Case Law[2025] ZASCA 172South Africa
AIG South Africa Limited and Others v Azrapart (Pty) Ltd and Another (898/2024) [2025] ZASCA 172; [2026] 1 All SA 1 (SCA) (14 November 2025)
Headnotes
Summary: Insurance law – antecedent insurance agreements – whether the insurance contract falls to be rectified – whether antecedent agreements were concluded between the appellants and the respondents, and if so, what the terms of those antecedent agreements were – whether the insurance policy ought to have been rectified, by the deletion of the clause providing for Infectious and Contagious Disease cover.
Judgment
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## AIG South Africa Limited and Others v Azrapart (Pty) Ltd and Another (898/2024) [2025] ZASCA 172; [2026] 1 All SA 1 (SCA) (14 November 2025)
AIG South Africa Limited and Others v Azrapart (Pty) Ltd and Another (898/2024) [2025] ZASCA 172; [2026] 1 All SA 1 (SCA) (14 November 2025)
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sino date 14 November 2025
FLYNOTES:
CONTRACT
– Insurance –
Infectious
and contagious disease cover –
Plea
of rectification – Failed to discharge heavy onus to prove
rectification in clearest and most satisfactory manner
–
Evidence showed no mutual error or continuing intention to exclude
ICD cover – Negotiation process culminated
in a signed
placing slip and policy that included ICD cover consistent with
insured’s original request – Contract
accurately
reflected parties’ intention – Appeal dismissed.
THE
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Not reportable
Case
no: 898/2024
In the matter between:
AIG SOUTH AFRICA
LIMITED
FIRST APPELLANT
OLD MUTUAL INSURE
LIMITED
SECOND APPELLANT
BRYTE INSURANCE
COMPANY LIMITED
THIRD APPELLANT
GUARDRISK INSURANCE
COMPANY LIMITED
FOURTH APPELLANT
INSURANCE UNDERWRITING
MANAGERS (PTY) LTD FIFTH
APPELLANT
and
AZRAPART (PTY)
LTD
FIRST RESPONDENT
ACCELERATE PROPERTY
FUND LIMITED
SECOND RESPONDENT
Neutral
Citation:
AIG
South Africa Limited and Others v Azrapart (Pty) Ltd and Another
(898/2024)
[2025] ZASCA 172
(14 November 2025)
Coram:
MOTHLE, KGOELE and
KOEN JJA and STEYN and HENNEY AJJA
Heard:
4 September 2025
Delivered:
14 November 2025
Summary:
Insurance law – antecedent
insurance agreements – whether the insurance contract falls to
be rectified – whether
antecedent agreements were concluded
between the appellants and the respondents, and if so, what the terms
of those antecedent
agreements were – whether the insurance
policy ought to have been rectified, by the deletion of the clause
providing for
Infectious and Contagious Disease cover.
ORDER
On
appeal from
: Gauteng Division of the
High Court, Johannesburg (Manoim J sitting as court of first
instance):
The
appeal is dismissed with costs, including the costs of two counsel.
JUDGMENT
Mothle
JA (Kgoele and Koen JJA and Steyn and Henney AJJA concurring)
Introduction
[1]
This is an appeal against the judgment and order of the
Gauteng
Division of the High Court, Johannesburg (the high court), delivered
on 3 May 2024. The issues in this appeal arise from
a dispute over
the terms of an insurance contract, concluded by the insurers (the
appellants) and the insured (the respondents).
It concerns the
question whether the contract of insurance stands to be rectified, as
pleaded by the insurers.
[2]
The insurers, with different percentages of the assumed
risk, are the
first to fifth appellants, namely, AIG South Africa Limited (AIG)
with 70 per cent risk, Old Mutual Insure Limited
(OMI) with 14
percent risk, Bryte Insurance Company Limited (Bryte) with 8 percent
risk, Guardrisk Insurance Company Limited (Guardrisk)
with 3 percent
risk and Insurance Underwriting Managers (Pty) Ltd (IUM) with 5
percent risk, respectively. The insured are
Azrapart (Pty) Ltd and
Accelerate Property Fund Limited, cited as the first and second
respondents in this appeal.
In
the high court
[3]
The respondents (as plaintiffs in the high court) had
claimed
indemnification under the insurance contract, against the appellants
(as defendants), based on the loss suffered consequent
to the
outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. The terms of the insurance
contract under the item ‘Business Interruption’,
provided
for a clause which included cover against Infectious and Contagious
Disease (the ICD cover). The appellants denied liability,
claiming
rectification in their answering affidavits. The rectification, as
pleaded by the appellants, contends for the deletion
of the clause
providing the ICD cover under business interruption.
[4]
On 3 May 2024, the high court dismissed the appellants’
plea of
rectification of the insurance contract and granted a declaratory
order in favour of the respondents, to the effect that,
on a proper
interpretation, the insurance contract under business interruption
includes the ICD cover. On 23 July 2024, on application
by the
appellants, the high court granted leave to appeal to this Court. On
the eve of the hearing of the appeal in this Court,
the first to
fourth appellants concluded a settlement agreement with the
respondents. As a result, the first to fourth appellants
delivered a
notice to withdraw their appeals. The appeal proceeded only with the
fifth appellant against the respondents.
Background
facts
[5]
The background narrative to the cause of the dispute,
stated
succinctly, is the following. The respondents were co-owners of
Fourways Mall (the mall), a shopping complex located in
Fourways,
Sandton, Gauteng. They conducted the business of letting out store
premises to tenants who traded from the mall. In July 2019,
the
respondents engaged Marsh (Pty) Ltd (Marsh), a local affiliate of an
international firm of insurance brokers, with the same
name, to
secure insurance for the mall. The respondents needed an insurance
policy that, amongst others, would provide cover against
factors that
would cause business interruption, from which losses would be
incurred. The ICD cover was one such factor. Marsh accepted
the
mandate and appointed its employee, Mr Andrew Stockton (Mr Stockton),
the new business development manager in South Africa,
to the project.
[6]
Mr Stockton, who was the only witness to testify in the
high court,
stated that he had approached the first appellant because they had
the largest capacity to underwrite this type of
insurance. As the
largest insurer, the first appellant took on the role of lead
insurer, conducting negotiations as to the terms
of the contract on
behalf of other insurers participating in the deal. In order to
provide a better context of the genesis of the
dispute, it is
apposite to explain, in a simplified manner, the procedure through
which the negotiations were conducted.
[7]
It is common practice in the insurance industry, that the
negotiations for an insurance contract of this magnitude are
conducted through a set of ‘governing rules’. These rules
are recorded as ‘Drafting Instructions’, which entail the
agreed base wording for the draft proposal, in this case,
the
drafting Assets All Risks Policies (POLDRA). Broadly stated, the
negotiations commence with the insured requesting a quotation
on the
terms of insurance it requires. This request is made in the insured
broker’s standard form or template, named a ‘Quoting
Slip’. This document contains the standard terms and conditions
for that kind of contract. The Quoting Slip would also provide
space
for the parties to state their preferred subjectivities and
conditions.
[8]
Of importance is that the system envisages all parties communicating
their proposals, subjectivities and conditions, as well as
counter-proposals on the same Quoting Slip, exchanged between them.
The use of the Quoting Slip is governed by the POLDRA rules, which
are binding on all parties to the negotiation. As an example,
any
subjectivities and conditions, additions and amendments or counter
proposals would be stated and highlighted by the author,
for the
receiving party to easily identify them from the detailed text, as it
will be highlighted in the designated area in the
Quoting Slip.
Anything not highlighted will be taken as accepted. The exchange will
continue until the final text is agreed upon
by the insurer and the
insured. The negotiations end with the insured issuing a ‘Placing
Slip’ for signature by the
parties, indicating acceptance of
the antecedent agreement from the Quotation Slips. The wording of the
signed Placing Slips would
be the basis on which the insurance
contract or policy would be drafted and provided to the parties. I
will later in this judgment,
revert to some of the rules that were
applicable to this process.
[9]
On 23 July 2019, Mr Stockton sent a request for quotation
to Ms
Valerie Wide (Ms Wide), then employed by the first appellant as the
senior underwriter. Mr Stockton and Ms Wide
knew each
other, having conducted business as representatives of brokers in
similar roles before. Ms Wide, as the representative
of the first
appellant, was the lead broker for the first to fourth appellants,
though each appellant had an underwriter to cater
for the interests
of the insurer on behalf of which they acted. In the case of the
fifth appellant, the underwriters comprised
a team which included Mr
Ryan Shepherd (Mr Shepherd) and Mr Lekang Motaung (Mr Motaung).
[10]
Mr Stockton initiated the request for a quotation, using the Marsh’s
form of Quoting Slip, for the insurance in respect of the mall. On
page 8 of the first Quoting Slip, under the heading ‘Business
Interruption: specific extensions’, he included the phrase
‘Infectious/Contagious Disease’. The invitation to
quote
reflects in a highlighted block on the front page, the following
instruction:
‘
Please
quote in accordance with the underwriting information, coverage,
terms and conditions as reflected below. Should you require
any
restrictive/unusual/different terms, conditions or exclusions please
indicate this clearly on the document.
Any
amendments made by the Insurer to the slip which are not highlighted
shall not apply to this quotation.
’ (My emphasis.)
[11]
This Quoting Slip included the ICD cover in the text block, stating
the terms of
Business Interruptions: specific extensions cover. The
fifth appellant entered the negotiations later in the year. I will
return
to the negotiation with the fifth appellant later in this
judgment, since the source of the confusion which led to the dispute
in this appeal, arose from the first quotation sent by Ms Wide,
before the fifth appellant was invited to participate as one of
the
insurers.
[12]
In response to the Request for Quotation (RFQ), Ms Wide sent a
quotation to
Mr Stockton on 5 August 2019, using a different Quoting
Slip from the one sent by Mr Stockton. This Quoting Slip, sent by Ms
Wide,
did not include the ICD cover, under the block on Business
Interruptions: specific extension cover. Significantly, the omission
of the ICD cover was neither specifically highlighted nor signalled
by a strike-through on the Quoting Slip, as required by the
governing
rules. It could thus not be detectable to a reasonable reader unless
they painstakingly checked every word against the
initial Quoting
Slip sent by Mr Stockton. In addition, Mr Stockton sent the Quoting
Slip in Word format, but Ms Wide returned hers
in PDF format.
[13]
It has not been definitively determined why Ms Wide’s Quotation
Slip
excluded the ICD cover. Ms Wide did not testify at the hearing
in the high court, though, in her sworn statement presented to the
court, she denied having acted deliberately. Of importance, and
contrary to the governing rules, there was no iteration in the
document or highlighted portion of the text, to indicate the
exclusion of the ICD cover from her Quoting Slip. Consequently,
neither
Ms Wide nor Mr Stockton appears to have taken notice of
this critical error. The consequence was the use of two Quoting
Slips,
interchangeably including or excluding the ICD cover. This
reality, which went undetected, is the factor on which the appellants
hung their defence of rectification.
[14]
The two Quoting Slips were used interchangeably during the
negotiation phase. The
negotiations were conducted mainly through the
exchange of emails. The focus of the discourse through the emails,
was on the determination
of the risk capacity percentage for each
insurer. The risk capacity was determined on the concept of ‘follow
the line of
the lead insurer’
.
This meant that the first
appellant as the lead insurer, assumed the greater risk capacity
percentage. The other appellants had
to negotiate theirs in line with
the terms negotiated by the first appellant. The risk capacity
percentage having been broadly
agreed, Marsh sent a Quoting Slip
dated 14 November 2019 to each representative of the appellants to
confirm, by signature, the
final risk capacity percentage. This
Quoting Slip, for some inexplicable reason, excluded the ICD cover.
The first to fourth appellants
signed it, confirming the risk
capacity percentage as allocated. The first appellant, as lead
insurer, accepted a risk capacity
of 70 percent. The second and
subsequent other appellants made various proposals or offers to Marsh
on capacity percentages,
eventually settling their offers at
14 percent, 8 percent, 3 percent and 5 percent
respectively. I will return to the
latter case of the fifth
appellant’s 5 percent risk capacity, later in this judgment
[15]
On 11 December 2019, Marsh sent the Placing Slip to all parties for
signature.
The Placing Slip included the ICD cover. The
representatives of the first to fourth appellants signed the Placing
Slip, with Mr
Shepherd signing the Placing Slip for the fifth
appellant on 13 January 2020. On 12 March 2020, Marsh sent the final
Policy document
(insurance contract), which was accepted by the
appellants. Like the Placing Slip, the insurance contract included
the ICD cover.
[16]
On 21 November 2022, two years after the insurance contract was
concluded,
the respondents instituted an action against the
appellants, wherein they claimed business interruption losses. The
claim arose
from the outbreak of the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, which
resulted in the promulgation of emergency regulations. The
regulations,
published by the government in order to curb the spread
of this contagious disease, sought to restrict the movement of the
population
in South Africa, mainly from public places. The
restrictions affected, amongst others, the conduct of trade and
business overall,
including that of the tenants at the mall. The
tenants could not trade and consequently, could not afford the
payment of rental
of the premises. Thus, the loss allegedly suffered
by the respondents arose from COVID-19, which was in essence ‘an
infectious
and contagious disease’, which caused the business
interruption.
[17]
The respondents thus raised their claims for indemnity under the
clause of
the ICD cover. In response, the appellants raised the
defence of the rectification of the insurance contract, contending
that the
contract should be read as excluding the ICD cover.
[18]
In the high court, the first to fourth appellants and the respondents
agreed
to request the court to order a separation of three issues,
‘on the basis that if any one of the three was resolved in the
[appellants’] favour, that would end the claim’. The high
court considered it prudent to grant an order of the separation
of
issues. The first separated issue was whether the contract of
insurance consisted of the policy in its final form or whether
it
consisted of the final Quoting Slip of 14 November 2019. The
second separated issue concerned the rectification defence
raised by
the appellants. The third separated issue concerned only the first to
fourth appellants, who raised the contention that
the respondents had
not paid their premiums in full, and therefore, were not entitled to
an indemnification.
[19]
The fifth appellant did not consent to the granting of the order for
separation
of issues, but nevertheless participated in the second
separated issue, rectification, which is the basis of its appeal
before
this Court. I now turn to deal with the fifth appellant’s
case as presented in the high court and in this Court.
The
Fifth Appellant’s case
[20]
The defence of rectification raises the question: what was the common
and continuing
intention of the parties? The intention of the parties
is determined on the basis of the facts of each case. The following
are
the facts of the case in so far as the fifth appellant is
concerned. About two months after Mr Stockton sent the first request
for quotation to Ms Wide on 23 July 2019, he sent an initial request
for a quotation by email to Mr Shepherd, on 13 September 2019,
inviting the fifth appellant to participate with a 10 percent risk
capacity. In that email, he referred Mr Shepherd to the then
‘current
terms agreed to’ with the first appellant. This could only have
meant the first appellant’s Quoting
Slip dated 19 August 2019,
which included the ICD cover. Mr Shepherd responded on the same
day by stating: ‘[t]hat sounds
do-able. We will send you our
formal quotation by latest COB on Monday’.
[21]
On 16 September 2019, Mr Motaung sent an email to Mr Stockton,
stating: ‘[A]attached
please find in principle our follow line
capacity confirmation’. At that stage, the fifth appellant had
been offered 10 percent
risk capacity. On 15 November 2019, as
with all the appellants, Mr Shepherd received from Mr Stockton
the 14 November
2019 Quoting Slip, which required a signature,
confirming the participation of the fifth appellant at 5 percent
capacity risk.
This Quoting Slip did not have the ICD cover
.
Significantly, the fifth appellant did not sign this last Quoting
Slip. In this regard, the fifth appellant, in its heads of argument,
quoted from Mr Stockton’s oral evidence:
‘
[The
fifth appellant] responded in an email on 21 November 2019 to my
correspondence of 15 November 2019 by attaching its correspondence
of
16 September 2019 containing the original signed Quoting Slip (which
contains the R5 000 000.00 sub-limit and the
“infectious/Contagious
Disease” wording) and detailed
subjectivities. [The fifth appellant]
did
not sign the 14 November 2019 Quoting Slip.
’
(Own emphasis)
[22]
Instead of the fifth appellant signing the 14 November 2019 Quoting
Slip, Mr Motaung
sent two emails dated 21 and 29 November 2019,
to Ms Lesego Lydia Motala (Ms Motala) and Ms Nokwanda Mbilase (Ms
Mbilase) respectively
of Marsh. In particular, in the email to Ms
Mbilase dated 29 November 2019, Mr Motaung confirmed that the
fifth appellant
would take 5 percent capacity, and there and then, Mr
Motaung also requested a Placing Slip. Nothing was raised in the
emails concerning
the inclusion or exclusion of the ICD cover.
[23]
The first to fourth appellants all signed the 14 November 2019
Quoting Slip,
effectively signalling an end to the negotiations. The
appellants went on risk from 1 December 2019. On 13 December
2019,
the appellants received the Placing Slip, which included the
ICD cover. Mr Shepherd was then on leave and indicated to Marsh that
he would attend to the Placing Slip sent to the fifth appellant on
his return in January 2020, which he in fact did and signed
on 13
January 2020. It needs to be noted that it appears that the Placing
Slip was the first document of POLDRA, which the fifth
appellant
signed. There appears to be no evidence of a signed Quoting Slip from
the fifth appellant. The fifth appellant was negotiating
mainly
through exchange of emails.
[24]
It was only two years later, after the respondents claimed indemnity,
that
the first appellant, in its answering affidavit, raised the
defence of rectification concerning the inclusion of the ICD cover in
the policy wording of the insurance contract. Throughout the
negotiation, none of the parties raised the issue concerning the
inclusion or exclusion of the ICD cover. This is evidenced by the
fact that none of the appellants ever highlighted in any Quotation
Slip or raised any objection to the ICD cover in the emails.
[25]
The fifth appellant’s pleaded case for rectification relies on
an ‘alleged
insurance contract concluded on or about 1 December
2019, consisting of allegedly four documents’, which in fact
were three.
These documents, stated in paragraph 7.3 of its plea,
were:
(a)
The Final Quoting Slip by AIG dated 14 November 2019 (which
excluded
the ICD cover and was not signed by the fifth appellant);
(b)
The quotation, subjectivities and conditions to cover, sent
on 15
November 2019 (the same document as in (a) above);
(c)
The Final Placing Slip (which included the ICD cover);
and
(d)
The Policy Wording (which included the ICD cover).
[26]
The fifth appellant contended that these documents are contradictory
and wholly
irreconcilable with one another, as regards the ICD cover.
Therefore, the clause on the ICD cover ‘. . . was included in
the policy wording as a result of a bona fide mutual error in the
drafting of the policy wording and it should not have been included
in the policy wording at all. The policy wording stands to be
rectified accordingly’.
The
law
[27]
The onus to prove
rectification lies with the party seeking it. The fifth appellant
must prove the factors required to sustain rectification.
This Court,
in
Propfokus
49 (Pty) Ltd and Others v Wenhandel 4
(Pty)
Ltd
,
[1]
held that in order to succeed with a defence of rectification, a
party must prove the following five factors:
‘
(a)
that an agreement had been concluded between the parties and reduced
to writing;
(b)
that the written document does not reflect the true intention of the
parties – this requires that the common continuing
intention of
the parties, as it existed at the time when the agreement was reduced
to writing, be established;
(c)
an intention by both parties to reduce the agreement to writing . .
.;
(d)
a mistake in drafting the document, which mistake could have been the
result of an intentional act of the other party or a bona
fide common
error; and
(e)
the actual wording of the true agreement.’
[28]
The facts and evidence relied on must, in this case, also be
considered within
the context of the POLDRA governing rules that
applied during the negotiations. The POLDRA governing rules in Realty
Assets All
Risks are stated as clauses in the Quoting Slip. Clauses 8
and 9, which are applicable and relevant to the issues in this case,
will be referred to later in this judgment.
Analysis
of the fifth appellant’s case
[29]
The background facts concerning the communication between the fifth
appellant
and Marsh, indicates the following:
(a)
In the first instance, the first appellant became aware of the
intention to include the ICD cover
in the request for quotation sent
by Mr Stockton on 13 September 2019, when the first appellant
received its invitation to
participate in the deal. By that date, the
ICD cover was in the Quoting Slip of 19 August 2019 to which Mr
Shepherd was referred.
The fifth appellant never raised any issue
concerning the inclusion of the ICD cover. It never highlighted an
objection or proposed
an amendment to the contrary, as invited to do
so, if necessary, which appears on page 8 of the request for
quotation.
(b)
Clause 8 of POLDRA is instructive. It recognises the Placing Slip as
the policy wording which
must be contained in the insurance contract.
Clause 8 provides: ‘the policy must be drafted in accordance
with the terms,
conditions, exclusions, etc reflected in the signed
Placing Slip. Do not deviate from the Placing Slip without first
renegotiating
with Insurers. If changes are negotiated with Insurers,
a Placing Slip endorsement reflecting those changes must be issued
and
signed by the relevant Insurer’. The fifth appellant was
the last party to sign the Placing Slip, a month after it was sent.
In so signing, the fifth appellant did not signify any changes.
(c)
The fifth appellant alleges a contradiction between two
(in fact one)
Quoting Slips of 14 November 2019 on the one side, and a Placing Slip
as well as the ultimate insurance contract,
on the other side. First,
the Quoting Slips referred to by the fifth appellant under (a) and
(b) are one and the same document.
The Quoting Slip sent to all the
parties, is dated 14 November 2019. The fifth appellant received its
copy on 15 November 2019,
but unlike the first appellant, it never
signed it. It seems to me that, the Quoting Slip, within this
context, served as received
confirmation of the risk capacity
allocations to all the participating insurers. The fifth appellant
confirmed this fact by email
of 29 November 2019, from Mr Motaung to
Ms Mbilase. The obvious fact is that the initial Quoting Slip to
reach the fifth appellant,
is the one dated 19 August 2019, as an
attachment to the September 2019 invite to participate, dated. That
Quoting Slip of 19 August
2019, came from the first appellant and had
ICD cover included. The fifth appellant accepted the terms contained
therein, at 10%
risk participation.
(d)
Clause 9 provides for measures to ensure that the intentions
of the
parties are correctly reflected in a Placing Slip. After having
received a Placing Slip for a month,
the fifth appellant’s
brokers should have checked the wording of the Placing Slip before
they signed
. The email invited them to comment or sign. Clause 9
provides:
‘
In
cases where clauses are not included in this document [a reference to
the Placing Slip] but are required on a client specific
basis, these
clauses should be referred to the Sandton wordings team who will work
with you to ensure that they correctly reflect
intention and are
aligned with the balance of the policy.’ (My emphasis.)
(e)
The intention of the respondents has always been that under
Business
Interruptions there is a need for the ICD cover. Ms Wide would attest
to this fact, as the very first request for a quotation
sent to her
on 23 July 2019, included the ICD cover. The 19 August 2019 Quotation
Slip, which she sent on behalf of the fifth appellant,
and referred
to the fifth appellant by Marsh, in the email of invitation to quote
dated 13 September 2019, also included the ICD
cover. The fifth
appellant made no reference to this vital evidence. Apart from
seeking to limit its cover liability to R1million,
there was no issue
relating to the terms of insurance cover on ICD, that was raised by
the fifth appellant, that would have affected
the intention of the
fifth appellant and the respondent to contract.
(f)
The respondents’ claim was lodged in April
2020. The appellants
only raised the alleged rectification concerning the inclusion of the
ICD cover for the first time in the
answering affidavits in 2022,
nearly two years after the claim was lodged. In addition, the fifth
appellant failed to call a witness
to testify in support of the
rectification. The latter would have enabled the high court to be
better placed to determine Mr Shepherd’s
intention when he
signed the Placing Slip.
(g)
In answering the first
question of the separated issues, the high court invoked the Parol
evidence rule
[2]
, and concluded
that the contract between the parties is the last document, the
contract of insurance, distributed and signed for
acceptance by all
parties in March 2020. The terms and conditions of the contract of
insurance reflected those of the Placing Slip,
signed by the parties
before the contract of insurance, the last party being the fifth
appellant in January 2020. These last two
documents contain the terms
and conditions of the agreements concluded during the negotiations
between the insured and insurers,
and their intention to enter into
an insurance contract. It is therefore these last two documents that
have to be properly interpreted
to consider whether there is a
‘mistake common to the parties’, that would raise the
question of rectification. The
fifth appellant has not proved any
existence of a mistake between any of the two documents.
[30]
Having regard to the
conspectus of the evidence and the factors stated above, it is clear
that the fifth appellant latched on to
a defence which the first to
fourth appellants have raised. In
Soil
Fumigation Services Lowveld CC v Chemfit
Technical
Products Pty Ltd
[3]
this Court held: ‘It is a settled principle that a party who
seeks rectification must show facts entitling him to that relief
“in
the clearest and most satisfactory manner”…In essence, a
claimant for rectification must prove that the
written agreement does
not correctly express what the parties had intended to set out
therein.’ The fifth appellant’s
communication with Marsh
did not yield any ‘mistake’ common to it and the
respondents. The fifth appellant has not
proved, ‘in the
clearest and most satisfactory manner,’ that the written
contract of insurance is contrary to the Placing
Slip. Further, no
evidence was provided that there exists ‘a mistake common to
the parties’ concerning the two documents,
such that these
documents do not correctly express the intention of the contracting
parties.
[31]
The fifth appellant was the last party to join the deal and
negotiated its
part through an exchange of emails. The terms of
agreement were negotiated on the basis of the Quotation Slip of 19
August 2019,
concluded with the first appellant which included the
ICD cover. Apart from the question of risk capacity and monetary
limitation
of cover, the fifth appellant did not negotiate for
anything else. The wording in the Placing Slip and the insurance
contract is
the same, and indicates that the parties were of the same
intent. Therefore, the defence of rectification has no merit, and the
appeal must therefore fail. The costs should follow the result.
[32]
I make the following order:
The
appeal is dismissed with costs, including the costs of two counsel.
S P MOTHLE
JUDGE OF APPEAL
Appearances
For
the fifth appellant:
E J
Ferreira SC
Instructed
by:
Engelbrecht
Attorneys Inc., Johannesburg
McIntyre Van der
Post Inc., Bloemfontein
For
the respondents:
M C
Maritz SC with G Elliot SC
Instructed
by:
Thomson
Wilks Inc., Cape Town
Honey
Attorneys, Bloemfontein.
[1]
Propfokus
49 (Pty) Ltd and Others v Wenhandel 4 (Pty) Ltd
[2007]
ZASCA 15
; [2007] SCA 15 (RSA);
[2007] 3 All SA 18
(SCA) para 13.
[2]
In
Union
Government v Vianini Ferro-Concrete Pipes (Pty) Ltd
1941
AD 43
at p 47, The parol evidence rule is: ‘that when a
contract has been reduced to writing, the writing is, in general,
regarded
as the exclusive memorial of the transaction and in a suit
between the parties no evidence to prove its terms may be given save
the document or secondary evidence of its contents, nor may the
contents of such document be contradicted, altered, added to
or
varied by parole evidence.’
[3]
Soil
Fumigation Services Lowveld CC v Chemfit Technical Products (Pty)
Ltd
[2004]
2 All SA 366
;
2004 (6) SA 29
(SCA) para 21.
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