Law Association of Zambia and Ors v Attorney General and Ors (2025/CCZ/0029) (8 December 2025) – ZambiaLII

fUiPU UC Of' ZAMBIA i Ifft· U ONAl coo,;ir O ZA.MetA 'i.15 IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF ZAIVIIBM 0 8 DEC 2025 cz,oo29 HOLDEN AT LUSAKA (CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION) REGISTRY 1 P O BOX 50067', I..U~ IN THE MATTER OF: A . ES 1, 2, 92, 128 AND 267 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF ZAMBIA (AMENDMENT) ACT NO. 2 OF 2016 IN THE MATTER OF: THE ALLEGED CONTRAVENTION OF ARTICLES 1( 2), 5, 8, 9, 90, 91 (1 )(2) AND (3), 92(2)(F) AND (J) OF THE CONSTITUTION IN THE MATTER OF: THE MISAPPLICATION OF ARTICLES 92(2)(F) AND 92(2)(J) OF THE CONSTITUTION IN THE MATTER OF: THE DECISION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN MUNIR ZULU AND ANOTHER V ATTORNEY GENERAL [2025) ZMCC 12 (27 JUNE 2025) IN THE MATTER OF: THE ESTABLISHMENT, COMPOSITON AND OPERATION OF THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION APPOINTED BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA ON 2 OCTOBER BETWEEN: THE LAW ASSOCIATON OF ZAMBIA 1st PETITIONER NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS' CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT REGISTERED TRUSTEES 2"d PETITIONER BISHOP ANDREW MWENDA (AS EXECUTIVE DIRECTR OF THE EVANGELICAL FELLOWSHIP OF ZAMBIA 3rd PETITIONER BISHOP EMMANUEL CHIKOYA (AS SECRETARY -GENERAL OF THE COUNCIL OF CHURCHES IN ZAMBIA) 4th PETITIONER FATHER FRANCIS MUKOSA (AS SECRETARY R2 '--- GENERAL OF THE ZAMBIA CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS 5th PETITIONER LCK FREEDOM FOUNDATION LIMITED 6th PETITONER THE ATTORNEY GENERAL RESPONDENT CONSORTIUM OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS 1sr INTENDED ON GEVERNANCE INTERESTED PARTY (ACTON INSTITUTE FOOR POLICY ANALYSIS CENTER- AIPAC) (ZAMBIAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION-ZCLU) (GOVERNANCE ELECTIONS ADVOCACY RESEACH SERVICES (GEARS) INITIATIVE ZAMBIA) (CENTER FOR PEACE, RESEARCH AND ADVOCACY) MEASURES OF JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY FOUNDATION - MJDF) (COMMUNITY ACTION AGAINST POLITICAL VIOLENCE-CAAPOV) (ANTI-POLITICAL VIOLENCE ASSOCIATION OF ZAMBIA) ERIC SAKALA 2ND INTENDED INTERESTED PARTY BEFORE LADY JUSTICE MARIA MAPANI - KAWIMBE IN CHAMBERS ON 4th AND 8th DECEMBER, 2025 For the Petitioner: Mr. M. Batakathi of Messrs Malisa & Partners Legal Practitioners For the Respondent: Mr. M.D Kabesha, Attorney General of Zambia, assisted by Mr. C. Mulonda - Deputy Chief State Advocate, Mr. N. R3 Mwiya - Principal State Advocate, Mr. C. Bikoko - State Advocate and Mr. G. Beene - State Advocate of the Attorney General's Chambers For the 1st Intended Interested Party Mr. I. Mwanza - Chairperson of the Consortium and Mr. C. Chifuwe - Executive Director of the Centre for Peace, Research and Advocacy For the 2nd Intended Interested Party In Person RULING Cases referred to: 1. Institute of Law, Policy Research and Human Rights Limited v Attorney General and Brian Mundubile 2023/CCZ/0024 2. Clare Akombelwa Mac Wangi v Katongo Bwalya & Attorney General Appeal No. 108/2019 3. R v North and East Deon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan [2001] QB 213 4. Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 5. Moses Sakala v The Attorney General and Another 2023/CCZ/0025 6. /;'bel Mulenga and Others v Mabvuto Adan Avuta Chikumbi and Others (2006) ZR 33 7. Mike Hamusonde Mweemba v ZSIC (2006) ZR 101 8. Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance v Muma Matemu & 5 Others [2014] KESC 32 9. Francis Muruatetu & Anotherv Republic [2021] KESC 31(KLR) 10. Mu Ieng a v Mumbi ex parte Mhango (1975) ZR 78 11. Isaac Mwanza and Zambian Civil Liberties Union v The Attorney General and 3 Others (Ruling) 2024/CCZ/008 12. Dr. Daniel Pule & Others v Attorney General & Others (Ruling) 2017/CCZ/004 13. Workers Development Corporation (ZCTU Ltd) v Davie Mkandawire SCZ Judgment No. 19 of 1999 14. Afri Zone Global Merchants Ltd v The Bank of Zambia SCZ Appeal No. 14 of R4 15. Law Association of Zambia v The Attorney General (Ruling) 2025/CGZ/0015 Legislation referred to: The Constitution of Zambia Chapter 1 of the Laws of Zambia as amended by Act No. 2 of 2016 The Constitutional Court Act No. 8 of 2016 The Constitutional Court Rules Statutory Instrument No. 37 of 2016 The Rules of the Supreme Court, Edition (1965) (White Book) INTRODUCTION [1] This composite Ruling is on joinder applications brought by two intended interested parties. The 1st intended interested party is a consortium of civil society organisations (CSOs) on governance while the 2nd intended interested party is an advocate of the High Court, diplomat, political activist and leader of a registered foundation concerned with the promotion of human rights. [2] _Both intended interested parties filed their applications for joinder to these proceedings on 24th November, 2025. I heard the two applications at the same time and now render this decision. 1st INTENDED INTERESTED PARTY'S APPLICATION [3] The affidavit in support of the 1st intended interested party's application was jointly sworn by Mr. Solomon Ngoma, Mr. Isaac Mwanza, Mr. Arthur Muyunda, Mr. Patrick Kaumba, Mr. Clifton Chifuwe, Mr. George Shonga, Mr. Bernard Uteka and Ms. Bernadettte Mulenga, in their capacities as leaders and R5 representatives of the CSOs that are members of the Consortium intending to join the proceedings. [4] It was their evidence that the Consortium is an unincorporated association of eight (8) registered CSOs collectively engaged in promoting democracy, good governance, constitutionalism and the rule of law. [5] Chronicling the Consortium's involvement in the constitutional reform process from the time a ministerial statement on the Government's intention to amend the Constitution was made in March 2025, to the introduction of the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill No. 7 of 2025; the deponents averred that the Consortium expressed its concerns through press releases and letters addressed to the Minister of Justice and the Republican ----- President over the Constitution amendment process. [6] According to the deponents, on 24th June, 2025, the Consortium and another coalition of CSOs met the President. That one of the resolutions from the meeting was that members of the Consortium would be considered for inclusion on the Technical Working Group. Following the deferment of the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill No. 7 of 2025, the Consortium and CSO coalition authored a letter nominating fourteen (14) organisations to be considered for C ii •' R6 appointment to the Technical Working Group. That some of the nominated organisations included, the Law Association of Zambia, Non-Governmental Organisations Coordinating Committee for Gender and Development Registered Trustees (NGOCC), the Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) and the Zambian Civil Liberties Union (ZCLU). [7] The deponents further averred that on 2nd October, 2025, the President appointed a Technical Committee on Amendments to the Constitution. Some of the people appointed to serve on the Technical Committee, were members from the Consortium namely its Chairperson, Mr. Isaac Mwanza and Ms. Isabel Mukelebai as representatives of the coalition of CSOs. In addition, the President appointed traditional leaders, lawyers, academicians, youth and women representatives, as well as persons with disabilities. [8] It was deposed that when the Technical Committee started its public consultations and receipt of submissions, the Consortium made both written and oral submissions to the Technical Committee as provided in its terms of reference, broader issues concerning the electoral process and systems, as well as specific constitutional matters. R7 [9] That the Consortium which was an active participant in the Constitution amendment process is concerned that a decision in favour of the petitioners in the main matter could render its submissions to the Technical Committee meaningless. As a result, that this would prejudice the Consortium's engagement, legitimate interest and expectation because its submissions were already taken on board. [1 O] It was on this basis that the Consortium seeks to be joined to these proceedings as an interested party so that the Court may be given full perspective of the Constitution amendment process in determining this petition. [11] In the skeleton arguments in support of the application, the 1st intended interested party begun by citing Order V rule 6 of the Constitutional Court Rules Statutory Instrument No. 37 of 2016 (CCR) as the basis for its application. It also relied on the case of Institute of Law, Policy Research and Human Rights Limited v Attorney General and Brian Mundubile1 submitting that the Consortium had sufficient interest in the petition by virtue of being a central stakeholder in the Constitution amendment process, and that it was only just and equitable that the Consortium be heard in the defence of that process. RS [12] Marshalling the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the 1st intended interested party co'ntended that a Government initiated constitutional review process creates a legitimate expectation that participants views would be genuinely considered and feedback given through a produced report. The cases of Clare Akombelwa Mac Wangi v Katongo Bwalya & Attorney General2 R v North , and East Deon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan3 and Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly4 were called in aid of its position. [13] Article 2 of the Constitution, Chapter 1 of the Laws of Zambia as ~,t~ -arnenoeo b\> ~ct No. 2 0120,e (tne Co'f'lst,tut,on), w~t e,\~~ ~~ supporting the Consortium's application to be joined as an interested party, on the ground that the Consortium has a constitutional duty to defend the Constitution. According to the Consortium, defending the Constitution included the Constitution amendment process. [14] It was further submitted that the absence of the Consortium from the proceedings would entail that the Court would only be hearing a limited view from one side of civil society in Zambia in relation to the Constitution amendment process; adding that this would not paint a full picture of the constitutional complexities given that the R9 petitioners' views did not represent the collective position of CSOs in the Constitution amendment process. [15] The 1st intended interested party concluded by submitting that it is in the interest of justice, fairness and completeness of adjudication that it be joined to these proceedings as this would assist the Court in arriving at a fully informed and just determination. 2nd INTENDED INTERESTED PARTY [16] The 2nd intended interested party deposed that he is the Executive Director of Honour for Justice Foundation whose objectives include civic education and promotion of human rights. [17] That as a Zambian national and registered voter at Mungoliso Poling station, he is an active citizen with interest in the affairs of the country and was part of a coalition of over eleven thousand (11,000) Zambian voters and activists who made submissions to the Technical Committee. [18] He averred that his fear lay in the aim of the petition, that is, challenging the process of the Technical Committee so as to annul the submissions that were made before it. That consequently, the ------ outcome of the petition would directly affect his rights and interests as a citizen and voter, as well as the legal and political framework within which he operates. R10 [19] In the skeleton arguments, the 2nd intended interested party stated , that his application was made pursuant to Order V rule 6(1) of the CCR and Order 15 rule 6(2) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of England, 1965 (The White Book) (RSC). Based on these provisions, he submitted that a person may be joined to proceedings if they are entitled to claim some share or interest in the subject matter of the suit or are likely to be affected by the result. That the rationale of this was to ensure that all matters in dispute are effectually and completely determined as well as to avoid multiplicity of suits and miscarriage of justice. [20] Cited were persuasive authorities from the Supreme Court and decisions made by single judges of this Court, namely, Moses Sakala v The Attorney General and Another5 and Institute of Law, Policy Research and Human Rights Limited1 to advance an argument that the test for joinder of an interested party is a demonstration of sufficient interest. [21] The 2nd intended interested party further submitted that his interest in the petition was not speculative or academic. It was direct, tangible and legally recognisable due to the direct consequences that the outcome of the petition would have on the Zambian populace and citizenry. That as a registered voter and citizen, the 2nd intended interested party had a fundamental stake in the • R11 constitutional compact. His main assertion was that the Technical Committee was legally constituted and justifiable as its mandate is purely advisory in keeping with this Court's directive for the need for popular participation. The 2nd intended interested party did not file a reply. PETITIONERS' RESPONSE [22] The petitioners filed a single response to the joinder applications of the intended interested parties. The affidavit in opposition was sworn by the president of the Law Association of Zambia (LAZ), Mr. Lungisani Zulu who averred that the two intended interested parties had not disclosed any direct legal interest in the petition. The deponent further averred that the joinder applications were premature because the respondent had not yet filed his answer to the petition. That at this stage, the 1st intended interested party was not in a position to show how the respondent would not be able to make arguments on its behalf. "-- [23] In the skeleton arguments, the petitioners argued that the applications by the intended interested parties were premature. Seeing as the pleadings had not closed, the issues between the principal parties to the petition had not crystallised to warrant a 3rd party to claim a legal stake. According to the petitioners, Order V rule 6(1) of the CCR, only provides for joinder in respect of an R12 existing 'matter in controversy'. That the Court therefore, cannot assess a legal interest in a dispute that has not yet been framed in law or fact. [24] The petitioners next argued that the intended interested parties failed to demonstrate a legally cognisable interest in the subject matter of the petition. Relying on the cases of Abel Mulenga and Others v Mabvuto Adan Avuta Chikumbi and Others6 and Mike Hamusonde Mweemba v ZSIC7 the petitioners argued that mere , public participation in the constitution amendment process did not cloth the intended interested parties with direct, identifiable and legally protectable interest. [25) The petitioners further contended that the intended interested parties' interests were policy based as none had shown any legal right likely to be extinguished; or any obligation likely to be imposed; or any direct 'legal prejudice arising from the petition. [26) The Kenyan cases of Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance v Mumo Matemu & 5 Others8 and Francis Muruatetu & Another v Republic9 were cited to underscore the limited role of interested parties in proceedings. It was argued that the issues the intended interested parties sought to raise relating to public consultations do not fall within the scope of pleaded issues as between the petitioners .. R13 and the respondent. Rather, that the intended interested parties' applications rely heavily on conjecture about potential political or - policy consequences. As a result, that this does not satisfy Order V rule 6 of the CCR, which requires an interested party to hold a legally identifiable interest in a dispute before the Court. [27] On the authority of Mulenga v Mumbi ex parte Mhango10 the , petitioners argued that the two applications amounted to a multiplicity and duplication of procedural steps, and therefore an abuse of court process. [28] The petitioners also advanced the argument that the petition sought to challenge the actions of the Executive only. As such, this did not affect the intended interested parties' interest as no order was sought against them. [29] In concluding, the petitioners urged me to dismiss the applications for joinder with costs. 1sT INTENDED INTERESTED PARTY'S REPLY [30] The 1st intended interested party filed its reply, affidavit in support and skeleton arguments on 3rd December, 2025 in which it maintained its position of having demonstrated sufficient interest in the proceedings to warrant its joinder as an interested party. It then went on to challenge in its affidavit the regularity of paragraphs 2, 3, R14 4 and 5 of the petitioners' affidavit for containing extraneous matters not permissible under the CCR The reply also challenged the assertion by the petitioners that Mr. Isaac Mwanza was a member of the Electoral Reforms Technical Committee (ERTC), a position which counsel for the petitioners withdrew at the hearing. [31] The arguments in reply were anchored on three issues raised by the petitioners in response. On the issue of whether the Consortium has demonstrated a sufficient and identifiable legal interest to be joined as an interested party, it was submitted that the phrase "identifiable legal interest" is broad. It encompasses parties whose public interest responsibilities are directly implicated by the subject matter of the litigation or connected to the protection of constitutionalism and rule of law. The case of Isaac Mwanza and Zambian Civil Liberties Union v The Attorney General and 3 Others11 was given as an example where the Court allowed the joinder of church mother bodies as interested parties on the basis of their involvement in the promotion of morality, ethics, human dignity and individual rights and freedoms. [32] Being composed of registered CSOs whose constitutional mandates include promotion of good governance, constitutionalism, public accountability and public participation, it was argued that the R15 1st intended interested party had a legal interest in the petition at hand. [33] On the strength of the case of Dr Daniel Pule and Others v The Attorney General and Others 12 .it was submitted that constitutional , litigation is to be approached with broad and purposive rules of standing. That legal interest includes a direct or indirect interest in the subject matter, in the interpretation or enforcement of the Constitution and a demonstrable engagement with the processes being challenged. [34] The 1st intended interested party argued that it had a stake in the outcome of these proceedings because the determination of the petition will affect the environment within which CSOs operate and therefore to decide the petition without its participation would be prejudicial. Further, that the Court could not determine the allegation in the petition touching on the Constitution amendment process not being people-driven without the benefit of evidence and submissions from entities that were engaged with the process. [35] Replying to the second issue on whether the joinder application was premature on account of pleadings not having closed, the 1st intended interested party called in aid the CCR. It reasoned that the Rules permit the joinder of interested parties at any stage of the R16 proceedings provided that there is no prejudice. Early joinder applications, it was offered by the 1st intended interested party are preferred because they promote orderly case management and avoid disruption arising from late Joinder applications. [36] Submissions on the last issue were that the joinder of the 1st intended interested party would be of great assistance to the Court. It was pointed out that the 1st intended interested party was in a unique position by virtue of having participated in the Constitution amendment process. It not only made formal submissions, but can also speak to the consultations undertaken, the nature of public participation and the broader context within which the process unfolded. HEARING [37] The matter came up for hearing on 4th December, 2025. Before the intended interested parties could lay out their applications, the petitioners' counsel, Mr. Batakathi, raised a preliminary objection against the 1st intended interested party's representation, alleging that as body corporates, they ought, according to the law, have appeared through counsel and not in person. The cases of Workers Development Corporation (ZCTU Ltd) v Davie Mkandawire13 and Afri Zone Global Merchants Ltd v The Bank R17 of Zambia14 were cited in support of the position. On that basis, counsel argued that the 1st intended interested party's presence in Court was defective and ought to be thrown out. [38] On behalf of the 1st intended interested party, Mr. Isaac Mwanza argued on the basis of Article 2 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court Act No. 8 of 2016 (CCA) and the CCR that the 1st intended interested party had a right to defend the Constitution. That under Article 266 of the Constitution, they _f ell within the definition of 'person' and had a right to participate in proceedings before the Court under section 11 of the CCA. He also argued that the established practice of the Court was to permit organisations to appear in person contrary to the petitioner's submission that they could only appear through counsel according to the RSC. In Mr. Mwanza's view, the CCR were comprehensive and could not be dominated by the RSC because the Constitutional Court was created as a people's court and its practice was to allow persons to appear in person. In concluding, he urged me to dismiss the preliminary objection. [39] The learned Attorney General did not offer any opinion. [40] In reply, Mr. Batakathi contended that section 11 of the CCA was not in issue but rather how a body corporate ought to appear in R18 these proceedings. That body corporates could not appear in person and where they opted to do so, they would have to obtain leave of the Court. Placing reliance on the Workers Development Corporation (ZCTU Ltd) case, counsel argued that requiring the proper appearance of the 1st intended interested party would not entail a loss of their constitutional rights but rather to ensure that the law was applied properly. [41] Mr. Mwanza, thereafter, moved to present the 1st intended interested party's application for joinder. He placed reliance on the 1st intended interested party's affidavit in support and skeleton arguments filed on 24th November, 2025, the affidavit in reply and skeleton arguments in support filed on 3rd December, 2025. He rehashed most of the arguments on record, however augmenting that the 1st intended interested party's participation in the process of the Technical Committee involved a lot of resources and time. In addition, activities were taken by the Consortium to facilitate the people's participation in the Constitution amendment process. [42] In terms of the Consortium's legal interest in the proceedings, Mr. Mwanza submitted that the CSOs are involved in governance, championing constitutionalism and democracy. That they share a common duty with the pethioners to contribute to the constitutional reform process. That in the premises, if the intended interested R19 parties were added to the ongoing proceedings, the Court could benefit by hearing from the people who participated in the process as opposed to the petitioners who absconded from it. He concluded by urging me to join the 1st intended interested party to these proceedings. [43] The 2nd intended interested party, placed reliance on his affidavit in support and skeleton arguments filed on 24th November, 2025. He averred that the petitioners had not launched a real challenge against his application. That the petitioners' argument that he had failed to disclose direct legal interest in the petition and that his application was prematurely before Court was not supported by any law. He submitted that the Court has already settled the law at what stage joinder of interested parties can be made. Thus, the alleged requirement by the petitioners' that a respondent must file an answer before interested parties can be joined to proceedings is misconceived and misleading. [44] Mr. Sakala submitted that the petitioners' contention that the dispute between the principal parties has not yet crystalised was misplaced because by filing their petition, the petitioners had accrued a cause of action. As far as Mr. Sakala was concerned, his legal interest in the petition was disclosed at paragraphs 4, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of his affidavit. That in consequence, the petitioners' quest to annul the R20 work of the Technical Committee before the Court, directly affected him as a participant in the process and as a person who now has more interest in these proceedings as opposed to the petitioners who absconded from it. [45] Mr. Sakala further submitted that through his organisation, Honour for Justice Foundation, the people he reached out to during the process of the Technical Committee and himself, had a right and duty to protect the process. That this could only be done if they were heard by the Court. [46] The learned Attorney General did not offer any view. [47] In response, and on behalf of the petitioners, Mr. Batakathi told the Court that he would rely on their affidavit in opposition and skeleton arguments filed on 28th November, 2025. He augmented that the principles on the joinder of interested parties to proceedings were well settled. That is, a person is required to demonstrate legal or legitimate interest in proceedings, a direct and substantive interest in the matter and, more importantly, to show the prejudice that would occasion to the intended interested party if they were not joined to the proceedings. That in this matter, the intended interested parties failed to demonstrate that they had legal interest, or a stake or a legal duty to participate in these proceedings. R21 [48] He added that the intended interested parties were only a small fraction and it would be too simplistic for the Court to open the flood gates by allowing the intended interested parties or the alleged 11,860 people who participated in the Technical Committee process to join these proceedings merely on account of that fact. That instead, the Attorney General through his Office as protector of ' public interest would be able to cover their interest and that of the others. Counsel supported his view by referring me to the Court's decision in the case of Law Association of Zambia v The Attorney General15 and emphasised that all the people who participated before the Technical Committee did not have to appear in these proceedings because the Attorney General's Office would adequately represent them. [49] Counsel submitted that for the orderly conduct of litigation in this country and to avoid unnecessary intervention in cases by people who ought not to be involved, it was only prudent that where the public interest is concerned, the responsibility should fall on the Attorney General to effectively defend the interest. [50] In response, Mr. Mwanza submitted that section 11 (2)(d) of the CCA clothes the 1st intended interested party with the right to appear before the Court. He dismissed the petitioners' argument that only the Attorney General could stand in matters of public interest before R22 the Court. That just like the petitioners who had brought a matter which they labelled to be in public interest, the 1st intended interested party and other persons had a right to litigate public interest matters before the Court. [51] Mr. Mwanza further dismissed the petitioners' argument on prejudice being a consideration in an application for the joinder of an interested party, arguing that the criterion was not provided in Rule 2 of the CCR. He summed up by reiterating that the 1st intended interested party had demonstrated its legal or identifiable interest in these proceedings and prayed to the Court to join them. [52] Mr. Sakala in reply dismissed the petitioners' argument that the intended interested parties represented a small fraction of the people who participated before the Technical Committee. That instead, as a citizen guided by the Constitution which states the duties and rights of citizens, he participated in the work of the Technical Committee, just like the 11,000 people. As such, they had every right to defend the process and if it would take all the 11,000 people who submitted to the process to be joined to these proceedings; then that would be considered as serving the real interest of justice. R23 (53] The petitioners' submission that the learned Attorney General is the rightful custodian of public interest was not disputed. However, Mr. Sakala wondered why the petitioners who are Zambians and protected by that Office chose to sue the Attorney General. That in any case, the Attorney General was only defending the relief that targets the process as the rightful person, while he has a right to be joined to these proceedings because the relief that targets to annul the process that he participated in roots his legitimate interest. That in any case, the aggrieved members of the Law Association of Zambia, who are one of the petitioners' herein, a body he is affiliated to, only represent a small fraction of the Zambian people. As such, it was only proper that he be granted leave to join these proceedings. CONSIDERATION AND DETERMINATION (54] I have considered the two applications for joinder, the affidavits in support and reply thereof, the petitioners' affidavit in opposition, the respective skeleton arguments filed by learned counsel for the parties and their oral submissions. [55] I will begin by addressing the petitioners' preliminary objection that the 1st intended interested party is wrongly before Court. That as body corporates, the members of the Consortium ought to have R24 been represented by counsel and if they opted to appear in person, they were required to obtain leave of the Court before proceeding. [56] Article 2(a) of the Constitution relevantly provides that: . 2. Every person has a right to - (a) defend the Constitution [57] A person is defined under Article 266 of the Constitution as: 'person' means an individual, a company or an association of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate. [58] It can therefore be stated that in the defence of the Constitution, any person can appear before this Court to defend the Constitution. [59] In terms of the Constitutional Court Act, section 11 (1) provides that: 11. (1) The parties to a matter before the Court may appear in person or be represented and appear by a practitioner. [60] It follows, therefore, and in determining the petitioners' preliminary objection, that neither the Constitution nor the CCA requires a person including a company to appear before the Constitutional Court through a lawyer or that where a body corporate seeks to appear before this Court in person, that it should first obtain leave of Court. This is because constitutional litigation is broad and covers public interest and the people should not be fettered in their quest for justice before this Court. Thus, a person can appear in person before this Court and where they elect to appear through advocates, ------ R25 they would be equally entitled to do so. As a result, the petitioners' reliance on the RSC which applies to ordinary civil cases is misplaced because the Constitution, the CCA and CCR adequately provide for locus standi befoce this Court. [61] I am mindful that the 1st intended interested party also raised objection on the petitioners' affidavit in opposition to their application alleging that paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 contained extraneous matters not permitted under the CCR. [62] Order VI rule 13 of the CCR provides that - An affidavit shall contain only a statement of facts and circumstances to which the witness deposes, based on the witness's own personal knowledge or from information which the witness believes to be true. [63] Rule 14 of Order VI of the CCR further goes to state that: an affidavit shall not contain an extraneous matter by way of objection, prayer, legal argument or conclusion. [64] These provisions collectively require that affidavits should be composed of facts/content that a deponent knows to be true or believes to be true. These facts have to be relevant to the subject of an application of which the affidavit evidence is tendered in support of and they should not take the form of objections, prayers, legal arguments or conclusions. R26 [65] The impugned paragraphs are to the effect that: 2. The deponent has read the intended interested parties affidavits and wishes to respond to them. 3. The intended interested parties applications do not disclose a direct legal interest in the petition. 4. The application is premature as the respondent has not filed its answer to the petition. 5. Mr. Isaac Mwanza is a member of the Technical Committee and the ERTC. (The latter averment was withdrawn at the hearing). [66] After examining the paragraphs above, my view is that they represent factual assertions by the petitioners' on how they perceive the intended interested parties' positions. They do not contain extraneous matters by way of argument or conclusion. I therefore, have no basis upon which to expunge the paragraphs from the record. I accordingly decline to grant the 1st intended interested party's prayer. [67] Turning to the application to be joined to these proceedings, the intended interested parties, have relied on Order V rule 6 of the CCR which provides that: 6. (1) A person may, with leave of the Court, make an application to be joined as an interested party. R27 (2) The Court may, on its own motion, join a person as an interested party to the proceedings. [68] An interested party is defined under Rule 2 of the CCR as follows: "Interested party" means a person or entity directly involved in the litigation that - (a) has an identifiable legal interest in the proceedings; (b) has a stake in the success or failure of the litigation; or (c) has a legal duty to participant in, or obscure, the proceedings. [69] In essence, Rule 2 of the CCR as read with Order V rule 6 of the CCR requires a person intending to join ongoing proceeding as an interested party to show that they have some level of identifiable involvement in the litigation before the Court. This involvement is on three disjunctive levels, namely, (i) identifiable legal interest which must be understood to mean interest founded in law; (ii) having a stake in the success or failure of litigation which covers any person who may be affected by the outcome of the litigation; (iii) having a duty to participate in proceedings which must be drawn from the law. [70] Order V rule 6(1) of the CCR, expressly empowers the Court, 'at any stage of the proceedings', to order the joinder of a person whose presence is necessary to enable it to effectually and completely adjudicate upon all questions involved in a matter before it. The R28 Rule, it must be emphasised, does not make the filing of an answer a pre-condition for determining an application for joinder of an interested party. [71] As such, the petitioner's contention that in the absence of an answer filed by the respondent implying that issues between the principal parties would not yet have crystallised is inconsequential, as the Court is not required to consider such factor which is not supported by the law. [72] Having settled the matter, I now move to consider the issue before me, that is, whether I should grant the intended interested parties leave to join the main proceedings? The only criteria as stated above that the Court should consider in the joinder of interested parties in ongoing proceedings is provided for in Order V rule 6(1) as read with Rule 2 of the CCR. [73] In the cases of Moses Sakala5 Institute of Law, Policy Research , and Human Rights Limited1 and Dr. Daniel Pule & Others v Attorney General & Others12 the Court has established that the determination of legal interest under Order V rule 6(1) of the CCR must be made purposively and in a manner consistent with the Court's constitutional mandate, because it implicates interests that go beyond the immediate parties. Further, that the joinder of other R29 parties in ongoing proceedings in constitutional litigation may be required in the public interest and to enhance the Court's capacity in dealing with constitutional questions. [74] Suffice to state that in Dr. Daniel Pule & Others12 the Court opined that the CCR adequately provide for the criteria upon which the Court may order the joinder of interested parties in proceedings before it and there is no need for a party to rely on the provisions of the RSC as the 2nd intended interested party sought to do. [75] In considering the applications of the intended interested parties to join these proceedings, all I have to bear in mind is that they only, and not any other party, have the duty to satisfy me that they meet the threshold test stated in Order V rule 6(1) as read with Rule 2 of the CCR. [76] The 1st intended interested party offers that the Consortium was actively involved in the Constitution amendment process from the time the Government announced its intention up to the time the Technical Committee was established. That its members made submissions to the Technical Committee based on its terms of reference and on other governance issues. In addition, the Consortium spent resources, time and effort in mobilizing citizens to participate before the Technical Committee. That more pointedly, .. R30 the issues that the 1st intended interested party intends to bring to the Court if it were joined to these proceedings and as fully set out in its affidavits in support and reply, will give the Court the full picture of the dispute before it. [77] It was further submitted that, the 1st intended interested party as a Consortium of CSOs who are involved in governance, championing constitutionalism and democracy, and more importantly as citizens who participated in the Constitution amendment process, have a better view of the issues before Court as opposed to the petitioners who absconded from the process. [78] Accordingly, the Consortium has the right to be heard by the Court and to explain the process of the Constitution amendment process which they aver was people-driven, engaging and a reflection of the people's submissions who by legitimate expectation expect that the process will result into constitutional reform. That this is what is in . the interest of the public and forms the core of the Consortium's asserted legal interest in this petition as well as its participation in these proceedings. [79] The 2nd intended interested party, offers that as a citizen, voter, leader of a civic organisation and as one of the more than 11,000 people who made submissions to the Technical Committee, he has R31 a legal stake in this petition, which seeks to annul his contributions to the Constitution amendment process. He also submits that he has legal interest in the proceedings before this Court as opposed to the petitioners who absconded from the process and do not represent the public interest. [80] The 2nd intended interested party further submits that his participation in the Constitution amendment process was guided by the Constitution, which imposes a legal right and duty on him to do so. That if at all the issue is about the defence of the public interest, then the 11,000 people who participated before the Technical Committee have more right to be heard by the Court. [81] Applying the principles that the Court must take into account when considering an application for joinder of an intended interested party, I am satisfied that the intended interested parties have demonstrated sufficient legal and cognisable interest in these proceedings. In my view, their interest is not abstract, nor does it amount to mere speculation or conjecture about policy consequences or an expression of general civic curiosity or commentary. Rather, their affidavits in my view, disclose that they have an identifiable legal interest in the proceedings before Court coupled with a stake in the success or failure of the litigation. R32 [82] am also satisfied that their participation will assist the Court in hearing all the perspectives in this petition that are necessary for the proper and effectual determination of the issues in controversy. [83] I therefore exercise my discretion in their favour and join the intended interested parties to these proceedings as the 1st and 2nd interested parties, respectively. [84] I shall issue directions on how the matter shall proceed at the scheduling conference. [85] The parties shall bear their own costs. Dated at Lusaka this 8th day of December, 2025 M. Mapani-Kawimbe Constitutional Court Judge