury by the judge about the level o f awards made in respect o fpain and suffering in persona / injury cases." Secondly, we are also aware that the trial court had the discretion to determine the quantum of general damages. Consequently, this Court as an appellate forum will not be justified in substituting a figure of its own for that awarded by the trial court unless it is satisfied that the court below applied an incorrect principle or misapprehended the evidence, 23

resulting in a figure that is either excessive or insignificant (see, for example, The Cooper Motor Corporation Ltd. v. Moshi/Arusha Occupational Health Services [1990] T.L.R. 96; and Stanbic Bank Tanzania Limited v. Abercrombie & Kent (T) Limited [2006] TZCA 7). In the present instance, the trial court awarded the first and second respondents general damages in the sums of TZS 350,000,000.00 and TZS 250,000,000.00, respectively, as previously mentioned. In determining the sum in favour of the first respondent, the trial court considered the fact that the first respondent was an internationally recognised investigative journalist who held senior positions at the appellant company and The Guardian Limited, and that at some point, he worked for Reuters, a British news agency and media organisation headquartered in London. The trial court noted that the second respondent was a person of exceptional character who excelled in various roles at the companies she worked for, both domestically and internationally. With respect, however, we take the view that the quantum awarded was not justified by the trial court's overly restrictive reasoning. We are also concerned about the discrepancy in the two awards. Why was the first respondent awarded a whooping TZS. 100,000,000.00 more than his co-plaintiff? The impugned judgment is silent on this matter. 24

At first, we are aware that the impugned notices were published in a newspaper with a broad circulation in the country. As previously mentioned, the notices aimed to coerce the respondents into settling the overdue debts. The evidence indicates that the publications garnered attention, as numerous relatives, friends, and acquaintances (including PW3 and PW4) contacted the respondents after reading the notices to express their apprehensions. The respondents' psychological and emotional distress was undeniable. We also observe that the appellant maintained its version of the story throughout the trial and declined to retract the notices or offer an apology. This behaviour lends credence to the assertion that the publications under scrutiny were venomous and vindictive. Conversely, there was no evidence that the respondents experienced any tangible losses. The defamatory imputations did not result in any job loss for any of them. The first respondent stated that he continued to work for The Guardian Limited after the notices were published untif October 2017, when he resigned his position of his own accord to pursue new personal endeavours. The second respondent, also, maintained her position in Kigali and subsequently relocated to Cape 25

Town, South Africa, to assume new responsibilities with another Symbion affiliate. Most importantly, this case highlights a concerning fact. Undoubtedly, the respondents were delinquent loan defaulters. The first respondent had an amount of TZS 800,000.00 that had been uncleared for more than two years at the time of the impugned publications, while the second respondent had a debt of TZS 11,214,064.00 that was five years old. This fact raises concerns regarding their character. We acknowledge that the purpose of the law of defamation is to safeguard the plaintiff's well-founded reputation or public image, rather than their character. However, it would be unjust in this case to award them general damages generously, despite their questionable character. We believe that the trial court's award was excessive considering all the aforementioned factors. The justice of the case demanded that each respondent be awarded general damages nominally in the amount of TZS. 20,000,000.00. Consequently, we reverse the trial court's decision to award general damages in the specified sums and instead award each respondent TZS 20,000,000.00. 26

In the end, we allow the appeal to the extent shown above and make no order as to costs. For avoidance of doubt, the other orders made by the trial court in the respondents' favour remain unaltered. DATED at DODOMA this 27th day of August, 2025. G. A. M. NDIKA JUSTICE OF APPEAL P. M. KENTE JUSTICE OF APPEAL L. A. MANSOOR JUSTICE OF APPEAL The Judgment delivered, via virtual Court, on this 29th day of August, 2025 in the presence of Mr. Ambrose Menance Nkwera, learned counsel for the Appellant, Mr. Safari Malata, learned counsel for the Respondent and Mr. Eliuter Ngolongoio, Court Clerk; is hereby certified as