Case Law[2025] ZAGPJHC 109South Africa
City of Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Mohanlal and Another (19/26907) [2025] ZAGPJHC 109 (11 February 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
11 February 2025
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## City of Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Mohanlal and Another (19/26907) [2025] ZAGPJHC 109 (11 February 2025)
City of Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Mohanlal and Another (19/26907) [2025] ZAGPJHC 109 (11 February 2025)
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sino date 11 February 2025
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REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO: 19/26907
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED:
YES
11
February 2025
In
the matter between:
CITY
OF EKURHULENI METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY
APPLICANT
and
HAWEETA
ABDUL MOHANLAL
FIRST RESPONDENT
UNLAWFUL
OCCUPIER
SECOND RESPONDENT
These reasons were
handed down electronically by circulation to the parties and/or
parties’ representatives by email and by
upload to CaseLines.
The date and time for hand down is deemed to be 10h00 on 11 February
2025
REASONS
FOR ORDER
S VAN NIEUWENHUIZEN
AJ
[1]
This matter came to me in the opposed
motion court on 25 November 2024 and when called only counsel for
Applicant (”the Municipality”).
announced an appearance.
None of the respondents attended court. The First Respondent’s
name was specifically called out
in the passage outside the court.
[2]
I proceeded with the matter and, given that
all papers were filed (founding, answering, replying and
supplementary affidavits, as
well as heads of argument and full
practice notes) I continued with the matter and conducted it as an
opposed matter. I have, however,
after delivering my order, failed to
specify when I will provide reasons. This sets out the factual matrix
to and the reasons in
respect of the eviction order granted on 25
November 2024.
[3]
The Municipality contended that, during or
around 9 March 1998, it entered into a lease agreement with the First
Respondent (“Abdul”)
at times referred to in
the matter as “Mohanlal” – for the sake of brevity
I will refer to her as “Abdul”),
a copy of which was
annexed to the founding papers as “EMM1”.
[4]
The lease makes provision for a fixed
period of a calendar month (see clause 2) and commenced on 1 March
1998. This clause also
stipulates that it is terminable by either
party on one calendar month’s written notice.
[5]
The rent payable in terms of the lease is
R229.66 a month, payable in advance (see clause 4).
[6]
Clause 6 provides as follows:
“
The
Premises shall be used for residential purposes only. The Premises
shall be used and occupied personally by the Lessee and his
lawful
dependants.”
[7]
According to Frank, (the Divisional Head:
Corporate Legal Services and the deponent to the Municipality’s
founding affidavit),
Abdul, during her tenancy, allowed her late
father (who was never on the initial application according to the
Municipality) to
occupy the property while she had been occupying a
house elsewhere. I read this to mean that he was not a party to the
agreement.
If one assumes that this agreement was still operative he
would in my view have been a dependant. But for that Abdul would have
had to have entered and still have a valid agreement.
[8]
It is further contended that, during about
2010, Abdul vacated the property with the intention not to return and
she failed to surrender
the property to the Municipality.
[9]
According to Frank, Abdul returned to the
property years later (apparently after she and her ex-husband
separated).
[10]
During or around June 2009, the
Municipality informed all tenants of properties that they ought to
enter into a new lease agreement
if they wished to remain on the
premises. Subsequently, and during 2013, Abdul was issued with a
notice to surrender the property
but failed to cooperate and, at that
point in time, the flat was being occupied by her late father.
[11]
The deponent states that the Municipality
cannot enter into a lease agreement with an individual that does not
reside in the property.
From there then the notion that the late
father was not a lawful occupier.
[12]
After the Municipality became aware that
Abdul no longer resided on the property, and on or about 2 April
2013, it cancelled the
lease agreement between the Municipality and
Abdul. A copy of the cancellation of the lease is attached to the
founding affidavit
as annexure “EMM2” and same also
requires Abdul to vacate the unit.
[13]
It is important to note that, in terms of
this notice to vacate, it is recorded that an investigation was
conducted by the Department’s
officials and that she was found
not to be in occupation of the property for a long time.
According to this notice, the information
received and verified by
the Municipality and its Department’s official revealed that
she is living in a house in Mackenzie
Park.
[14]
I interpose that Department
ex
facie
the notice seems to mean the
Municipality’s Department of Housing Eastern Service Delivery
Region, Benoni Service Delivery
Centre.
[15]
The notice informed her that the lease
agreement which she signed was terminated on 30 June 2009. It also
points out that the Municipality
had requested all tenants to enter
into new lease agreements effective 1 July 2009, which she failed to
do.
[16]
It also alleges that her father is
illegally occupying the property and that he is not the tenant of
record.
[17]
It is, therefore, stated in the notice that
her request for an extension of time (to settle her divorce) is not
approved, as she
no longer resides in the unit or holds any legal
lease with the Department. The notice further states that her
subsequent interviews
with the executive manager and investigations
do not permit her to leave the matter in abeyance any longer.
[18]
Hence, all occupants of the flat were given
one month’s notice effective 1 April 2013 to vacate the
unit and to hand
the keys to an official at the Human Settlements
Offices in Actonville on or before 2 May 2013. Failure to do so would
result in
the necessary legal action being taken to evict all
occupants in the unit and the locks would be changed. She was also
notified
that, should the Department institute legal action, she
would be responsible for all costs incurred. This letter was sent by
one
Eddie Mkomotse. At the bottom of this notice, there is an
endorsement reflecting the time as 12:34 with the note that it had
been
pushed under the door on 3 April 2013.
[19]
I
interpose here to point out that, strictly speaking, given the demand
made, and that new agreements should be entered into, Abdul
may well
not, at that point, even have been entitled to notice but I will
assume, for present purposes, that a valid agreement
was in place
despite the demand made and that she was entitled to notice. The
notice does not qualify as a proper notice under
the lease given the
wording of clause 2 and the annotation on the purported notice that
it was pushed under the door on 3 April
2013. Such a notice is not a
calendar month notice. As to notices in general see
Putco
v Tv and Radio Guarantee Co (Pty) Ltd and other related cases
[1]
.
[20]
Some years later and only on 4 April 2019,
a further letter of demand was delivered to Abdul to surrender the
unit. This letter
is annexed to the Municipality’s founding
affidavit as “EMM3”. This letter reflects the fact that,
since March
2013, the Municipality was engaged with Abdul and had
conducted several investigations which reconfirmed that she is not in
occupation
of the flat and that her late father had moved into the
unit. It further confirms that the Municipality had handed the matter
over
to its legal department, that an attorney was appointed and that
there was a delay in the implementation of the legal process and
the
eviction.
[21]
It further confirms that, in April 2013,
Abdul contacted the Department requesting an extension of time to
empty the unit and surrender
same to the Department, which she failed
to do (by now she had had several years to do so).
[22]
The letter further records that she was
sensitised that the unit in question was not an inheritance and could
not pass onto family
members and, for personal reasons, then not be
surrendered to the Department.
[23]
The letter further notifies her that the
matter is still in legal processes and, although she made rental
payments continuously,
she was equally in such period living in
Mackenzie Park for a number of years.
[24]
Her attention was drawn to the fact that
there is no legal lease entered into between herself and the
Department, according to their
records, since 2009. It is also
recorded that the Department found the occupation by her late father
unacceptable while she lived
in another property elsewhere.
[25]
It is also pointed out to her that she
chose not to surrender the flat but held onto same and deprived
another family of access
to accommodation, notwithstanding the fact
that there are legal costs since the handover for legal action.
[26]
It also indicates that no electricity was
supplied to the flat since 8 March 2013, whilst her father resided in
the unit.
[27]
Her attention was drawn to the fact that,
in the event of a tenant owning a property, he or she cannot occupy a
council rental unit.
Regardless of the fact that she is now divorced,
the fact remained that she did not occupy the unit since 2013 and
failed to surrender
same and, due to personal reasons, chose to move
back into the unit.
[28]
It is also recorded that her brother
approached the Department to have the electricity restored and
indicated that she was put out
of her house, which resulted in her
moving back into the unit. It was also pointed out that the request
(presumably this refers
to the earlier request referred to above)
would not be acceded to.
[29]
Accordingly, she was advised that the
electricity could not be restored and demand was made that she
voluntarily surrender the unit
to the Department, failing which legal
processes would continue to have all occupants evicted from the unit.
[30]
There is a note on this document, 4 April
2019, reflecting that it was pushed under the door.
[31]
This letter was written by one Mrs M
Mtlakana, a senior manager, on 28 March 2019.
[32]
The deponent further states that, despite
the various demands, Abdul and an unlawful occupant (presumably her
late father) refused
to vacate the property and that she has no legal
right to occupy the property.
[33]
Under the rubric “Just and equitable
rights of children, people with disabilities and elderly persons”,
the deponent
states that the Municipality has limited information
regarding the respondents and, with regard to the justice and
equitability
of the eviction, or the date by which the respondents
must vacate the property, the deponent sets out that he is unaware of
the
employment status of Abdul and that there are no children
residing at the property. He also states that the rights of the
elderly, children, or disabled persons will not be infringed by the
application and that it will be just and equitable to grant
such
application.
[34]
It is further alleged that there was
compliance with section 4(1) of Act 19 of 1998 and no valid defence
can be raised by the respondents
by virtue of the right to occupy the
property.
[35]
The deponent specifically points out that,
at the time he deposed to his affidavit, there are individuals who
are currently waiting
for housing allocations from the Municipality
and who are willing to pay for the occupation of the property and
that, in the meantime,
it bears all the risks as owner of the
property.
[36]
It is further stated that, given her
behaviour, the risk of ownership is problematic and could cause the
Municipality harm or damage.
[37]
It is further submitted that Abdul and any
other unlawful occupants are not destitute and can secure alternative
accommodation for
themselves and, in the circumstances, the order
should be granted.
[38]
From a legal perspective and seen in
isolation the founding affidavit makes no valid case for a valid
notice of termination but
actually makes out a case that Abdul
abandoned the property (leaving her late father there) and then
taking up occupancy of the
property again.
[39]
A notice of opposition was filed and an
answering affidavit filed on 20 October 2019 wherein Abdul states
that
she is the owner of the property
and a disabled adult female residing in such property.
As will be seen later the latter assertions are false.
[40]
She deposes to the fact that she has read
the founding affidavit and the application in terms of section 4 of
the Prevention of
Illegal Eviction from the Unlawful Occupation of
Land Act (Act 19 of 1998) (“PIE”)and then sets forth that
she is advised
that she should apprise the court of the predicaments
and hardships that she suffered and is still suffering as a result of
the
abuse inflicted upon her by the Municipality.
[41]
She alleges that she was married to one
Mohanlal, which marriage was ultimately dissolved on 28 September
2015. During the
marriage, and in March 1998, she applied for a
flat to rent from the Municipality and that, at the time, she
disclosed all her
personal issues and the fact that she left her
marital home and children with her husband, due to him physically
being abusive
to her.
[42]
She, therefore, states that the application
was approved with the full knowledge that she was the registered
owner of (another)
immovable property by virtue of her marriage in
community of property, same having been dissolved.
[43]
She further states that she moved into the
property in dispute together with her sick father (who passed away on
27 November 2018)
and stayed there until representatives of the
Municipality switched off the electricity at the rented property. She
states as a
reason for the cut-off of the electricity was alleged to
be the fact that she resided with her father in the property. This
was
allegedly attended to and an explanation was given in the form of
an affidavit requested by the Municipality and a copy of such
affidavit was annexed as annexure “OP2”.
[44]
In this affidavit, which was deposed to on
19 November 2009, she admits that she lives at the property with her
father and further
states that she sells goods and travels sometimes
for one or two days on business trips to Nelspruit and Durban. She
further states
that she cannot tell when she will be present at her
flat. It is clear from this that the affidavit hardly explains
anything other
than the fact that she is absent from the flat and why
she cannot sign a new lease agreement or re-apply for a lease. In the
chronology
it fits in, in November 2009 shortly after the
Municipality called on her to enter into a new lease.
[45]
From this, it is clear that she never
complied with the request to enter into a new agreement and also
indicates that she is employed
and, it would appear, gainfully so.
[46]
She further submits that, during the period
2012 to 2015, she spent some time between the property and her
matrimonial home looking
after her minor children, as the social
workers in Benoni requested that she do so because her husband was
arrested for using illicit
drugs in front of the children.
[47]
She then continues by saying that she never
spent more than 10 days away from the property while staying at the
matrimonial home.
Neither the explanation offered in annexure “OP2”
or the latter statement are persuasive. The indications are clear
that she is not permanently resident at the property. I also have no
proof of the demands made by the social worker. She is also
economic
with the facts surrounding the age of her “minor children”
in the sense that she provides no context or time
frame. Logically
this should be in the period before her divorce i.e. between 2009
-2015. Annexure “OP2” is vague in
the extreme as to when
she is really present on the property. She is a tenant who faced with
a vindicatory application by the owner
of the property should plead
her entitlement thereto (if only by a valid lease).
[48]
She then contends that, at a meeting held
at the offices of the Municipality, it was resolved that she could
stay in the property
as long as she could afford to, and she did,
paying the monthly rental per the municipal amounts and she submits
and confirms that
her account is up-to-date and that the manager of
the property, one Ragini Naranjee, was actually present at this
meeting. She
does not provide a date for this meeting nor does she
suggest that the written agreement was formally varied or rectified
to reflect
the true basis on which it was concluded i.e. that she was
pending a divorce and would from time to time have to attend to her
minor children pending a divorce and that her sickly father may then
have to live there (for an extended period) while she is absent
and
working, nor was her ownership of a share in the communal property
reflected by a variation or rectification.
[49]
She further submits that, in 2009, after
she received the notification to report to the offices of the
Applicant, wherein she was
requested to renew the lease agreement,
she did so and states:
“……
I
do so and my lease agreement was there renewed. I submit that
as was previously done in March 1998 a copy of the signed
lease
agreement was not given to me. I verily submit and confirm that I
signed the lease agreement during the year of 2009.”
[50]
Of much more importance is what she does
not say here. She does not say that the Municipality accepted her
renewed lease agreement.
This in itself seems to render the
explanation in annexure “OP2” unnecessary. She then
states in paragraph 3.8, during
February to March 2019, the
Municipality switched off her electricity again and she went back to
their offices to complain about
same. It was then that she was
informed that there was a pending High Court application for her
eviction and that she should await
service of such documents. She
further states that the issue of electricity was referred to the
electricity department, and Messrs
Mnhlakane and Mokgosi, both
employees of the Municipality, confirmed that the electricity would
be reconnected to her property.
This did not happen until she
received the eviction notice on 8 October 2019.
[51]
Abdul further states that, after her
divorce, a receiver and liquidator was appointed to sell her
“
removable property
”.
She states that:
“
this
Sadiyah Geyer instated eviction proceedings against myself and the
applicant in this matter without my knowledge”.
She then continues to say
that she supposes that the eviction documents were served at her
matrimonial home instead of her residential
address, Flat No 122, the
property in issue. She also annexes the eviction order obtained by
Sadiyah Geyer, as annexure “OP3”.
[52]
Annexure “OP3” is indeed a
court order, dated 28 November 2018, which reflects that Abdul was
ordered to vacate the
property known as:
“
Erf
2[…] (2[…]) D[…] H[…] Park, M[…]
Park, B[…], Ekurhuleni, Gauteng
Province”,
on or before 14 December
2018.
[53]
The mere fact that the appointed
receiver and liquidator had to evict her from the matrimonial
property gives the lie to her
story as to her purported permanent
occupation of the property owned by the Municipality. If she
was truly permanently resident
at the property in issue no such
eviction would have been necessary.
[54]
The affidavit proceeds to, under the rubric
“
defence in brief
”
state that she denies that she is an unlawful occupier as defined in
PIE. She further submits that she obtained the occupation
as a result
of herself having entered into a valid lease agreement during the
year 2009. This lease agreement she says is still
valid and in
force. She concedes that the 9 March 1998 agreement is
cancelled and was no longer in force during the year
2013 or 4 April
2019.
[55]
Given the fact that she must have abandoned
the property in Actonville leaving her sickly father there under
circumstances which
the Municipality could not countenance I, having
assumed above that she had a valid lease, have no doubt that she
abandoned the
property. She clearly clung to the matrimonial property
till the eviction from same and then sought to reclaim rights of
occupancy
in the Municipal property after such eviction. Her denial
is hardly
bona fide
given that, in her statement dated November 2009, she indicated that
she does not really know when she will be back at the property
in
issue. It is also inherently improbable that she would not have been
given a copy of the lease, even more so given that, on
her version,
she had just been a person whose lease was cancelled. She further
states that she does not own any immovable property.
Whilst this is
true at the time the answering affidavit was filed it is objectively
clear that she had a stake in immovable property
when she allegedly
renewed her lease in 2009.
[56]
She further invokes the National Housing
Code for housing assistance emergency and relies on clause 12.3.1 of
the Emergency Housing
Act, which I quote as presented in her
affidavit (with a complete failure to comply with the normal rules
when one relies on a
statute):
“
The
affected person are, owing to situation beyond their control, evicted
or threatened with imminent eviction from land or unsafe
buildings,
situations whose homes are demolished or threatened with imminent
demolition or situations where pro-active steps ought
to be taken to
forestall such consequences.”
[57]
It is not clear why the aforesaid is
invoked and on what basis it helps and this is even more so if one
takes into account where,
in paragraph 4.5 of her answering
affidavit, she states that it is clear that
all
persons who are victims of eviction proceedings in terms of PIE must
be given assistance in terms of the Emergency Housing Programme.
I
will deal with the PIE considerations later in these reasons.
[58]
She denies that there were any unlawful
occupiers on her property and insists that she was occupying the
property on the strength
of a lease agreement entered into between
herself and the Municipality. The lease agreement invoked by Abdul is
not annexed and,
even if one assumes that she did sign same, she did
not produce any proof that the Municipality ever accepted her
application for
a new lease agreement.
[59]
Later in her answering affidavit, she
alleges that the new agreement she signed in June/July 2009 was such
that she could renew
her lease agreement with the Municipality on a
three-yearly interval. This is completely contradictory to her
statement, in annexure
“OP2”, which suggests that, in
November 2009, she does not know when she will be back at the address
and it appears
to me as patently false.
[60]
In any event, Abdul nowhere points out, or
provides any proof thereof, that any further agreement was signed
after the three years
had expired. In fact, she submits that Ragini
Naranjee (referred to above) has at all times, when she attended the
offices, refused
to accept her renewal application. I emphasise
that, on her version, this is a renewal application under the alleged
“renewed”
lease agreement, dated June/July 2009.
[61]
She accuses the said Naranjee of a desire
for revenge and states that it was suggested by other people, whom
she cannot identify,
that the said Naranjee was in a close
relationship with her ex-husband. Her defence has now moved from
speculative to the surreal.
Not only was she so busy that she
did not know when she would really be at the property (see Annexure
“OP2”) she allegedly
entered into a new agreement in 2009
(renewable on a 3 yearly basis – of which she has no copy) but
could never renew same
because Naranjee is said to be in a close
relationship with her ex-husband. Even if Naranjee was in the way of
a renewal this means
she never renewed the “new lease”.
In any event as part owner in the communal property she would not
have qualified
for a new lease.
[62]
She further submits that she has been in
occupation of the property in line with the prescripts of her lease
agreement and she confirmed
that she stayed there with her father
with the permission of the Municipality. It is common cause that her
father has by now passed
away.
[63]
She ultimately demonstrates that she is no
longer the owner of the property she is alleged to have owned.
[64]
Abdul admits that she received the notice
to vacate in 2013 but persists in the denial that she had not renewed
her agreement. What
is of much more importance is that that was her
version in the affidavit. There was never, at the time that the
notice to vacate
was given, any response from her or from her lawyer
to the effect that she had renewed her agreement, nor was there any
request
made at that time to the Municipality to supply her with a
copy of the renewed agreement. This apart from the fact that in 2013
she would not have qualified for a renewal.
[65]
When Abdul denies that the agreement
between herself and the Municipality was duly and lawfully cancelled,
she does not state to
which agreement she refers. I accept by
implication, this must refer to the so-called new agreement, but one
is left to wonder
whether such agreement ever came into existence,
because there was no proof that the Municipality ever approved of her
renewal
or having entered into same ever renewed it after the expiry
of the 3 tear period.
[66]
She claims that she qualifies under the
Emergency Housing Programme and hence she can remain in occupation of
the property.
[67]
Abdul further contends that, at the time of
the answering affidavit (approximately 7 December 2021), she was
50 years of age
and had no educational qualifications, which rendered
her unemployable and she regards herself as an elderly person who
needs protection
by law. Yet, some twelve years before that, in
2009, when she was approximately 38 years of age, she was so busy
that she
had no idea when she would be permanently at the property in
dispute.
[68]
Ultimately, she contends that it is not
just and equitable that she should be evicted from the premises.
[69]
The Municipality challenged her affidavit
in their reply, for obvious and good reason, apart from the fact that
her defences set
out make no sense if scrutinised in context. On the
one hand, she seeks to avoid the notice of cancellation and invoke
another
agreement but does not demonstrate the existence of the new
agreement, and, subsequently, implying that she always had the right
to stay there (presumably under the initial agreement), which is, in
itself, suspicious. I say so because she does not demonstrate
that
her renewed agreement, the agreement she allegedly concluded in 2009,
which would have operated for another three years, was
ever received
for renewal during the period 2012 to the date the proceedings were
instituted. Nor did she resort to legal assistance
to ensure the
renewal of the alleged renewed agreement after the expiry of three
years.
[70]
To the extent that the Municipality
demonstrates that she was the owner of a property at the time of the
initial lease and on her
own version after she entered into a new
lease they are, of course, correct. She thus never qualified to enter
into a new lease
with the Municipality until after the divorce. The
Municipality does not accept that she suffers any of the alleged
hardships and
predicaments at their hands and further denies that
they abused her in any fashion. They also deny that she disclosed her
personal
issues (presumably this refers to her pending divorce and
the difficulties with her father) and, in that regard, the very
Naranjee
accused of being in a relationship with her former husband
supports the replying affidavit of the said Frank..
[71]
The Municipality unsurprisingly states that
the electricity was terminated as far back as March 2013 and remained
terminated.
[72]
In addition, another affidavit is provided
in the reply, that of Mrs MMabatho Ntlakana, the Municipality’s
Senior Manager
of Operations in Region D and same is annexed as
annexure “B” to the replying affidavit. She states that
the Municipality’s
records do not reflect any reinstatement of
the electricity supply. Mr Mokgosi who is implicated in the alleged
reinstatement of
the electricity supply is no longer in the employ of
the Municipality. She states that she never agreed to such a
reconnection
of the supply and that Abdul unlawfully in not
surrendering the property after the first lease was allegedly
lawfully terminated.
(I have already expressed my views on the
validity of the notice and the fact that she probably abandoned the
property in issue
for the matrimonial property, hence the need for
the eviction.)
[73]
The Municipality also states, in its reply,
that Abdul has confirmed that she received financial assistance from
her (former) husband
and her daughter and that she could go and live
with her daughter and would not be thrown out in the streets, and
that the ownership
of the property, Erf 2[…], certainly
existed at the time she received the notice to vacate the property.
The co-ownership
of the said property at best for the Municipality
disqualified her from entering in a new lease.
[74]
The Municipality states, in its reply, that
there are 119 informal settlements in the Municipality with an
estimated 165 000
families living there and that around 2000
applicants are still awaiting homes/flats from the Municipality.
[75]
It is further stated that people like Abdul
are causing a greater backlog and that she provides no reason why she
cannot go and
live with her daughter or use the funds from the sale
of the property in the divorce to find a new place to live.
Effectively what
the Municipality is stating is that there are other
people in a worse off position than Abdul.
[76]
I should point out that Naranjee
specifically takes issue with the circumstances which were disclosed
when Abdul applied for the
flat in 1998. She states that she was
instructed to assist Abdul in the completion of the paperwork and no
personal issues were
disclosed to her at the time.
[77]
Naranjee also points out that it was
Abdul’s husband who applied initially for the property in 1998
and that he failed to
qualify and it was only then that she made the
first application for a lease. She very specifically deals with the
details of the
accusations made and makes it clear that the only
request that was ever made was that Abdul be given a further week
before she
vacated the property and the Municipality’s
Executive Manager acquiesced to this request.
[78]
She quite rightly points states in her
affidavit that Abdul, having alleged that she has a valid lease
agreement, later alleges
that Naranjee refused to let her enter into
a new lease agreement, which two versions are mutually destructive.
Naranjee, as one
would expect, very specifically engages the
allegations that she is acting inspired by revenge and that there are
rumours of a
relationship with Abdul’s ex-husband.
[79]
I now refer to the supplementary affidavit
filed by Abdul.
[80]
She was initially represented by attorneys
of record by the name of C Malumane Attorneys and indicates that
there were new
developments and hence the supplementary affidavit
became necessary. She corrects an obvious error in her answering
affidavit,
i e that she actually owns the property which she is
asked to vacate, and states that she is only renting same and also
states
that she is
not disabled
as was originally stated in her answering affidavit. She does not
produce a proper explanation for having signed an affidavit,
which is
effectively false inasmuch as it claims that she is disabled. She
does make an allegation that this could have been an
error on Mr
Malumane’s part or anyone else who was dealing with the file at
their offices. What she does not explain is how
it came that she
signed such an affidavit without correcting it.
[81]
To the extent that the Municipality took
issue in their replying affidavit with the allegation that the
property (Erf 2[…])
was sold, Abdul admits that her answering
affidavit was opaque in not revealing the full factual situation
regarding the proceeds
of the sale of this property. She alleges that
she only learned about this on 3 September 2020 when she
consulted with her
new attorney, Mr Khumalo, who drew her attention
to the allegations and the statements of account received from Mr
Malumane and
Mr Phala. Copies of these are annexed as “HA1”
and “HA2” to her supplementary affidavit.
[82]
Abdul further states that the amount paid
to her by Mr Malumane is R69 242.08 and that was paid to her new
attorneys of record
and it was going to be used for purposes of her
legal costs. She, therefore, denies that she has the means to acquire
another property.
[83]
On 10 May 2022 the matter was set-down
before Maier-Frawley J who postponed the matter
sine
die
and made the following order:
“
2
The Applicant is, prior to re-enrolling this matter for
hearing, to undertake investigations into the First Respondent's
personal
circumstances and serve and file a supplementary affidavit
containing a report detailing:
2.1.
The availability of alternative accommodation which may be
provided by the Applicant to the First Respondent;
The availability of
temporary emergency accommodation which may be provided by the
Applicant to the First Respondent in the event
of her eviction;
2.2.
The Applicant's investigation into the First Respondent's
personal circumstances;
2.3.
The personal circumstances of the First Respondent, as known
to the Applicant consequent to the aforesaid investigation; and
2.4.
Any other facts or considerations which the Applicant
considers necessary or prudent to place before the Court for the
purposes
of the court determining the justice and equitability of
granting an eviction order in this application.
3 The First
Respondent, not more than fifteen (15) court days after service of\
the Applicant's supplementary affidavit
and report as aforesaid, is
to serve and file a supplementary affidavit containing:
3.1.
Full details of her personal circumstances as relevant to
these proceedings; and
3.2.
Any other facts or considerations which the First Respondent
considers necessary or prudent to place before the Court for the
purposes
of the court determining the justice and equitability of
granting an eviction order in this application”
[84]
On 6 May 2024, and pursuant to the
aforesaid order the Municipality filed a supplementary affidavit, the
deponent of same being
one Njabulo Sibusiso Trevor Zulu, who
describes himself as a male Divisional Head Specialised Legal
Services By-Law Drafting and
Supply Chain Management Support of the
Municipality, with its offices situated in Germiston.
[85]
He states that the Municipality is not in a
position to offer alternative accommodation due to a lack of readily
available resources
and submits that the personal circumstances of
the respondents do not give rise to a situation where the
Municipality can provide
assistance. He points out that the
Municipality receives a large number of requests for alternative
accommodation on a monthly
basis and such requests include
individuals who would be rendered destitute in the event that
evictions were granted. He submits
that Abdul would not be rendered
destitute or homeless.
[86]
He states that Abdul is 54 years of age,
divorced and resides with her daughter at the Municipality’s
property, her daughter,
Stephanie Abdul, being 30 years of age, and
her son, Brandon Abdul, being 20 years of age. Stephanie Abdul is
unemployed and Brandon
Abdul, at the time, was in Grade 12 at
Liverpool High School.
[87]
He further states that there are no
individuals with disabilities or elderly at the property and, without
disclosing his source,
alleges that Abdul suffers from high blood
pressure and is treated at the Actonville Clinic. I do not regard
high blood pressure
in a person 54 tears of age that is being treated
as of any relevance. In addition, Abdul is employed as an operator at
EDEAP,
an entity situated at 11-12 Apex Road.
[88]
According to him Abdul is earning R7 200.00
a month, which is the total income of the household, and Abdul
indicated that the
household expenses are only R4 200.00 and
that she also owns a Toyota Sedan vehicle with registration number
PDT 861 GP.
Abdul told him they have no other family
members in the country.
[89]
Under the rubric “Other circumstances
that make it just and equitable to grant an eviction” he stated
the following:
“
8. The City of
Ekurhuleni(Applicant) comprises of approximately two million
inhabitants living in an agglomeration of 9 small towns
and 17
townships. The amalgamation of two existing regional entities, namely
Kyalami Metropolitan and the Eastern Gauteng Services
Council served
as the beginning of the now large City that accommodates a population
of about 3.5 million inhabitants. At the heart
of the City's plans
and service delivery operations are the communities of Tembisa,
Katlehong, Vosloorus, Duduza, Daveyton and
Thokoza, which
collectively house over 68% of the Municipality's total population.
9. The Applicant's
population has grown exponentially from an estimated 2 368 283
in 2000 to 3 379 104 in 2016. The Applicant's
population growth rate
is steady at 2.47% per annum, coming down from a high of 4% per annum
in the period between 1996 and 2001.
The current population
represents over 6% of the total population of South Africa (Stats SA:
2017). An important feature of growth
in the Ekurhuleni population is
the net migration into the Applicant's jurisdiction.
10. The Applicant, like
other major cities in its region, is at the epicentre of the
migration trend facing South Africa. This trend
presents a set of
challenges and opportunities for the development of cities in the
Gauteng City Region.
The intersection of rapid
population growth spurred by in-migration, historical backlogs and
lacklustre housing delivery has resulted
in a phenomenon – low
intensity land invasions and the growth of informal settlements. In
responding to these challenges,
the Applicant must deliver
spatially-integrated human settlements that respond to the need to
redress spatial injustices, but also
attend to the immediate basic
needs of the people (whilst at the same time improving the
liveability) in informal settlements.
11 . The Applicant has 1
299 490 households and according to the household survey conducted in
2016, 18.7% of these households live
in informal dwellings. It is
important to note that informal settlements also pose other service
delivery challenges in particular
those linked to infrastructure such
as water supply, sanitation , electricity, roads and storm water
reticulation .
12. There is currently
land shortage within the city for purposes of providing housing
subsidies for qualifying beneficiaries. There
is a housing backlog
that goes back many years in the Applicant municipality, with
hundreds of thousands of individuals still awaiting
allocation of
housing.
13. The Applicant
municipality has an estimated 130 (one hundred and thirty) informal
settlements which currently are occupied by
thousands of households.
These constitute some of the poorest of the poor who do not even
have an income (unlike the First Respondent)
. It is not just and
equitable that the Respondents should be allowed to jump the queue
and benefit in living on a property that
should be allocated to
someone else.
14.As the First
Respondent is gainfully employed, she would be able to seek and
obtain alternative accommodation elsewhere. With
a salary of
R7200.00(seven thousand two hundred Rands), it would be fair and
reasonable to expect the First Respondent to rent
accommodation
elsewhere in the vicinity of Actonville.
15. Neither the First
Respondent nor her children rely on a government subsidy. It should
be noted that the Respondents also have
a motor vehicle. I humbly
submit that the occupiers of the property are not indigent.
16. Given the personal
circumstances of the Respondents, I humbly submit that should an
eviction order be granted, they will not
be rendered homeless. It is
further humbly submitted that the Respondents will not be displaced
in the event that an eviction order
is granted”
(my underlining)
[90]
Neither Abdul or any of the notional unlawful occupants filed any
further affidavit.
[91]
PIE enjoins me as follows:
“
(7) If an unlawful
occupier has occupied the land in question for more than six months
at the time when the proceedings are initiated,
a court may grant an
order for eviction if it is of the opinion that it is
just and equitable
to do so, after considering all the relevant
circumstances, including, except where the land is sold in a sale of
execution pursuant
to a mortgage,
whether land has been made
available or can reasonably be made available by a municipality or
other organ of state or another land
owner for the relocation of the
unlawful occupier, and including the rights and needs of the elderly,
children, disabled persons
and households headed by women
.
(8) If the court is
satisfied that all the requirements of this section have been
complied with and that no valid defence has been
raised by the
unlawful occupier, it must grant an order for the eviction of
the unlawful occupier, and determine-
(a)
a
just and equitable date on which the unlawful occupier must vacate
the land under the circumstances; and
(b)
the
date on which an eviction order may be carried out if the
unlawful occupier has not vacated the
land on the date contemplated
in paragraph (a)”
[92]
On a conspectus of all the facts and the circumstances under which
Abdul orchestrated occupation of the property I am
not satisfied that
her contractual defences were
bona fide
raised.
[93]
I was concerned as to whether a new PIE notice
should not have been delivered but I take comfort from the fact that,
in terms of
paragraph 6.7 of the joint Practice Note, Abdul’s
lawyer took no issue with the lack thereof and, in fact, is of the
view
that it is not necessary for a further Section 4(2) notice to be
delivered, or that Abdul would be prejudiced as a result thereof.
I have noticed that the final Practice Note was not signed by both
parties, but the joint practice note dated 28 April 2022 were
signed
by the legal representatives of both parties and reflect the same
view. Given the fact that an appropriate 4(2) notice was
given
historically, I was satisfied.
[94]
I should add that Abdul’s present
attorneys of record only withdrew on 12 November 2024, whilst the
final joint Practice Note
was already filed on 7 November 2024. If
they were not satisfied with same, they had ample opportunity to deal
therewith.
[95]
I am
also not satisfied that upon a consideration of the respondents’
present circumstances their unlawful occupation should
be
countenanced.
Abdul
has an income and a job and should be able to find alternative
accommodation together with all her family presently occupying
the
property unlawfully. The respondents personal circumstances do not
justify a prevention of eviction.
[2]
Justice and equity favours the truly indigent. I specifically
considered the date for the eviction and concluded that 28 February
2025 would be a just and equitable date for the eviction allowing
Abdul to scout for another property.
S. VAN NIEUWENHUIZEN
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT
JOHANNESBURG
Date order granted:
25 November 2024
Date reasons provided:
11 February 2024
Representation for
Applicant:
Counsel: Adv N Felgate
Instructed by: KM MMUOE
ATTORNEYS
2
nd
Floor Edinburgh Building
Hyde
Park Lane Office Park
Cnr
Jan Smuts and William Nicol Drive
Hyde
Park
Tel:
011 484 0945
Fax:
086 479 4697
Email:
katlego@mmuoe.com
and
philisa@mmuoe.com
Ref: KM
MMuoe/sn/114089
Representation
for the First Respondent:
Counsel:
None
Former
Attorneys for First Respondent:
:
Quinton Khumalo Inc
19
Angus Street
Germiston
South
Germiston
Tel:
011 825 1138
Fax:011
873 2578
Email:
gkhumalo@ymail.com
Ref:
Mr Khumalo/zm/C001700
[1]
1985(4)
SA 809 (A)
[2]
Compare
Pitje v Shibambo
2016 ZACC 5
relied upon by the first respondent;
City
of Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd and Others
2012 (6) SA 294
(SCA) relied on by the applicant.
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