Petro Uched Itagaw vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 81 of 2022) [2024] TZCA 1082 (8 November 2024)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT ARUSHA fCORAM: WAMBALI. J.A.. KENTE. 3.A. And MURUKE. J J U CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 81 OF 2022 PETRO UCHED ITAGAW................................................ APPELLANT VERSUS THE REPUBLIC ............................................................ RESPONDENT (Appeal from the decision of the High Court of Tanzania at Arusha) (Philip, 3 .^ Dated the 24th day of January, 2022 in Criminal Appeal No. 107 of 2019 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 21st October & 8th November, 2024 KENTE. J.A.: The appellant, Petro Uched Itagaw, was on 25th June, 2019 convicted by the District Court of Hanang of the offence of rape contrary to sections 130 (1), (2) (e) and 131 (1) of the Penal Code, Chapter 16 of Revised Laws. The particulars of the offence alleged that, on 24th June, 2018 at Molam Village, in Hanang District, Manyara Region, the appellant had sexual intercourse with a girl whose name we shall not disclose for purposes of protecting her social integrity. The said girl to whom we shall hereafter refer as either PW1 or the victim, was thirteen

years old at the time. Upon conviction, the trial court sentenced the appellant to the mandatory thirty years imprisonment. Before the trial court, the prosecution called four witnesses who testified against the appellant. PW1 was the complainant. Giving an account of the sequence of events that unfolded on the fateful day, she told the trial court that/during the morning hours, she was home and that, other members of the family had gone to church. She then heard knocks on the door to which she responded. Upon opening, the appellant who was their close neighbour, entered the house. PW1 recounted that, before entering, the appellant asked her if there was any other person close by, upon which she unsuspectingly told him she was all alone in the house as other members of the family had gone to church. The door was open when the appellant entered but, on being told that PW1 was all alone, he closed it and quickly advanced towards her obviously knowing well that she was very exposed. In an unexpected turn of events, having caught up with her, the appellant, while covering her mouth with a palm, he dragged her into her mother's bed room. After having pinned her down, he lay on her and, using one hand, he removed his trousers and ripped off her

underwear before he went on raping her. In the course of the forced sexual encounter, it emerged that PWl's brother one Anthony Herman (PW2) came back from the church only to find the appellant almost in flagrante delicto with PW1, leaving him (PW2) in awe. According to PW1, on hearing PW2 who was knocking the door, the appellant gave her one thousand shillings and pushed her under the bed apparently, to divert the attention of PW2. Having talked for a while to PW2 who was quite disturbed by his half-nakedness, the appellant left for his abode. It was immediately after the appellant had left that PW1 emerged from underneath the bed copiously weeping and asking her brother to help her. When the help came and on being informed of what the appellant had done to her, PW2 informed their neighbour one Joseph who in turn phoned their father. After receiving the information regarding his daughter's sexual abuse, the father gave instructions to PW2 and Joseph to take the victim to the Police Station where she was further referred to hospital for medical examination. Upon examination, she was confirmed to have been sexually abused. Immediately thereafter, the victim's father gave

information to the local leadership who, relying on that information, they went on to arrest the appellant. In cross-examination, PW1 testified that, she could not raise an alarm as the appellant had covered her mouth and ordered her to keep quiet, threatening to kill her if she revealed the sexual assault to anyone. PW3 was No. E. 2097 Detective Sergeant Isack. He told the trial court that, on 28th June, 2018, he was assigned a case concerning rape to investigate. Accordingly, he took the appellant from the police cell and interviewed him, but the appellant denied the charge saying that, indeed he had gone to the victim's residence on the material day for no more than to request for a small pot which he could use to fetch water from a deep well. On being found with a case to answer and subsequently put on his defence, the appellant had a version quite different from that of the prosecution. He testified that, on 24th June, 2018 he was accosted by the hamlet and chairman of the Village Council who informed him that he was suspected to have raped his neighbour's daughter, something

that he strongly denied. He was thereafter taken to Endasak Police Post where he found the victim's father who seemed to have arrived there much earlier. He rejected the accusations and characterized the charge levelled against him as a frame up because of the long-standing feud between him and the victim's father whom he accused of encroaching on his land sparking a dispute that was resolved in his favour by the Ward Tribunal. The appellant also accused the victim's father of having an affair with his wife. After hearing the parties and analysing evidence, the learned trial Magistrate found as a fact that, the appellant was properly implicated by PW1 as the person who went to her home on the fateful day and raped her. The trial Magistrate also found as a fact that, PWl's evidence was consistent with the medical examination evidence shown both in the medical report (Exh. P.2) and the oral testimony of Jeremiah Fisso (PW4) a Medical Officer whose examination established that, PW1 had abrasions around her vaginal opening which suggested that she had been forcefully penetrated by an unnamed object. The learned trial Magistrate further found that, PW1 and PW2 had no motive and were incapable of tailoring their testimony in such a way as to falsely

implicate the appellant. The learned trial Magistrate then pointed out that, these two witnesses had given very strong evidence which discredited the appellant's defence of a frame up. Thus, it was finally found that the offence of rape had been proven and that the appellant who was then the accused in the dock, was the one responsible for the said rape. Accordingly/ the appellant was convicted and sentenced to the earlier mentioned sentence of thirty years' imprisonment. Dissatisfied with the conviction and sentence, the appellant appealed to the High Court of Tanzania, (sitting at Arusha) complaining that:

1. The trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact by convicting him on a defective charge sheet;

2. The trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact for failure to notice the variance between the charge and the evidence as regards the place where the offence was committed, a defect which was not rectified by the trial court by way of amendment under section 234 of the Criminal Procedure Act;

3. The trial court wrongly admitted Exhibit PI;

4. The trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact for neglecting (sic) the appellant's defence; and

5. The trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact for convicting the appellant of an offence which was not proved by concrete evidence. In her judgment, the learned Judge of the first appellate court accepted the prosecution evidence as having proved beyond doubt that, on the material day the appellant went to the victim's home and raped her. In so holding, the learned Judge was satisfied and she accordingly found that, on the evidence before the trial court, the offence was committed at Molam Village within Endagaw Ward in Hanang District. The above finding was in respect of the appellant's complaint regarding what he viewed as discrepancies in the prosecution evidence concerning the actual place where the offence was committed. Addressing herself to the question regarding the identity of the appellant as the offender, the learned Judge of the first appellate court was convinced and she accordingly sustained the finding by the trial court that, the evidence of PW1 had left no doubt that it is the appellant who committed the charged offence. The case of Mohamed Said v.

Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 145 of 2017 (unreported) was called in aid by the learned Judge to emphasize the principle that, the best evidence in rape cases is the evidence of the victim. She also sought and found corroboration in the evidence of PW2 who told the trial court that he found the appellant half dressed in a compromising situation. Like the trial court, the learned Judge discounted the appellant's explanation that he was a victim of a frame up as he had gone to the victim's home to request for a small pot which he could use in fetching water from the well. The learned Judge ultimately proceeded to find the appeal wanting in merit and accordingly dismissed it in its entirety. Disenchanted with the judgment of the first appellate court upholding the conviction and sentence by the trial court, the appellant has now appealed to this Court. He contends, substantially that, the conviction was against the weight of the evidence on the record. In particular, the appellant contends in his grounds of appeal, that:

1. The age of the victim was not proved;

2. The evidence of PW2 was received in contravention of section 198 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act Chapter 20 of the Revised Laws (the CPA).

3. The two lower courts failed to consider his defence;

4. There was a material variance between the charge and the evidence led by the prosecution with regard to the name of the place where the offence was committed;

5. The lower court ought to have found that PW4 (a medical expert) did not establish the cause of abrasions on PWl's private parts;

6. The lower courts did not take into account the possibility of the appellant having been framed in view of the long standing dispute between him and the victim's father and that;

7. The case against him was not proved to the required standard to warrant a conviction. Before us, the appellant appeared in person without any legal representation. When we invited him to address the Court, being lay and illiterate, he sought and we granted him leave to present to us a handwritten document titled. "Ufafanuzi wa sababu zangu za Rufasf' which loosely translates into "A comprehensive exposition o f my grounds o f appeal." Essentially, the document is similar to a written statement of

arguments envisaged by rule 74 (1) of the Tanzania Court of Appeal Rules, 2009. Moreover, the appellant informed us that he would rely on the informally filed arguments. In support of ground one, the appellant contended that, throughout the proceedings, right from plea taking to the conclusion of the parties' respective cases, there was no evidence establishing the age of the victim. It was the appellant's submission that, in the absence of such evidence, the offence of statutory rape with which he stood charged, was not proved to the required standard as the prosecution had failed to establish the age of the victim which was a necessary element of the charged offence. Reliance on this submission was placed on our earlier decision in the case of Samwel s/o Nyerere v. Republic, (Criminal Appeal No. 65 of 2020) [2023] TZCA 27 (20 February 2023, TANZLII). In support of the second ground of appeal, the appellant submitted correctly in our view that, the evidence of PW2 who was aged sixteen years at the time, was recorded wrongly in terms of section 127(2) of the Evidence Act, Chapter 6 of the Revised Laws (the Evidence Act) as if PW2 was a child of the age of, or below the age of fourteen. It 10

was the appellant's contention that the proper provision of the law under which the evidence of PW2 ought to have been taken was section 198 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Chapter 20 of the Revised Laws (the CPA). Given the infraction of the law, the appellant invited us to expunge the evidence of PW2 from the record for having been taken contrary to the applicable law. Moving forward to the third ground of appeal, the appellant faulted the two lower courts for failure to find that there was a discrepancy between the particulars of the offence and the evidence led by the prosecution regarding the place where the offence was committed. Elaborating, the appellant contended that, whereas the charge refers to Molam Village as the place where the offence was committed, the evidence led in support of the charge refers to Endagaw Village. Because of this variation and, in the absence of an amendment to the charge in terms of section 234 (1) of the CPA, it was the appellant's submission that the charge upon which the offence was based, was defective as not to warrant a conviction. In so arguing, the appellant referred us to the case of John Julius Martine and Another v. Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 42 of 2022) [2022] TZCA 789 li

(3 December 2022 TANZLII) as authority of the proposition he was propounding before this Court. On the fourth ground of appeal, without elaborating, the appellant complained generally that, the trial court did not consider his evidence. What's more, however since an appeal is also said to be by way of rehearing, the appellant could not say anything with regard to the question as to whether or not, his grievances in the fourth ground of appeal were brought to the attention and subsequently addressed by the first appellate court, upon appeal. Submitting in support of the fifth ground of appeal, the appellant attacked the evidence of the Medical Expert (PW4) for allegedly not specifically mentioning the kind of the object which he found to have been the cause of bruises in the victim's private parts. On the sixth ground, the appellant faulted the two lower courts for discounting his explanation that he was a victim of malice and fiction as the charge against him was designed to embarrass and teach him a lesson after he had successfully won the battle on the land dispute.

Upon the above substantive grounds of appeal, the appellant submitted in the upshot that, the judgment of the first appellate court sustaining the decision of the trial court, was flawed in a number of respects and that the conviction returned against him was bad both in law and infact. In conclusion, the appellant urged us to allow the appeal and overturn the conviction and sentence because, the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The appeal was opposed orally by Ms. Chema Maswi, learned State Attorney who appeared to represent the respondent, the Republic. On the first ground of appeal, she was in agreement with the appellant that indeed, no direct evidence was forthcoming from the prosecution to establish the age of the victim. However, the learned State Attorney was quick to refer us to our earlier decision in the case of Leonard Sakata v. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 235 of 2019 [2022] TZCA 30 (17 February 2023 TANZLII) in which, in the absence of direct evidence proving the age of the victim in a case of statutory rape such as in the present one, we held that, while the necessity of proving age remains a king post in firmly grounding the prosecution case, in terms of section 122 of the Evidence Act, the age of the victim may be proved by the

existence of factual circumstances for which it can be suggested or implied that the victim is below eighteen years of age. As we shall hereinafter demonstrate and as correctly argued by Ms. Maswi, there exists such circumstances in the instant case. Coming to the specifics of the present case, Ms. Maswi submitted that, being a Primary School pupil, PW1 was most probably below eighteen years, all the more so because, PW2 her elder brother, was aged sixteen at the time. Moving forward, Ms. Maswi had no qualms with the appellant's complaint in the second ground of appeal. She submitted that, indeed the learned trial Magistrate fell into error when he led PW2 who was aged sixteen years to promise to tell the truth and not to tell lies in terms of section 127 (2) of the Evidence Act as if PW2 was a child of tender age as defined under section 127 (4) of the same Act. The learned State Attorney shared the view of the appellant that the evidence of PW2 which was wrongly received should be expunged from the record.

On the third ground of appeal which faulted the first appellate court for failure to find that there was a discrepancy between the material contents of the charge and the evidence led to support it particularly with regard to the place where the offence was committed, Ms. Maswi submitted that, it is really the case that while, the particulars of the offence alleged that the offence was committed at Molam Village, the evidence of PW2 shows that the offence occurred at Endagaw Village both of which are in Hanang District. Even though, as opposed to the appellant's views, the learned State Attorney could not see the relevancy or centrality of the name of the said village to the determination of the germane issues to this appeal. On our part, for a purpose, we will in the meantime, desist from further delving into this ground of appeal and later on revert to it, at the opportune moment. Meanwhile, we move on to the fourth and sixth grounds of appeal in which the first appellate court is essentially being faulted for allegedly not considering the appellant's defence version and subsequently holding that, the case against him had been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Arguing the above posed grounds of appeal, Ms. Maswi submitted very briefly that, the appellant's defence evidence including the claim that he was in bad blood with the victim's father, was considered by the first appellate court which however, found it unmerited. The learned State Attorney invited us to follow suit and dismiss not only the fourth and sixth grounds of appeal but also the appellant's defence version in general, for lack of merit. On the fifth ground of appeal which faults the lower court for not finding that the Doctor who examined the victim had failed to establish the cause of bruises on her private parts, Ms. Maswi submitted very briefly that, the duty of the Medical Expert as he did, was to establish if the victim had been a subject of sexual penetration a question commonly asked in sexual related offences. With the foregoing observations and authorities, Ms. Maswi submitted that, the learned Judge of the first appellate court rightly relied on the evidence of PW1 and the relevant jurisprudence to decide that the case against the appellant had been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

We have heard the arguments from each party to this appeal. While it is trite law that, in a charge of statutory rape falling under sections 130 (1) (2) (e) and 131 (1) of the Penal Code such as the present one, the prosecution is saddled with a duty to prove that the victim was below the age of eighteen years at the time of the offence, it should be borne in mind that, in view of the current jurisprudence in our jurisdiction, it is now settled law that, in the absence of direct evidence establishing that the victim was below eighteen years of age at the time of commission of the offence, the existence of factual circumstances implying or suggesting that the victim was below such age can be as reliable as direct evidence establishing the victim's actual age. That in essence, is what we held in the case of Leonard Sakata (supra). Notably, in the instant case, immediately before PW1 went on testifying in support of the prosecution case and, after she indicated that she was 14 years old, the trial Magistrate, obviously upon ocular observation, went on observing thus:

"The victim is below 18 years, so she is addressed as to whether she promises to tell the truth. PW1: 1promise to tell the truth. Court: PW1 has promised to tell the truth to the court." Yet, in her testimony which was taken slightly a year after she was raped, the victim herself testified that, at the time of the offence, she was a standard seven pupil at Endagaw Primary School in Hanang District. There is obviously no witness who gave direct evidence establishing the age of PW1, but the sense one gets from the above quoted excerpt of the proceedings of the trial court, is that, PW1 was below eighteen years and it is noteworthy here that, even the trial Magistrate was so satisfied such that, he had to invoke the mandatory requirements of section 127 (2) of the Evidence Act which deals with witnesses of tender age before he went on receiving her evidence. By so doing, the learned trial Magistrate seems to have dealt with PW1 as a witness of tender age and not a person of the age of majority. In our respectful view, it could not have been possible for the trial Magistrate to observe that PW1 was below 18 years while she was not.

We also note that, throughout the trial, the question as to the age of the victim who was said to be aged thirteen years at the time of the offence, did not arise. We should also add, for the sake of completeness that, throughout the trial, even the appellant himself, did not at any stage, say that the victim had attained the age of majority or otherwise seek to challenge the fact that she was aged 13 years at the time of the offence. These circumstances indicate, and the lower courts were entitled to infer that the age of the victim had been proved beyond doubt. Upon the foregoing discussion, it cannot be said that the prosecution had failed to prove that PW1 was below the age of eighteen at the time. We are of the view the above-mentioned circumstances fell within the purview of the circumstances contemplated in section 122 of the Evidence Act and the applicable jurisprudence. Having looked at the context in which the above cited law was enacted, we are satisfied that, in the present case, the age of the victim was proved as to leave no doubt that she was below the age of eighteen at the time of the charged offence. We thus find no merit in the first ground of appeal which we accordingly dismiss.

In addressing our minds to grounds 2 and 3, we note that they are closely related in so far as they relate to the testimony of PW2. We therefore propose to deal with the second ground of appeal right away as it will facilitate the resolution of the third ground. To capitulate, in the 2n d ground of appeal, our attention has been directed to the fact that the evidence of PW2 who was aged 16 years at the time, was wrongly recorded in terms of section 127 (2) of the Evidence Act which provides that: "127 (2) A child o f tender age may give evidence without taking an oath or making an affirmation but shall, before giving evidence, promise to tell the truth to the court and not to tell any lies." In view of the above quoted provisions of the law, we acknowledge with reference to the appellant's complaint which was gracefully conceded by Ms. Maswi and we subsequently find that, on the whole, the evidence of PW2 was wrongly received. As we have already observed, PW2 was aged 16 years on 14th February, 2019 when he appeared to testify before the trial court. We agree with Ms. Maswi that, given the age of PW2 at the time, his evidence ought to have been

received in terms of section 198 of the CPA which specifically provides that: "Every witness in a criminal cause or matter shall, subject to the provisions o f any other written law to the contrary, be examined upon oath or affirmation in accordance with the provisions o f the Oath and Statutory Declarations Act." The learned Judge of the first appellate court obviously did not detect the above omission by the trial court to comply with the mandatory provisions of the law and we think, with respect, that was an error on her part. In the circumstances, we side with the appellant and Ms. Maswi and subsequently proceed to exclude the evidence of PW2 for having been received in total violation of the applicable law. Needless to say, after the evidence of PW2 is excluded, the conviction of the appellant depends on the question as to whether or not the remaining evidence points to the appellant's guilt. Relying on the evidence of PW1, the prosecution's argument is that, in fact, that is the case.

Before considering the above posed question, we wish to observe that, having sustained ground two of the appeal, we find the determination of the third ground of appeal which faults the first appellate court for failure to find that there was a discrepancy between the contents of the charge and the evidence produced at the trial, completely superfluous if not academic. Bearing in mind as we must, that from the record of the proceedings in the trial court, it is only PW2 whose evidence shows that the charged offence was committed at Endagaw Village while the particulars of the offence referred to Molam Village as the place where the offence took place, and as such, the evidence of PW2 having been excluded, the appellant's complaint in the third ground of appeal, is bound to be redundant. Before going to the fourth ground of appeal which we will have to consider along with the sixth ground of appeal as the two grounds are closely related essentially raising the issue of whether the evidence that was before the lower courts was sufficient to sustain a conviction, we intend to first deal with the fifth ground of appeal in which the first appellate court is faulted for failure to find that PW4 (a Medical Expert) had failed to establish the cause of bruises in the victim's private parts.

In dealing with this ground, we intend to start with what PW4 told the trial court while under cross-examination by the appellant as appearing at page 22 of the record of appeal. He stated that: "I do not know the person who caused bruises to her (the victim). The bruises are caused by penetration in the vagina by an object. The penetration is caused by a male person.../' [Emphasis supplied]. If the evidence on the record is anything to go by, it must be apparent from the foregoing excerpt of the record of the trial court that, the appellant has misrepresented PW4's testimony and on that account, his complaint in the fifth ground of appeal, is basically unfounded. According to the evidence of PW4 which was not contested by the appellant, the bruises in PWl's private parts were caused by an unnamed object but this could be attributed to the fact that PW1 was said to have recently been raped. As held by this Court in the case of Kidai Magembe v. Republic, Criminal Appeal No.228 of 2021 [2022] TZCA 346 (13 June 2022 TANZLII) in which we quoted with approval the English case of J.P. Morgan v. Springwell [ 2007] 1 ALL ER (Comm)

549, an expert witness is not to find facts but to express his opinion on the basis of the assumed facts. In the case before us, it is not in dispute that PW4 was informed by the Police that PW1 had been raped. Being a Medical Expert, his duty was to verify the information given to him by examining the victim to establish if she had been penetrated which would be the case if she had been raped. In so doing, PW4 observed bruises in her private parts which were attributable to a recent sexual assault. Needless to say, the above evidence indicates that the victim had been penetrated which is one of the basic ingredients requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt in a charge of rape. It follows in our judgment that once, it was proved that PW1 had been penetrated, PW4 was, for all purpose and intents, home and dry. What was left for the first appellate court, as it is with this court, was to determine the identity of the perpetrator of the crime. That said, we find no merit in the fifth ground of the appeal and we dismiss it. As stated earlier, the fourth and sixth grounds of appeal are closely related in as far as they all challenge the first appellate court for

not considering the appellant's defence and not holding in conclusion that, all in all, the case against him was not proved to the required standard. As it will be recalled, at the heart of the appellant's defence version, was a complaint that he was a victim of a frame up. As to the reason why he would be falsely implicated, the appellant told the trial court that, he did not have a cordial relationship with the victim's father who had encroached on his land and was in romantic relationships with his wife. He complained that, as a result of the said relationship, his wife had taken some of their family belongings and hidden them at the home of her paramour. When considering the appellant's defence evidence which she finally rejected, the learned Judge of the first appellate court had the following to say at page 107 of the record of appeal; thus: "Also, I have considered the appellant's defence, but the same is a sham. The appellant tried to put up multiple excuses and explanations to make up his defence, but all o f them were not convincing and did not shake the prosecution case at all, instead they created a strong

message that the appellant did commit the offence o f rape. The appellant's allegations that he had a dispute with EH's father over boundaries, was not substantiated." Indeed, as correctly found by the learned Judge of the High Court, while the appellant did not dispute to have gone to the home of the victim on the material day, his assertions as to why he would falsely be implicated by the prosecution witnesses were not substantiated. In the first place, he did not state why the victim's father who was his supposedly enemy chose to falsely implicate him by way of shadowboxing making use of his children as witnesses instead of going directly after him. As if that was not enough, it occurs to us that as a means to avoid challenge and embarrassment, the appellant decided to keep that allegation under his hat until after the prosecution witnesses had testified. On the appellant's contention that the offence was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, we wish to observe that, the learned Judge exhibited her awareness of the law to the effect that, except for the reasons that have to be clearly put on the record, the best evidence of rape has to come from the victim as we held in the case of Seleman 26

Makumba v. R [2006] T.L.R.379. She then went on to find in the instant case that, the charged offence had been proved to the required standard, relying mainly on the evidence of PW1 who was the victim of the crime. As rightly argued by Ms. Maswi, the victim testified candidly that it is the appellant who raped her and that, thereafter, he threated to kill her if she disclosed to anybody the sexual assault. Further that, however, unscared by the appellant's threats, she immediately named him as her ravisher to her brother after the appellant had left for his home. It is worthwhile to also note that, the above evidence was not materially challenged by the appellant during cross-examination leaving no doubt in the mind of the court that, PW1 was indeed a credible witness who had testified to what she had really seen and the ordeal she had gone through. Looking at the evidence led in support of the prosecution case, we find no fault upon which the decision of the 1s t appellate court regarding the appellant's conviction and sentence can be overturned. We therefore find in respect of the seventh ground of appeal that, the charge against the appellant was proved reasonable doubt.

Given the overwhelming and unchallenged evidence led in support of the prosecution case, we think with respect that, the position taken by the learned Judge of the first appellate court was consistent with the facts of the case. We therefore find no merit in the grounds of appeal raised by the appellant. The net result of the foregoing discourse is that, except for the second ground of appeal which we have allowed but which has no substantial impact on the overall outcome of the appeal, this appeal is otherwise dismissed. DATED at ARUSHA this 7th day of November, 2024. F. L. K. WAMBALI JUSTICE OF APPEAL P. M. KENTE JUSTICE OF APPEAL Z. G. MURUKE JUSTICE OF APPEAL The Judgment delivered this 8th day of November, 2024 in the presence of the appellant in person and Mr. Mahfudhu Mbagwa, learned State Attorney for the respondent/Republic is hereby certified as a true cot— -------