Case Law[2024] ZASCA 145South Africa
Transasia 444 (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy and Others; Transasia Minerals (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy and Others (702/2023; 707/2023) [2024] ZASCA 145 (23 October 2024)
Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa
23 October 2024
Headnotes
Summary: Failure to cite party with direct and substantial interest in application to compel disclosure of records held by the Director-General of the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy relating to the application for the Ministerial consent for the transfer of a mineral right under s 11 of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Act 28 of 2000 – disclosure order erroneously sought and granted as contemplated by rule 42(1)(a) of the Uniform Rules of Court – order issued by court considering rescission supplementing the disclosure order incompetent – order set aside and substitution order granted.
Judgment
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## Transasia 444 (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy and Others; Transasia Minerals (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy and Others (702/2023; 707/2023) [2024] ZASCA 145 (23 October 2024)
Transasia 444 (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy and Others; Transasia Minerals (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy and Others (702/2023; 707/2023) [2024] ZASCA 145 (23 October 2024)
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sino date 23 October 2024
THE
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
### JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT
Not
Reportable
Case
no: 702/2023
In
the matter between:
TRANSASIA
444 (PTY) LTD
APPELLANT
and
THE
MINISTER OF MINERAL RESOURCES
AND
ENERGY
FIRST RESPONDENT
DIRECTOR-GENERAL:
DEPARTMENT OF
MINERAL
RESOURCES AND ENERGY
SECOND RESPONDENT
THE
REGIONAL MANAGER: KWAZULU-NATAL
REGION
THIRD RESPONDENT
UMSOBOMVU
COAL (PTY) LTD
FOURTH RESPONDENT
TRANSASIA
MINERALS SA (PTY) LTD
FIFTH RESPONDENT
In
re:
UMSOBOMVU
COAL (PTY)
LTD
APPLICANT
and
THE
MINISTER OF MINERAL RESOURCES
AND
ENERGY
FIRST RESPONDENT
DIRECTOR-GENERAL:
DEPARTMENT OF
MINERAL
RESOURCES AND ENERGY
SECOND RESPONDENT
THE
REGIONAL MANAGER: KWAZULU-NATAL
REGION
THIRD RESPONDENT
And
Case
no: 707/2023
In
the matter between:
TRANSASIA
MINERALS (SA) (PTY) LTD
APPELLANT
and
THE
MINISTER OF MINERAL RESOURCES
AND
ENERGY
FIRST RESPONDENT
DIRECTOR-GENERAL:
DEPARTMENT OF
MINERAL
RESOURCES AND ENERGY
SECOND RESPONDENT
THE
REGIONAL MANAGER: KWAZULU
NATAL
REGION
THIRD RESPONDENT
UMSOBOMVU
COAL (PTY) LTD
FOURTH RESPONDENT
TRANSASIA
444 (PTY)
LTD
FIFTH RESPONDENT
In
re
:
UMSOBOMVU
COAL (PTY)
LTD
APPLICANT
and
THE
MINISTER OF MINERAL RESOURCES
AND
ENERGY
FIRST RESPONDENT
DIRECTOR-GENERAL:
DEPARTMENT OF
MINERAL
RESOURCES AND ENERGY
SECOND RESPONDENT
THE
REGIONAL MANAGER: KWAZULU NATAL
REGION
THIRD RESPONDENT
Neutral
citation:
Transasia 444 (Pty) Ltd v The
Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy and Others
(702/2023)
&
Transasia Minerals (SA) (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Mineral Resources
and Energy and Others
(707/2023)
[2024] ZASCA 145
(23 October
2024)
Coram:
MOLEMELA P, ZONDI DP and UNTERHALTER JA and MANTAME and DIPPENAAR
AJJA
Heard:
This appeal was, by consent between the parties, disposed of without
an oral hearing in terms of
s 19
(a)
of the
Superior Courts Act
10 of 2013
.
Delivered:
This judgment was handed down electronically by
circulation to the parties’ representatives by email,
publication on the Supreme
Court of Appeal website, and release to
SAFLII. The date for hand down is deemed to be 23 October 2024 at
11h00.
Summary:
Failure to cite party with direct and substantial interest in
application to compel disclosure of records held
by the
Director-General of the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy
relating to the application for the Ministerial consent
for the
transfer of a mineral right under s 11 of the Mineral and Petroleum
Resources Act 28 of 2000 – disclosure order erroneously
sought
and granted as contemplated by rule 42(1)(a) of the Uniform Rules of
Court – order issued by court considering rescission
supplementing the disclosure order incompetent – order set
aside and substitution order granted.
ORDER
On
appeal from:
Gauteng Division of the High Court
,
Pretoria
(Millar J, sitting as court of first instance):
In relation to Transasia
444 (Pty) Ltd’s appeal under case number 702/2023:
1
The appeal succeeds.
2
The order issued by Millar J on 29 August 2022 is set aside and
substituted with the
following:
‘
(a) The
application for rescission succeeds.
(b) The default
order granted by Mngqibisa-Thusi J, on 8 July 2022, under case number
10531/2022, is hereby set aside.
(c) The application
for the joinder of the applicant as the fourth respondent in the
disclosure application under case number
10531/2022 is granted.
(d) The applicant
is granted leave to oppose the disclosure application and to file its
answering affidavit within (15) fifteen)
days from the date of this
order.
(e) The fourth
respondent in the rescission application (Umsobomvu Coal (Pty) Ltd)
is ordered to pay the applicant’s
costs.’
3
The fourth respondent is ordered to pay the appellant’s costs
of appeal including
the costs of the application for leave to appeal
both in the high court and in this Court.
In
relation to Transasia Minerals (SA) (Pty) Ltd’s appeal under
case number 707/2023, the following order is issued:
1
The appeal succeeds.
2
The order issued by Millar J on 29 August 2022 is set aside and
substituted with the
following:
‘
(a) The
applicant is granted leave to intervene as an applicant in the
application for leave to appeal.
(b) The
applicant is granted leave to oppose the disclosure application and
to file its answering affidavit within
15 (fifteen) days from the
date of this order.
(c) The
fourth respondent in the rescission application (Umsobomvu Coal (Pty)
Ltd) is ordered to pay the applicant’s
costs in the
intervention application.’
3
The fourth respondent is ordered to pay the costs of appeal including
the costs of application
for leave to appeal both in the high court
and in this Court.
JUDGMENT
Zondi
DP (Molemela P and Unterhalter JA and Mantame and Dippenaar AJJA
concurring):
[1]
The two appeals were heard simultaneously, as the issues they raise
are substantially similar,
notwithstanding that they were not
formally consolidated. The appellant in the matter under case number
702/2023 is Transasia 444
(Pty) Ltd (Transasia 444) and under case
number 707/2023 the appellant is Transasia Minerals (SA) (Pty) Ltd
(Transasia Minerals).
Transasia 444 and Tranasia Minerals, though
they are separate entities, are owned by a common shareholder,
Transasia BVI, which
is incorporated and registered in the British
Virgin Islands.
[2]
The two appeals concern the validity of the order made by Millar J of
the Gauteng Division of
the High Court, Pretoria in an application
for rescission of the order made by Judge Mngqibisa-Thusi of the same
division on 28
June 2022. The main issue before Millar J was whether
Mngqibisa-Thusi J’s order should be rescinded. Instead of
expressly
granting or dismissing the application for rescission,
Millar J issued an order which substantially changed the terms of
Mngqibisa-Thusi
J’s order.
[3]
The facts which gave rise to these appeals are largely common cause
and are the following. Transasia
444 and Transasia Minerals have been
involved in a long-standing dispute with the fourth respondent,
Umsobomvu (Pty) Ltd (Umsobomvu).
The dispute relates to the transfer
of certain mining rights Umsobomvu sold to Transasia 1 (Pty) Ltd,
(Transasia 1) which the latter
subsequently assigned to Transasia
444. Umsobomvu disputed the validity of the sale agreement and
cancelled it. Transasia 444 disputed
Umsobomvu’s right to
cancel the agreement and sought to enforce it.
[4]
Transasia 444 applied to the second respondent, the Director-General
of the Department of Minerals
and Energy (Director-General) for
ministerial consent in terms of s 11 of the Mineral and Petroleum
Resources Development Act 28
of 2002 (the MPRDA) for the transfer of
the mineral rights to it. In support of the application, Transasia
444 submitted to the
Director-General various documents, some of
which were confidential, while others belonged to third parties,
including Transasia
Minerals. Umsobomvu opposed the application.
Despite its opposition, the Minister gave his consent to the transfer
of Umsobomvu’s
mineral rights to Transasia 444. Umsobomvu was
aggrieved by the decision and lodged an appeal in terms of s 96 of
the MPRDA.
[1]
To prosecute the appeal, Umsobomvu was entitled to the record of the
decision, subject to disclosure under confidentiality protection.
[5]
On 28 June 2022, Umsobomvu sought and obtained from the Gauteng
Division, Pretoria an order (Mngqibisa-Thusi
J’s order)
directing the first respondent (Minister of Mineral Resources and
Energy), the Director-General and the third
respondent, (the Regional
Manager: KwaZulu-Natal Region), (collectively referred to as the
Department) to deliver all the records
in respect of the appeal that
Umsobomvu had brought in terms of s 96 of the MPRDA . When this
application was brought, Transasia
Minerals and Transasia 444 were
not joined as parties, nor did they receive notice of the
application. Both were entitled to service
of the application and to
be cited as parties to the application as they are both affected
persons as envisaged in regulation 74(1)
to the MPRDA. Some of the
documents which were sought to be disclosed contained material which
they claimed to be confidential.
[6]
Mngqibisa-Thusi J’s order reads as follows:
‘
The
Third respondent is directed to deliver all records required in terms
of the Applicant’s notice of appeal in terms of
Section 96 read
with Regulation 74 of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development
Act, 2000 ('MPRDA and Application for the
withdrawal of the decision
in terms of s 103(4)(b) and Application for suspension of the
decision in terms of s 96(2)(a) in respect
of the decision made by
the Director-General concerning the application made by Transasia
Minerals 444 (Pty) Ltd (registration
number 2011/003954/07)
(Transasia 444) for Ministerial consent in terms of Section 11 of the
MPRDA for the transfer of mineral
right with reference number
KZN30/5/1/2/2/10021MR in respect of the property Farm terrace 3707
Portion 8 of the Farm Winkel no
5054, Remainder and Portion 1 of the
Farm Eastkeal no 5138 Farm Lot W no.8610, the Farm Corby Rock no
11509, Remainder of Portion
3, Remainder of Portion 4 and Portions 12
and 15 Farm Hazeldene no 12649 (‘Appeal’) in compliance
with Regulation 74(8)
of the MPRDA within 5 days of the granting of
the Order.’
Mngqibisa-Thusi
J did not furnish reasons for her order.
[7]
Aggrieved by the order of Mngqibisa-Thusi J, Transasia 444, on 15
July 2022, brought an urgent
application in the Gauteng Division,
Pretoria seeking its rescission. It simultaneously sought leave to be
joined as the respondent
in the disclosure application and to be
allowed to file its answering affidavit within 15 days from the date
of the order. Transasia
444’s complaint was that the order that
was obtained by Umsobomvu was granted without notice to it, even
though Umsobomvu
was aware that it was an interested party. Tranasia
444 contended that, as an interested party, it ought to have been
joined as
a party to the proceedings. The application for rescission
was brought under rule 42(1)(a) of the Uniform Rules of Court,
alternatively
under the common law.
[8]
Rule 42(1)(
a
) provides:
‘
The
court may . . .
mero motu
[of its own accord] or upon the
application of any party affected, rescind or vary:
(a)
an order or judgment erroneously sought or erroneously granted in the
absence of any party affected thereby . . .’.
[9]
The rescission application was heard by Millar J, who, after hearing
arguments, granted the following
order without reasons:
‘
1
By 5 September 2022, Third Respondent will deliver to the Applicant
and the Fourth Respondent
a complete index of all copies of all
documents pertaining to the Record of Decision concerning the
application made by the Applicant
in terms of section 11 of the
Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 2002 ("MPRDA")
("the Index").
2.
By no later than 12 September 2022, the Applicant will instruct
the Third Respondent
regarding which documents contained
in the Index and the record is / are confidential.
3.
The documents so identified by the Applicant shall be produced by the
Third Respondent as part
of the Record, but under a separate folder
to be titled “Confidential Portion of the Record”, by no
later than close
of business on 23 September 2022.
4.
For avoidance of doubt, the confidential and non-confidential parts
so compiled must contain a
copy of each and every document in the
Record in its original format (and may not be redacted).
5.
Only the legal representatives of the Fourth Respondent and the
experts employed by the fourth
Respondent who sign the
confidentiality undertaking attached as Annexure “A”
(“the Confidentiality Undertaking”)
hereto and submit the
Confidentiality Undertaking to the Applicant's attorneys, shall be
entitled to receive and inspect the Confidential
Portion of the
Record.
6.
For avoidance of all doubt, the Fourth Respondent and its directors
and shareholders and employees
shall not be entitled to receive or
inspect the contents of the Confidential Portion of the Record.
7.
Insofar as the Fourth Respondent (acting on advice received from its
legal representatives and/
or experts who have signed the
Confidentiality Undertaking), wish to challenge the classification of
a particular document as a
confidential document, the dispute in this
regard will be referred to by the Fourth Respondent and the Applicant
to a retired judge
who will be appointed by the parties within 24
hours of a dispute being declared. The retired judge so appointed
will act as an
expert and not as an arbitrator; and will decide
his/her own procedure, and whether or not evidence and argument is
required and
if so how it is to be presented. His/her decision on
either of these issues will be final and binding on the parties. If
the parties
cannot agree to the identity of the retired judge to be
appointed within 24 hours, the Chairperson of the Johannesburg Bar
shall
be required to make such an appointment and shall be requested
to do so on an urgent basis. The determination of the dispute will
be
treated by the parties and the expert as an urgent matter. Any issues
concerning the interpretation and/or application of the
confidentiality undertaking which may arise shall be referred to the
retired judge on the same basis.
8.
All submissions to the Minister making reference to the Confidential
Portion of the Record will
be treated confidentially by the Fourth
Respondent and submissions will be treated in the same vein as the
Confidential Portion
of the Record.
9.
Costs of two counsel from 15 July 2022 to the date of hearing
(including the date of hearing) are
to be paid by the Applicant to
the Fourth Respondent on a party and party scale.’
This
order followed the terms of the draft order that was handed up in
court by counsel for Umsobomvu. The order in the terms as
proposed by
Umsobomvu did not find favour with counsel for Transasia 444. He
objected to it, stating that his instructions were
merely to seek
rescission of Mngqibisa-Thusi J’s order and for Transasia 444
to be given an opportunity to oppose the main
application. Millar J
did not provide reasons for his order, and none were requested by
Transasia 444 before launching its application
for leave to appeal.
[10]
Transasia 444 sought leave to appeal against the order of Millar J
and sought condonation for the late filing
of its application for
leave to appeal. Transasia Minerals joined the fray. It applied for
leave to be joined as an applicant in
the application for leave to
appeal and the rescission application, alternatively to intervene in
the application for leave to
appeal and/or application for
rescission. In turn, Umsobomvu responded by bringing an application
to compel compliance with the
Mngqibisa-Thusi J’s order and to
hold the Department and Transasia 444 in contempt for failure to
comply with it; alternatively,
for an immediate execution of the
order in terms of
s 18(3)
of the
Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013
.
Although all three applications served before Millar J on 20 January
2023, he only dealt with the application for leave to appeal
and the
intervention application. He left the remaining application for
determination at a later stage.
[11]
Millar J granted Transasia Minerals leave to intervene as the
applicant in the application for leave to appeal
and dismissed
Transasia 444’s application for leave to appeal with no order
as to costs. In his judgment on the application
for leave to appeal
and the intervention application, Millar J for the first time shed
light on why he had granted his original
order. He explained that he
had granted Transasia Minerals leave to intervene in the appeal for
it to be able ‘to exercise
its rights together with Transasia
444
inter alia
in terms of paragraphs 2 and 7’ of his
order of 29 August 2022. In other words, according to Millar J the
order that he fashioned
affords Transasia Minerals and Transasia 444
the right to have a say on what documents the Department could
release to the attorneys
for Umsobomvu. He stated that in considering
the rescission application he had regard to the MPDRA and
regulation
74(8)
, regulating appeals, which requires the Regional Manager, upon
receipt of the notice of appeal, to send all records pertaining to
the decision appealed against to all identified affected persons.
[12]
According to Millar J, Umsobomvu, being one of the parties
contemplated in the regulation, was entitled to
be furnished with the
record. In his view, Umsobomvu was, however, not entitled to the
documents in respect of which the appellants
claimed confidentiality
or documents which were not relevant to the appeal and to which
Umsobomvu had no objection to their exclusion
from the appeal record.
Notably, Millar J’s order does not stipulate in explicit terms
whether he granted or refused rescission,
and his reasoning does not
provide clarity. He says at para 30 of the judgment:
‘
The
order made on 29 August 2022, insofar as the rescission of the order
of 28 June 2022 was refused, accommodated, without objection
by
Umsobomvu, the rights and interests of Transasia 444 (and now
Transasia Minerals also).’
Millar
J also says at para 19 of the judgment that his order does not vary
Mngqibisa-Thusi J’s order ‘
but serves, in conjunction
with [Mngqibisa-Thusi J’s] order, to impose a regime in terms
whereof the interests of Transasia
444 (and also Transasia Minerals)
could be represented and protected- in the way they would have been
had either been before the
court on 28 June 2022’.
(Own
emphasis.) Millar J rejected Transasia Minerals’ contention
that the order he issued on 29 August 2022 was not a variation
of
Mngqibisa-Thusi J’s order in its terms. He explained that his
order was an addition to the order of Mngqibisa-Thusi J
and had to be
read in conjunction with it
.
[13]
Aggrieved by the order of Millar J dismissing leave to appeal, both
Transasia 444 and Transasia Minerals
petitioned this Court for leave
to appeal. Leave to appeal was granted by this court on 22 June 2023.
[14]
Both Transasia 444 and Transasia Minerals submitted that Millar J’s
order was a nullity to the extent
that it varied the final order of
Mnqgibisa-Thusi J, alternatively, that Millar J erred in refusing
rescission. I disagree with
the first proposition. Millar J’s
order is not a nullity. I accept that it is not a model of clarity,
and it is ambiguous,
but the fact that it lacks clarity does not
render it a nullity. Millar J should ideally have furnished his
reasons for his
order before the hearing of the application for leave
to appeal. But be that as it may, his intention must be
ascertained
from the language of the judgment on the
application for leave to appeal as construed according to the usual,
well-known rules.
[2]
As in the case of a document, the judgment and his reasons for giving
it, must be read as a whole to ascertain his intention.
[3]
It is now settled that, when interpreting a document, including a
court order, the point of departure should be the language in
question, read in context while also having regard to the purpose of
its provision and the background.
[4]
[15]
The Constitutional Court, in
Democratic
Alliance in re Electoral Commission of South Africa v Minister of
Cooperative Governance and Others
,
[5]
had this to say regarding the interpretation of court orders:
‘
The
order with which a judgment concludes has been described as the
“executive part of the judgment”, because it defines
what
the court requires of the parties who are bound by it. For this
reason, it was said in
Ntshwaqela
that although the order must
be read as part of the entire judgment, and not as a separate
document, the order’s meaning,
if clear and unambiguous, cannot
be restricted or extended by anything else stated in the judgment.
The modern approach is
not to undertake interpretation in discrete
stages but as a unitary exercise in which the court seeks to
ascertain the meaning
of a provision in the light of the document as
a whole and in the context of admissible background material.
This principle
applies to the interpretation of court orders, as
decisions of this Court make plain.
The
principle is unaffected by the circumstance that, for reasons of
urgency, the order preceded the reasons. Analogously, in
International Trade Administration Commission
, this Court said
that, in interpreting a court’s order, regard could be had to
the court’s subsequent judgment on an
application for leave to
appeal. A court order is made for particular reasons and for
particular purposes, and although these may
be discerned from the
order itself, greater light is shed on them by the judgment.’
(Footnote omitted.)
[16]
Properly construed, in the light of the judgment given on the
application for leave to appeal, the effect
of Millar J’s
order, although it does not say so in explicit terms, was to refuse
rescission. This is, in fact, what he himself
says in paragraph 30 of
the judgment referred to in para 12 above. The effect of the refusal
was that Mngqibisa-Thusi J’s
order remained extant. Instead of
confirming Mngqibisa-Thusi J’s order, Millar J then
reformulated it. He was of the view
that it was competent for him to
supplement Mngqibisa-Thusi J’s order by imposing a
confidentiality regime which would regulate
the manner in which the
appellants’ documents, which were in possession of the
Department, were to be disclosed to Umsobomvu.
His explanation for
doing so is that, in his view, putting in place a confidentiality
regime in the order was necessary in order
to address the concerns
raised by the appellants which Mngqibisa-Thusi J’s order had
failed to do. In my view this was wrong.
He either had to grant or
refuse rescission. If he had granted rescission, the question of a
proper confidentiality regime could
have been traversed once the
appellants had filed papers in the disclosure application. If the
rescission application had been
correctly refused, Mngqibisa-Thusi
J’s order, being an order to compel disclosure, was an
interlocutory order, capable of
amendment depending on the exigencies
of the situation.
[17]
The order of Millar J should be set aside. It was incorrect. He was
faced with the application for rescission
under
rule 42(1)(a)
,
alternatively under the common law. All that was required of him was
either to grant rescission if a case for It was made out
or dismiss
it, if he was not satisfied that the order had been erroneously
sought or erroneously granted. Based on the evidence
that was
presented to him, which was not disputed, Millar J should have
granted rescission. The appellants had not been joined
as parties to
the main application before Mngqibisa-Thusi J. Nor did they receive
notice of the application. Both were entitled
to service of the
application and to be cited as parties to the application because
they were owners of the material which the
Director-General and/or
the Minister were required to disclose. They were therefore clearly
interested parties. This fact was well
known to Umsobomvu’s
attorneys when they brought the application to compel.
[18]
In the notice of appeal in terms of
s 96
of the MPRDA that preceded
the application to compel, Umsobomvu’s attorneys identified the
appellants as affected parties
as contemplated in
regulation 74(1)(
b
)
of the MPRDA Regulations and again, in the correspondence that
exchanged between the parties they were identified as such.
Mngqibisa-Thusi
J’s order was therefore erroneously sought or
granted within the meaning of rule 42(1)(
a
).
[19]
It was made in the absence of the appellants, who had a direct and
substantial interest in the proceedings
by virtue of the fact that
they were the owners of the confidential material that was sought to
be disclosed. Since they have a
legal interest in the subject-matter
of the main application, they should have been served with the
application to compel.
[6]
The
appellants were necessary parties, and they ought to have been
joined. The appellants’ non-joinder rendered the proceedings
irregular.
[20]
Madlanga J, in
Morudi
and Others v NC Housing Services and Development Co Limited and
Others
,
[7]
quoted with approval the following
dictum
by Brand JA in
Judicial
Service
Commission v Cape Bar Council
:
[8]
‘
It
has by now become settled law that the joinder of a party is only
required as a matter of necessity – as opposed to a matter
of
convenience – if that party has a direct and substantial
interest which may be affected prejudicially by the judgment
of the
court in the proceedings concerned. The mere fact that a party
may have an interest in the outcome of the litigation
does not
warrant a non-joinder plea. The right of a party to validly
raise the objection that other parties should have been
joined to the
proceedings, has thus been held to be a limited one.
’
(References omitted.)
[21]
In
Amalgamated
Engineering Union v Minister of Labour
,
[9]
this Court held:
‘
Indeed it seems
clear to me that the Court has consistently refrained from dealing
with issues in which a third party may have a
direct and substantial
interest without either having that party joined in the suit or, if
the circumstances of the case admit
of such a course, taking other
adequate steps to ensure that its judgment will not prejudicially
affect that party’s interests.’
[22]
It follows therefore that when Mngqibisa-Thusi J
granted the order in the absence of the appellants, she committed a
procedural
irregularity. She could not validly grant an order in the
main application without the appellants having been joined.
Therefore,
Millar J was in error to have, in effect, refused the
application for rescission of the order of Mngqibisa-Thusi J.
[23]
The next question is whether the matter should be remitted to the
high court for the consideration of the
rescission application.
Having regard to the fact that the entire record is before this
Court, and that the matter was fully argued
before us, it would serve
no useful purpose other than to delay the finalisation of these
proceedings to uphold the appeal and
remit the matter back to the
high court for it to consider the rescission application. In these
circumstances, it would be in the
interest of justice to uphold the
appeal, set aside the order of Millar J, rescind the order granted by
Mngqibisa-Thusi J and grant
Transasia 444 leave to oppose the
disclosure application.
[24]
Transasia Minerals’ position is different to that of Transasia
444. It was not a party to the rescission
application that was
brought by Transasia 444. It only joined the dispute at the stage of
the application for leave to appeal when
it sought to be joined in
the application for leave to appeal and the rescission application,
alternatively to intervene in the
application for leave to appeal
and/or in the rescission application. Transasia Minerals supported
the rescission application.
Millar J granted it leave to intervene as
an applicant in the application for leave to appeal but he dismissed
Transasia 444’s
application for leave to appeal. This meant
that although Transasia Minerals was granted leave to intervene in
the application
for leave to appeal, it was not afforded an
opportunity to prosecute the appeal since the application for leave
to appeal was refused.
Transasia Minerals is not entitled to a
rescission remedy because it was not a party to the rescission
application. It will, however,
enjoy the benefit of the rescission
granted by reason of the success of Transasia 444’s appeal. And
in consequence, Transasia
Minerals is granted leave to oppose the
disclosure application.
The
order
[25]
In relation to Transasia 444 (Pty) Ltd’s appeal under case
number 702/2023:
1
The appeal succeeds.
2
The order issued by Millar J on 29 August 2022 is set aside and
substituted with the
following:
‘
(a) The
application for rescission succeeds.
(b) The
default order granted by Mngqibisa-Thusi J, on 8 July 2022, under
case number 10531/2022, is hereby set aside.
(c) The
application for the joinder of the applicant as the fourth respondent
in the disclosure application under
case number 10531/2022 is
granted.
(d) The
applicant is granted leave to oppose the disclosure application and
to file its answering affidavit within
(15) fifteen) days from the
date of this order.
(e) The
fourth respondent in the rescission application (Umsobomvu Coal (Pty)
Ltd) is ordered to pay the applicant’s
costs.’
3
The fourth respondent is ordered to pay the appellant’s costs
of appeal including
the costs of the application for leave to appeal
both in the high court and in this Court.
In
relation to Transasia Minerals (SA) (Pty) Ltd’s appeal under
case number 707/2023, the following order is issued:
1
The appeal succeeds.
2
The order issued by Millar J on 29 August 2022 is set aside and
substituted with the
following:
‘
(a) The applicant
is granted leave to intervene as an applicant in the application for
leave to appeal.
(b) The applicant is
granted leave to oppose the disclosure application and to file its
answering affidavit within 15 (fifteen)
days from the date of this
order.
(c) The fourth
respondent in the rescission application (Umsobomvu Coal (Pty) Ltd)
is ordered to pay the applicant’s
costs in the intervention
application.’
3
The fourth respondent is ordered to pay the costs of appeal including
the costs of application
for leave to appeal both in the high court
and in this Court.
D
H ZONDI
JUDGE
OF APPEAL
Heads
of argument prepared by:
Case
number: 702/2023
For
the appellant:
B C
Stoop SC
Instructed
by:
Hammond-Smith
Attorneys, Pretoria
Matsepes
Inc, Bloemfontein
Case
number: 707/2023
For
the appellant:
T N
Ngcukaitobi SC
Instructed
by:
R
Baloyi Inc, Johannesburg
Matsepes
Inc, Bloemfontein.
[1]
Section 96 of the MPRDA headed, ‘Internal appeal process and
access to courts’ provides as follows:
(1)
Any person whose rights or legitimate expectations have been
materially and adversely affected or who is aggrieved by any
administrative decision in terms of this Act may appeal within 30
days becoming [sic] aware of such administrative decision in
the
prescribed manner to-
(a)
the Director-General, if it is an administrative decision by a
Regional Manager or any officer to whom the power has been delegated
or a duty has been assigned by or under this Act;
(b)
the Minister, if it is an administrative decision that was taken by
the Director-General or the designated agency.
(2)
(a)
An appeal in terms of subsection (1) does not suspend the
administrative decision, unless it is suspended by the
Director-General
or the Minister, as the case may be.
(b)
Any subsequent application in terms of this Act must be suspended
pending the finalisation of the appeal referred to in paragraph
(a)
.
(3)
No person may apply to the court for the review of an administrative
decision contemplated in subsection (1) until that person
has
exhausted his or her remedies in terms of that subsection.
(4)
Sections 6, 7(1) and 8 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice
Act, 2000 (Act 3 of 2000), apply to any court proceedings
contemplated in this section.’
[2]
Firestone
South Africa (Pty) Limited v Genticuro AG
[1977] 4 All SA 600
(A);
1977 (4) SA 298
(A) at 304D-E.
[3]
Finishing
Touch 163 (Pty) Ltd v BHP Billiton Energy Coal South Africa Ltd and
Others
[2012] ZASCA 49
;
2013 (2) SA 204
(SCA) para 13.
[4]
Natal
Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality
[2012]
ZASCA 13
;
[2012] 2 All SA 262
(SCA);
2012 (4) SA 593
(SCA) para 18.
[5]
Democratic
Alliance in re Electoral Commission of South Africa v Minister of
Cooperative Governance and Others
[2021] ZACC 30
;
2022 (1) BCLR 1
(CC) para 12-13.
[6]
De
Villiers and Others v GJN Trust and Others
[2018] ZASCA 80
;
2019 (1) SA 120
(SCA) para 22.
[7]
M
orudi
and Others v NC Housing Services and Development Co Limited
[2018]
ZACC 32
; 2019 (2) BCLR (CC) para 29.
[8]
Judicial
Service Commission v Cape Bar Council
[2012]
ZASCA 115
;
2013 (1) SA 170
para 12.
[9]
Amalgamated
Engineering Union v Minister of Labour
1949 (3) SA 637(A)
at 659.
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