National Housing Corporation vs Deepan Premji Dusara & Others (Civil Appeal No. 222 of 2022) [2024] TZCA 937 (25 September 2024)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT PAR ES SALAAM f CORAM: MWARI3A. 3.A.. MAIGE. J.A. And MGEYEKWA. J.A.^ CIVIL APPEAL NO. 222 OF 2022 NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION .......................................... APPELLANT VERSUS DEEPAN PREMJI DUSARA ..... . .................. . .......................... 1 st RESPONDENT KISHORE PREMJI DUSARA ........................... . ..................... 2N D RESPONDENT MRS. PRABHABEN MOHANLAL BHIKA.. .......... .............. .....3 rd RESPONDENT (Appeal from the judgment and decree of the High Court of Tanzania, Land Division at Dar es Salaam) (Mgpnya, J.) dated the 5th day of April, 2019 in Land Case No. 86 of 2016 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 30th April & 25th September, 2024 MWARI3A. 3.A.: This appeal arises from the decision of the High Court of Tanzania, Land Division at Dar es Saiaam (Mgonya, J., as she then was) in Land Case No. 86 of 2016. In that case, by their amended plaint, the respondents, Deepan Premji Dusara, Kishore Premji Dusara and Mrs. Prabhaben Mohanlal Bhika (the 1s t - 3rd respondents respectively) sued the appellant, the National Housing Corporation, seeking inter alia, an order declaring them the lawful owners of a landed property on Plot No. 813 situated at Upanga area, Ilala Municipality within the Dar es Salaam City (hereinafter "the suit land" or "the property"). They also sought an

order declaring any subsequent title granted to the appellant invalid and an order permanently restraining the appellant from interfering with the right of ownership by them, of the suit land. They also prayed for special and general damages as well as the costs of the suit. The filing of the suit followed the notification to the respondents by the appellant in 2013, that it was in the process of taking over the possession of the suit land which had previously been vested in the Registrar of Buildings after its acquisition by the President on 18/6/1971. The President acquired the suit land on public interest under section 4 (1) of the Acquisition of Buildings Act No. 13 of 1971 (the Acquisition Act). It was later transferred to the appellants after the dissolution of the Registrar of Buildings by the National Housing Corporation Act, Chapter 295 of the Revised Laws (the NHC Act) which repealed both the Acquisition Act and the previous National Housing Act, Chapter 481 of the Revised Laws. The respondents contended that, until the time of institution of the suit, they were tenants in common in the suit land with the 1s t and 2n d respondents having equal shares of a quarter (1 A) each while the 3r d respondent was owning half (Y 2 ) shares of the value of the property. They claimed that, the title of the property passed to them from Premji

Meghji Dusara, the late father of the 1s t and 2n d respondents and Mohanlal Bhika, the late husband of the 3r d respondent who jointly and together purchased it from its previous owner, one Badrudin Nurmohamed Bhapoo (the first owner). They stated as follows in paragraph 5 of their amended plaint: "5. The plaintiffs and their respective predecessors in title to the property have since the year 1962 been in continuous occupation and possession o f the property as tenants o f Mr. Badrudin Nurmohamed Bhapoo. Later on, 8th o f April 1968, Mr. Baphoo transferred the property to Mr. Premji Meghji Dusara , the father o f the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs and to the late Mr. Mohanlal Bhika, the husband o f the 3 d plaintiff, Mrs. Prabhaben Mohanlal Bhika and the plaintiffs and their predecessors continued to be in occupation and possession o f the property as owners thereof A copy o f a transfer documents...and a copy o f the certificate o f approval o f disposition dividing 1 A shares to each plaintiff, duly registered are attached to the plaint..." According to the certificate of approval of disposition, a quarter share from the 3r d respondent's half share was transferred to one Kamla Shavji Trikam who was not a party to the suit.

The respondents contended that, the grant of a right of occupancy and registration of the appellant as the successor in title to the suit land was perpetuated by fraud because, at the time of the acquisition in 1971, the same was not in the possession of the first owner from whom it was alleged to have been acquired by the President. On its part, the appellant disputed the respondents' claim that they were the lawful owners of the suit land. In its amended written statement of defence, it averred inter alia that, the property was acquired by the President from the first owner and the notice to that effect was published in the Government Gazette No. 26 Vol. II of 18/6/1971 and as a result, his right of occupancy was extinguished and the ownership was consequently vested in the Registrar of Buildings. The appellant contended further that, following the enactment of the NHC Act which, under its section 42, repealed both the previous National Housing Act, Chapter 481 and the Acquisition Act, thereby dissolving the Registrar of Buildings with effect from 1/8/1990, the assets and liabilities which had been vested in the Registrar were transferred to the appellant. The appellant went on to contest the respondent's claim stating that, it acquired the title to the suit land not by fraud or misrepresentation but by operation of the law. It averred that, Premji Meghji Dusara and

Mohanlal Bhika were wrongly granted the right of occupancy over the suit land because, at the time of the said grant, the property had already been acquired by the President from the first owner who was duly notified of that acquisition on 22/2/1978. According to the appellant, the transfer from the first owner to Premji Meghji Dusara and Mohanlal Bhika and the subsequent ratification of the register authorizing the division of shares of ownership by the respondents, was null and void ab initio. It added that, when on 14/2/1978, the said two persons informed the Registrar of Buildings that they were the transferees of the rights of occupancy from the first owner, they were duly informed that, the suit land had been acquired by the President on 18/6/1971. They were thus advised to appeal to the Appeals Tribunal as provided for under section 10 (3) of the Acquisition Act, if they were dissatisfied with the acquisition, but did not however, do so. From the pleadings, the following two issues were framed and agreed upon by the parties: " 1. Whether the plaintiffs have legal right o f ownership o f plot No. 813 located at Matake Road within Ilala Municipality. 2. What reliefs are the parties entitled to."

At the hearing of the suit in the High Court, six witnesses testified for the plaintiffs' case while on its part, the defendant relied on the evidence of one witness. The 1s t respondent, Deepan Premji Dusara who also sued under the power of attorney donated to him by the 2n d respondent, Kishore Premji Dusara, testified as PW1. His evidence was to the following effect: He was born and grew up together with the 2n d respondent in the suit land in which their father, Premji Meghji Dusara, was a tenant since 1962. Later in 1968, their father and Mohanlal Bhika together with Kamla Shavji Trikam bought it from the first owner and later obtained a certificate of Title No. 186175/15 issued on 28/4/1977. The certificate of title was admitted in evidence as exhibit PI. The witness went on to state that, after the demise of their father in 1998, he was appointed the administrator of the deceased's estate and in 2003, they sub-divided the suit land into two equal shares whereby each of them owned a quarter shares while the other half shares were owned by Mrs. Prabhaben Mohanlal Bhika and Kamla Shavji Trikam (a quarter shares each). According to PW1, the sub-division was authorized through ratification of the register. He tendered the document containing the said ratification and the same was admitted in evidence as exhibit P3. He insisted that the respondents were the lawful owners of the suit land and

were thus surprised when they were required by the appellant to give vacant possession or opt to become its tenants. He contended further that, the notice of acquisition was not served on the respondents but to the first owner who was not, at the time of the acquisition in 1971, the owner of the property. He thus prayed for an order declaring that, the same belonged to the respondents. In his further evidence, PW1 stated that, he was evicted from the suit land on 4/4/2016 together with the other respondents and in the process, white some of his properties were destroyed, others were stolen by the group of about 50 persons who were hired by the appellant to carry out the eviction. Apart from the loss, which he estimated at about TZS 50,000,000.00, he claimed that, his reputation was lowered as his neighbours were made to understand that, he was a trespasser into the suit land. As a result of the loss of property and reputation, he prayed for damages and compensation amounting to a total of TZS 150,000,000.00 to each of the 1s t and the 2n d respondents. The other witnesses who testified for the plaintiffs' case were Ikbal Premji Manji (PW2) and Janardan Ganpatram Shukla (PW4) who were until the material time, the respondents' neighbors and an employee of the Ministry of Justice, Administrator General's Office, respectively. It was

their evidence that, they had known that the suit land belonged to Premji Meghji Dusara and that, after his death the ownership thereof passed to the 1s t and 2n d respondents. PW4 added that, he assisted PW1 to obtain the letters of administration of the estate of his late father, the said Premji Meghji Dusara. Evidence was also adduced by Chandrika Chunila Vara (PW3) Edith Emilian Mganga (PW5) and Brenda Kuringe (PW6). PW3 was at the material time the Mtaa Chairman of the area where the suit land is situated while PW5 and PW6 were the Land Officer, Ilala Municipality and Assistant Registrar of Titles, respectively. The evidence of PW3 was to the effect that, from his knowledge, part of the property was owned by Mr. Mohanlal Bhika, the late husband of the 3r d respondent. On their part, PW5 and PW6 testified on the history of ownership of the suit land. According to PW5, Premji Meghji Dusara and Mohanlal Bhika were granted a right of occupancy over the suit land vide a letter of offer dated 30/10/1976. He explained that, from the office records, whereas Premji Meghji Dusara owned half shares of the suit land, Mohanlal Bhika and another person, the said Kamla Shavji Trikam, owned a quarter shares each. Supporting that evidence, PW6 testified that, the suit land was first registered on 8/6/1977 in the names of the above stated three

persons, each one of them owning the stated portions of shares. He testified further that, on 16/4/2003, the shares were transferred to the 1s t and 2n d respondents and to the 3r d respondent. With regard to the ownership by the appellant, it was PW6's testimony that, on 27/7/2005, the suit land was registered in the name of the appellant following its acquisition and after dissolution of the Registrar of Buildings. He stated however, that, after acquisition by the President, the suit land had not, at any time, been registered in the name of the Registrar of Buildings. The evidence for the defendant was adduced by Elias Msese Mlwande (DW1) who was the Estates Manager of the appellant. In the course of his testimony, he tendered a copy of a Government Gazette; Gazeti fa Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania, No. 26 Vol. II of 18/6/1971 to substantiate that, the suit land was acquired by the President on 18/6/1971 from the first owner. A copy of the Gazette was admitted in evidence as exhibit Dl. He stressed that, after the acquisition, the suit land was vested in the Registrar of Buildings and the occupiers were required to opt to become tenants or vacate from the property. He went on to state that, the first owner did not return the original title within the prescribed period of 30 days despite having been duty

notified of the acquisition. As a result, after dissolution of the Registrar of Buildings, on 27/7/2005 the title of the suit land held under certificate of title No. 186175/15 (exhibit PI) was transferred to the appellant. He contended further that, the original title was consequently revoked. The same certificate of title No. 186175/15 evidencing the transfer of a right of occupancy to the appellant was admitted in evidence as exhibit D2. The witness insisted in his testimony that, the appellant did not acquire ownership of the suit land by fraud or forgery but by operation of the law. He also denied that, the process of evicting the respondents caused them to suffer special or general damages. According to him, the respondents decided to vacate the suit land on their own volition after they had been required to do so. Having considered the evidence adduced by the witnesses for both parties, the learned trial Judge found it established that, the suit land was originally owned by Badrudin Nurmohamed Bhapoo and that, in 1968, he transferred his right of occupancy to Premji Meghji Dusara, Mohanlal Bhika and Kamla Shavji Trikam who thereafter, in 1977, obtain a certificate of title No. 186175/15 (exhibit PI) issued on 28/4/1977. She thus decided that, at the time when the notice of acquisition was issued to the first owner on 18/6/1971, the ownership had already passed to the

three persons named in the said certificate of title. She thus concluded that the grant of a right of occupancy to the appellant was a nullity. Conversely however, the learned trial Judge was of the view that, since the property was lawfully acquired by the President on 18/6/1971 the respondents had no right of ownership because their predecessors in title ought to have taken a judicial notice of exhibit D1 before they applied to be issued with the certificate of title. Furthermore, in her judgment, the learned trial Judge raised and determined the issue whether or not the respondents were compensated after the acquisition of the suit land in terms of section 8 (1) of the Acquisition Act. She found that, the evidence on that matter was lacking and therefore, granted them the right to remain in the suit land until they were sufficiently compensated in accordance to the law as was then provided under section 8 (1) of the Acquisition Act. She also awarded the respondents general damages of TZS 25,000,000.00 each and costs of the suit. Aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, the appellant has preferred this appeal which is predicated on the following five grounds: '7. That, the Honourable trial Judge erred in iaw and in fact in faiiing to properiy interpret and appiy ii

the provisions o f the Acquisition o f Buildings Act No. 13 o f 1971 and the Land Registration Act Cap. 334 R.E. 2002 on the issue o f jurisdiction o f the trial court. 2. That, the Honourable trial Judge erred in law and in fact in holding that the respondents were lawful owners [of the suit land on accounts o f the appellant's failure to compensate them] while the said suit property was acquired from one Badrudin Nurmohamed Bhapoo and not the respondents. 3. That, the Honourable trial Judge committed procedural irregularities in declaring that the suit property was transferred to the late father o f the respondents who bought it from Mr. Badrudin Nurmohamed Bhapoo basing o f the evidence o f PW5 which formed the basis o f the controversial judgment. 4. That, the Honourable trial Judge erred both in law and in fact by pronouncing judgment in favour o f the respondents without any sufficient evidence to prove general damages upon the standard required by law. 5. That, the Honourable trial Judge erred both in law and in fact by ordering the appellant to compensate the respondents in the manner prescribed in the law, that is, the Acquisition o f 12

Buildings Act No. 13 o f 1971 hence delivered a controversialjudgm ent" On the date of hearing the appeal, the appellant was represented by Mr. Aloyce Sekule, learned Principal State Attorney assisted by Ms. Grace Lupondo, Messrs Abdallah Makulo and Kefa Anase, all learned State Attorneys. On their part, the respondents had the services of Mr. Humphrey Mwasomboma assisted by Mr. Qassim Mussa Abdallah, both learned counsel. At the outset, Mr. Sekule informed the Court that, the appellant did not file written submissions in support of the appeal and that therefore, in terms of rule 106 (10) (b) of the Tanzania Court of Appeal Rules, relied on oral arguments. The appeal was argued by Ms. Lupondo. Before she embarked on making her submissions, she informed the Court that, the appellant had decided to abandon the 3rd ground of appeal. As a result, she only argued the remaining grounds. Starting with the 1s t ground of appeal, the learned State Attorney argued that, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to try the case. She relied on the provisions of section 10 (3) and (5) of the Acquisition Act. According to the learned State Attorney, if the respondents were aggrieved by inter alia, the acquisition notice or acquisition of the suit 13

land or refusal to be paid compensation, they ought to have appealed to the Appeals Tribunal in terms of section 10 (3) of the Acquisition Act or appeal to the High Court by virtue of the provisions of section 102 (1) of the Land Registration Act, Chapter 334 of the Revised Laws, if they were dissatisfied with the decision of transferring the right of occupancy to the appellant. She argued further that, since section 10 (5) of the Acquisition Act provided that, no court should have jurisdiction to entertain any matter which the Appeals Tribunal had jurisdiction, the trial court erred when it heard and determined the suit. He cited the case of the Inspector General of Police and Another v. Ex. B. 8356 S/Sgt. Sylivester Nyanda, Civil Appeal No. 64 of 2014 (unreported) to bolster her argument. She added that, the respondents were notified of the intended change of ownership before the rectification of the register whereby the name of the appellant was registered in the place of their names and should therefore, have appealed if they were dissatisfied. In reply to the arguments made in support of the 1s t ground of appeal, Mr. Mwasomboma opposed the contention that the trial court did not have jurisdiction. He argued that, because the cause of action arose in 2013, at the time when the Appeals Tribunal was no longer in existence 14

following the repeal of the Acquisition Act by the NHC Act, the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. On the argument that the respondents should have invoked the provisions of section 102 (1) of the Land Registration Act, the learned counsel submitted that, they did not receive any notice, rather, the same was directed to the first owner. From the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, the issue which arises for determination in this ground of appeal, is whether the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The issue was not raised at the trial but being based on a point of law, this Court has the power to consider and make a decision on it. - See for instance, the cases of Fanuel Mantiri Ng'unda & Two Others v. Herman Mantiri Ng'unda [1995] T.L.R. 155 and Tanzania China Friendship Textiles Company Limited v. Our Lady of the Usambara Sisters [2006] T.L.R. 70. In the latter case, the Court stated as follows: "Admittedly, this issue was not raised before the trial court. But since it is about the jurisdiction o f the court, it can be raised at any stage even before this court."

In the case at hand, as shown above, the contention by the learned State Attorney that the trial court lacked jurisdiction is based on the provisions of section 10 (5) of the Acquisition Act. Sections 10 (1) (3) and (5) provided that: "10-(1) The President shall establish an Appeals Tribunal for the purpose o f this Act. ( 2 ).... (3) Any person aggrieved by any acquisition notice or terms o f any acquisition notice or the acquisition o f any building or the refusal to pay compensation in respect o f any building acquired under this Act or the amount o f compensation or the manner in which the compensation is to be paid, may appeal to the Appeals Tribunal within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed. (5) No court shall have jurisdiction to inquire into or determine any matter or issue which the Appeals Tribunal has jurisdiction to inquire into or determine ." From the pleadings the respondents alleges to have been in uninterrupted occupation of the suit land before and after its acquisition on 18/6/1971 until in 2013 when they learnt from the appellant that it 16

had been registered as the owner and issued with a certificate of occupancy on 27/7/2005. They were later on evicted from the suit land on 4/4/2016. It was after their eviction that they filed the suit on 18/4/2016. It is obvious therefore, that, when the dispute between the parties arose, the Acquisition Act had been repeated. For that reason, since the dispute involved a landed property which, according to the plaint, was valued at more than TZS 250,000,000.00, the proper forum where the dispute was to be referred in terms of the provisions of sections 33 (d) and 37 (1) (a) of the Land Disputes Courts Act, Chapter 216 of the Revised Laws, was the trial court. On the argument that, after the appellant had been registered as the owner of the suit land, the respondents were supposed to have invoked section 102 (1) of the Land Registration Act, we hasten to state that, they were not at fault for having not done so. From exhibit P3, which consists of a hand written changes of ownership of the respondents by shares, the transfer to the appellant vide exhibit D2 was from Premji Meghji Dusara, Mohanlal Shikha and Kamla Shavji Trikam not from the respondents. Since therefore, the disputed transfer of ownership to the appellant was not from the respondents, but from the above named three persons, the respondents could not invoke the provisions of section 102 17

(1) of the Land Registration Act, instead, because they claimed to be the lawful owners of the suit land, the proper move to take was to file the suit in the High Court Land Division as they did. In the circumstances, we find the 1s t ground of appeal devoid of merit and thus dismiss it. Submitting further in support of the appeal, the learned State Attorney argued together the 2n d and 5th grounds of appeal. She faulted the learned trial Judge for having found that the respondents were the lawful owners of the property on account that, the appellant did not compensate them in terms of section 8 (1) of the Acquisition Act. According to Ms. Lupondo, the acquisition was done by the President, not the appellant and thereafter, the same was vested in the Registrar of Buildings. She contended thus that, the appellant should not have been held liable to pay compensation for the suit land. She argued further that, since in essence, the respondents claimed to be declared the lawful owners thereof and since compensation was not one of the reliefs sought, the trial court erred in awarding it while it was neither pleaded nor were the parties heard on it. In support of her arguments, she cited the decisions of the Court in the cases of Ex. B. 8356 S/Sgt. Sylivester Nyanda (supra), Mussa Chande Jape v. Moza Mohamed Salim, Civil Appeal No. 141 of 2018 and Mufindi Paper Mills Limited v. Ibutu

Village Council and 3 Others, Civil Revision No. 555/17 of 2019 (both unreported). As for the 4th ground of appeal, the learned State Attorney submitted briefly that, the learned trial Judge erred in awarding general damages to the respondents. It was her submission that, after having found that the suit land was lawfully acquired, the appellant should not have been held liable to pay any damages arising from the eviction of the respondents from the suit land. Responding to the submission made by the learned State Attorney on the two grounds of appeal, Mr. Mwasomboma argued that, the trial court was justified in its decision to award compensation to the respondents. He submitted that, although the respondents did not plead that relief, they were entitled to the same because the appellant took ownership of the suit land without compensating them. He supported the finding of the trial court that, since the appellant did not compensate the respondents the value of the suit land, the title could not pass unless they were compensated. The learned counsel argued thus that, the respondents remained to be the lawful owners of the suit land. On the submissions made by Ms. Lupondo in respect of the 4th ground of appeal, Mr. Mwasomboma argued in reply that, the 19

respondents were entitled to general damages as a result of their forceful eviction from the suit land. He agreed however, that the awarded amount was not argued and assessed by the trial court. We have duly considered the submissions made by both learned counsel for the parties on the 2n d and 5th grounds of appeal. It was not disputed, first, that the property was acquired by the President on 18/6/1971 from the first owner. Secondly, the registration of the appellant as the subsequent owner vide exhibit D1 was by operation of the law. As submitted by Ms. Lupondo, the appellant did not acquire the suit land. It took over the ownership from the defunct Registrar of Buildings to whom the same was vested after it was acquired by the President on public interest. It is also not disputed that, the registration of the respondents' predecessors in title was made on 28/4/1977 after the acquisition. Similarly, it is a correct position, as submitted by the learned State Attorney that, in their plaint, the respondents did not claim compensation for the suit land in terms of the then applicable law; that is section 8 (1) of the Acquisition Act. Furthermore, at the hearing of the suit, the parties were not heard on the issue of compensation. Now, starting with the claim of ownership by the respondents, we agree with Ms. Lupondo that, the claim was not proved. Their claim was 20

based on allegation that, at the time of the acquisition of the suit land on 18/6/1971, the same had already been purchased in 1968 by the 1s t and 2n d respondents' father, Premji Meghji Dusara and the husband of the 3r d respondent, Mohanlal Bhika. That allegation was not however, substantiated by any documentary evidence such as; a copy of a sale agreement or contract of disposition of a right of occupancy between the first owner and the two named persons or oral evidence of any person who had the knowledge of the alleged sale. In his evidence, PW1 merely stated that, the suit land was purchased from the first owner by the above named persons. In our considered view, that evidence was of low probative value because it was based on a bare assertion of fact and should not therefore, have been acted upon to hold that exhibit PI was lawfully obtained. - See for example, the case of Paulina Samson Ndawavya v. Theresia Thomasi Madaha, Civil Appeal No. 45 of 2017 (unreported). Reiterating that important requirement of discharging a burden of proof to the applicable standard in civil cases, the Court stated as follows: "It is trite iaw and indeed elementary that he who alleges has a burden o f proof as per section 110 o f the Evidence Act, Cap. 6 [R.E. 2002]. It is equally elementary that since the dispute was in civil case, 21

the standard o f proof was on a balance o f probabilities which simply means that, the court will sustain such evidence which is more credible than the other on a particular fact to be proved." Since the allegation about a sale was not substantiated, we are unable to agree with the assertion by the learned counsel for the respondents that, the suit land was sold by the first owner before its acquisition by the President. For this reason, the purported grant of a right of occupancy to Premji Meghji Dusara and Mohanlal Bhika on 28/4/1977 and the subsequent ratification of the register as per exhibit P3, authorizing a sub-division of the suit land to the respondents, was not lawfully done. We therefore allow the 2n d and 5th grounds of appeal. In the event, the grant of a right of occupancy and the subsequent ratification of the register are hereby declared a nullity. The ownership of the suit land shall remain vested in the appellant in accordance to section 40 (2) of the NHC Act. On the 4th ground of appeal, after having nullified the grant of a right of occupancy in respect of Premji Meghji Dusara and Mohanlal Bhika and the sub-division of the suit land to the respondents, we need not be detained much in determining the 4th ground of appeal. The respondents claimed that, in the process of their eviction, some of their properties 22

were stolen and/or destroyed. They did not, however, substantiate that allegation. As for the claim of general damages, it is obvious from our finding above that, the respondents were staying in the suit land unlawfully because, in the eyes of the law, they were trespassers. They were therefore, not entitled to any damages which might have resulted from their eviction. - See for instance, the case of Equator Limited v. National Development Corporation (Civil Application No. 388/01 of 2019) [2023] TZCA 4 (27 January 2023). In that case, the Court cited a passage in the case of Princess Nadia (1998) Ltd. v. Remency Shikusiry, Civil Appeal No. 242 of 2018 (unreported) in which the Court observed that: "...Since it was proved that the appeilant was a trespasser, she had no right to benefit from her wrongful act. At worst, the appellant assumed the risk arising from her unlawful occupation in the premises. Just as she was not entitled to any notice before eviction, she had no right to claim any compensation from the forceful eviction " Guided by the above stated position, we find that the 4th ground of appeal has merit. The same is also hereby allowed. 23

On the basis of the foregoing reasons, we find that this appeal has merit and thus allow it and reverse the decision of the trial court. Given the nature of the dispute between the parties, we make no order as to costs. DATED at DAR ES SALAAM this 23r d day of September, 2024. A. G. MWARIJA JUSTICE OF APPEAL I. J. MAIGE JUSTICE OF APPEAL A. Z. MGEYEKWA JUSTICE OF APPEAL The Judgment delivered this 25th day of September, 2024 in the presence of Mr. Aloyce Sekule, learned Principal State Attorney for the appellant and Mr. Humphrey Mwasomboma, learned counsel for the respondents, is hereby certified as a true copy of the original. 24