Yosophina Katoto and Others vs January Gervas Muheza and Another (Misc. Land Application No. 000010329 of 2026) [2026] TZHC 3115 (12 June 2026)

1 . IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA (SONGWE SUB – REGISTRY) AT SONGWE MISC. LAND APPLICATION No. 0000 10329 OF 2026 (From Land Case Application No. 34/2024 in the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Songwe at Mbozi) YOSOPHINA KATOTO………………………………………………… 1 ST APPLICANT HELMANI NGAZIA BOHAS …………………………………...……. 2 ND APPLICANT JANUARY EVARIST HOGO …………………………………………. 3 RD APPLICANT VERSUS JANUARY GERVAS M U HEZA …………………………………… 1 ST RESPONDENT PETER VISENT MURU ……………………………………………. 2 ND RESPONDENT RULING OF THE COURT Date of last order: 25|05|2026 Date of Ruling: 12|06|2026 BEFORE: G.P. MALATA, J . Initially , the applicants had filed Land Appeal No. 3384/2025 in the High Court of Tanzania , Mbeya Sub – Registry which was eventually struck out for being incompetent for the reasons that, the p leadings were prepared and filed by an advocate with no valid practising licence, thus in contravention of section 48(1) of the Advocates Act [Cap 341 R.E 2023] . 2 . F ollowing th e order striking out the appeal, the applicants found themselves out of time to lodge another appeal , t hence th e present application for enlargement of time . The applicants want to lodge an appeal against the decision of the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Songwe in Land Application No. 34/2024 dated 21/11/2025 . Th is application is supported by applicants’ joint affidavit and contested by the respondents who filed their joint counter affidavit. The applicants did not file a rejoinder affidavit. When the application came for hearing on 25/05/2026, all parties appeared represented. Ms. Joyce Kasebwa learned counsel advocated for the applicants . Mr. Nickson Kiliwa learned counsel represented the respondents. Hearing of the application proceeded orally and parties made their respective submissions for and against the application . Arguing in favour of the application, Ms. Joyce Kasebwa commenced her submissions by adopting the applicants’ supporting affidavit. She went on to state that , the applicants have assign ed good reasons for extension of time. This was one of their legal obligations to assign reasons. To cement 3 . the position, reference was made to the case of Lyamuya Construction Co mpany Ltd vs Board of Registered Trustees of Young Women ’s Christian Association of Tanzania Civil Application No. 2/2010 at page 6 and 7. In the case of Lyamuya Construction Company Ltd vs Board of Registered Trustees of Young Women’s Christian Association of Tanzania Civil Application No. 2/2010 , the Court of Appeal principled that : one ; the applicant must assign reasons for delay, two ; the applicant must account for all days of delay: t hree : the delay should not be inordinate: four ; the applicant must demonstrate diligence, and not apathy: and four ; existence of other reasons such as illegality of the judgment. Ms. Joyce Kasebwa went on submit ting that , upon receipt of the proceeding s and judgment, the applicants filed an appeal in court on 15/03/2026 . O n 24/04/2026 the respondent s raised an objection that , the appeal was incompetent as the appeal documents were prepared by an advocate with no valid practising licence . The objection was upheld on 24/04/2026 and the appeal was struck out. The applicants filed the present on the same day on 24/04/2026 of delivery of the ruling. 4 . She submitted that t he applicants have discharged their legal obligation of accounting the days of delay and that, there was no negligence on the applicants’ side. To cement the position, the case of Star Media Tanzania Ltd vs Acacius Anaclet Kamarla Misc. Labour Application No. 16/2023 was cited. Moreover, Ms. Joyce Kasebwa submitted that, the applicants have inter alia raised issue of illegality as one of the grounds for the extension of time as echoed in paragraph 7 of the supporting affidavit. To bolster the position, a case of Attorney General vs. Emmanuel Malangikis, Civil Application No. 138 of 2019 was cited to justify that, illegality is good ground for extension of time. Finally, Ms. Joyce Kasebwa succumbed that, the applicants have discharged their legal obligation of assigning and demonstrati ng that, there is a good cause for extension of time. She prayed the application to be granted with costs. Mr. Nickson Kiliwa learned counsel for the respondent s commenced his reply submission by adopting the counter affidavit filed by the respondents. He submitted that , fundamentally they oppose the application as the reasons advanced do not meet the legal requirements for extension of time. To bring the submission home, he cited the case of 5 . Ally Nuru vs. Kudura Haruna Civil Application No. 49/2025 cementing that, the applicants were negligent in handling their affairs as the y failed to file the appeal within time. Elaborating the point, Mr. Nickson Kiliwa submitted that , the applicants did not apply to the Tribunal for documents and appeal within time. He stated that, the letter by the applicants referred to as ‘ Annexture YHJ 1 ’ dated 22/11/2025 had nothing to do with the present case. As such, the applicants had neither applied for proceedings nor judgment to date for want of letter requesting the same. This was the first limb of the respondents’ resistance to the application. As to the second limb, Nickson Kiliwa learned counsel submitted that , the applicants were duty bound to hire a n advocate with valid practising licence. As such, the applicants negligently failed to discharge their obligations. He submitted that, Joyce Kasebwa learned counsel is the one who drew and filed incompetent appeal knowingly that, she had no practising valid practising licence. The third limb of the respondents’ grounds opposing the application is on the alleged illegality . I t was Mr. Nickson Kiliwa’s submission that , it should not be honoured as the applicants’ appeal was time barred. 6 . Additionally, h e submitted that, the respondents will be prejudiced, if the application will be granted . T hey will continue to spend time and money in pursuing for the matter due to applicants’ negligence. Based on the three limbs of grounds of resistance, he prayed for dismissal of th e application with costs . By way of rejoinder, Ms. Joyce Kasebwa learned counsel for the applicants stated that , the applicants wrote a letter on 21/11/2025 requesting for proceedings and judgement. She maintained that the applicants filed the appeal timely having been issued with certified copies of proceedings and judgment on 29/01/2026 and filed the appeal on 10/02/2026 . She concluded her submission by stating that , the case of Ally Nuru vs Kudura Haruna ( supra ) is distinguishable as it dealt with an appeal after an application for extension of time having been rejected. She maintained that parties will not be prejudiced. This marked the end of submissions for and against th e application for extension of time. Having gone through the applicant’s affidavit , counter affidavit, and parties’ rival submissions for and against this application, it is my firm position that , issues calling for determination by this court are: one ; whether th e applicants filed the appeal out of time limine prescribed by 7 . law and two ; whether the applicants have established good cause for extension of time. Regarding the first issue, it is evident that: one ; the DLHT delivered judgment sought to be appealed on 21/11/2025 , two ; the applicants did not request for copies of proceedings and judgement as Annexture YHJ 1 ’ dated 22/11/2025 has nothing to do with the applicants’ case. Three ; DLHT issued certified cop ies of proceedings and judgement on 29/01/2026, four ; the applicants’ appeal was filed on 10/02/2026 being twelve (12) days from the date of certification, five ; according to section 44 of the The Land Disputes Courts Act , Cap. 216 R.E. 2023 such an appeal has to be lodged within 45 days from the date of decision. It reads that: 1) Subject to the provisions of any law for the time being in force, all appeals , revisions and similar proceeding from or in respect of any proceeding in a District Land and Housing Tribunal in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be heard by the High Court. 2) An appeal under subsection (1) may be lodged within forty - five days after the date of the decision or order: Provided that, the High Court may, for good cause , 8 . extend the time for filing an appeal either before or after the expiration of such period of forty - five days More so, filing of appeals before the High Court is also regulated by Rule 1 (1) and (2) of Order XXXIX of the Civil Procedure Code, Cap. 33 R.E. 2023. The Order reads that : 1) Every appeal shall be preferred in the form of a memorandum signed by the appellant or his advocate and presented to the High Court hereinafter in this Order referred to as “the Court” or to such officer as it appoints in this behalf and the memorandum shall be accompanied by a copy of the decree appealed from and unless, the Court dispenses therewith, of the judgment on which it is founded. 2) The memorandum shall set forth, concisely and under distinct heads, the grounds of objection to the decree appealed from without any argument or narrative, and such grounds shall be numbered consecutively. Based on the above provision of the law, it is with no shadow of doubt that, for the appellants to lodge an appeal, in the circumstances, they ought to have been obtained copy of judgment appealed against and 9 . attach the same to the Memorandum/Petition of Appeal. This means that, an appeal cannot be processed until the appellants obtain the copy of judgement for attaching to the Memorandum of Appeal. While I am factually aware that, the appellants did not apply for the copy of proceedings and judgement, the time within which to lodge an appeal commences on the date of DLHT issued the certified copies of proceedings and Judgment. This court is guided by well settled principle by the C ourt of A ppeal in the case of Alex Senkoro and three others Vs Eliambuya Lyimo (As Administrator o f Appellants t he Estate o f Frederick Lyimo, Deceased) , Civil Appeal No. 16 Of 2017 where it was held that: We need to stress what we stated in the above case that , the exclusion is automatic as long as there is proof on the record of the dates of the critical events for the reckoning of the prescribed limitation period. For the purpose of section 19 (2) and (3) of the LLA, these dates are the date of the impugned de cision, the date on which a copy of the decree or judgment was requested and the date of the supply of the requested document. The germane issue now is whether or not the appeal to the High Court from the trial tribunal's decision was duly lodged. 10 . It is common ground that , the trial tribunal's decision was rendered on 11 th February, 2010 and that the appeal to the High Court had to be instituted within forty - five days in terms of section 41 of the Land Disputes Courts Act, Cap. 216 R.E. 2002 read together with Item 2 of Part II of the Schedule to the LLA. It is also on record that , the memorandum of appeal instituting the said appeal was lodged on 1 st April , 2010. Mr. Massawe contended that , since the decree appealed from was dated 11 th February , 2010 and hence issued on that same day, the respondent could not avail herself of the exclusion under section 19 (2) of the LLA. With respect, we do not agree with him, at least, for three reasons: first , the date on the decree only indicates the date of the judgment from which that , decree was extracted. That date is not necessarily the date on which the decree was extracted. Of course, we note that the decree does n ot indicate the date it was extracted and issued. Secondly , noting from the record that , the impugned trial tribunal's judgment was certified on 18 th March, 2010 and taking into account the practice that , a decree is extracted from a judgment upon which it is founded, we think it is preponderant that , both the judgment and decree were certified simultaneously by the trial 11 . tribunal. Thirdly , even if it were to be assumed that , the exclusion under section 19 (2) of the LLA as to the preparation of the decree appealed from was inapplicable, the respondent could still have availed herself of the exclusion under section 19 (3) of the LLA exempting requisite time for preparation of t he judgment on which the decree appealed from is founded. We say so because in terms of Order XXXIX, rule 1 (1) of the Civil Procedure Code, Cap. 33 R.E. 2002 (now R.E. 2019) ("the CPC"), such copy of judgment on which the decree appealed from is founded, along with a copy of the decree, is required to be attached to the memorandum of appeal when instituting an appeal. In the event therefore, it is undisputed that, since the certified copies of proceedings and Judgement w ere issued and dated on 29/01/2026 and the appeal was filed on 10 th February, 2026 , just twelve days from the date of certification, then it goes without saying that, the time limit commenced on the date of certification , that is the date , the documents were ready for collection by the parties, the app licant s inclusive. This is regardless on whether the applicants requested for copy proceedings and judgment or not as the same brings no changes to the time for reckoning of time limit within which to lodge an appeal. 12 . More so, the appeal was filed within the forty - five days prescribed by law as it was filed just twelve days from the date of certification , where reckoni ng of time limit commence d . The app licant s’ appeal was thus within time. Therefore, t he first limb of respondents’ opposition to this application fails. As to the second issue, this court has observed two pertinent matters, one , that, the applicants used the legal service of Ms. Joyce Kasebwa learned counsel who had no valid practising licence, thus a negligence on the applicants’ part. Indeed, this court considered both submission s from both sides and concluded that, the applicants being laypersons were unable to ver ify on practising certificate of the said advocate. What they had in mind is to have legal service believing that Ms. Joyce Kasebwa being learned counsel had valid practising certificate. In the minds of this court, the applicants’ act of failure to verify the practising certificate is too far - flung to amount to negligence on the applicants’ side. In fact, Ms. Joyce Kasebwa learned counsel is the one to be blamed for unethical and illegal act she discharged to the detriment of the applicants. This court, in the exercise of its supervisory mandates of advocates’ discipline under the Advocates Act and its rules hereby condemn s for uncalled - for acts by Ms. Joyce Kasebwa learned counsel 13 . who assumed legal obligation of entering into contract with applicants knowingly that, she had no valid practising certificate. This is confirmed by the ruling of this court, delivered at Mbeya Sub registry in which Ms. Joyce Kasebwa learned counsel did not challenge. This means that , indeed she drew and filed the applicants’ documents while she had no valid practising certificate. It is an embarrassment to the court, applicants and respondents who are subjected to the present application unnecessarily. The parties have been compelled to spend another filing fees to the present application so unnecessary. This court cannot remain silent anymore for such uncalled - for acts by the advocates who act unprofessionally. That said and done, this court finds that, the applicants have no hand on what happened but their legal counsel. Besides, the applicants filed the present application on the date of delivery of the ruling striking out the appeal for being found incompetent, thus timely acting upon. All said and done, the applicants have discharged their legal obligations to the dictates as articulated in the case of Lyamuya Construction 14 . Company Ltd vs Board of Registered Trustees of Young Women’s Christian Association of Tanzania Civil Application No. 2/2010 . More so , the applicants have satisfied what the Court of Appeal principled in the cases of : Elius Mwakalinga vs. Domina Kagaruki and 5 others, Civil Application no. 120/12 of 2018 where it was held that: “A delay of even a single day has to be accounted for otherwise there should be no point of having rules prescribing period within which certain steps have been taken.” Hamisi Ismail @ Zulu Vs. Republic , Criminal Appeal N o. 205 of 2015 where the C ourt of A ppeal held that : “It is settled that in an application for extension of time, the applicant is duty bound to demonstrate good or sufficient cause for delay. Further, every delay, even if for one day has to be accounted for.” Osward Masatu Mwizarubi vs. Tanzania Fish Processing Ltd, Civil Application No. 13 of 2010 where the Court of Appeal stated that: "What constitutes good cause cannot be laid down by any hard and fast rules. The term "good cause" is relative one and is dependent upon the party seeking extension 15 . of time to provide the relevant material in order to move the court to exercise its discretion." Sebastian Ndaula vs. Grace Rwamafa , Civil Application No. 4 of 2014 (unreported) where the Court principled that, “D elay of even a single day has to be accounted for, otherwise there would be no point of having ru l es prescribing periods within which certain steps have to be taken ” I f illegality has been pleaded as ground for extension of time, it shall be equally, in additionally be considered as per the case of Principal Secretary, Ministry of Defence and National Service v. Devram Valambhia [1992] T.L.R. 387 where the court stated that; The Court... emphasized that such point of law, must be that of sufficient importance and I would add that it must also be apparent on the face of the record, such as the question of jurisdiction; not one that would be discovered by a long - drawn argument o r process . I llegality must feature to the principles articulated in the case of Mtengeti Mohamed vs Blantina Macha , Civil Application No. 344/17/2022 where the C ourt of A ppeal voiced that; 16 . It is a principle of equity that, vigilantibus , non dormientibus, jura subvenient , that is to say, equity aids the vigilant and not the indolent. By way of explanation, suffice it to say that, as a general rule, the law favours those who exercise vigilance in pursuing their rights and disfavours those who rest on their legal rights b y failing to act to protect their rights in a reasonable period of time. Equally, the C ourt of A ppeal in the case of William Kasian Nchimbi and three others v. Abas Mfaume Sekapala and Two Others , Civil Reference No. 2 of 2015 held that : “…illegality cannot be used as a shield to hide against inaction on the part of the applicants. And if I may add, the position set by our previous decisions is that, irrespective of the nature of the grounds advanced by the applicant in support of an appli cation for extension of time, he must as well show diligence, and not apathy, negligence or ineptness in the prosecution of the action that he intends to take. (See Lyamuya Construction Company Ltd v. Board of Trustees of Young Women's Christian Associatio n of Tanzania, Civil Appeal No. 2 of 2000 (unreported)”. That being the case, this court is of the settled view that, the applicants have successfully advanced cogent grounds for the grant of extension time. Indeed, as it is trite law , in our jurisdiction that, extension of time is 17 . granted upon the court being satisfied with good reasons for the delay, and as the applicants discharged their legal obligation s of advancing good cause, this court has no reasons to deny the sought extension of time. In the event therefore, this court hereby grants extension of time to the applicants on condition that, they should file an appeal WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS from the date of this ruling. Owing the prevailing circumstances , this court orders that, each party to bear their own costs. ORDER ACCORDINGLY . DATED at SONGWE this 12 th June, 2026. G.P. MALATA JUDGE 12 TH JUNE, 2026 RULING d elivered at SONGWE this 12 th June, 2026 in the presence of Ms. Joyce Kasebwa, learned counsel for the applicants , 1 st responden t , Mr. Machumu G. Pamba, JLA, and Ms. Joyce Simba, RMA and in the absence of th e 2 nd respond ent . 18 . G.P. MALATA JUDGE 12 TH JUNE, 2026 Right of appeal duly explained. G.P. MALATA JUDGE 12 TH JUNE, 2026