Pule Inc and Others v Revfin (Pty) Ltd (2022/024265) [2026] ZAGPJHC 42 (28 January 2026)

begin wrapper begin container begin header begin slogan-floater end slogan-floater - About SAFLII About SAFLII - Databases Databases - Search Search - Terms of Use Terms of Use - RSS Feeds RSS Feeds end header begin main begin center # South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg You are here: SAFLII >> Databases >> South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg >> 2026 >> [2026] ZAGPJHC 42 | Noteup | LawCite sino index ## Pule Inc and Others v Revfin (Pty) Ltd (2022/024265) [2026] ZAGPJHC 42 (28 January 2026) Pule Inc and Others v Revfin (Pty) Ltd (2022/024265) [2026] ZAGPJHC 42 (28 January 2026) Download original files PDF format RTF format make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPJHC/Data/2026_42.html sino date 28 January 2026 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG CASE NO: 2022-024265 (1)  REPORTABLE: YES / NO (2)  OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES / NO (3)  REVIEWED: YES/NO 28 January 2026 In the matter between: PULE INC First Applicant MOKGOTSI SIPHIWE MOLEPANE PULE Second Applicant WALIE PAELO THOBEJANE Third Applicant ITUMELENG SETHABA Fourth Applicant ADRI JONES Fifth Applicant And Revfin (Pty) Ltd Respondent JUDGMENT Raubenheimer AJ: Order a.  The application for leave to appeal is dismissed the applicants to pay the costs of the application on scale B the one paying the other to be absoloved. Introduction 1.  The applicant applied for leave to appeal the judgment of 27 August 2025. The original order was granted on 5 August whereafter the applicant requested reasons for the order. The application for leave was heard on 20 November 2025. 2.     The basis for the application is that the court erred in: 2.1 Finding that the defences raised by the applicant are not tenable in law and in arriving at this conclusion the court exercised its wide discretion narrowly by not having regard to the merits of the matter as a whole; 2.2 The merits of the matter is of such a nature that it could not have been considered by the court as the denial of signatures by the applicant and the allegation of fraud in this regard could only be adjudicated with reference to the testimony of expert witnesses; 2.3 Insisting on strict compliance with the rules in respect of condonation and the upliftment of the bar and consequently dismissing the application for the upliftment of the bar; 2.4 The strict adherence to the rules results in substantial injustice where the applicant stands to have default judgment granted against it where the defences in the main action will not be fully ventilated and amounts to a limitation of the right to audi et alteram partem; 2.5 Overlooking the principle in Federated Trust Ltd v Botha [1] by insisting on exact The criteria for leave to appeal 3.  The criteria is found in Section 17(1)(a) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 (“the Act”) which states that: (i) leave  to  appeal  may only be given where the judge or judges concerned are of the opinion that the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success; (ii) there is some other compelling reason why the  appeal  should be heard, including conflicting judgments on the matter under consideration. 4. The test to be applied by the court when considering an application for leave  to appeal is that the judge must be persuaded that there is a sound rational basis to conclude that should leave be granted the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success, or there exists some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard. The presence of a mere possibility of success, an arguable case or one that is not hopeless does not meet the threshold. [2] 5. The threshold has indeed been raised by the replacing the word “may” with “would” [3] 6. The provision in section 17(1) that: “Leave to appeal may only be given...” and section 17(1)(a)(i) that: “The appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success” has obtained statutory force and has consequently become peremptory. The former requirement of “If there is a reasonable prospect that another court may come to a different conclusion than the one reached by the Court a quo” [4] has now become: “….may only be given if there would be a reasonable prospect of success.” The effect of this wording is that a discretion has been replaced by a mandatory and obligatory requirement having the effect that leave may not be granted if there is no reasonable prospect that the appeal will succeed. The effect is furthermore that the threshold for the granting of leave to appeal has indeed been increased. [5] 7. This replacement together with the inclusion of the word “only” not only results in a more stringent test [6] but creates a higher degree of certainty [7] and furthermore prevents parties being subjected to the inconvenience and expense to deal with a meritless appeal. [8] 8. In assessing the reasonable prospects if success the court takes a dispassionate approach based on the facts and the law on whether the court of appeal could reasonably come to a different conclusion. The prospects should not be remote, not a mere possibility and not amount to a case that is arguable on appeal but have a realistic chance of succeeding. [9] 9. Where the court is unpersuaded about the existence of reasonable prospects of success it must still enquire into whether there is a compelling reason to entertain the appeal. [10] 10. Compelling reason would be the following: an important question of law or a discreet issue of public importance that will have an effect on future disputes. The merits of the case is important in deciding whether there are other compelling reasons [11] 11. The increased threshold serves to support the integrity and efficiency of the judicial process and ensures that appellate courts deals with matters of substantial merit and potentially different outcome. [12] Discussion 12. The dismissal of the application for the upliftment of the bar and the refusal of the condonation for the belated bringing of the upliftment of the bar is dealt with extensively in the judgment and is based on a judicious assessment of the relevant factors as enunciated in the Grootboom judgment. [13] 13. The pattern of default displayed by the applicant constitutes a flagrant disregard for the Rules and amounts to an abuse of process which is contrary to the interests of justice. [14] 14. The interests of justice requires a court to conduct a holistic assessment of the consequences of non-compliance on the non-defaulting party [15] as well as on the administration of justice [16] 15. The inherent power to regulate its own process does not amount to a license to override express statutory provisions that are constitutionally compliant [17] and should be used sparingly, with restraint [18] and only in exceptional circumstances. [19] 16. The consideration of the submissions by the applicant without due regard to the rights of the respondent to finality in litigation, fairness for complying with the rules, the possibility of increased legal costs and prolonged uncertainty runs counter to the interests of justice and constitutes an indication that the required threshold have not been met. [20] 17. Coupled with the rights of the respondent are the consequences to the administration of justice comprising the expeditious and inexpensive finalisation of litigation, the systemic need for an orderly, speedily and efficient administration of justice including the optimal use of judicial resources, avoidance of backlogs and ensuring the public confidence in the efficiency of the courts. [21] 18. Being placed under bar in terms of Rule 26 does not in itself constitute an infringement of the audi alteram partem rule. A holistical view of the procedural mechanism of barring indicates that the potential infringement of section 34 of the Constitution is cured by Rule 27, which provides the essential constitutional safeguard. The applicant was not permanently excluded from the proceedings as it retained the right to apply to the court for the upliftment of the bar provided the application complied with the requirements of the rule. 19. The reference by the applicant to the infringement of its rights are thus unsubstantiated and has the applicant, in the light of its inadequate condonation application as well as the legally defective defences [22] not submitted evidence to the effect that a different court would arrive at a different conclusion. 20. The defence raised by the applicant is one of the voidness of the contract by virtue of the person who signed the contract not being authorised to sign the contract and alternatively that the signature appearing on the contract is not the signature of the person who is indicated as the signor of the contract. 21. In determining whether this defence is a bona fide defence one has to consider when the defence was raised. It was raised only after extensive negotiations between the parties and after the applicant’s offer to settle the dispute was met with a counter offer. The applicant provides no explanation why a defence going to the heart of the existence of the contract was not raised from the start. 22. More importantly the applicant does not explain why it retained some of the equipment if there was no contract in terms of which the equipment was provided in the first place. 23. The applicant does not deal with the provisions of the Companies Act in respect of the authority of a director to bind a company in his defence neither does he set out material facts supporting this defence. [23] Even if the person who entered into the agreement was not authorised the company is still bound. [24] 24. The mentioned factors serves as indications that the defence is not a bona fide defence. Conclusion 25. Based on the reasons above the application for leave to appeal was dismissed and the order contained in paragraph a issued. E Raubenheimer ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA GAUTENG DIVISION JOHANNESBURG Electronically submitted Delivered: This judgement was prepared and authored by the Acting Judge whose name is reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation to the Parties / their legal representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter on CaseLines. The date of the judgment is deemed to be 28 January 2026 COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: INSTRUCTED BY: Pule Inc COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: INSTRUCTED BY: Thompson Wilks Inc DATE OF ARGUMENT: DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20 November 2025 28 January 2026 [1] 1978(3) SA 645 (A) [2] MEC for Health, Eastern Cape v Ongezwa Mkhitha and The Road Accident Fund (1221/2015) [2016] ZASCA 176 (25 November 2016). Fusion Properties 233 CC v Stellenbosch Municipality [2021] ZASCA 10 (29 January 2021). Fairtrade Tobacco Association v President of the Republic of South Africa (21686/2020) [2020] ZAGPPHC 311 [3] Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others v Democratic Alliance In Re: Democratic Alliance v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others [2016] ZAGPPHC 489 (24 June 2016) Chithi and Others; in re: Luhlwini Mchunu Community v Hancock and Others [2021] ZASCA 123 (23 September 2021) Seathlolo v Chemical Energy Paper Printing Wood and Allied Workers Union  (2016) 37 ILJ 1485 (LC). [4] Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Tuck 1989 (4) SA 888 (T) [5] Acting National Director (n 3above) [6] Gopaul and Another v Lutcham and Others (13185/2016D) [2019] ZAKZDHC 5 (17 May 2019) [7] The Mont Chevaux Trust (IT2012/28) v Tina Goosen &18 Others. Matoto v Free State Gambling and Liquor Authority and Others  (4629/2015) [2017] ZAFSHC 80 (8 June 2017). [8] Four Wheel Drive v Ratten N.O. 2019 (3) SA 451 (SCA) [9] S v Smith 2012 (1) SACR 567 SCA para 7. S v Kruger 2014 (1) SACR 647 (SCA) Ramakatsa and Others v African National Congress and Another (724/2019) [2021] ZASCA 31 (31 March 2021) [10] Caratco (Pty) Ltd v Independent Advisory (Pty) Ltd [2020] ZASCA 17; 2020 (5) SA 35 (SCA) [11] Caratco (n 10 above) [12] Minnaar Boerdery v CCMA (Application for Leave to Appeal) – (JR2187/2020) [2025] ZALCJHB 198 (20 May 2025) [13] Grootboom v National Prosecuting Authority and Another 2014 (2) SA 254 (CC). Van Wyk v Unitas Hospital and Another [2007] ZACC 24 ; (2008) (2) SA 472 (CC) [14] Uitenhage Transitional Council v South African Revenue Service 2004 (1) SA 292 (SCA) [15] Uitenhage Transitional Council (n 14 above) [16] Grootboom (n 13 above) [17] South African Broadcasting Corporation Limited v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others (CCT58/06)[2006] ZACC 15 [2006] ZACC 15 ; ; 2007 (1) SA 523 (CC); 2007 (2) BCLR 167 (CC), [2006] JOL 1833 (CC) 2007 (1) SACR 408 (CC) 9 21 September 2006) . Oosthuizen v Road Accident Fund 9259/10) [2011] ZASCA 118 , 2011 (6) SA 31 SCA [2011] 4 All SA 71 SCA 96 July 2011) [18] Theophilopoulos, C. 2007. "The Lingering Lure of Inherent Jurisdiction". South African Law Journal , 124(1): 47-66. [19] Moulded Components and Rotomoulding South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Coucourakis and Another 1979 (2) SA 457 (W) [20] Grootboom (n 13 above) [21] Grootboom (n 13 above) [22] Silber v Ozen Wholesalers (Pty) Ltd 1954 (2) SA 345 (A) [23] Maharaj v Barcklays National Bank Ltd 1976 (1) SA 418 (A) [24] Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 (4) SA 121 (CC) sino noindex make_database footer start