Sayida Daud Masanja vs Vodacom Tanzania Public Limited Company (Civil Case No. 6 of 2023) [2026] TZHC 3127 (12 June 2026)

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA (SHINYANGA SUB – REGISTRY) AT SHINYANGA CIVIL CASE NO . 6 OF 2023 SAYIDA DAUD MASANJA……………………………… …. …PLAINTIFF VERSUS VODACOM TANZANIA PUBLIC LIMITED COMPAN Y…………………………………………………… DEFENDANT RULING 19 th Ma y & 12 th June 2026 MASSAM, J .: The plaintiff herein claims against defendant principal sum to the tune of Tshs, 10,000,000,000/= (Ten Billion Shillin gs’ only) as damages for substantial distress and loss of privacy arising out of the defendant’ s negligence for failure to protect the personal data of the plaintiff by purposely facilitating and allowing a third party unauthorized access to such personal data and plaintiff’s proprietary network information which includes incoming and outgoing calls , identities of people whom the plaintiff made a call(s), duration of the incoming and outgoing calls, IMEI, IMSI and SIM identity of the plaintiff, personally Identifiable Information(PIIs) and various location (s) of the plaintiff ( Ce ll site Location Inf ormation )(CSLI) . 2 When the matter came for final pre - trial conference, the respondent’s counsel raised a preliminary objection to wit: 1. This suit is bad in law and offends the law and procedure because, the Plaintiff has not taken any bona fide steps or attempted to have his so called dispute resolved amicably between himself and the Defendant, contrary to the dictates of the mandatory requirements of section 13 of the Civil Proc edure Code [Cap. 33 R.E. 2023]. It is settled law that, once a preliminary ob jection is raised, it must be determined first before the substantive case is heard and determined. This is pertinent because the whole purpose of a preliminary objection is to make the court consider the first stage much earlier, save the time of the cour t and the parties by not going into the merits of the case, because there is a point of law that would dispose of the matter summarily. See the cases of Thabit Ramadhan Maziku and Kisuku Salum Kaptula vs. Amina Khamis Tyela and Mrajis wa Nyaraka Zanzibar , Civil Appeal No. 98 of 2011, The Bank of Tanzania Ltd vs. Devram P. Valambhia , Civil Application No. 15 of 2002, Khaji Abubakar Athumani vs. Daud Lyakugile t/a DC Aluminium and Mwanza City Council , Civil Appeal No. 86 of 2018, and Modest 3 Joseph Temba vs. B akari Selemani Simba and two others, Civil Revision No. 223/17 of 2019. During the hearing of the preliminary objection, the plaintiff was represented by Mr Paul Kaunda, Advocate, whilst the respondent enjoyed the service of Mr John Laswai, Advocate. By co nsensus, they agreed to urge their P.O by way of a written submission. The prayers were granted, and the court scheduled the dates as follows: the defendant to file submissions on or before 22/5/2026. The Plaintiff is to file a reply on 28/5/2026 and rejoi nder, if any, on 1/6/2026, and ruling on 12/6/2026, and the court order was complied with. Mr Laswai submitted that the objection concerns the Court’s jurisdiction, which may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Reliance is placed on the case of Rich ard Julius Rukambwa v Isaack Ntwa Mwakijila & Another , Civil Appeal No 2 of 1990[2004] TZCA 67, where the Court of Appeal emphasized that jurisdiction is a fundamental issue that can be raised at any time. Again, Laswai argued that Section 13, introduced b y the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No. 3 of 2020, was already in force when the suit was filed on 11th May 2023 and therefore applies to the present case. The section requires a party to make sincere and 4 genuine efforts to resolve a dispute outside court through measures such as notifying the opposing party of the dispute, exchanging relevant information, and considering reconciliation, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, or other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. According to Mr La swai, paragraphs 1 to 20 of the Plaint contain no indication that the Plaintiff took any of the steps prescribed under Section 13. The Plaintiff allegedly never notified the Defendant of the dispute, never attempted discussions, never supplied relevant inf ormation or documents, and never pursued any alternative dispute resolution process before filing the suit. Also, Mr Laswai contended that the Plaintiff merely complained of alleged unauthorized disclosure of personal information without first bringing the matter to the defendant’s attention in the manner required by law. Further, Mr Laswai contended that the use of the word “shall” in Section 13 makes compliance mandatory. Reliance is placed on Section 53(2) of the Interpretation of Laws Act, Cap. 1 R.E. 2 023, and the decisions in Ashura Abdulkadri v The Director Tilapia Hotel , MZA Civil Application No. 2 of 2005, and Godfrey Kimbe v Peter Ngonyani , 5 Civil Appeal No. 41 of 2014, which hold that statutory provisions using the word “shall” impose mandatory obl igations. It was the submission of Mr Laswai that the Plaintiff’s failure to take and plead bona fide pre - action steps renders the suit premature, incompetent, and fatally defective. Consequently, Mr Laswai argued this court to find that it lacks jurisdic tion to entertain the matter and to strike out Civil Case No. 6 of 2023 with costs. Besides, Mr Laswai submitted that this is not the first occasion on which the High Court has dealt with a suit instituted without compliance with Section 13 of the Civil Pr ocedure Code. He cemented his argument by referring to the case of Frode Farestveit v Mrisho Kinega Mrisho , Civil Case No. 23523 of 2024, where the High Court, on its own motion, considered whether non - compliance with Section 13 affected its jurisdiction. In that case, the Court emphasized that jurisdiction is a fundamental issue which must be established from the pleadings at the commencement of proceedings. The Court held that Section 13 creates a mandatory obligation requiring parties to make genuine and sincere attempts to resolve disputes before resorting to litigation. According to 6 the Court, Section 13(1) establishes the standard of bona fide steps, Section 13(2) sets out examples of such steps, Section 13(3) confirms that the list is not exhaustive, and Section 13(4) makes the requirement applicable to all proceedings intended to be instituted in court. Again, Mr Laswai argued that the Court in Frode Farestveit (supra) further held that compliance with Section 13 is a jurisdictional precondition and that a dispute becomes ripe for judicial determination only after the prescribed pre - action dispute - resolution efforts have been undertaken and failed. The Court found that ordinary demand letters or correspondence alone do not amount to the bona fide pre - litigation engagement contemplated by the statute. Consequently, failure to comply with Section 13 renders a suit premature, incompetent, and incapable of invoking the Court’s jurisdiction. Relying on the same reasoning, Mr Laswai yielded that the Plainti ff in the present case failed to undertake the mandatory pre - action steps required by Section 13 before filing Civil Case No. 6 of 2023. As a result, the dispute was not ripe for judicial determination, the Court’s jurisdiction was never properly invoked, and the suit is premature and incompetent. 7 Nevertheless, Mr Laswai contended that section 13(4) uses mandatory language applying the provision to all proceedings intended to be filed in court, leaving no room for discretion. Accordingly, Section 13 serves as a jurisdictional gateway that every litigant must satisfy before instituting a suit. Moreover, Mr Laswai relied on the decision in Beka Trading Co. Ltd & Another v Tanzania Electrical Mechanical and Electronics Agency (TEMESA) , Civil Case No. 10631 of 2 025, where the Court reiterated the principles laid down in Frode Farestveit and affirmed that Section 13 imposes a compulsory obligation on litigants to pursue genuine pre - litigation dispute resolution efforts before seeking judicial intervention. Mr Lasw ai, therefore, urged the Court to find that the Plaintiff failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, thereby depriving the Court of jurisdiction, and to strike out the suit with costs. Moreover, Mr Laswai fu rther relied on several recent High Court decisions interpreting Section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code as a mandatory precondition to instituting civil proceedings. The Defendant submits that these authorities consistently hold that the purpose of 8 Section 13 is to promote alternative dispute resolution, reduce court congestion and litigation costs, preserve relationships between disputing parties, and give effect to Article 107A of the Constitution, which encourages amicable settlement of disputes. Accordi ng to the cited decisions, Section 13 is not a mere procedural formality but a compulsory statutory requirement. While subsection (2) uses the word “may” in listing possible steps a party can take, that wording relates only to the choice of methods availab le. It does not remove the mandatory obligation under subsection (1) to take bona fide steps towards resolving the dispute before commencing litigation. The requirement is reinforced by Section 54(2) of the Interpretation of Laws Act, which provides that w here a statute uses the word “sh all,” compliance is mandatory. Again, Mr Laswai submitted that the courts have repeatedly held that mere demand letters, complaints, administrative representations, or notices are insufficient to satisfy Section 13. Rather, a party must demonstrate genuine and structured engagement aimed at resolving the dispute, including exchanging information, offering discussions, considering alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, and making meaningful attempts at settlement. 9 Further, Mr Laswai said that the courts have consistently found that where a plaintiff fails to demonstrate such bona fide pre - action steps, the suit becomes premature and incompetent. In such circumstances, the court’s jurisdiction is not properly invoked because compliance with Section 13 is regarded as a jurisdictional gateway to litigation. Applying those principles to the present case, Mr Laswai argued that the Plaintiff failed to issue any demand notice, initiate discussions, pursue alternative dispute resolu tion, or otherwise engage the Defendant before filing Civil Case No. 6 of 2023. Mr Laswai contended that the Plaintiff’s position is even weaker than that of litigants in the cited cases, where at least some correspondence or notices had been exchanged. Mr Laswai maintained that the Plaintiff failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, rendering the suit premature, incompetent, and incapable of invoking the Court’s jurisdiction. Consequently, the Defendant u rges the Court to uphold the preliminary objection and strike out the suit. Also, Mr Laswai further relied on the decision in Joseph Chilery Mayenje v Sabrina Ally Kyara , Land Case No. 20518 of 2025, where 10 the High Court held that compliance with Section 1 3 of the Civil Procedure Code is mandatory and constitutes a necessary pre - action procedural requirement. The Court observed that Section 13 was enacted to promote alternative dispute resolution and aligns with the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies. Conse quently, failure to comply with the provision renders a suit prematurely instituted, incompetent, and liable to be struck out. Mr Laswai, cited several other decisions of the High Court, namely John Kapama v Chande Ally Chande , Land case No. 332 of 2023, B ernard Kilamala Alipinde & Another v Saed Yeslam Saed , Land case No. 32909 of 2024, Fred Habibu Katawa & Another v Jerico Jairos Mnunga & Others , Land case No. 32493 of 2025, Issa Hamadi Kivina & Another v Equity Bank Tanzania Ltd & Others , Land case no. 1 9389 of 2025, Ahmed Sijaona v Kisarawe District Council & Another , Land case No. 11450 of 2025 and Augustino Athumani Kavishe v William M. Gidema , Land case No. 14877 of 2024 in which courts struck out suits for failure to comply with the mandatory require ments of Section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. Relying on those authorities, Mr Laswai submitted that Civil Case No. 6 of 2023 suffers from the same defect because the Plaintiff failed 11 to take bona fide steps to resolve the dispute before commencing proc eedings. Mr Laswai contended that the Plaintiff does not disclose any efforts by the Plaintiff to pursue amicable settlement or other pre - action dispute resolution mechanisms as required by law. Moreover, Laswai further contended that the suit is premature and that the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain it. In particular, Mr Laswai maintained that the Plaintiff failed to utilize the available regulatory dispute - resolution mechanisms before the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA), which is the regulatory body responsible for handling complaints and disputes involving telecommunications service providers and subscribers. Finally, Mr Laswai prayed that the Court uphold the preliminary objection and strike out the suit with costs for failure t o comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. Mr. Kaunda, learned counsel for the Plaintiff, opposed the Defendant's preliminary objection and submitted that it does not raise a pure point of law. He cemented his argum ent by referring to the case of Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd , [1969] E. A 696, and Karata Ernest & Others v Attorney General , Civil Revision No. 10 of 2010. 12 He argued that the defendant's objection is misconceived becau se it requires the Court to determine disputed questions of fact relating to the Plaintiff's conduct before filing the suit, particularly whether the Plaintiff took bona fide steps to resolve the dispute as required under Section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. According to counsel, such factual issues cannot properly be determined through a preliminary objection. Mr Kaunda further submitted that the Plaintiff had, in fact, pleaded compliance with Section 13(2)(a) of the Civil Procedure Code in paragraph 19 of the Plaint. Mr. Kaunda contended that the Defendant's assertion that paragraphs 1 to 20 of the Plaint contain no pleading regarding compliance with Section 13 is incorrect and amounts to a misrepresentation of the record. He pointed out that paragraph 19 specifically sets out the Plaintiff's pre - action efforts to engage the defendant before instituting the suit. Again, Mr Kaunda emphasized that the defendant, in paragraph 13 of the Written Statement of Defence, expressly disputed the allegations contai ned in paragraph 19 of the Plaint. This, according to him, 13 demonstrates that the issue is factually contested and therefore unsuitable for determination through a preliminary objection. Accordingly, Mr. Kaunda urged the Court to find that the preliminary o bjection is improperly raised, does not raise a pure point of law, and should therefore be dismissed. Mr. Kaunda further submitted that the defendant's assertion that the Plaintiff's complaint contains no pleading demonstrating compliance with Section 13 o f the Civil Procedure Code is misleading because paragraph 19 of the Plaintiff's complaint expressly pleads that the Plaintiff repeatedly visited the Defendant's shop in Shinyanga to complain about the unauthorized disclosure of his personal data and sough t an explanation, rectification, and compensation. Mr Kaunda argued that when paragraph 19 of the Plaint is read together with paragraph 13 of the Written Statement of Defence, which disputes the allegations therein, the Defendant's preliminary objection b ecomes untenable. Again, Mr Kaunda maintained that determining compliance with Section 13 would require the Court to ascertain several disputed factual issues, including whether the Plaintiff visited the Defendant's premises, the number of visits made, t he nature of the complaints raised, whether 14 the Defendant received and responded to those complaints, and whether those actions amounted to a genuine attempt to resolve the dispute. Such factual inquiries fall outside the scope of a preliminary objection a nd can only be resolved through evidence at trial. Also, Mr Kaunda contended that, on the face of the pleadings, paragraph 19 demonstrates compliance with Section 13. If the Defendant disputes those facts, the objection ceases to be a pure point of law. Ac cordingly, Mr Kaunda argued that the court dismisses the preliminary objection with costs. It was the submission of Mr Kaunda that recent judicial decisions have incorrectly treated Section 13 as a rigid jurisdictional bar without examining its legislative history and underlying purpose. However, in the case of Exim Bank Tanzania Limited v Arusha Sundries Limited & Others , Commercial Case No. 15988 of 2025 (2026), where Hon. Gonzi, J. undertook an extensive analysis of the origin and purpose of Section 13 b y examining comparative legal developments from England and Australia. Mr Kaunda said that this decision demonstrated that Section 13 should be interpreted purposively and consistently with constitutional 15 principles of access to justice, rather than mecha nically as an automatic ground for striking out suits. According to Mr Kaunda, the court traced the genesis of Section 13 to the recommendations contained in Lord Woolf's Report on Civil Justice Reforms in England and Wales and to similar legislative devel opments in Australia. The Court observed that the concept of taking bona fide or genuine steps before litigation was introduced primarily to encourage parties to attempt amicable settlement and alternative dispute resolution before resorting to court proce edings. Again, Mr Kaunda submitted that, as explained in Exim Bank, the original intention behind the requirement was not to create a rigid jurisdictional barrier or a mandatory condition precedent to litigation. Rather, it was intended to encourage settl ement and enable courts to take pre - litigation conduct into account when exercising case - management powers, particularly regarding costs and interest. Further, Mr Kaunda argued that the Court in Exim Bank found that neither the English nor the Australian m odels treated non - compliance with pre - action requirements as a basis for invalidating proceedings or depriving courts of jurisdiction. Instead, the consequences of non - 16 compliance were generally limited to adverse orders relating to costs and other discreti onary remedies. Besides, Mr Kaunda emphasized that the court’s conclusion that Section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code should be interpreted as encouraging, rather than compelling, pre - litigation settlement efforts. The Court held that parties are expected, but not invariably required, to take bona fide steps before filing suit unless a specific law or contractual provision expressly makes such steps mandatory. Again, Mr Kaunda relied on the Court's observation that the phrase "shall be deemed" in Section 13 should be construed liberally and that a party need only demonstrate, on the face of the record, a genuine attempt or consideration of settlement efforts rather than strict proof of exhaustive compliance. Accordingly, Mr Kaunda submitted that Section 13 d oes not affect the jurisdiction of the High Court and that non - compliance, if any, cannot render proceedings incompetent. Mr Kaunda, therefore, argued that the defendant's preliminary objection, which treats Section 13 as a jurisdictional bar, is misconcei ved and should be dismissed. Again, Mr Kaunda challenged the defendant's contention that the use of the word “shall” in Section 13(1) automatically renders 17 compliance mandatory and jurisdictional. Counsel submitted that, although Section 53(2) of the Inter pretation of Laws Act generally provides that the word “shall” denotes a mandatory obligation, the Court of Appeal has consistently held that the meaning of the word must be determined within the context, purpose, and object of the particular statute. He r elied on the case Enerico Kakala v Mohammed Mussa (Administrator of estates of the late Ahmed Zahoro Ahmed) Civil Application No. 40 of 2011 and Attorney General & Another v National Bank of Commerce, Civil Appeal No. 35 of 2009. Again, Mr Kaunda yielded t hat the well - established principle of law is that parties are bound by their pleadings and that courts should determine disputes based on the matters specifically pleaded by the parties. He cemented his argument by referring to the case of Barclays Bank (T ) Ltd v Jacob Muro , Civil Appeal No. 357 of 2019. Mr Kaunda, for the plaintiff, argued that in determining the preliminary objection, the Court should confine itself to paragraph 19 of the Plaint and paragraph 13 of the Written Statement of Defence. It wa s contended that the Defendant's submission alleging that the Plaintiff failed to engage the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA) before filing the suit was not pleaded in the defence and 18 therefore constitutes an impermissible attempt by cou nsel to introduce new facts through submissions. Additionally, Mr Kaunda further submitted that paragraph 19 of the Plaint demonstrates compliance with section 13(2)(a) of the Civil Procedure Code. The paragraph alleges that the Plaintiff made frequent vi sits to the Defendant's shop in Shinyanga, complained about the disclosure of his personal data, and sought an explanation, rectification, and compensation. Counsel for the plaintiff argued that these actions amounted to notification of the dispute and an attempt to engage the Defendant with a view to resolving the matter amicably, thereby satisfying the requirements of section 13(2)(a). Further, Mr Kaunda submitted that Section 13(2)(a) of the Civil Procedure Code requires “notifying the other person of th e issues that are, or may be, in dispute and offering to discuss them,” and that the statute does not limit notification to written or formal notice. Again, Mr Kaunda argued that the term “notifying” should be given its ordinary and natural meaning, which includes both oral and informal communication. Had the Legislature intended to restrict compliance to 19 written notice, it would have expressly stated so, as it has done in other provisions of the law. It was further submitted that Section 13 should not be interpreted in a rigid or technical manner that imposes formal procedural hurdles on litigants, as this would undermine access to justice guaranteed under Articles 13 and 107A of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania. He supported his argumen t by referring to the case of Ahmed Sijaona v Kisarawe District Council & 2 Others, Land case No. 11450 of 2025. Also, Mr Kaunda further submitted that the defendant’s written statement of defence amounts to an evasive denial under Order VIII, Rules 4 and 5 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Defendant merely stated that the allegations were “vehemently disputed” without providing any specific denial or alternative version of events. As a result, all material facts pleaded in paragraph 19 of the Plaint, namely , that the Plaintiff visited the Defendant, raised complaints, and received no response, are deemed admitted in law. He fortifies his argument by referring to the case of Richard Crispine Silayo v Monica Serafimu , Civil Appeal No. 199 of 2023. 20 Mr Kaunda s ubmitted that several earlier High Court decisions, including Frode Farestveit, Beka Trading, Yassa General Supplies, and Alkemist Worldwide, were decided per incuriam because they failed to consider the legislative origin of section 13, particularly the L ord Woolf Report and the Australian statutory framework. Moreover, Mr Kaunda incorrectly treated section 13 as a mandatory jurisdictional requirement, without examining its comparative legal foundation or the consequences of non - compliance in the originat ing jurisdictions. Finally, Mr Kaunda prayed that the Preliminary Objection be dismissed with costs. In rejoinder, Mr Laswai maintained that section 13 is a strict statutory requirement reinforced by section 53(2) of the Interpretation of Laws Act, making compliance obligatory rather than optional. Again, Mr Laswai submitted that the Plaintiff is attempting to introduce a personal procedure contrary to the law and that reliance on cases such as Mukisa Biscuit is misplaced because section 13 creates a speci al exception requiring proof of pre - action steps even at the preliminary stage. 21 Moreover, Mr Laswai asked this court for reliance on foreign authorities as irrelevant to Tanzania’s legal framework and maintains that existing local precedents (including Fro de Farestveit and Beka Trading) are binding and confirm that non - compliance leads to striking out of prematurely filed suits, even where demand notices exist. Finally, Mr Laswai prayed that the preliminary objection be upheld and the suit struck out with c osts. I have carefully considered the rival submissions, the pleadings on record, and the authorities cited by both learned counsel. The principal issue for determination is whether compliance with Section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, Cap. 33 R.E. 2023 is a mandatory precondition to the institution of a suit and, if so, whether the Plaintiff complied with that requirement before filing the present proceedings. The law on preliminary objections is settled. As stated in Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [ 1969] E.A. 696, a preliminary objection consists of a pure point of law which, if upheld, may dispose of the suit without the necessity of taking evidence. Jurisdictional objections are among the recognized categories of preli minary objections and may be raised at any stage of the 22 proceedings. See the case of Richard Julius Rukambura vs Issack Ntwa Mwakajila and Tanzania Railways Corporation , Civil Appeal No. 2 of 1998, and Gem &Rock Ventures Co. Ltd vs Yona Hamis Mvutah , Civil Reference No. 1 of 2010 [2011] TZCA 200. The Defendant's objection is founded on the contention that the Plaintiff failed to comply with Section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. A careful examination of Section 13 reveals that the Legislature employed th e word "shall" when imposing the obligation upon parties to take bona fide steps to resolve disputes before instituting court proceedings. By virtue of Section 53(2) of the Interpretation of Laws Act, Cap. 1 R.E. 2023, the word "shall" ordinarily denotes a mandatory requirement unless the context suggests otherwise. See the cases of Salimu Aphan vs Republic , Criminal Appeal No. 547 of 2016 [2018] TZCA 246 , Chiriko Haruni David vs Kangi Alphaxad Lugola & 2 others , Civil Appeal No. 36 of 2012, and Melkizedeki Mkuta vs Republic , Criminal Appeal No. 164 of 2005. I find no indication within Section 13 that Parliament intended the requirement to be merely directory. The Plaintiff relied on paragraph 19 of the Plaint, wherein it is alleged that he made several visi ts to the Defendant's premises, 23 complained about the alleged disclosure of his personal information, and sought explanation, rectification, and compensation. In my considered view, even if those allegations are assumed to be true, they do not, on their fac e, demonstrate compliance with the statutory requirements contemplated under Section 13. The provision requires parties to undertake bona fide and genuine efforts aimed at resolving the dispute before resorting to litigation. Mere visits, complaints, or de mands directed to the opposing party, without demonstrating any structured attempt to engage in discussions, negotiations, mediation, reconciliation, arbitration, or other dispute - resolution mechanisms, cannot satisfy the requirements envisaged by the stat ute. Furthermore, the issue before the Court is not whether the Plaintiff actually visited the Defendant's premises or whether complaints were made. For purposes of this objection, the Court may assume those facts to be true. The real question is whether t he facts pleaded by the Plaintiff, even if accepted at their highest, amount in law to compliance with Section 13. That is a pure question of law and does not require the Court to receive evidence. See the case of Jackline Hamson Ghikas Vs Mllaties Richie Assey , Civil Application No. 656/01 of 2021. 24 I therefore reject the Plaintiff's contention that the objection raises disputed factual issues. The material facts relied upon by the Plaintiff are already pleaded in paragraph 19 of the Plaintiff's statement. The sufficiency of those facts to satisfy the legal requirements of Section 13 is a matter of legal interpretation, not factual investigation. I have also considered the authorities cited by the Defendant, particularly Frode Farestveit vs Mrisho Kinega Mri sho (supra), Beka Trading Co. Ltd & Another v Tanzania Electrical Mechanic and Electronics Agency (TEMESA) (supra), Joseph Chilery Mayenje v Sabrina Ally Kyara (supra), and the other decisions referred to by counsel. The consistent position emerging from th ose decisions is that compliance with Section 13 is a mandatory pre - action requirement and that failure to comply renders a suit premature and incompetent. Applying those principles to the present case , I find that the Plaintiff did not disclose sufficient facts demonstrating compliance with the mandatory requirements of Section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. Consequently, the dispute was prematurely brought before the Court, and the Court's jurisdi ction was not properly invoked. 25 Accordingly, I uphold the preliminary objection. The suit is hereby struck out with costs for want of compliance with Section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, Cap. 33 R.E. 2023. It is so ordered. DATED at SHINYAN GA , this 12 th day of June 2026. R.B. M assam J udge