Case Law[2023] ZACC 7South Africa
Minister of Tourism and Others v Afriforum NPC and Another (CCT 318/21) [2023] ZACC 7; 2023 (6) BCLR 752 (CC) (8 February 2023)
Headnotes
Summary: Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002 — Tourism Relief Fund — Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment— B BBEE
Judgment
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## Minister of Tourism and Others v Afriforum NPC and Another (CCT 318/21) [2023] ZACC 7; 2023 (6) BCLR 752 (CC) (8 February 2023)
Minister of Tourism and Others v Afriforum NPC and Another (CCT 318/21) [2023] ZACC 7; 2023 (6) BCLR 752 (CC) (8 February 2023)
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sino date 8 February 2023
CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case
CCT 318/21
In
the matter between:
MINISTER
OF
TOURISM
First Applicant
DEPARTMENT
OF
TOURISM
Second Applicant
DIRECTOR-GENERAL
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
TOURISM
Third Applicant
and
AFRIFORUM
NPC
First Respondent
SOLIDARITY
TRADE
UNION
Second Respondent
Neutral
citation:
Minister
of
Tourism and Others v Afriforum NPC and Another
[2023] ZACC 7
Coram:
Zondo CJ, Maya DCJ, Baqwa AJ, Madlanga J,
Majiedt J,
Mathopo J, Mbatha AJ, Rogers J, and
Tshiqi J
Judgment:
Zondo CJ (unanimous)
Heard
on:
08 September 2022
Decided
on:
08 February 2023
Summary:
Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002
— Tourism Relief Fund —
Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment— B BBEE
Covid 19
— state of disaster — mootness — B BBEE
selection criteria for beneficiaries of the Tourism
Relief Fund
ORDER
On
appeal from the Supreme Court of Appeal hearing an appeal from the
High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Division, Pretoria:
1.
Leave to appeal is refused with costs including the costs of two
counsel.
JUDGMENT
ZONDO CJ
(Maya DCJ, Baqwa AJ, Madlanga J, Majiedt J,
Mathopo J, Mbatha AJ, Rogers J, and
Tshiqi J
concurring):
Introduction
[1]
This is an application brought by the Minister of Tourism (the
Minister), the Department of Tourism and the Director-General of that
department as, respectively, the first, second and third applicants,
for leave to appeal against a judgment and order of the Supreme
Court
of Appeal in a matter involving them, on the one hand, and, Afriforum
NPC and Solidarity Trade Union, on the other. The
Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgment and order
related essentially to whether the Minister was obliged or entitled
to include Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (B BBEE)
status level criteria among the criteria that the Department
of
Tourism used to select small, micro and medium sized businesses
(SMMEs) that would be given grants out of the Tourism Relief
Fund for
SMMEs.
[2]
The Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgment was to the effect
that the Minister was not obliged nor was she entitled to include
race-based criteria in the selection criteria used to select SMMEs to
be given the grants. It is in respect of that judgment that
the
Minister, the Director-General and the Department apply for leave to
appeal. Afriforum and Solidarity oppose the application.
Background
[3]
The
Disaster Management Act
[1]
(DM
Act) makes provision for the declaration of a disaster in any part of
the country or in the whole country by the Minister of
Cooperative
Governance and Traditional Affairs (Minister of COGTA) if a state of
disaster has occurred in a certain area or province
or in the whole
country. The term “disaster” is defined as follows in
section 1 of the DM Act:
“’
disaster’
means a progressive or sudden, widespread or localised, natural or
human caused occurrence which-
(a)
causes or threatens to cause-
(i)
death, injury or disease;
(ii)
damage to property, infrastructure or the environment; or
(iii)
significant disruption of the life of a community; and
(b)
is of a magnitude that exceeds the ability of those affected by the
disaster to cope with its effects
using only their own resources.”
[4]
The purpose of the DM Act is:
“
To provide for –
·
an integrated and co-ordinated disaster management policy that
focuses on preventing or reducing
the risk of disasters, mitigating
the severity of disasters, emergency preparedness, rapid and
effective response to disasters
and post-disaster recovery and
rehabilitation;
·
the establishment and functioning of national, provincial and
municipal disaster management
centres;
·
disaster management volunteers; and
·
matters
incidental thereto.”
[2]
[5]
Once the Minister of COGTA has declared a state of disaster he
or she may make regulations in terms of section 27(2) of the DM Act
to regulate various matters. Section 27(2) reads:
“
If a national
state of disaster has been declared in terms of subsection (1), the
Minister [of COGTA] may, subject to subsection
(3), and after
consulting the responsible Cabinet member, make regulations or issue
directions or authorise the issue of directions
concerning –
(a) the release of any
available resources of the national government, including stores,
equipment, vehicles and facilities;
(b) the release of
personnel of a national organ of state for the rendering of emergency
services;
(c) the implementation of
all or any of the provisions of a national disaster management plan
that are applicable in the circumstances;
(d) the evacuation to
temporary shelters of all or part of the population from the
disaster-stricken or threatened area if such
action is necessary for
the preservation of life;
(e) the regulation of
traffic to, from or within the disaster-stricken or threatened area;
(f) the regulation
of movement of persons and goods to, from or within the
disaster-stricken or threatened area;
(g) the control and
occupancy of premises in the disaster-stricken or threatened area;
(h) the provision,
control or use of temporary emergency accommodation;
(i) the suspension
or limiting of the sale, dispensing or transportation of alcoholic
beverages in the disaster-stricken or
threatened area;
(j) the maintenance
or installation of temporary lines of communication to, from or
within the disaster area;
(k) the dissemination of
information required for dealing with the disaster;
(l) emergency
procurement procedures;
(m)
the facilitation of response and post-disaster
recovery and
rehabilitation;
(n) other steps that may
be necessary to prevent an escalation of the disaster, or to
alleviate, contain and minimise the effects
of the disaster; or
(o) steps to facilitate
international assistance.
[6]
At the end of 2019 a virus was discovered in China which
caused people to suffer from flu-like symptoms which could lead to
death.
It was named as “coronavirus”. The illness it
caused was called Covid-19. This virus soon spread to many parts of
the
world. Early in 2020 it reached our shores. In March 2020 the
Minister of COGTA declared a state of disaster in the whole country.
The Government made regulations in terms of which it instituted a
national lockdown. The national lockdown had various levels,
starting
from level 5 up to level 1, 5 being the severest form of restrictions
of movement and human activity. Level 5 was the
first level of
lockdown under which the country was put. This was in March 2020.
Except for people who were employed in essential
services or who
provided essential services such as doctors and nurses and other
people employed in the health sector, people were
not allowed to go
to work or go on social visits. People were obliged by law to stay at
home and only leave their houses to go
and buy food or to see a
doctor. Businesses were also compelled to close unless they rendered
essential services.
[7]
The national lockdown, especially level 5 and, later, level 4,
had severe economic and financial consequences for businesses and
people because, for some time, businesses were completely closed and
could not trade. Businesses suffered huge losses. Workers
were not
paid their wages because their employers were not allowed to operate
their businesses. Later many businesses closed down
permanently and
many workers lost their jobs.
[8]
In response to the national lockdown and in an attempt to
alleviate or prevent or contain the adverse economic and financial
impact
of the national lockdown on SMMEs within the tourism sector,
the Minister established a fund called the Covid-19 Tourism Relief
Fund for SMMEs. The total amount set aside for the Fund was R200
million. The Minister decided that SMMEs selected for grants under
the Fund would be paid R50 000 each to assist them. The Minister
had the power to establish such a fund in terms of regulation 10(8)
of the regulations promulgated by the Minister of COGTA.
Regulation 10(8) reads as follows:
“
Any Minister may
issue and vary directions, as required, within his or her mandate, to
address, prevent and combat the spread of
COVID-19, from time to
time, as may be required, including—
(a)
disseminating information required for dealing with the national
state of disaster;
(b)
implementing emergency procurement procedures;
(c)
taking any other steps that may be necessary to prevent an escalation
of the national state
of disaster, or to alleviate, contain and
minimise the effects of the national state of disaster; or
(d)
taking
steps to facilitate international assistance.”
[3]
[9]
To
deal with how the businesses which would be given grants out of the
Fund were to be selected, the Minister decided that the Department
would be guided by the Tourism B BBEE Code of Good Practice
which were approved by the Minister of Trade and Industries in
2015.
These were made in terms of the Broad-Based Black Economic
Empowerment Act
[4]
(B-BBEE Act).
The qualifying criteria identified or established by the Minister
were the following:
“
1.
QUALIFIYING CRITERIA
1.1
Proof of valid registration with Companies and Intellectual Property
Commission (CIPC).
1.2
Must be an Exempted Micro Enterprise (EME) defined in terms of the
Amended Tourism B-BBEE Sector Code, 2015.
1.3
Must have a valid tax clearance certificate or PIN.
1.4
Proof of compliance with the minimum wage requirements.
1.5
Must provide proof of UIF registration for employees employed by the
business.
1.6 Be
an existing tourism-specific establishment as outlined in the scope
of application (suppliers and intermediaries
are not eligible).
1.7
Must be in existence for at least one business financial year.
1.8
Proof that the relief is required as a result of the impact of
COVID-19.
1.9
Must submit the latest statements of financial position, financial
performance and cash flows.
1.10 Must submit
six months’ bank statements.
1.11 Grading
certificate or proof of application to be graded for accommodation
establishments.”
[10]
The selection of SMMEs which would benefit from the Fund was
based on scores that would be given to the SMMEs which applied for
grants out of the Fund. In the view I take of this matter it is not
necessary to elaborate on the selection criteria.
High
Court
[11]
In separate applications in the High Court, Afriforum and
Solidarity sought to have the Minister’s decision to include
the
race-based criteria (i.e. B BBEE status level) as some of
the criteria to be used to select SMMEs to receive grants from the
Fund reviewed and set aside. This was on various bases including that
the Minister had no power to include such criteria in a fund
related
to providing relief to businesses that had suffered as a result of
the Covid-19 pandemic. The Minister, the Director General
and
the Department opposed the applications on, among others, the basis
that she was obliged by law to include the selection criteria
taken
from the Tourism B BBEE Code of Good Practice (i.e. the criteria
that Afriforum and Solidarity called raced-based criteria).
The
Minister also stated that she was entitled to include such criteria
because one of the goals of the Department was the transformation
of
the tourism industry. She said that there was no reason why, in
seeking to alleviate, prevent or contain the economic effects
of the
Covid-19 pandemic on SMMEs, the Department could not have due regard
to the transformation agenda of the Department for
the tourism
industry.
[12]
The matter came before Kollapen J. He concluded that:
(a)
given the other criteria that represent 80 points, it could hardly be
suggested that the consideration
of race created an insurmountable
advantage for black businesses over white businesses; on the
contrary, Kollapen J said that
the point of difference between
two and eight points was capable of being bridged by the scoring in
other categories and it was
possible that a white applicant could
score more points than a black applicant.
(b)
the criteria were flexible and did not perpetuate an unfair advantage
for some candidates over others
based on race; in summary, Kollapen J
pointed out that the criteria did not have the effect of excluding
white applicants
nor did it “seal in an advantage” for
black candidates but rather it had the effect of providing those
candidates with
a head start which other candidates could overcome
within the general scoring system which was both diverse and
flexible.
(c)
the Minister’s decision was not irrational.
[13]
The
High Court dismissed Afriforum’s and Solidarity’s
applications but, in accordance with
Biowatch
,
[5]
did not make any costs order against them. Subsequently, it also
dismissed Afriforum’s and Solidarity’s applications
for
leave to appeal.
Supreme
Court of Appeal
[14]
After the High Court refused leave to appeal, Afriforum and
Solidarity petitioned the Supreme Court of Appeal for leave to appeal
against the decision of the High Court. The Supreme Court of
Appeal set the petition down for the hearing of oral argument
on the
basis that the merits would also be argued at the same time.
The Supreme Court of Appeal granted Afriforum
and
Solidarity leave to appeal. It then concluded that:
(a)
in making the direction that included the B-BBEE criteria for
eligibility, the Minister was acting administratively;
(b)
given (a) above, her conduct was subject to the Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act,
[6]
(PAJA) and could, therefore, be challenged on review under PAJA; and
(c)
the Minister had erred in believing that she was obliged by
section 10(1)(e) of the B-BBEE Act
to apply the B BBEE
status levels as part of the criteria for eligibility for grants from
the Tourism Relief Fund which, therefore,
means that in her decision
she was materially influenced by an error of law as contemplated by
PAJA.
[15]
The Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the appeal with costs
including the costs of two counsel. It set aside the decision of the
High
Court and replaced it with an order declaring that, when the
Minister made the direction of 6 April 2020 in terms of
regulation 10(8)
of the regulations under the DM Act, she was
not legally obliged by section 10(1)(e) of the B BBEE Act
to make eligibility
for assistance from the Fund subject to the
Tourism Sector Code made in terms of the B BBEE Act. The
Supreme Court of
Appeal declared the Minister’s decision
unlawful. It also made an order to the effect that the declaratory
order did not
authorise the Minister to recover funds already
disbursed from the Fund.
In
this Court
[16]
The Minister, the Director-General and the Department apply to
this Court for leave to appeal against the judgment and order of the
Supreme Court of Appeal. Afriforum and Solidarity oppose this
application on the basis, among others, that the matter is moot
and,
in any event, there are no reasonable prospects of success.
Jurisdiction
[17]
This matter relates to a review application which is a
constitutional matter. Furthermore, the Minister submits that this
Court
has jurisdiction because part of the dispute is whether or not
she was obliged to include the B-BBEE level status among the criteria
to be used to select SMMEs to benefit from the Fund. Since the
decision that is challenged is a decision which the Minister says
she
took to advance transformation in the tourism industry, it is a
decision that raises constitutional issues. Such issues relate
to
section 9 of the Constitution. Section 9 reads:
“
(1) Everyone is
equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and
benefit of the law.
(2) Equality includes the
full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the
achievement of equality, legislative
and other measures designed to
protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged
by unfair discrimination may
be taken.
(3) The state may not
unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or
more grounds, including race, gender,
sex, pregnancy, marital status,
ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability,
religion, conscience, belief,
culture, language and birth.
(4) No person may
unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or
more grounds in terms of subsection (3).
National legislation must be
enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.
(5) Discrimination on one
or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it
is established that the discrimination
is fair.”
I
agree that this raises a constitutional matter. For that reason, this
Court has jurisdiction.
Leave
to appeal
[18]
As already indicated earlier, the Minister, Director-General
and the Department apply for leave to appeal. This Court grants leave
to appeal if it is in the interests of justice to do so. Three of the
factors that may influence the conclusion whether or not
it is in the
interests of justice to grant leave are:
(a)
if the issue that the court is required to decide affects many people
or certain sectors of society
and, therefore, more people may stand
to benefit from the decision of this Court.
(b)
the issue is an important one.
(c)
there are reasonable prospects of success.
[19]
In its answering affidavit filed in this Court, Solidarity
contended, among others, that the application for leave to appeal
should
be dismissed because the matter has become moot. A conclusion
that the matter is moot may lead to this Court refusing leave to
appeal. However, the fact that a matter is moot is not decisive of an
application for leave to appeal. In certain circumstances
the Court
may grant leave and deal with a matter even though it is moot. Each
case depends on its own circumstances.
[20]
In this matter, if we grant leave to appeal and hear the
appeal, the Minister urges us to uphold the appeal and set aside the
order
of the Supreme Court of Appeal.
[21]
One of the points which Solidarity took in its answering
affidavit, in support of its opposition, is that the matter has
become
moot and that, on that ground alone, the application should be
dismissed. The Minister was not entitled to file a replying affidavit
in this Court where she could have responded to the mootness point.
Nevertheless, in her written submissions the Minister referred
to the
fact that the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal had
given conflicting judgments. She submitted that, for this
reason, it
was in the interests of justice that this Court should decide the
matter even if it was moot. In its written submissions
Afriforum also
took the point that the matter was now moot and that, for that reason
alone, it was not in the interests of justice
to grant leave.
[22]
In support of its mootness point, Afriforum relied upon the
following:
(a)
the dispute between the parties related to a fund which the Minister
had established in
terms of the DM Act read with regulations
promulgated under that Act during the state of disaster;
(b)
the state of disaster had been terminated;
(c)
the order made by the Supreme Court of Appeal in respect of which the
Minister sought leave
to appeal was specific to powers which the
Minister had purported to exercise under the DM Act and
regulations promulgated
under that Act;
(d)
the order of the Supreme Court of Appeal made it clear that its order
did not authorise
the recovery of funds that had been given to the
small businesses already; and
(e)
the Fund had been exhausted.
[23]
A
case is moot when there is no longer a live dispute or controversy
between the parties which would be practically affected in
one way or
another by a court’s decision or which would be resolved by a
court’s decision. A case is also moot when
a court’s
decision would be of academic interest only. In
National
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality
[7]
it was said:
“
A case is moot and
therefore not justiciable, if it no longer presents an existing or
live controversy which should exist if the
Court is to avoid giving
advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law. Such was the case
in JT Publishing (Pty) Ltd and Another
v Minister of Safety and
Security and Others 1996 (12) BCLR1599 (CC)
[1996] ZACC 23
; ;
1997 (3) SA 514
(CC),
where Didcott J said the following at para 17:
‘
[T]here can hardly
be a clearer instance of issues that are wholly academic, of issues
exciting no interest but a historical one,
than those on which our
ruling is wanted have now become.’”
[8]
[24]
In
President
of Republic of South Africa v Democratic Alliance
[9]
Mogoeng CJ, writing for the majority, said:
“
The President
himself says ‘the order of Vally J no longer has any
practical effect between the parties and has become
academic’.
This Court is thus being asked to advise or guide the President. That
is the only real purpose to be served by
entertaining this appeal.
And courts should be loath to fulfil an advisory role, particularly
for the benefit of those who have
dependable advice abundantly
available to them and in circumstances where no actual purpose would
be served by that decision, now.
Entertaining this application
requires that we expend judicial resources that are already in short
supply especially at this level.
Frugality is therefore called for
here.”
[10]
[25]
Later on in the same judgment, the Chief Justice said:
“
There is no
discrete issue raised here. Detailed factual considerations would
have to be traversed to do justice to this matter.
And the President
stands to suffer no harm should the determination of the issue be
left to a future challenge to the appointment
or dismissal of Cabinet
members. A refusal to exercise our discretion to address a moot
interlocutory question would thus not be
a lost opportunity,
necessary to address foreseeably imminent challenges. This is not one
of those challenges to presidential power
that are likely to arise as
frequently as is apparently feared. It didn’t for the past 25
years of our constitutional democracy
and is most unlikely to arise
any time soon.”
[11]
[26]
Counsel for the Minister conceded that the matter was moot but
submitted that, nevertheless, it was in the interests of justice for
this Court to grant leave to appeal. In support of this, counsel
pointed out that a judgment of this Court could give guidance
on
whether a Minister is entitled to use the B-BBEE level status in
respect of relief under the DM Act. There is no merit
in this
point. The Minister’s defence to the attack by Afriforum and
Solidarity was very specific. It related to the state
of disaster,
the DM Act and the regulations that were promulgated to regulate
certain matters during the state of disaster.
The state of disaster
has been terminated. It may take a long time before South Africa is
faced with another state of disaster.
[27]
In my view, there are no sound reasons for this Court to
entertain this matter despite it being moot. The fact that the High
Court
and the Supreme Court of Appeal in this matter gave
conflicting decisions does not on its own carry much weight. It may
have
been different if we were dealing with conflicting decisions of
different courts in different matters raising the same issue. In
this
regard I wish to point out that at some stage in the past this Court
may have been more inclined to entertain matters even
if they were
moot. This Court’s workload has increased substantially since
its jurisdiction was expanded by the 17
th
Constitution
Amendment in 2013. This does not mean that this Court will never
entertain a matter that is moot if there are proper
grounds
justifying that it should entertain a moot matter. However, it means
that in the future this Court is likely to be less
inclined than it
would have been before to entertain such matters. This Court will,
generally speaking, rather wait for another
matter that will not be
moot before it may pronounce on an issue. This is something
practitioners should bear in mind when advising
litigants in matters
that have become moot. It is not in the interests of justice for this
Court to grant leave to appeal and determine
the appeal.
[28]
In my view, the applicants’ application falls to be
dismissed with costs including the costs of two counsel.
[29]
In the result, the following order is made:
1.
Leave to appeal is refused with costs including the costs of two
counsel.
For
the Applicants:
Adv Moses Mphaga SC (with Adv Faith Zulu)
Instructed by State
Attorney (Pretoria)
For
the First Respondents:
Adv Margaretha J Engelbrecht SC (with Adv
Johan GC Hamman)
Instructed
by Hurter Spies Incorporated
For
the Second Respondent:
Adv Corné
Goosen (with Adv Dirk J
Groenewald)
Instructed
by Serfontein Viljoen and Swart
[1]
57 of 2002.
[2]
Id at preamble.
[3]
Regulation 10(8) Government Gazette No 43107 GG 318 of 18 March
2020.
[4]
53 of 2003.
[5]
Biowatch
Trust v Registrar, Genetic Resources
[2009] ZACC 14; 2009 (6) SA 232 (CC); 2009 (10) BCLR 1014 (CC).
[6]
3 of 2000.
[7]
National
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs
[1999]
ZACC 17; 2000 (2) SA 1; 2000 BCLR 39 (CC).
[8]
Id at footnote 18.
[9]
[2019] ZACC 35; 2020 (1) SA 428 (CC); 2019 (11) BCLR 1403 (CC).
[10]
Id at para 35.
[11]
Id at para 38.
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