Case Law[2023] ZASCA 117South Africa
De Graaf NO v C (565/2022) [2023] ZASCA 117; 2023 (6) SA 374 (SCA) (3 August 2023)
Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa
3 August 2023
Headnotes
Summary: Family law – divorce – interpretation and enforceability of clauses of a consent paper concluded by ex-spouses governing the ex-wife’s entitlement to (i) the ex-husband’s pension fund with his previous employer; and (ii) the ex-husband’s retirement annuity – whether the impugned clauses of the consent paper are vague, and should be interpreted to mean that the ex-husband agreed to pay to the ex-wife half of his entire retirement benefits – held that the impugned clauses are clear – half of his net entitlement must be interpreted to mean that the ex-husband agreed to pay to the ex-wife 50% of one-third of the amount which the ex-husband could have commuted less tax as at date of his withdrawal from the pension fund.
Judgment
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## De Graaf NO v C (565/2022) [2023] ZASCA 117; 2023 (6) SA 374 (SCA) (3 August 2023)
De Graaf NO v C (565/2022) [2023] ZASCA 117; 2023 (6) SA 374 (SCA) (3 August 2023)
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sino date 3 August 2023
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THE
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
### JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT
Reportable
Case
no: 565/2022
In
the matter between:
ANTHONY
ROBERT DE GRAAF
NO APPELLANT
and
C[…]
S[…]
C[…] RESPONDENT
Neutral
citation:
De Graaf NO v C[…]
(565/2022)
[2023] ZASCA 117
(03 August 2023)
Coram:
SALDULKER, MOCUMIE and MEYER JJA and NHLANGULELA and DAFFUE AJJA
Heard:
12 May 2023
Delivered:
This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ representative via email,
publication on the Supreme
Court of Appeal website and release to SAFLII. The date and time of
hand-down is deemed to be 11:00
am on 03 August 2023.
Summary:
Family law – divorce – interpretation
and enforceability of clauses of a consent paper concluded by
ex-spouses governing
the ex-wife’s entitlement to (i) the
ex-husband’s pension fund with his previous employer; and (ii)
the ex-husband’s
retirement annuity – whether the
impugned clauses of the consent paper are vague, and should be
interpreted to mean that
the ex-husband agreed to pay to the ex-wife
half of his entire retirement benefits – held that the impugned
clauses are clear
– half of his net entitlement must be
interpreted to mean that the ex-husband agreed to pay to the ex-wife
50% of one-third
of the amount which the ex-husband could have
commuted less tax as at date of his withdrawal from the pension fund.
ORDER
On
appeal from:
Western
Cape Division of the High Court
, Cape Town
(
Nziweni
AJ,
sitting
as
court
of first instance)
.
1
The appeal is upheld to the extent set out below.
2
The order of the high court is set aside and substituted with the
following
order:
‘
The
defendant shall pay to the plaintiff:
a.
The sums of R805 125.00 and R22 320.94 in respect of clauses
9.4 and
9.7 of the consent paper respectively.
b.
Interest on the aforesaid amounts at the prescribed legal rate
from
date of the defendant’s withdrawal from the Munich Reinsurance
Company Pension Fund and the Sanlam Retirement Annuity
Fund
respectively to date of payment.
c.
Each party to pay their own costs of suit.’
3
Each party to pay their own costs of the appeal.
JUDGMENT
Saldulker
JA (Mocumie and Meyer JJA and Nhlangulela and Daffue AJJA
concurring):
[1]
This appeal is against the judgment of the Western Cape Division
of
the High Court, Cape Town, per Nziweni AJ (the high court), which
granted payment in favour of the respondent, Ms C[…]
S[…]
C[…], against the appellant, Mr Anthony Robert de Graaf NO,
the executor of the estate of her late husband,
Mr R[…] C[…]
(the deceased) for a claim in respect of his pension interests.
Payment was awarded in the amount of
R3 225 302.66 with
interest thereon, which represented 50% of the value of the
deceased’s retirement benefit, as
a defined benefit member of
the Munich Reinsurance Company Pension Fund (MR pension fund), net of
tax, less an amount which the
fund had previously paid to the
respondent directly. Additionally, the respondent claimed and was
awarded payment of an unspecified
sum equivalent to 50% of the
deceased’s net entitlement as at date of his withdrawal from
the Sanlam Retirement Annuity Fund
(the Sanlam RA), net of tax, less
the sum of R10 619.42, which had previously been paid to her.
[2]
The deceased and the respondent were married in 1983, out of
community
of property, with the exclusion of the accrual system. On 2
August 1999, they were divorced and a consent paper which was
concluded
by them was incorporated in the divorce order that was made
an order of court. The deceased’s pension interests in the MR
pension fund and the Sanlam RA are dealt with in paragraph 9 of the
consent paper, which is set out below:
‘
9.1
It is recorded that Plaintiff is a member of
Munich Reinsurance Company Pension Fund.
9.2
Plaintiff consents to an endorsement
being made in respect of the aforementioned Pension Fund,
that 50% of
his pension interest as at date of his divorce as defined in the
present
Divorce Act, No. 70 of 1979
is due to Defendant.
9.3
Plaintiff undertakes to communicate
the provisions of this paragraph to his Pension Fund in order
that
Defendant’s entitlement herein is endorsed in the relevant
records. Plaintiff undertakes to furnish proof to Defendant
of his
having advised the Pension Fund of the aforesaid endorsement as soon
as such endorsement has been effected.
9.4
In addition
to what is stated
above, Plaintiff specifically agrees and undertakes to pay an
additional amount
to Defendant
at the time of his
withdrawal from the fund
, so as to ensure that she receives
one-half of the nett entitlement to him
as at date of
withdrawal from the fund
, (i.e. nett of all taxes). Such
“
additional amount”
shall be paid in the same
manner as Plaintiff receives his payments from the Pension Fund.
9.5
It is further recorded that Plaintiff
is the holder of Sanlam Retirement Annuity Policy No. 9282632X0.
9.6
Plaintiff consents to an endorsement
being made in the records of Sanlam that 50% of his pension
interest
as at the date of divorce as defined in the present
Divorce Act is
due to Defendant. Plaintiff similarly undertakes to communicate the
provisions of this paragraph to Sanlam in order that Defendant’s
entitlement herein is endorsed in the relevant records. Plaintiff
undertakes to furnish proof to Defendant of such endorsement
as soon
as such endorsement has been effected.
9.7
In addition
to what is stated
above, Plaintiff specifically agrees and undertakes to pay an
additional amount
to Defendant
at the time of his
withdrawal from the Fund
, so as to ensure that she receives
one-half of the nett entitlement to him
as at date of
withdrawal
from the Fund,
(i.e. nett of all taxes). Such
“
additional amount”
shall be paid in the same
manner as Plaintiff receives his payments from Sanlam.’ (My
emphasis.)
[3]
Sub-clauses 9.1 to 9.3 and 9.5 and 9.6 concern the appellant’s
pension and retirement benefits in the MR pension fund and the Sanlam
RA, respectively, and are worded in the standard form used
by
practitioners at the time. However, and contrary to the usual clauses
dealing with pension interests, the parties’ agreement
contains
two further clauses, to wit 9.4 and 9.7, the interpretation of which
is the central issue in this appeal.
[4]
A dispute arose between the respondent and the deceased with regard
to the interpretation of the impugned clauses, 9.4 and 9.7.
Initially, she accordingly instituted action against the deceased,
but when he passed away on 24 December 2018, the appellant was
substituted in his capacity as the executor of the estate of her
deceased husband. It is the respondent’s case, which the high
court accepted to be correct, that she is entitled to 50% of
the
deceased’s entire pension and retirement annuity benefits
accumulated during the marriage as well as after the divorce
to the
date of the deceased’s exit from the MR pension fund and the
Sanlam RA, respectively. The appellant argues that the
respondent is
not entitled to any portion of the deceased’s pension interest
on the bases that the impugned clauses are vague,
unenforceable and
void. Alternatively, he argues that the respondent is only entitled
to 50% of the deceased’s pension interest
growth based on an
actuarial calculation made by the fund. The amount of R52 648.73
as at date of divorce increased to R212 802.57,
a growth of only
R160 154. Further alternatively, he argues that at best for the
respondent, she is entitled to 50% of the
net commuted cash amount
paid to the deceased which he elected to commute, less the
R52 648.73, the amount being R539 224.
[5]
The high court concluded inter alia, as contended for by the
respondent,
that the impugned clauses providing for additional
payments should be interpreted to mean that the deceased agreed to
pay to the
respondent 50% of his entire retirement benefits in the MR
pension fund and in his Sanlam RA which were accumulated during his
marriage and also the period after divorce. The high court further
held that the impugned clauses were not vague, as submitted on
behalf
of the appellant, and made an order for the payment in the amount
reflected above. Aggrieved, the appellant applied for
leave to appeal
the judgment and order, which was refused by the high court. This
appeal is with the leave of this Court.
[6]
Some background is necessary. The deceased worked for Munich
Reinsurance
Company, initially as a manager in foreign shipping, and
later as manager of the Cape Town branch, where he dealt with all
aspects
of insurance, both short and long term, life policies and
pension funds. The respondent was a secretary at Munich Reinsurance
Company
when she married the deceased. At the time of the divorce,
the deceased was a member of the MR pension fund. The deceased also
held the Sanlam RA. On 2 August 1999, the date of divorce, the
deceased’s pension interest in the MR pension fund, as defined
in s 1 of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 (the
Divorce Act), was
R105
297.46 and R21 238.84 in the Sanlam RA. The respondent was
unable to withdraw 50% of these amounts assigned to her until
the
deceased’s exit from the MR pension fund and Sanlam RA
respectively, and neither did the amounts attract any growth.
This
was as a result of the existing law at the time.
[7]
On 17
December 1999, the deceased married Ms T[…] C[…] (T[…])
in community of property. When the consent paper
was concluded, the
deceased and T[…] were already living together and planning to
marry. T[…] is the surviving widow
of the deceased. In 2011
and years before the deceased retired, the MR pension fund paid to
the respondent at her request R52 648.73,
being 50% of the
deceased’s pension interest in the MR pension fund, assigned to
her in terms of clause 9.2 of the consent
paper. Sanlam also paid the
respondent directly an amount of R10 619.42, being 50% of the
deceased’s pension interest
in the Sanlam RA as at date of
divorce, assigned to her in terms of clause 9.6 of the consent paper.
As mentioned, payment of these
assigned amounts was not possible in
1999 when the parties divorced, but became possible because of the
amendment of the Pension
Funds Act 24 of 1956 (the PFA),
[1]
which introduced s 37D(4)
(d)
of the PFA.
[8]
The gross value of the deceased’s retirement benefit, as a
defined benefit member of the MR pension fund on his retirement in
May 2015, was R6 872 099.67 before tax (pension benefit),
arrived at on the basis of the deceased’s final pensionable
salary multiplied by his pensionable service. In terms of the
MR
pension fund rules the deceased was not entitled to take his entire
retirement benefit in cash. On retirement the deceased had
the option
of commuting a maximum of one-third of the pension benefit in cash.
He was obliged to purchase a compulsory pension
with the balance of
the pension benefit after commutation, in the form of a guaranteed
annuity, a living annuity or a combination
of a guaranteed annuity
and living annuity pension, with a domestic insurer on the terms and
conditions prescribed in the MR pension
fund rules. The deceased
elected to commute less than the maximum one-third pension benefit in
cash, to wit a gross amount of R1
499 943, of which he received
an amount of R1 183 746.11 after the deduction of R316 196.89
for income tax. The balance
of the deceased’s pension benefit
of R5 372 156.67 was used to purchase a compulsory pension
in the form of a living
retirement annuity with Allan Gray Living
Retirement Annuity Fund during approximately February 2016.
[9]
Pension interest is defined in
s 1
of the
Divorce Act as
follows:
‘
[P]ension interest
in relation to a party to a divorce action who-
(a)
is a member of a pension fund (excluding a retirement annuity
fund), means the benefits to which that party as such a member would
have been entitled in terms of the rules of that fund if his
membership of the fund would have been terminated on the date of the
divorce on account of his resignation from his office;
(b)
is a member of a retirement annuity fund which was
bona fide
established for the purpose of providing life annuities for the
members of the fund, and which is a pension fund, means the total
amount of that party’s contributions to the fund up to the date
of the divorce, together with a total amount of annual simple
interest on those contributions up to that date, calculated at the
same rate as the rate prescribed as at that date by the Minister
of
Justice in terms of
section 1(2)
of the
Prescribed Rate of Interest
Act, 1975
, for the purposes of that Act.’
[10]
Pension fund in turn is defined in the
Divorce Act as
follows:
‘
[P]ension fund
means a pension fund as defined in
section 1(1)
of the
Pension Funds
Act, 1956
, irrespective of whether the provisions of that Act apply
to the pension fund or not.’
[11]
Sub-sections 7(7) and 7(8) of the
Divorce Act read
as follows:
‘
(7)
(a)
In the determination of the patrimonial benefits to which the parties
to any divorce action may be entitled, the pension
interest of a
party shall, subject to paragraphs
(b)
and
(c)
,
be deemed to be part of his assets.
(b)
The amount so deemed to be part of a party's assets, shall be reduced
by any amount of
his pension interest which, by virtue of
paragraph
(a)
, in a previous divorce-
(i)
was paid over or awarded to another party; or
(ii)
for the purposes of an agreement contemplated in subsection (1), was
accounted in
favour of another party.
(c)
Paragraph
(a)
shall not apply to a divorce action in
respect of a marriage out of community of property entered into on or
after 1 November
1984 in terms of an antenuptial contract by which
community of property, community of profit and loss and the accrual
system are
excluded.
(8)
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law or of the rules of
any pension fund-
(a)
the court granting a decree of divorce in respect of a member of such
a fund, may make
an order that-
(i)
any part of the pension interest of that member which, by virtue of
subsection
(7), is due or assigned to the other party to the divorce
action concerned, shall be paid by that fund to that other party when
any pension benefits accrue in respect of that member;
(ii)
the registrar of the court in question forthwith notify the fund
concerned that an
endorsement be made in the records of that fund
that that part of the pension interest concerned is so payable to
that other party
and that the administrator of the pension fund
furnish proof of such endorsement to the registrar, in writing,
within one month
of receipt of such notification;
(b)
any law which applies in relation to the reduction, assignment,
transfer, cession, pledge,
hypothecation or attachment of the pension
benefits, or any right in respect thereof, in that fund, shall
apply
mutatis mutandis
with regard to the right of
that other party in respect of that part of the pension interest
concerned.’
[12]
Section 1
of the PFA defines a benefit in relation to a fund as any
amount payable to a member or beneficiary in terms of the rules of
that
fund.
Section 37A(1)
of the PFA and 37D limit the circumstances
under which deductions or reductions may be effected from a benefit.
Section 37A(1)
specifically protects a ‘benefit . . . or right
to such benefit’ from ‘being reduced, transferred or
otherwise
ceded’. Deductions are permitted only under the
provisions of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 and the
Maintenance Act
99 of 1998
, and in accordance with
s 37D
of the PFA.
[13]
As
mentioned above, at the time the deceased and the respondent divorced
in 1999, the legislative provisions were such that a party
could not
obtain immediate payment of the pension interest assigned to such a
party at date of divorce. The statutory framework
in 1999 governing a
non-member spouse’s entitlement to a member spouse’s
pension interest, which underpinned the consent
paper in the present
matter, was discussed in
Old
Mutual Life Assurance Co (SA) Ltd and Another v Swemmer
.
[2]
This Court pointed out that
ss 7(7)
and
7
(8) of the
Divorce Act had
to be read together with
s 37A
of the PFA, which prohibits the
cession or transfer of a member’s pension benefits or the right
to such benefits.
[3]
[14]
The
Constitutional Court summarised the legislative history of the rights
of non-member spouses to the pensions of member spouses
in
Wiese
v Government Employee’s Pension Fund
.
[4]
The Constitutional Court confirmed that a so-called ‘clean
break principle’ was introduced by the
Pension Funds Amendment
Act 11 of 2007
into
s 37D
of the PFA in terms of which a non-member
spouse entitled to a share in the pension interest of a member spouse
did not have to
wait until the member spouse exited the fund in order
to obtain payment.
[15]
In
Sentinel
Retirement Fund and Another v Masoanganye and Others
[5]
(
Sentinel
),
this Court confirmed that once a member’s pension interest is
paid over, it loses its protection. The court said:
‘
[16]
This brings me to the real issue in this case; whether the restraint
order requires the Fund to pay
the money into Mr Ndebele’s
personal banking account and not to an account designated by the
curator. The high court held
that once a benefit is paid to the
member, and he ceases being a member, the protection afforded to the
benefit by
s 37A(1)
falls away and the pay-out then becomes part of
the general estate of the former member. For this conclusion the
learned judge
relied upon the judgments in
Van Aartsen v Van
Aartsen
and
Foit v First Rand Bank BPK
. I did not
understand the Fund to take issue with the correctness of this
statement of the law.’
[16]
Context is everything. In order to give context to the consent paper
entered into
it is important to take into account the circumstances
surrounding the terms of the consent paper. It appears that
notwithstanding
their marital regime, the parties divided their
assets accumulated by them during their marriage on a fifty-fifty
basis. The parties
waived maintenance from each other. The respondent
and the deceased considered the terms very seriously, were legally
represented
by experienced divorce attorneys and had no doubt about
its enforceability and implementation.
[17]
Furthermore, with regard to the implementation of the consent paper,
the deceased
would have known that he could not access the full
pension benefit. The two-thirds of the pension benefit, which was
used to purchase
the Allan Gray Living Retirement Annuity Fund, did
not fall into the deceased’s estate. If one considers the
deceased’s
total assets at the time of his death, his estate
would have been insolvent if the respondent’s claim was
accepted as valid.
[18]
Nevertheless,
there can be little doubt that the parties intended that the
respondent would be entitled to an additional amount,
over and above
that provided for in the
Divorce Act. The
wording of the impugned
clauses of the consent paper are not vague, but clear and
unambiguous. The terms were clear from the wording
through which the
parties expressed their contractual intention in light of all the
relevant facts and in context, including the
circumstances in which
the consent paper was entered into.
[6]
An examination of the clauses of the consent paper reveals that the
words ‘in addition’ are repeated in both the impugned
clauses 9.4 and 9.7. The deceased specifically agreed and undertook
to pay an additional amount to the respondent at the time of
his
withdrawal from the fund (net of all taxes) in respect of the MR
pension fund and the Sanlam RA. It was agreed between the
deceased
and the respondent that this was to ensure that she receives
‘one-half of the nett entitlement to him as at date
of
withdrawal from the fund’. The additional amount in both
instances would become due, at date of the deceased’s
withdrawal from the funds, which can only mean at the time when he
exits the funds.
[19]
Thus, if consideration is given to the language, context and the
purpose of the consent
paper, it accords with the overall structure
of clause 9. The contractual intention of the deceased and the
respondent is clearly
expressed and textually clear from the words
used in clauses 9.4 and 9.7.
[20]
In terms of
the MR pension fund rules the maximum net entitlement to the deceased
was one-third of the total net amount (after taxation).
The deceased
was not entitled to the full pension benefit as at date of exiting
the fund, which was far in excess of R6 million.
The impugned clauses
have been formulated in such a way between the respondent and the
deceased so as not to fall foul of the prohibition
against cession or
transfer of the deceased’s right to the pension benefit in
s
37A(1)
of the PFA, which prohibits cession of pension benefits. The
impugned clauses provide for the payment by the deceased to the
respondent
of 50% of his net entitlement to the funds in line with
the decision in
Van
Aartsen v Van Aartsen
[7]
and applied in
Sentinel
.
The undertaking was to pay the respondent once the proceeds had been
paid out to him.
[21]
The high court made an error in calculation by deducting tax in the
amount of R316 196.89
from the entire gross entitlement of R6
872 099.69 in order to arrive at a net entitlement of R6 555
902.78 and concluding
that the respondent was entitled to 50% of this
amount, namely R3 277 951.39 less the sum of R52 648.73
already
paid to her, arriving at an amount of R3 225 302.66.
It is apparent from the record that the amount of R316 196.89
was the tax payable by the deceased on the cash commuted.
Furthermore, the high court’s order fell foul of the
prohibition
against cession of pension fund interest. Finally, the
high court failed to consider that the respondent was only entitled
to 50%
of the deceased’s net entitlement at date of withdrawal
from the MR pension fund, which, as indicated, could not be more than
one-third of the MR pension fund benefit.
[22]
In practice the deceased elected to commute less than the maximum
one-third pension
benefit in cash. However, the deceased could not
elect to commute a lesser amount than the ‘nett entitlement to
him’,
as in doing so he would be flouting the meaning intended
by the parties as clearly recorded in the impugned clauses and clause
9.4 in particular.
[23]
In view of all of the above, in regard to the MR pension fund, the
respondent is
entitled to only 50% of one-third of the net pension
benefit that the deceased was entitled to. The respondent’s
entitlement
in respect of the Sanlam RA is dealt with further below.
[24]
At the hearing of this matter the parties were requested to provide
this Court with agreed
amounts payable in respect of the deceased’s
entitlement in the MR pension fund based on certain assumptions which
the appellant
should be ordered to pay pursuant to clause 9.4 of the
consent paper. The legal representatives obliged and presented the
following
amounts based on two scenarios:
(A)
First scenario: on the assumption that ‘the one half of the
nett
entitlement to him as at date of withdrawal from the Fund (i.e.
nett of all taxes)’ refers to one half of the net entitlement
of the one-third that the deceased could have commuted less tax,
which amounts to R805 125.00. This is made up as follows:
(i)
Gross
benefit
R6 872 099.67
(ii)
1
/
3
commuted
R2 290 699.89
(iii)
Less
tax
(R577 151.96)
(iv)
Net after
tax
R1 713 547.93
(v)
50%
thereof
R856 773.96
(vi)
Less amount already paid to the respondent
(R52 648.73)
(vii)
Amount
payable
R805 125.00
(B)
Second scenario: on the assumption that the court finds that the
entitlement within the
meaning of clause 9.4 is limited to 50% of the
amount that the deceased actually commuted after tax, then the agreed
amount would
be R539 224.00. This is calculated as follows:
(i)
Net proceeds commuted after
tax
R1 183 746.11
(ii)
50%
thereof
R591 873.06
(iii)
Less amount already received by the
respondent
(R52 648.73)
(iv)
Amount
payable
R539 224.00
[25]
Accordingly, this Court finds that the respondent is entitled to the
amount as per
the first scenario (A) set out above. The appeal must
therefore succeed to the limited extent set out in the order.
[26]
In paragraph (c) of the order of the high court the amount to be paid
to the respondent
in respect of the Sanlam RA was not determined. The
respondent is entitled to 50% of the deceased’s net entitlement
in this
fund as at date of withdrawal from the fund, less the sum of
R10 619.42, which she has already received. The parties are not
in agreement as to the correct amount, although they agree that this
fund has paid out R65 880.72 to the deceased in May 2015.
50%
thereof is R32 940.36, from which the amount of R10 619.42
previously received must be deducted. The amount due to
the
respondent is therefore R22 320.94.
[27]
Although the respondent obtained success in the high court, the final
result is remarkably
different from what she intended to obtain.
Therefore, it would be just and equitable not to grant her the costs
of the action
in the high court, but to order each party to pay their
own costs. Although the appellant has obtained some success in this
Court,
in the circumstances of this case, it would be just and
equitable that each party bears their own costs of the appeal.
[28]
In the result, the following order is made:
1
The appeal is upheld to the extent set out below.
2
The order of the high court is set aside and substituted with the
following
order:
‘
The
defendant shall pay to the plaintiff:
a.
The sums of R805 125.00 and R22 320.94 in respect of clauses 9.4 and
9.7 of the
consent paper respectively.
b.
Interest on the aforesaid amounts at the prescribed legal rate from
date of the
defendant’s withdrawal from the Munich Reinsurance
Company Pension Fund and the Sanlam Retirement Annuity respectively
to
date of payment.
c.
Each party to pay their own costs of suit.’
3
Each party to pay their own costs of the appeal.
_____
__________________
H
K SALDULKER
JUDGE
OF APPEAL
Appearances
For
the appellant:
B
D J Gassner SC
Instructed
by:
De
Klerk & Van Gend Inc, Cape Town
Lovius
Block, Bloemfontein
For
the respondent:
J
A van der Merwe SC
Instructed
by:
Ashersons
Attorneys, Cape Town
Webbers
Attorneys, Bloemfontein
[1]
In terms of
s 16
(c)
of the
Financial Services Laws General Amendment Act 22 of 2008
.
[2]
Old
Mutual Life Assurance Co (SA) Ltd and Another v Swemmer
2004
(5) SA 373 (SCA).
[3]
Ibid para 24.
[4]
Wiese v
Government Employees Pension Fund and Others
[2012]
ZASCA 5
;
2012 (6) BCLR 599
(CC) paras 5-7.
[5]
Sentinel
Retirement Fund and Another v Masoanganye and Others
[2018]
ZASCA 126
(SCA) para16.
[6]
Namibian
Minerals Corporation Ltd v Benguela Concessions Ltd
[1996] ZASCA 140
;
[1997]
1 All SA 191
(A);
1997 (2) SA 548
(A) at 557. See also
Bothma-Batho
Transport (Edms) Bpk v S Bothma & Seun Transport (Edms) Bpk
[2013] ZASCA 176
;
[2014] 1 All SA 517
(SCA);
2014 (2) SA 494
(SCA);
University
of Johannesburg v Auckland Park Theological Seminary and Another
[2021] ZACC 13
;
2021 (8) BCLR 807
(CC);
2021 (6) SA 1
(CC) para 65.
[7]
Van
Aartsen v Van Aartsen
2006
(4) SA 131
(TPD) paras 21-23.
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