Mashele v Road Accident Fund (2021/30859) [2026] ZAGPJHC 33 (22 January 2026)

begin wrapper begin container begin header begin slogan-floater end slogan-floater - About SAFLII About SAFLII - Databases Databases - Search Search - Terms of Use Terms of Use - RSS Feeds RSS Feeds end header begin main begin center # South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg You are here: SAFLII >> Databases >> South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg >> 2026 >> [2026] ZAGPJHC 33 | Noteup | LawCite sino index ## Mashele v Road Accident Fund (2021/30859) [2026] ZAGPJHC 33 (22 January 2026) Mashele v Road Accident Fund (2021/30859) [2026] ZAGPJHC 33 (22 January 2026) Download original files PDF format RTF format make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPJHC/Data/2026_33.html sino date 22 January 2026 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG) Case No: 2021/30859 (1) REPORTABLE: NO (2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO (3) REVISED: YES 22/01/2026 IN THE MATTER BETWEEN: MASHELE, HORISANI DON                                               PLAINTIFF ROAD ACCIDENT FUND                                                    DEFENDANT JUDGMENT ON APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL MOSTERT AJ 1. In this matter I handed down a Judgment on the 13 th of October 2025 dismissing the Plaintiff’s claim for loss of earnings and earnings potential. 2. The Plaintiff filed an application for leave to appeal.  The most important points of the application for leave to appeal were the following: 2.1 No costs were awarded in favour of the Plaintiff for appearance in the RAF Default Court for the week of 2 September 2025. 2.2 The Court granted an application in terms of Rule 38(2) therefore admitting into evidence affidavits deposed to by the Plaintiff’s experts in the matter, meaning that the court was bound to accept the opinions of the experts. 2.3 The Court failed to understand the role of the actuary. 2.4 The Court ignored the admitted evidence of the Plaintiff’s experts and did not understand the argument made in respect of the contingency deductions. 2.5. There is a reasonable prospect that a different Court will come to a different conclusion. 3.  For a number of reasons, I do not agree that the Plaintiff’s submissions are sound. 4.  The fact that an application in terms of Rule 38(2) was granted does not mean that a Court is duty bound to accept the evidence of a particular witness.  All that such application being granted means is that it is not necessary for a particular litigant to call such witness to give evidence viva voce , the witness’s evidence is evaluated purely on affidavit.  It is still for the court to decide whether to accept the opinion expressed by the witness or not. 5.  The function of the actuary in motor vehicle collision matters is to place contingencies before a court as to what reduction or increase needs to be applied to losses that the victim of a motor vehicle collision personal injury has suffered. He deals with complicated mathematical calculations Invariably the actuary bases his calculation on the opinion or factual conclusions of other experts. The court is not bound by the calculations that the actuary provides. See Visser & Potgieter Law of Damages First Edition p 367. See also Legal Ins v Botes 1963 (1) SA 608 A. The Court is entitled and in fact duty-bound to evaluate the conclusions of the actuary. 6.  In the instant case the Plaintiff has failed to prove causation, namely failed to prove that the accident in which he suffered injury to his two wrists caused the amount that he claimed for future loss of income.  At the time of the accident the Plaintiff had a successful career at the bank. The evidence of Talmud does not establish that in his farming business the Plaintiff suffered financial damage.  The “but for” test that is frequently applied in delictual matters was not satisfied. 7.  As far as costs are concerned the Plaintiff is not without recourse.  The only cost that was not allowed was the Plaintiff’s costs for appearances in the RAF Default Court for the week 2 September 2025. All the other expenses incurred by the Plaintiff are still alive insofar as he incurred such costs to pursue his claim for general damages. 8.  The test for whether leave to appeal should be granted is set out in Section 17(1)(a)(i) of the Superior Courts Act, 10 of 2013 namely whether there is a prospect of another court coming to a different conclusion, i.e. whether there exists a reasonable prospect of success.  I am not convinced that there is a reasonable prospect that a different court will come to a different conclusion. ORDER 9.  The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs. DNH MOSTERT ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT JOHANNESBURG This Judgment is handed down electronically by circulation to the Plaintiff’s Legal Representative and the Defendant by email, publication on Case Lines. The date for the handing down is deemed 22 January 2026 Date of appearance:  27 November 2025 Date Judgment delivered:  22 January 2026 Appearances For the Plaintiff:  Adv N Makopo Instructed by:  Levin Tatanis Inc For the Defendant:  Ms Booysens (RAF State Attorney) sino noindex make_database footer start