Case Law[2024] ZACC 11South Africa
Coronation Investment Management SA (Pty) Limited v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service (CCT 47/23) [2024] ZACC 11; 2024 (9) BCLR 1128 (CC); 2024 (6) SA 310 (CC); 87 SATC 150 (21 June 2024)
Constitutional Court of South Africa
21 June 2024
Headnotes
Summary: Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 — section 9D exemption — foreign controlled company — foreign business establishment — meaning of “business” and “primary operations”
Judgment
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## Coronation Investment Management SA (Pty) Limited v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service (CCT 47/23) [2024] ZACC 11; 2024 (9) BCLR 1128 (CC); 2024 (6) SA 310 (CC); 87 SATC 150 (21 June 2024)
Coronation Investment Management SA (Pty) Limited v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service (CCT 47/23) [2024] ZACC 11; 2024 (9) BCLR 1128 (CC); 2024 (6) SA 310 (CC); 87 SATC 150 (21 June 2024)
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FLYNOTES:
TAX – Income tax –
Exemptions
–
Whether
net income of foreign subsidiary was exempted from tax for 2012
year of assessment in accordance with section 9D exemption
–
Foreign controlled company – Requirements for constituting a
foreign business establishment – Tax Court
was correct in
holding that tax exemption applied – Approach adopted by
Supreme Court of Appeal is legally and factually
unsustainable –
Does not make commercial sense – Requirements for section 9D
met – Appeal upheld –
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962.
CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case
CCT 47/23
In
the matter between:
CORONATION
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
SA
(PTY)
LIMITED
Applicant
and
COMMISSIONER
FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN
REVENUE
SERVICE
Respondent
Neutral
citation:
Coronation Investment
Management SA (Pty) Limited v Commissioner for the South African
Revenue Service
[2024] ZACC 11
Coram:
Zondo CJ,
Bilchitz AJ, Chaskalson AJ,
Madlanga J,
Majiedt J, Mathopo J, Mhlantla J, Theron J and
Tshiqi J.
Judgment:
Majiedt J (unanimous)
Heard
on:
13 February 2024
Decided
on:
21 June 2024
Summary:
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 — section 9D exemption —
foreign controlled company — foreign business establishment —
meaning of “business” and “primary operations”
ORDER
On appeal from the
Supreme Court of Appeal (hearing an appeal from the Tax Court, Cape
Town):
1.
Leave to appeal in respect of the appeal is granted.
2.
The appeal is upheld. The order of the Supreme Court of Appeal
is set aside
and substituted with the following:
“
The
appeal is dismissed with costs, including the costs of two counsel.”
3.
The respondent must pay the costs, including the costs of two
counsel.
JUDGMENT
MAJIEDT J
(Zondo CJ, Bilchitz AJ, Chaskalson AJ,
Madlanga J,
Mathopo J, Mhlantla J, Theron J and Tshiqi J
concurring):
Introduction
and background
[1]
During the mid to
latter part of the 1990s, as South Africa increasingly gained
acceptance back as a member of the international
community, exchange
controls were being relaxed by the government. There was
significant appetite among South African
investors to gain
access to global markets and to externalise assets. As a
consequence, local companies increasingly established
foreign
subsidiaries. The Coronation group was one of those which did
so. A notable related development was that during
2001 the
South African tax system changed from a source-based system of
taxation to a residence-based system. This came about
through
the enactment of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act.
[1]
The worldwide income of a South African tax resident then became
subject to normal taxation. Non-residents are only
subject to
tax in South Africa to the extent that they have income from a
source in South Africa.
[2]
Section 9D of the
Income Tax Act
[2]
(ITA) is an
anti-avoidance provision that was introduced by the Revenue Laws
Amendment Act.
[3]
That
section was introduced to deal with the taxation of
South
African taxpayers
on
their
income
earned abroad
,
particularly
income
earned by South African owned foreign
corporate
entities
.
As will appear more fully later, in respect of foreign-earned company
income, the section seeks to strike a balance between
the opposing
paradigms of pure anti-deferral (warranting complete taxation) and
international competitiveness (exemption).
[4]
It does so by favouring international competitiveness where the
income emanates from active operations abroad.
[3]
The central issue is whether the net income of
Coronation
Global Fund Managers (Ireland) Limited (CGFM),
a foreign
subsidiary of the applicant in the main application,
Coronation
Investment Management SA (Pty) Limited (CIMSA)
, was exempted
from tax for the 2012 year of assessment in accordance with the
provisions of section 9D of the ITA. The
exemption will
apply if, at that time, CGFM had met the requirements for
constituting a “foreign business establishment”
(FBE) as
defined in section 9D(9)(b). It is not in issue that at
that time CGFM was a “controlled foreign company”
of
CIMSA, as defined in section 9D.
[4]
In
respect of the 2012 tax year, the respondent, the Commissioner for
the South African Revenue Service (SARS), assessed CIMSA’s
tax
liability to include in its income an amount equal to the entire “net
income” of CGFM. In doing so, SARS
sought to apply
section 9D(2) read with section 9D(2A) of the ITA.
[5]
In
its Finalisation of Audit Letter, SARS concluded that CGFM does not
meet the requirements for recognition as an FBE as the primary
functions of its business had been outsourced.
The
Tax Court in Cape Town held that CGFM was an FBE as defined and,
accordingly, qualified for a tax exemption. It upheld
CIMSA’s
objection to that additional assessment. The Tax Court
thus set aside SARS’s additional assessment
against CIMSA and
ordered it to issue a reduced tax assessment, excluding therein any
amount that was included in CIMSA’s
income under section 9D of
the ITA pertaining to CGFM’s income. Consequently, the
Tax Court held that SARS was not
entitled to claim: (a)
understatement penalties in terms of section 222 of the Tax
Administration Act
[6]
(TAA); (b)
understatement penalties for provisional tax under paragraph 20 of
the Fourth Schedule to the ITA; and (c) interest
in terms of
section 89(2) of the ITA. The Tax Court granted leave
to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
[5]
The Supreme Court
of Appeal upheld the appeal. It disagreed with the Tax Court in
respect of the question as to whether CGFM
met the definition of an
FBE as defined in the ITA. That Court held that
CGFM
does not meet the requirements for an FBE exemption and, instead, the
net income of CGFM is imputable to CIMSA for the 2012
tax year under
section 9D(2). It thus upheld SARS’ appeal to the
extent that it directed CIMSA to pay the income
tax on CGFM’s
income and the interest in terms of section 89(2) of the ITA.
However, the Supreme Court of Appeal
found that SARS’
claim for understatement penalties and underestimation penalties must
fail.
[7]
CIMSA seeks leave
to appeal against the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal.
There is also
an
application by SARS for leave to cross-appeal against parts of the
judgment and order of the Supreme Court of Appeal relating
to the
penalties.
The legislative scheme
[6]
Since CGFM is a controlled foreign company
of the applicant, CIMSA, it is subject to South African tax law.
Section 9D(2) provides that the net income of a controlled
foreign company is imputed to its South African parent company. The
section
reads:
“
There
shall be included in the income for the year of assessment of any
resident . . . who directly or indirectly holds any participation
rights in a controlled foreign company . . . an amount equal to . . .
the proportional amount of the net income of that controlled
foreign
company.”
[7]
The imputation of income is subject to certain exceptions, one
of which relates to the net income of a controlled foreign company
that derives from an FBE. In this regard, section 9D(9)(b)
states:
“
in
determining the net income of a controlled foreign company . . . ,
there must not be taken into account any amount which is attributable
to any foreign business establishment of that controlled foreign
company.”
[8]
Section 9D(1) defines and outlines the requirements of an FBE.
It reads:
“‘
foreign
business establishment’, in relation to a controlled foreign
company, means-
(a)
a fixed place of business located in a country other than the
Republic that is used or will
continue to be used for the carrying on
of
the business of that controlled foreign company
for a
period of not less than one year, where-
(i)
that business is conducted through one or more offices, shops,
factories, warehouses
or other structures;
(ii)
that fixed place of business is suitably staffed with on-site
managerial and operational
employees of that controlled foreign
company who conduct
the primary operations of that business
;
(iii)
that fixed place of business is suitably equipped for conducting
the
primary operations of that business
;
(iv)
that fixed place of business has suitable facilities for conducting
the primary operations of that business
; and
(v)
that fixed place of business is located outside the Republic solely
or mainly for
a purpose other than the postponement or reduction of
any tax imposed by any sphere of government in the Republic:
Provided that for the
purposes of determining whether there is a fixed place of business as
contemplated in this definition, a controlled
foreign company may
take into account the utilisation of structures as contemplated in
subparagraph (i), employees as contemplated
in subparagraph
(ii), equipment as contemplated in subparagraph (iii), and facilities
as contemplated in subparagraph (iv) of any
other company-
(aa)
if that other company is subject to tax in the country in which the
fixed place of business of the
controlled foreign company is located
by virtue of residence, place of effective management or other
criteria of a similar nature;
(bb)
if that other company forms part of the same group of companies as
the controlled foreign company;
and
(cc)
to the extent that the structures, employees, equipment and
facilities are located in the same
country as the fixed place of
business of the controlled foreign company.” (Emphasis
added.)
[9]
CGFM, and not
CIMSA, would ordinarily be liable for local taxes in Ireland.
If CGFM was in fact liable for local taxes in
Ireland, CIMSA would be
able to deduct the amount of those local taxes from its tax liability
under section 6
quat
(1)(b).
[8]
That section would be of relevance only if CGFM is not an FBE,
because if CGFM is an FBE, section 9D(9)(b) provides
that none
of the income of CGFM is included in CIMSA’s taxable income
under section 9D(2).
Issues
[10]
Two elements of the definition of an FBE
are central to the determination of the main issue. They are:
(a) identifying the
“business of that controlled foreign
company” and (b) determining whether the fixed place of
business was suitably
staffed and equipped for conducting “the
primary operations of that business”. Plainly, therefore,
the enquiry
must be undertaken as a two-stage process: first, what is
CGFM’s “business” and, second, what are its
“primary
operations”. These two enquiries are
interrelated and discussing them may overlap. CGFM’s
business activities
in Dublin bear close scrutiny to answer these two
questions.
[11]
CIMSA’s case has consistently been
that the business operations conducted by CGFM in Ireland complied
with the FBE requirements
set out in section 9D(1)(a)(i)- (v).
It did not seek reliance on the proviso in that section at all.
SARS
accepts that CGFM had adequate on-site operations, employees and
management. But SARS contends that CGFM’s business
lacked
economic substance. That contention is based on SARS’
averment that CGFM had outsourced its entire core business
and all
that remained in Dublin were ancillary, non-core activities. It
was common cause that CGFM had, apart from investment
management
trading, also outsourced the marketing and distribution functions.
[12]
The determination of whether CGFM’s
operations in Ireland had the requisite economic substance to qualify
for the tax exemption
in section 9D calls for a close scrutiny
of the facts relating to CGFM’s business activities.
Importantly, a distinction
must be drawn between fund management and
investment management, an aspect that will be considered presently.
Factual matrix
[13]
Virtually
all the facts are common cause or not seriously disputed. They
appear in SARS’ statement of the grounds of
assessment and
CIMSA’s statement of the grounds of appeal. The facts
also emerge from the evidence led by CIMSA before
the Tax Court of
Mr Alan King,
[9]
Ms Tracy Doyle,
[10]
Mr John Snalam
[11]
and Mr Declan Casey.
[12]
CIMSA also adduced documentary evidence in the form of board packs
and minutes of board meetings relating to CGFM’s
Dublin
operations. SARS led no evidence.
[14]
Coronation
Fund Managers Limited (Coronation) is a South African public company
listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE).
It has various
subsidiaries, here and abroad, that operate in the sphere of fund
management and investment management. At
all material times,
CIMSA was a 100% subsidiary of Coronation and held all the shares as
the holding company of Coronation Management
Company (RF) (Pty)
Limited
(CMC)
and
Coronation Asset Management (Pty) Limited (CAM), both registered as
tax residents in South Africa. CIMSA was also the
100% holding
company of Coronation Fund Managers (Isle of Man) Limited, tax
resident in the Isle of Man. The latter, which
has since been
deregistered, in turn, was the 100% owner of CGFM and Coronation
International Limited (CIL), which were registered
and tax resident
in Ireland and the United Kingdom (UK) respectively.
[13]
The
applicant explains that Ireland was selected because of its highly
regarded regulatory regime.
[15]
CGFM was established in 1997 as a fund
management company in Dublin, Ireland, to provide foreign investment
opportunities in Irish
collective investment funds (often referred to
as unit trusts)
. CIMSA did so because Irish law did not
permit it or any of its South African subsidiaries to manage Irish
domiciled collective
investment funds – it had to establish an
Irish fund management company to do so. It was common cause
that tax considerations
played no role in the decision to establish
CGFM in Ireland. A collective investment fund receives and
pools money from external
investors for investment in terms of the
prospectus of the fund.
[16]
The business model
chosen by CIMSA in relation to CGFM in Ireland is an exact replica of
the business model it uses in relation
to its fund management
business in South Africa,
where
CMC was established as a fund manager (or “management company”)
for a South African-domiciled collective investment
fund. CMC
does not conduct investment trading
[14]
activities, because it is not licensed to perform investment trading
– that would require it to obtain a licence from South
Africa’s
Financial Services Board (FSB). It contracts with CAM
which is a specialist investment manager (that
is licensed under a
different licensing regime) to conduct investment trading activities.
Similarly, in Ireland, CGFM does
not conduct investment trading
activities because it is not licenced to do so. It contracts
with CIL and CAM, which are specialist
investment managers licensed
to conduct investment trading activities within their respective
jurisdictions. On the evidence,
the business model used by
CIMSA in South Africa and Ireland is one used by most South African
and Irish fund managers.
[17]
In its business plan, CGFM enumerated the managerial functions
that it was licensed and required to perform – these were
identified
by the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) as operational
functions. They were: decision-taking, monitoring compliance,
risk management,
monitoring of investment performance, financial
control, monitoring of capital, internal audit and
supervision of
delegates
. In 2011, the business plan was updated to add
complaints handling and accounting policies and procedures as
functions.
[18]
CGFM has a
licence, issued by the CBI under the European Communities
(Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities)
(UCITS) Regulations,
[15]
that
authorises it to manage various collective investment funds in
Ireland, but the licence does not authorise CGFM to conduct
investment management trading activities itself. CGFM is thus a
UCITS fund management company. CGFM adopted as a business
model
in its business plan, which formed part of its licence application
(as the licence in effect required it to do), the delegation
of
investment management trading activities to third parties. As
stated, CGFM has delegated these functions to CAM and CIL
in South
Africa and the UK respectively. CAM and CIL were appropriately
licensed and independently regulated specialist investment
managers.
They made all the decisions and performed all the tasks in
respect of the collective investment funds in South
Africa and the UK
respectively, but under the supervision of CGFM. The latter
established the investment objectives and policies
in an offering
document, the prospectus. The CBI reviewed the prospectus which
CGFM would usually have shared with investors.
CGFM retains
overall responsibility for the prospectus.
[19]
Clause 23 of the UCITS Regulations makes provision for the
delegating of business activities and functions. It reads:
“
(1)
A management company may delegate activities to third parties for the
purpose of the more efficient
conduct of the company’s business
provided that –
(a)
the management company has informed the Bank in an appropriate manner
(whereupon the Bank
shall, without delay, transmit the information to
the competent authority of the home Member State of a UCITS managed
by that management
company),
(b)
the delegation mandate does not prevent the effectiveness of
supervision over the management
company, and in particular it shall
not prevent the management company from acting, or the UCITS from
being managed, in the best
interests of its investors,
(c)
when the delegation concerns investment management, the mandate is
only given to undertakings
which are authorised or registered for the
purpose of asset management and subject to prudential supervision;
the delegation shall
be in accordance with investment-allocation
criteria periodically laid down by a management company,
(d)
where the mandate concerns investment management and is given to a
third country undertaking,
cooperation between the Bank and the
supervisory authorities of the third country concerned is ensured,
(e)
a mandate with regard to the
core function of investment
management
is not given to the trustee or to any other
undertaking whose interests may conflict with those of the management
company
or the unit-holders,
(f)
measures are put in place which enable the persons who conduct the
business of the
management company to monitor effectively at any time
the activity of the undertaking to which the mandate is given,
(g)
the mandate does not prevent the persons who conduct the business of
the management company
either from giving at any time further
instructions to the undertaking to which functions are delegated or
from withdrawing the
mandate or both with immediate effect when this
is in the interest of investors,
(h)
having regard to the nature of the functions to be delegated, the
undertaking to which functions
will be delegated is qualified and
capable of undertaking the functions in question, and
(i)
the prospectuses issued by a UCITS list the functions which a
management company
has been permitted to delegate in accordance with
this Regulation.
(2)
Neither the management company’s nor the trustee’s
liability shall be affected
by the fact that the management company
delegated any functions to third parties, nor shall the management
company delegate its
functions to the extent that it becomes a
letterbox entity.”
[20]
In Dublin, CGFM executed its business activities in terms of
its licence through its directors who held quarterly meetings to set
its business strategy, and through its executive team who managed the
daily operations. As stated, documentary evidence before
the
Tax Court and the evidence of particularly Mr King provided
insight into these operations. Oversight and supervision
of the
investment management functions, outsourced to CAM and CIL, formed a
significant part of CGFM’s tasks.
Tax
Court
[21]
The Tax Court distinguished between fund
management and investment management and noted that CGFM is not an
investment management
company, but a fund management company.
CGFM’s licence authorises it to conduct collective portfolio
management, that
is, fund management. While a fund management
company can do investment management, in this instance that function
was outsourced
to CAM and CIL.
[22]
The
Tax Court held that CGFM fulfilled the requirements of an FBE,
because its fixed place of business is conducted in a physical
structure, it is suitably staffed and equipped, has suitable
facilities to conduct its primary operations (of fund management)
and
is located outside South Africa not for the purpose of postponing or
reducing tax imposed in South Africa. That Court
held that CGFM
has economic substance and does not merely exist on paper – it
said that CIMSA did not form CGFM to “house
activities in the
foreign company to avoid tax in the home country on the income they
produce”.
[16]
It
thus qualified for the section 9D tax exemption.
[23]
The Tax Court upheld CIMSA’s appeal
and set aside SARS’ additional assessment for the 2012 year of
assessment. It
directed SARS to issue CIMSA with a reduced
assessment for the 2012 year of assessment in which no amount was
included in CIMSA’s
income pertaining to the income of CGFM.
Supreme Court of
Appeal
[24]
The Supreme Court of Appeal understood the
primary operations of CGFM’s business to be investment
management. It reasoned
that if CGFM had outsourced all the
primary operations, then the fixed place of business in Ireland lacks
the staff and facilities
to conduct those operations. That
Court further reasoned that if these outsourced operations are
central to the business
of CGFM, because they go to the very nature
of what its business does, then CGFM does not conduct its primary
operations in Ireland.
[25]
The Supreme Court of Appeal further
reasoned that, to qualify for the exemption under section 9D, the
essential operations of a
business must be conducted within the
jurisdiction in respect of which exemption is sought. While
there are undoubtedly many
functions that a company may choose to
outsource legitimately, it cannot outsource its primary business. To
enjoy the same
tax levels as its foreign rivals, making it
internationally competitive, the primary operations of that company
must take place
in the same foreign jurisdiction. Therefore,
CGFM does not meet the requirements for an FBE exemption and,
consequently,
the net income of CGFM is imputable to CIMSA for the
2012 tax year under section 9D(2).
[26]
The
Supreme Court of Appeal upheld SARS’ appeal to the extent that
it directed CIMSA to pay the income tax on CGFM’s
income and
the interest in terms of section 89(2) of the ITA. However,
the Court held that SARS’ claim for understatement
penalties
and underestimation penalties must fail. The latter conclusion
was based on its earlier judgment in
Thistle
Trust
[17]
relating to the provisions of section 222 of the TAA.
In
this Court
CIMSA’s
submissions in the appeal
[27]
CIMSA submits that this Court’s
jurisdiction is engaged as the appeal raises arguable points of law
of general public importance.
The interpretation of “the
business of the controlled foreign company” and “primary
operations of that
business” for purposes of the FBE definition
are points of law. That legal question transcends the interests
of the
parties, since it impacts all South African resident companies
that hold controlled foreign companies.
[28]
Regarding the merits, CIMSA submits that
the Supreme Court of Appeal erred in its
interpretation of the FBE definition.
CIMSA draws a distinction
between what it terms the Supreme Court of Appeal’s
“notional-business interpretation”
and its own
“actual-business interpretation”. The latter
interpretation means that the business of a controlled
foreign
company and the primary operations of that business must be
determined by having regard to what the company in fact does.
The Supreme Court of Appeal’s interpretation, on
the other hand, adopted the approach that the business of
a
controlled foreign company and the primary operations of that
business must be determined by having regard to what the company
could in theory perform and not what it actually does.
[29]
According to CIMSA, a controlled foreign
company’s business is not defined by what it could potentially
or theoretically do,
but by what it actually does. It cannot
have operations (primary or otherwise) that are not part of its
chosen business.
[30]
CIMSA submits further that in its business
plan, presented as part of its licence application, CGFM undertook to
follow a delegated
business model in which it would conduct specified
fund management functions, and would delegate investment management
trading
activities (which it is not authorised to do) to competent
third parties, while retaining overall supervision of, and
responsibility
to the regulatory authority, for those functions.
Further, the licence application was reviewed on the basis that CGFM
was
a “management company who will delegate all constituent
[collective portfolio management] functions to third parties and
[will] maintain the management functions”.
[31]
According to CIMSA there is no single ideal
way to conceive of a business, particularly having regard to
innovation in commerce.
The manner in which companies employ
and manage third-party resources to achieve their commercial purposes
does not mean that they
are not performing “their business”;
on the contrary, that is exactly what they are doing.
[32]
CIMSA submits that the Supreme Court of
Appeal’s approach requires a company like CIMSA to select the
ideal and all-inclusive
form of that business, and then set up a
controlled foreign company in a manner that necessarily makes it
uncompetitive, by resourcing
itself to perform functions that are
much more efficiently and sensibly outsourced, as its competitors do.
[33]
CIMSA contends further that section 9D and
the FBE definition do not use the word “outsource”. The
FBE definition
is not an “anti-outsourcing” provision, as
appears to be central to the Supreme Court of Appeal’s
reasoning.
The focus is on economic substance. The FBE
definition seeks to ensure that a foreign business has economic
substance in
the foreign jurisdiction, regardless of its chosen
business model, and is not an illusory or “paper”
business.
The rationale is that section 9D must not enable tax
avoidance.
[34]
CIMSA argues that the business of CGFM is
that of a fund manager. Thus understood, the Ireland office had
sufficient staff
and equipment to enable CGFM to perform the primary
functions needed to carry on fund management in accordance with the
delegation
model in that fixed place of business in Dublin. As
a result, CGFM satisfied the requirements in (ii), (iii), and (iv) of
the FBE definition, because the fixed place of business was suitable
for the business that CGFM in fact conducted in Ireland.
[35]
Finally, CIMSA points out that, contrary to
the finding of the Supreme Court of Appeal, CGFM had
not been granted
a licence to perform investment management trading
activities. The correct position was that CGFM’s licence
was, in
law, limited to being a fund management company which
supervised the performance of its delegates, CAM and CIL. Thus,
investment
management trading cannot be part of CGFM’s primary
operations under the FBE definition, and therefore cannot be
outsourced
as envisaged by the definition’s proviso. It
is only fund management (without investment management trading) that
forms
part of CGFM’s primary operations.
SARS’
submissions in the appeal
[36]
SARS argues that there is no arguable point
of law, because neither the Supreme Court of Appeal nor the Tax
Court undertook
any interpretive exercise in respect of section 9D or
the FBE definition. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Appeal
judgment is of no general public importance.
[37]
In respect of the merits, SARS submits that
CGFM had outsourced all its core functions for which it is licensed
as a management
company, including its primary function of investment
management, to offshore entities – CAM and CIL.
[38]
SARS contends that the proviso to the FBE
definition expressly allows for the outsourcing of various functions
in relation to the
location permanence and the economic substance of
a controlled foreign company to other structures. The proviso
makes plain
that, when assessing the notion of a “fixed place
of business” in relation to a controlled foreign company, it
may
utilise the premises, employees, equipment and facilities
belonging to one or more other companies. However, the proviso
requires that any other structure that is utilised by the controlled
foreign company:
(a)
must be subject to tax in the country in which the
fixed place of business of the controlled foreign company is located
by virtue
of residence, place of effective management or other
criteria of a similar nature (subsection (aa));
(b)
must form part of the same group of companies as
the controlled foreign company (subsection (bb)); and
(c)
to the extent that the structures, employees,
equipment and facilities are located in the same country as its fixed
place of business
(subsection (cc)).
[39]
SARS submits that a proviso is not a
separate and independent enactment. The words of a proviso are
dependent on the principal
enacting words to which they are attached
as a proviso and must be read and considered in relation to the
principal matter to which
it is a proviso.
[40]
In relation to the proviso, SARS submits
that few companies function completely independently, and most
benefit from partnerships
with suppliers as well as outside
contractors. Working with outside contractors, or outsourcing,
enables companies to conduct
their activities more efficiently and
effectively, although it would self-evidently be contrary to the
definition of an FBE for
all the activities of a business
establishment to be outsourced to third-party suppliers.
[41]
SARS submits that CGFM outsources its
investment management function to CAM, a South African resident, and
to CIL, a UK resident,
contrary to the requirements of subsections
(aa) and (cc), as both CAM and CIL are not subject to tax in Ireland
and the operational
employees to whom the function is outsourced are
not located in Ireland. As a result, CGFM does not meet the
requirements
of an FBE. The words of the proviso cannot be read
as though divorced from their context.
[42]
Emphasis is placed on the fact that section
9D is an anti-avoidance provision and that, through the use of
controlled foreign company
legislation, the delay or deferral of
taxes is curbed by taxing the South African owners of foreign
companies on the income earned
by those foreign companies as if they
have repatriated their foreign income as soon as it was earned.
[43]
According to SARS, after outsourcing its
main function, the only remaining functions that CGFM could perform
were the managerial
functions, attached to collective portfolio
management. This is borne out by the CBI’s response.
They categorically
stated that “it has reviewed the
application by [CGFM] as a management company who will delegate all
constituent CPM functions
to third parties and consequently the only
operational functions retained by [CGFM] will be the performance of
the managerial functions”.
SARS contends that the licence
does not state that CGFM is not approved by the CBI to perform
investment management.
The authorisation includes everything
except “individual portfolio management” and non-core
services, neither of which
CGFM applied for.
[44]
SARS further submits that the licence
expressly provides that, in the event that CGFM wishes to carry out
individual portfolio management
services and / or other non-core
services (such as investment advice, safekeeping, and
administration), CGFM was required to obtain
the appropriate
extension of its authorisation from the CBI. Investment
management is neither the business nor the primary
business activity
of CGFM. Schedule 1 of the investment management licence,
however, authorised CGFM to perform collective
portfolio management
and expressly excluded individual portfolio management.
Jurisdiction and leave
to appeal
[45]
I am of the view
that this matter engages our jurisdiction. It does not concern
a mere factual enquiry to decide what business
activities CGFM had
delegated to CAM in South Africa and to CIL in the UK. The
fundamental enquiry is this: what is the proper
interpretation of
“the business of that controlled foreign company” and
“the primary operations of that business”
as they appear
in section 9D, for purposes of applying the FBE exemption? That
is a question of law. This is similar
to
Big G Restaurants
,
[18]
where the question of law and the interpretation of the relevant
contracts was closely linked to the interpretation of section
24C(2)
of the ITA. In the present instance, the interpretation of
these key concepts in the statute is a question of law
as it involves
forming a view on the meaning of section 9D of the ITA.
[19]
[46]
This is a question that transcends the interests of the
parties and is of general public importance. It has an impact
on all
South African resident companies which hold controlled foreign
companies and which rely on the existence of an FBE to avoid being
subjected to tax on an amount equal to the controlled foreign
company’s net income under section 9D. The interests
of justice require that leave be granted so that certainty regarding
a question of significant importance to the South African
economy can be attained in light of the diverging conclusions of the
Tax Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal.
Given my conclusion in respect of the outcome in the main appeal, as
will appear, the cross-appeal will not arise and I say nothing
further about it under this rubric.
Merits
The rationale behind
the enactment of section 9D
[47]
As stated, the central enquiry concerns
whether CGFM’S business activities in Dublin during the 2012
year of assessment had
the requisite economic substance envisaged in
section 9D. Before answering that question, it is useful for
the contextual
background to understand the rationale behind the
enactment of section 9D. That rationale appears from the
Treasury
Explanation. It bears repetition that section 9D
does not seek to subject a foreign company to South African tax.
It subjects the South African holding company or shareholders of a
controlled foreign company to tax on an amount equal to the
net
income of that controlled foreign company.
[48]
The
Explanatory Memorandum explicates that section 9D was enacted as
an anti-avoidance provision with a general objective to
deter
South Africans from moving tainted forms of taxable income
beyond South Africa’s taxing jurisdiction by investing
through a controlled foreign company.
[20]
The section further has as its purpose to permit South African
multinationals to establish corporate entities abroad in a
way that
would enable them to compete there. Its aim is to strike a
balance between offshore competitiveness and protecting
the South
African tax base.
[49]
Key to section 9D is competitiveness abroad
for controlled foreign companies. The means of achieving that
without jeopardising
the South African tax base is the FBE
exemption. In the Treasury Explanation, the rationale behind
the FBE exemption is expressed
thus:
“
A
pure anti-deferral regime would immediately deem back all the South
African owned foreign income so that none of this foreign
income
receives any advantage over domestic income. Yet, section 9D
(
like
other internationally used regimes of its kind
)
falls short of this purity
in
order to cater for international competitiveness
.
International competitiveness dictates that foreign company income
should be ignored so that South African multinationals
can fully
compete on an equal basis with their foreign local rivals.
.
. .
The
principles of anti-deferral and international competitiveness are
diametrically opposed. Anti-deferral warrants complete
taxation, whereas international competitiveness warrants complete
exemption.
In
the end, section 9D follows international norms favouring a balanced
approach. Section 9D achieves this balance by favouring
international competitiveness (ie exemption) where the income stems
from active operations
.
Anti-deferral (ie immediate taxation) applies where the income stems
from passive investments or from transactions that
meet objective
criteria with a high tax avoidance risk.”
[21]
(Emphasis added.)
[50]
The Explanatory Memorandum enunciates this
principle as follows:
“
Active income of
controlled foreign companies are, however, exempt under section 9D(9)
in order to ensure that foreign businesses
remain competitive with
local businesses in the foreign country from a tax point of view.
This active income includes income
attributable to a business
establishment, unless it is passive or diversionary.”
[22]
[51]
The
Treasury Explanation requires that “
the
location of the business establishment must additionally contain
further substance”. That “economic substance”
must be demonstrated in terms of operations and business
purpose.
[23]
Importantly
(although of course not decisively on its own), the Treasury
Explanation states that “the business establishment
threshold
is very light”.
[24]
Economic substance counterpoises illusory or non-substantive business
activities simply utilised to avoid tax in South Africa.
[25]
CGFM’s
actual business and its primary operations
[52]
It bears
repetition that CGFM was established in Ireland as a fund manager,
and not an investment manager.
[26]
The function of investment trading was delegated (or “outsourced”
as the Supreme Court of Appeal phrased it),
as CGFM was legally
entitled to do. The undisputed evidence shows that this
business model is also common commercial practice
in Ireland and
other fund domiciles. Mr Casey testified that 70 to 80%
of UCITS fund managers in Ireland delegated
investment trading
activities. His evidence was confirmed by Mr Snalam and Ms
Doyle.
[27]
In terms of
that delegation model, a fund management company establishes a highly
specialised business to hold and maintain
a licence to perform fund
management which includes the supervision and oversight of services
provided by third parties on a delegated
basis. The trust deeds
of the collective investment funds in respect of which CGFM fulfilled
the role of fund manager also
recognised the delegation of the
investment management trading activities to third parties, the
specialised investment managers.
[53]
SARS misconceives the distinction between fund management and
investment management. That is a fundamental misconception in
respect of the central issue in the case. And the Supreme Court
of Appeal committed the same error, leading to its conclusions
with
which, for the reasons that follow, I disagree.
[54]
A good place to start is the distinction between fund
management and investment management trading, also called here
investment
management in the narrow sense to emphasise the
distinction. In sum, managing a collective investment fund
involves the governance
of and ultimate responsibility for all
regulatory, legal and other investor-related aspects of a collective
investment fund.
That entails administration of the fund,
trusteeship or custodianship, the management of investments and
distribution or marketing.
CGFM does all of this as a fund
manager under the auspices and control of the regulatory authority,
the CBI. This is “investment
management in the wide
sense” – the oversight and setting of policies, mandate
and restrictions for investments.
CGFM’s responsibilities
arise from the regulatory responsibility to the CBI to comply with
laws and regulations which apply
to its business and to the Irish
regulatory authorities.
[55]
Investment trading, on the other hand, entails professionally
and expertly allocating the funds invested in a collective investment
fund. These allocations are made strictly within the
parameters, policies, mandate and limits set out in the prospectus
issued by the fund manager. Thus, CAM and CIL, as delegates of
CGFM, would elect which assets to buy, hold or sell on behalf
of the
collective investment fund. They would do so subject to the
policies, mandate and restrictions imposed by CGFM as
the fund
manager. This is “investment management” in the
narrow sense – the actual trading of investments.
[56]
The distinction can be explained in a different way –
fund management in the present instance includes investment
management
in the wide sense, but not in the narrow sense. CGFM
performed the former and not the latter – that had been
delegated
to CAM and CIL.
[57]
Numerous features point to what CGFM’s core business as
a fund manager entailed and conclusively prove that this core
business
did not extend to investment trading activities.
First, there is the licence issued by the CBI as the regulatory
authority.
The licence constitutes the sole and complete
authorisation for CGFM to conduct the business of fund management and
the parameters
of that authorisation. CGFM was licensed to
provide oversight and overall management of investment collective
funds, but
CGFM did not have licensed approval to make decisions
itself on where to place the investments pooled in a collective
investment
fund. That function was delegated to CAM and CIL.
CGFM stated thus in its business plan as part of its application for
a licence. It submitted an application unequivocally based on
the delegation business model elected by it for commercial
reasons
and as it was in law entitled to do. The CBI viewed the licence
application in the terms submitted by CGFM in its
business plan, that
is, that “[CGFM] was a management company who will delegate all
constituent [collective portfolio management]
functions to third
parties and [will] maintain the management functions”.
[58]
The licence sets out the conditions of licensing in accordance
with the business plan submitted by CGFM and any other conditions
as
the CBI required. These conditions in the licence are:
“
[CGFM] may not
engage in activities other than the management of UCITS authorised
according to the Regulations and other collective
investment
undertakings which are not covered by the Regulations and for which
[CGFM] is subject to prudential supervision but
which cannot be
marketed in another Member State under the Directive . . . This
authorisation does not include the provision of
individual portfolio
management services or other non-core services. . . . [CGFM] must
revert to the Financial regulator seeking
appropriate approval in the
event that it proposes to engage in these activities.”
[59]
The evidence is persuasive that this is the common position
for virtually all UCITS management companies – very few of them
are approved to perform individual investment portfolio management
functions in respect of the investment funds that they manage.
In appointing CAM and CIL as external delegates to perform the
functions of investment portfolio management, it acted in terms
of
the law and in accordance with prevailing general commercial
practice. To hold, as the Supreme Court of Appeal did and
SARS
vigorously contended before us, that in doing so CGFM had
“outsourced” its core function, was left only with
non-core ancillary functions and was thus not conducting the business
of a UCITS management company, is fallacious.
[60]
The second aspect is the prudential considerations behind
separating the investment management (in the wide sense) and
investment
trading (investment management in the narrow sense)
functions. The investment manager can perform oversight
functions over
the latter, the investment trader, who must perform
its delegated functions within the mandate, policies and restrictions
set by
the investment manager. Thus, the investment trader may
be motivated to take risks that are not acceptable to the investment
manager; for this reason, the industry separates out supervision
(which inclines towards a more cautious approach to investor funds)
and trading (which tends to adopt a riskier approach).
[61]
Third, there is the uncontested evidence of CGFM’s
witnesses, particularly of Mr King and Ms Doyle. As stated,
SARS
led no evidence and almost all the evidence was uncontested.
In respect of Ms Doyle, in the Tax Court, SARS’ counsel
took
issue with the admissibility of her evidence on the basis that it was
irrelevant. That objection is ill-founded.
Ms Doyle
testified about a fiercely contested issue – what business CGFM
conducted in Ireland. Her evidence contextualised
the legal
setting in Ireland in terms of which CGFM was established. It
was thus relevant to set out the context within which
the testimony
of others like Messrs Snalam and King who testified about CGFM’s
business operations must be understood.
[62]
As stated, Mr Snalam was with the Coronation group from its
establishment in 1993 until 2019. He testified about the
rationale
behind the establishment of CGFM in Ireland to take
advantage of the opening up of global markets for South African
investors.
He explained the role of a prospectus to set out
investment policies and the mandate of a company. Mr Snalam
also confirmed
the rationale behind CGFM’s business model –
based on common commercial principles and the applicable legal
framework.
[63]
Ms Doyle explained the parameters of CGFM’s licensing
conditions. She emphasised that aspects like the setting of
investment
parameters and oversight over the investment managers also
fell within the concept of “investment management”.
But, as she explained, CGFM could not itself conduct investment
management trading, as that would contravene its licensing conditions
and placed the licence at risk. Had it desired to perform
investment management trading itself, CGFM would have had to make
a
fresh application in a new business plan, different in material
respects to the one it had originally submitted. That new
application would have to identify the individual portfolio managers,
their experience and qualifications, the systems they would
be using
and CGFM’s ability to resource appropriate trading activities
within itself.
[64]
Mr Casey confirmed this evidence and presented details of the
business model employed by most of the Irish domiciled management
companies, including CGFM. That model entailed the
establishment of an Irish management company with a strong governance
model in order to oversee the outsourced activities. The
industry and the regulatory authorities in Ireland operated on the
central premise that while activities and functions can be delegated,
the ultimate responsibility for that activity and function
remains
with the Irish management company.
[65]
Mr King, CGFM’s managing director during the 2012 year
of assessment, gave a detailed description of what CGFM’s
oversight
of the delegated functions entailed at the time.
Their main function was to provide oversight of the external service
providers.
Mr King emphasised that the variety of functions
performed in CGFM’s Dublin office were aimed at ensuring that
they
were compliant with their licence conditions. They had
access to the systems used by external service providers and/or
systems
used by the providers from which CGFM could obtain
information and assess their performance. In some instances,
CGFM would
perform corrective work like reconciliations. CGFM
would from time to time have meetings with the service providers to
review
their services and to suggest ways of addressing gaps or
weaknesses. There were systems through which monitoring could
be
done. For present purposes, a system known as “Statpro”
was used to monitor whether investment restriction breaches
had
occurred.
[66]
In summary – these three features, the licence
conditions, prudential considerations and the uncontested evidence,
compellingly
show that at all material times CGFM had conducted the
business of a fund manager. It performed the core functions of
a fund
manager, including the management, oversight and supervision
of the delegated investment management trading activities.
[67]
These features also overwhelmingly point to CGFM’s
primary operations being that of a quintessential fund manager
operating
in terms of a delegation business model. That was in
accordance with the overwhelming majority of Irish fund managers and,
for that matter, in other similar fund management domiciles, like
South Africa. It was also in accordance with the business
model
used by CIMSA within South Africa. Moreover, the evidence
clearly shows that the performance of investment trading
activities
was not the main source of CGFM’s income. In terms of the
prospectus of the relevant collective investment
fund (or unit trust)
CGFM earned its fees as a percentage based on the market value of
that fund’s assets. The confidence
that the investors
have in CGFM as the regulated fund manager and the responsible
execution of its tasks like administration and
the oversight of the
allocation of investor funds as per the prospectus, provide the basis
for CGFM to earn the fees that it does.
[68]
To sum up – in accordance with its
business
plan, presented as part of its licence application, CGFM employed a
delegated business model through which it would conduct
specified
fund management functions, and would delegate investment management
trading activities (which it is not authorised to
do by its licence)
to competent third parties, CAM and CIL, while retaining overall
supervision of and responsibility to the regulator
for those
functions.
CGFM performed a number of core management
functions under its licence, including the supervision of delegates
like CAM and
CIL as investment managers. Its day-to-day
operations from its Dublin office in pursuit of these management
functions met
the “economic substance” requirements of
the FBE definition, namely that the company must have a fixed place
of business
which is suitably staffed and equipped to conduct the
primary operations of its business – the provision of fund
management
in accordance with the delegation model. For these
reasons, the Tax Court was correct in holding that CGFM
qualified
for a tax exemption and that SARS must issue a reduced tax
assessment, excluding in it any amount that was included in
CIMSA’s
income under section 9D of the ITA pertaining to CGFM’s
income. What bears consideration next is the
flaws in the
reasoning and ultimate outcome of the Supreme Court of Appeal.
The
judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal
[69]
For the reasons
stated, the Supreme Court of Appeal misconceived CGFM’s actual
business as a fund manager. Instead of
determining what CGFM’s
business actually is, the Court examined CGFM’s licence and the
delegation provisions under
the UCITS Regulations. It concluded
from this that “c
ollective
portfolio management, which CGFM has been authorised to conduct,
includes investment management, administration and marketing”.
The Court stated that this was confirmed by Ms Doyle, Mr King and Mr
Snalam who had testified that “the licence permitted
investment
management of collective investment schemes and this was one of the
‘core functions’ which the company ‘elected
to
outsource as it did with administration and distribution and
trusteeship by custody’”.
[28]
[70]
The
Court held that “the regulations indicate that the purpose of
delegation is to enhance the efficiency of the company’s
business. It does not detract from the business of the company,
nor is it possible for delegation to alter that business”.
[29]
In adopting this “notional business” approach (as it was
called by CIMSA’s counsel), the Supreme Court
of Appeal
erred. As explicated earlier, the Court should have had regard
to CGFM’s business model (the manner in which
it elects to do
business) and its licensing conditions (what it may lawfully do).
And the Court failed to draw the important
distinction between
investment management in its wide sense and investment management
trading, the narrower concept.
[71]
A further misconception on the part of the Supreme Court of
Appeal is that t
he
evidence given by the witnesses for CIMSA was that the regulatory
functions were incidental. It held that Mr
King
testified that the licence “largely looked after itself”
and that Ms Doyle went so far as to state that it was
unnecessary to
have employees in Ireland, as the board members could have carried
out the function of fund management at their
quarterly meetings.
That
managerial functions, according to the Supreme Court of Appeal, are
ancillary to the investment function is also evidenced
by the
appendix to the application for the authorisation, in which
“managerial functions” are listed. These are
decision-taking,
monitoring compliance, risk management, monitoring of investment
performance,
financial
control, monitoring of capital, internal audit
and
supervision
of delegates
.
[72]
The Supreme Court of Appeal further held:
“
CIMSA has
conflated the role of a management company with its outsourcing or
delegation of its investment and other functions.
By so doing,
it has impermissibly elevated the management role. The licence
granted to CGFM was for fund management, which
includes investment
management, administration and marketing. That it elected to
outsource these functions and merely manage
these functions, does not
change the nature of the licence or elevate the managerial role into
any other than an ancillary one.”
[30]
[73]
As shown, this is fallacious reasoning
based on a misconception of what CGFM’s business entailed and a
misreading of the evidence,
both oral and documentary, adduced by
CGFM.
[74]
In
respect of CGFM’s primary business operations, the Supreme
Court of Appeal rejected CIMSA’s contentions that regard
must
be had to the
practical
actions required to operate its fund management business based on a
licensed delegated model and that, on this interpretation,
CGFM was
suitably staffed, equipped and resourced to carry out its primary
operations which are conducted in Ireland. Instead,
said the
Court, “the meaning to be ascribed to ‘primary
operations’ and ‘business’ must be contextual,
relative to the definition of an FBE, where the words are
found”.
[31]
The
Court had regard to the dictionary meaning of the words “primary”
and “operations” and CGFM’S
Memorandum of
Association.
[32]
Based
on the latter, the Court held:
“
T
he
notion that investment management is not CGFM’s core business
is at odds with what is stated in its memorandum of association.
The
stated objects of CGFM are to carry on the business of establishing
specified collective investment undertakings; to
promote, establish,
manage, regulate and carry on any investment, unit or other trust or
fund; and to carry on the business of
investment and financial
management.”
[33]
[75]
The Court concluded that CGFM’s
primary business is investment management and that, w
hile
there are numerous functions that a company may choose to
legitimately outsource, it cannot outsource its primary business.
To
enjoy the same tax levels as its foreign rivals, making it
internationally competitive, the primary operations of that
company
must take place in the same foreign jurisdiction. Therefore,
held the Supreme Court of Appeal, CGFM does not
meet the
requirements for an FBE exemption and, instead, the net income of
CGFM is imputable to CIMSA for the 2012 tax year under
section 9D(2).
[76]
The ultimate effect of the Supreme Court of
Appeal’s erroneous “notional business”
approach is that CGFM’s
primary business is that which it
calculatedly chose not to do, did not apply to do and by law was not
able to do, namely investment
management trading. The fallacy
of that reasoning is self-evident. It is inconceivable that the
business of a controlled
foreign company envisaged in section 9D
is everything that the controlled foreign company can in theory and
notionally do
in pursuing a commercial endeavour, even if that
company does not actually do it.
[77]
Moreover, and importantly, that approach
leads to insensible and unbusinesslike results that do not achieve
section 9D’s objects,
nor does it suppress the mischief at
which the section is directed. CGFM had to set up offshore, due
to the legal constraints
of performing fund management in respect of
Irish collective funds outside Ireland – thus the income was
not diversionary.
If CGFM had not been set up in Ireland, Irish
law would have prevented any of this income from being earned by
CIMSA or any of
its South African subsidiaries. This was not
income derived from royalties, dividends or interest – so it
was not passive
income. And it was certainly not mobile income
derived from a shell business with a post-box. The company was
adequately
staffed to perform the functions which it sought to do.
The fact that the separation of fund management and investment
trading
is standard practice in the industry fortifies the view that
CIMSA’s contentions in respect of CGFM as a qualifying FBE are
sound. The income earned by CGFM in Ireland is therefore not
diversionary, passive or mobile that can erode the South African
tax
base. Those are the three types of income that the Treasury
Explanation denotes as falling outside the FBE definition.
CGFM’s fund management business plainly had the requisite
economic substance.
[78]
It is fallacious to reason that, for purposes of the tax
exemption, a business entity can subjectively define what constitutes
the
business in a narrow way so as to fall within the realm of the
exemption. There would be narrow definitions of the ambit of
a
business – such as the provision of secretarial services to a
fund manager – which would clearly lack economic substance
and
create too wide a discretion for companies to avoid tax liability in
South Africa. SARS and a court will look objectively
at the
actual operations of the business to determine whether they have a
commercial rationale and the business has economic substance.
[79]
The Supreme Court of Appeal held:
“
The FBE definition
is not aimed solely at advancing international competitiveness for
offshore businesses. Nor is the legislation
concerned only to
prevent diversionary, passive or mobile income eroding the South
African tax base. It is also to limit
a situation where an
exemption is obtained over earnings in a low tax jurisdiction when
the primary operations for the business
are not conducted there.”
[34]
[80]
This statement entirely undermines the
stated objects of section 9D, to ensure that offshore companies
remain competitive in relation
to their foreign rivals. It
loses sight of the fact that a South African company is legally
constrained to move offshore
to service their investor clients who
want to take up the opportunities created abroad after the relaxation
of foreign exchange
controls. Moreover, there is no authority
advanced by the Court for this statement, nor am I aware of any.
As was correctly
contended by CIMSA before us, in effect, this
approach creates a further purpose for the words in the FBE
definition, which are
subject to interpretation exclusively from the
words themselves. This is tantamount to expecting of the words
to lift themselves
up by their own bootstraps.
[81]
Apart from the fact that the approach
adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeal is legally and factually
unsustainable, it does not
make commercial sense at all. It
effectively means that, on this interpretation of what “business”
and “primary
operations” of that business mean, there is
only a single, ideal notional concept of what a business entails.
There
is no scope at all for delegation that trenches on the core
functions of the ideal notional “business” – the
insurmountable strictures imposed by that narrow approach in setting
up an FBE are self-evident. Requiring South African
companies to set up an FBE within this anti-competitive limitation is
illogical, does not make business sense and undermines the
objects of
section 9D.
It would inadvertently discourage legitimate
business practices that contribute to the efficiency and
competitiveness of South African
companies on a global stage.
[82]
Lastly, as far as the Supreme Court of
Appeal’s reasoning is concerned, it bears emphasis that the FBE
definition is not an
anti-outsourcing enactment, as that Court
appears to approach it. Instead, it aims to ensure that an
offshore business, regardless
of its chosen business model, has
economic substance in that foreign country and is not merely an
illusory or “paper”
business. And its objects are
to ensure that the offshore company remains competitive with its
foreign rivals.
Conclusion
[83]
CGFM met all the requirements of an FBE in
terms of section 9D. Its net income ought to have been
exempted
from tax for the 2012 year of assessment
.
The appeal must succeed and it is thus not necessary to deal with the
cross-appeal. Costs must follow the outcome.
Order
[84]
The following order is made:
1.
Leave to appeal in respect of the appeal is granted.
2.
The appeal is upheld. The order of the Supreme Court of Appeal
is set aside
and substituted with the following:
“
The
appeal is dismissed with costs, including the costs of two counsel.”
3.
The respondent must pay the costs, including the costs of two
counsel.
For
the Applicant:
M
Janisch SC, C Rogers and V Jere instructed by
Bowman
Gilfillan Incorporated
For
the Respondent:
R
Williams SC and H Cassim instructed by the Office of the State
Attorney, Cape Town
[1]
59 of 2000.
[2]
58 of 1962.
[3]
The National Treasury
Explanatory
Memorandum to the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill of 2009
(10 September 2009)
(Explanatory Memorandum) explains this.
[4]
This is comprehensively discussed and explained in National Treasury
Detailed
Explanation to Section 9D of the Income Tax Act
(June 2022) (Treasury
Explanation).
[5]
In its Finalisation of Audit Letter, SARS concluded that CGFM does
not meet the requirements of an FBE as the primary functions
of its
business had been outsourced.
[6]
28 of 2011.
[7]
Commissioner
for the South African Revenue Service v Coronation Investment
Management SA (Pty) Ltd
[2023]
ZASCA 10
;
[2023] 2 All SA 44
(SCA);
2023 (3) SA 404
(SCA)
(
SCA
judgment
).
[8]
Section 6
quat
(1)(b)
reads:
“
Subject
to subsection (2), where the taxable income of any resident during a
year of assessment includes-
.
. .
(b)
any proportional amount contemplated in section 9D
.
. .
in
determining the normal tax payable in respect of that taxable income
there must be deducted a rebate determined in accordance
with this
section.”
[9]
CGFM’s managing director in Dublin.
[10]
An Irish solicitor.
[11]
Mr Snalam is one of the founders of the Coronation business in 1993
and remained there until September 2019.
[12]
Mr Casey is employed at the Irish Funds Industry Association (the
representative body of the International Asset Management Industry
in Ireland), responsible for regulation and advocacy.
[13]
The Coronation group of companies’ corporate structure is
available at:
https://www.coronation.com/en-za/institutional/shareholder-information/corporate-structure/.
[14]
The term “trading” does not appear anywhere in the
licence issued to CGFM or in its business plan, but I use it
intermittently in this judgment to denote the function of buying,
selling and placing investments. I do so for purposes
of
drawing a distinction between that function and the much broader
investment management that is part of fund management.
Ms
Doyle, the Irish solicitor who testified as an expert witness, did
the same.
[15]
European Communities (Undertakings for Collective Investment in
Transferable Securities) Regulations 2011, SI. No. 352 of 2011.
[16]
Coronation
Investment Management SA (Pty) Ltd v The Commissioner for the South
African Revenue Services
,
unreported judgment of the Tax Court of South Africa, Cape Town,
Case No 24596 (17 September 2021) at para 40.
[17]
Commissioner
for the South African Revenue Service v The Thistle Trust
[2022]
ZASCA 153
;
2023 (2) SA 120
(SCA) (
Thistle
Trust
).
[18]
Big G
Restaurants (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue
Service
[2020]
ZACC 16; 2020 (6) SA 1 (CC); 2020 (11) BCLR 1297 (CC).
[19]
Ascendis
Animal Health (Pty) Ltd v Merck Sharp Dohme Corporation
ZACC
41;
2020 (1) SA 327
(CC);
2020 (1) BCLR 1
(CC); 2019 BIP 34 (CC) at
para 36.
[20]
Explanatory
Memorandum
above
n 3 at 73.
[21]
Treasury
Explanation
above
n 4 at 1-2.
[22]
Explanatory Memorandum above n 3 at 14.
[23]
Id
at 9.
[24]
Id at 12.
[25]
Olivier and Honiball
International
Tax: A South African Perspective
5
ed (SiberInk, Cape Town 2011) at 582.
[26]
CGFM provided fund management services to: the Coronation Global
Opportunities Fund, an umbrella open- ended unit trust
established in Ireland and authorised by the CBI as a UCITS fund;
the Coronation Universal Fund, an open-ended umbrella unit
trust
established as a professional investor alternative investment fund
in Ireland, authorised by the CBI in terms of the Unit
Trust Act,
1990, in Ireland; and the Coronation Investment Holdings Limited
Fund, an umbrella limited liability corporate alternative
investment
fund domiciled in the Cayman Islands.
[27]
Mr Casey also described the practice as “overwhelming”,
“commonplace” and “the prevalent model”.
Mr Snalam said it was “the norm”. Ms Doyle
called it “typical” and that “the majority”
of UCITS fund management companies were authorised on that
particular basis.
[28]
SCA
judgment
above
n 7 at para 33.
[29]
Id at para 34.
[30]
SCA
judgment
above
n 7 at para 38.
[31]
Id at para 45.
[32]
The Memorandum of Association describes CGFM’s objects:
“
(a)
To carry on the business of establishing, either on the Company’s
own behalf or
on behalf of other persons or bodies, specified
collective investment undertakings, defined in Section 18 of the
Finance Act,
1989 (“Collective Investment Undertakings”)
and to provide for such undertakings investment management services
including
but not limited to financial advisory services,
administration services, marketing services, placement services,
brokerage services,
agency services and all other services of a
financial nature and generally to deal in units of the undertakings
managed by the
Company.
.
. .
(c)
To carry on the business of investment and financial management
including venture
and development capital investment, corporate
treasury management, fund management and fund administration for
individuals, investment
schemes or undertakings other than
Collective Investment Undertakings international corporate bodies,
governments or other authorities
both as principals and agents and
to transact and do all matters and things incidental thereto which
may be usual in connection
with the business of financing or dealing
in monies.
Provided that the
Company shall not act as or accept any appointment as a fund manager
for any investment scheme or undertaking
other than a Collective
Investment Undertaking without the prior approval of the Irish
regulatory authority but for the avoidance
of doubt the Company may
provide fund administration, investment advisory or management
services to any fund manager appointed
to an investment scheme or
undertaking other than a Collective Investment Undertaking.”
[33]
SCA
judgment
above
n 7 at para 47.
[34]
SCA
judgment
above
n 7 at para 53.
sino noindex
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