Registered Trustees of The National Muslim Council of Tanzania (BAKWATA) and Another vs Assia Mussa Buchugu and Another (Land Appeal No. 1011 of 2026) [2026] TZHC 3056 (11 June 2026)

THE JUDICIARY OF TANZANIA IN THE HIGH COURT OF UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA AT KIGOMA LAND APPEAL NO. 000001011 OF 2026 THE REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF THE NATIONAL MUSLIM COUNCIL OF TANZANIA (BAKWATA) .............................. COMPLAINANT / APPELLANT / APPLICANT / PLAINTIFF THE SECRETARY OF MAASJID AL-HUDA-BANGWE KIGOMA .............................. COMPLAINANT / APPELLANT / APPLICANT / PLAINTIFF VERSUS ASSIA MUSSA BUCHUGU .............................. RESPONDENT / DEFENDANT ZANTEL (T) LIMITED .............................. RESPONDENT / DEFENDANT JUDGMENT RWIZILE, J 23 rd April & 11 June th 2026 This appeal originates from Land Case No. 2 of 2016 which was before the District Land and Housing Tribunal of Kigoma at Kigoma. The respondent successfully convinced the tribunal which held the land in dispute situated at Bangwe, with an estimate of half an acre. After a full hearing of the matter on merits, the Tribunal delivered its judgment in favour of the 1 Respondent. The st Page. 1

Tribunal declared her a lawful owner of the disputed land and consequently ordered the appellants to pay her a sum of Tzs 40,000,000.00 as compensation for the period, the appellants were receiving rent arising from the installation of a telecommunications tower on the suit land. In the alternative, the Tribunal ordered the 2 nd respondent to remove the said telecommunications tower to enable the 1 Respondent to peacefully use and st enjoy the disputed land. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the a ppellants lodged the present appeal, challenging the decision of the Tribunal on six grounds of appeal, which are reproduced hereunder; -

1. That, the Hon trial chairperson erred in law and facts by deciding in favour of the 1st Respondent while she has no locus standi to sue since she was not the administrator of the late Mussa Buchugu.
2. That the Hon trial chairperson erred in law and facts by deciding that the land in dispute have never been demarcated while the land in dispute has the plot number which is six (6) with squire meter 11,171 as per exhibit D7.
3. That, the Hon trial chairperson errred in law and facts by ordering the 1st and 2nd Appellant to pay the 1st Respondent the sum of Tshs. 40,000,000/= (fourty million) without giving the analysis on how she came to conclusion that the 1st Respondent is entitled to the payment of the same.
4. That, the Hon trail chairperson erred in law and facts by entertaining the matter and deciding in favour of the 1st Respondent while the suit was time Page. 2

barred. 5. That, the Hon trial chairperson erred in law and facts by deciding in favour of the 1st Respondent while she did not prove the case on the required standard of balance of probabilities. 6. That, the Hon. Trial chairperson erred in law and facts by failing to evaluate the entire evidence on record and hence reached to wrong decision. This appeal was heard by way of written submissions. The appellants were represented by Mr. Eliutha Kivyiro learned counsel, while the 1 Respondent st was represented by Mr. Method R. G. Kabuguzi learned advocate, and the 2 nd Respondent by Mr. Paschal Kamala learned advocate. In his submission supporting this appeal, Mr. Kivyiro, argued that the 1 st Respondent lacked the requisite locus standi to institute the suit. He argued, the disputed land originally belonged to the 1 Respondent’s deceased st parents, who died intestate in 1958 and 1980. He contended that no probate or letters of administration proceedings has ever been instituted in respect of the estate of the deceased. The 1 Respondent st , he added, did not show was appointed the administrator of the estate of any of her parents. Therefore, it was argued that the 1 Respondent lacked the legal capacity to institute st legal proceedings on the property forming part of the estate of her deceased parents . In support of this contention, the learned counsel relied on the decision in Israel Ryana vs. Mutoka Sagarya & Another, Miscellaneous Land Case Page. 3

Appeal No. 158 of 2015, [2016] TZHC 3061 (High Court of Tanzania, Mwanza Registry, 28 April 2016). Arguing the second ground of appeal, he submitted that the Tribunal erred by finding that the disputed land has never been surveyed. He referred the Court to Exhibit D7, being a letter issued by the Kigoma Ujiji Municipal Council, which indicated that the disputed land formed part of Plot No. 6, measuring 11,171 square meters, and which was designated for religious purposes. He argued further that the Tribunal failed to properly consider and evaluate this material documentary evidence, as a result, arrived at an erroneous conclusion regarding the status of the suit land. Mr. Kivyiro challenged the award of TZS 40,000,000.00 on the third ground of appeal. He contended that the Tribunal failed to assign reasons for arriving at the said figure. He held the view that the award was made without proper justification in contravention of the requirements of Order XX Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code, [Cap 33 R.E 2023] and the case of Akiba Commercial Bank PLC vs. Registered Trustees of Crown Education Trust, Civil Appeal No. 477 of 2023, [2025] TZCA 706 (Court of Appeal of Tanzania, Dodoma Registry, 8 July 2025). Regarding the fourth ground of appeal, it was his argument that the suit before the trial Tribunal was time barred. He argued that the cause of action arose upon death of the 1 Respondent’s father in 1958, whereas the suit was st Page. 4

instituted in 2016, approximately fifty-eight years later. According to him, the action was filed outside the twelve-year limitation period prescribed under Item 22 of the First Schedule and section 9(1) of the Law of Limitation Act, [Chapter 89, R. E 2023]. In support of this argument, reliance was placed on Charles Lyimo vs. Atinesia Jonathan Lyimo, Miscellaneous Land Appeal No. 20 of 2019, [2019] TZHC 3736 (High Court of Tanzania, 18 June 2019 . Further, Mr. Kivyiro argued together the fifth and sixth grounds of appeal, and said, the Tribunal failed to properly evaluate and analyze the entire evidence adduced by both parties and consequently arrived at an erroneous decision. He contended that, had the evidence been objectively assessed, the Tribunal would have arrived at a different conclusion. He urged this Court, first appellate court, to re-evaluate evidence on record, make its own independent assessment thereof, and arrive at its own conclusions in accordance with established principles governing first appeals. The 2 Respondent supported the appeal in its entirety. In his submissions on nd the first ground of locus standi , Mr. Kamala associated himself with the submissions advanced by the appellants and contended that, in the absence of letters of administration, the 1 Respondent lacked the legal capacity to st institute and maintain the legal proceedings about the disputed land. He argued that, where a claim relates to property forming part of a deceased person's estate, only a duly appointed administrator is competent to sue on Page. 5

behalf of the estate. In support of this proposition, he relied on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Swalehe Juma Sangawe (As Administrator of the Estate of the Late Juma Swalehe Sangawe) and Another vs. Halima Swalehe Sangawe, Civil Appeal No. 82 of 2021, [2022] TZCA 3120 (Court of Appeal of Tanzania, 4 October 2022). With respect to the third and fourth grounds of appeal, Mr. Kamala adopted and relied on the submissions advanced by the appellant. He argued the last two grounds together in that the Tribunal failed to properly evaluate and analyze the evidence adduced by the parties and consequently based its findings on matters not supported by the pleadings and evidence on record. He was vehement that, it is a settled principle of law that a court is bound to determine only those issues arising from the parties’ pleadings and the evidence presented before it. It was his further contention that any findings made outside the scope of the pleadings are unsustainable in law as held in Nasoro Yahaya Nyongoly vs. Sutayi Ntambi Kazungu, Land Appeal No. 10 of 2020, [2020] TZHC 2352 (High Court of Tanzania, 21 August 2020), Leonard Mwanashoka vs. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 226 of 2014 (Court of Appeal of Tanzania, unreported), Hamisi Rajabu Dibaguja vs. Republic [2004] TLR 181, Lutter Symhorian Nelson vs. Attorney General and Ibrahim Said Msabaha, Civil Appeal No. 24 of 1999, and Mkulima Mbagala v s. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 267 of 2006 (Court of Appeal of Tanzania, unreported). Page. 6

Responding to their arguments, Mr. Kabuguzi opposed the appeal. He submitted that the 1 Respondent instituted the suit in her personal capacity as st the customary owner of the disputed land and not in her capacity as the administrator of her deceased parents’ estate. He said, the suit land had devolved to the 1 Respondent through customary inheritance from her late st father and, therefore, constituted her personal property. He further submitted that the Appellants neither pleaded nor raised the issue of locus standi at the trial and did not adduce any evidence on the matter at the hearing. In support of this contention, he cited Betam Communications Tanzania Limited vs. China International Telecommunication Construction Corporation, Civil Case No. 220 of 2012. He further argued that the decision in Israel Ryana vs. Mutoka Sagarya & Another, ( supra) was distinguishable from the present case, as the facts and circumstances giving rise to that decision were materially different from those obtaining in the instant appeal. On the second ground of appeal, he submitted that the Tribunal properly evaluated Exhibits D6 and D7 and correctly found that the said documents did not establish ownership of the disputed land to belong to the appellant. He emphasized that during a visit to the locus in quo , the Tribunal observed that the land remained in its natural state and contained the grave of the 1 st Respondent’s late father. According to him, those observations corroborated Page. 7

the 1 Respondent’s evidence that she had inherited the land under customary st law and remained its lawful owner. Regarding the third ground of appeal, Mr. Kabuguzi submitted that the award of TZS 40,000,000.00 was lawful, reasonable, and justified by the circumstances of the case. He argued that in her pleadings, the 1 st Respondent sought mesne profits, rental income, or such compensation as the Tribunal deemed fit to assess. It was maintained that the appellants had continued to derive economic benefits from the disputed land for several years by leasing it to the 2 Respondent for the installation and operation of a nd telecommunication tower. In those circumstances, he added, the Tribunal was entitled to assess and award reasonable compensation. He contended that the award was consistent with the principles governing general damages as articulated in Akiba Commercial Bank PLC v. Registered Trustees of Crown Education Trust, Civil Appeal No. 477 of 2023, [2025] TZCA 706 (Court of Appeal of Tanzania, Dodoma Registry, 8 July 2025). Responding the fourth ground of appeal, the learned counsel submitted that the suit was not barred by limitation. He argued that the 1 Respondent’s st cause of action arose in 2013 when she returned to Kigoma and discovered the Appellants had unlawfully encroached upon her land and that a telecommunications tower had been erected thereon by the 2nd Respondent. Since the suit was instituted in 2015, he held the view, it was filed within the Page. 8

limitation period prescribed under Item 22 of the First Schedule to the Law of Limitation Act. Further more, he submitted that the authority in Charles Lyimo vs. Atinesia Jonathan Lyimo, ( supra) was distinguishable from the facts of the present case and therefore inapplicable. Finally, with respect to the last two grounds of appeal, Mr. Kabuguzi submitted that the Tribunal properly scrutinized, evaluated, and analyzed evidence adduced by both parties before reaching its decision. He contended that findings of the Tribunal were supported by the evidence on record and that no error was demonstrated to warrant interference by this Court. Accordingly, he urged the Court to dismiss the appeal in its entirety with costs. I have carefully considered the grounds of appeal, the written submissions of the parties, the proceedings, pleadings, and the impugned judgment. In my considered view, the principal issue that falls for determination is whether the appeal has merit. In resolving it, I have to deal with grounds as argued. In the first ground of appeal, the Appellants challenged the 1 Respondent’s locus standi to institute st the suit, contending that the disputed land belonged to her deceased parents, who died intestate in 1958 and 1980. Upon re-evaluation of the evidence on record, it is apparent that the 1 Respondent st pleaded and testified that the suit land originally belonged to her parents and upon their demise, she inherited the land as their sole surviving child. Although she married in 1959 and resided Page. 9

away from the suit property, she maintained that she continued to visit the land regularly and entrusted caretakers managing it on her behalf. She further testified that the dispute arose in, 2012 and had pleaded, she discovered such trespass into the land in 2013, when she discovered that the 2nd Respondent had erected a telecommunications tower on the land. Consequently, she pursued her claim and eventually instituted Land Case No. 2 of 2015 before the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Kigoma on 7 November 2015. Her testimony was corroborated by her witness, SU2. The Appellants argue that, in the absence of letters of administration, the 1 st Respondent lacked the requisite legal standing to commence the legal proceedings. I have to say, Locus standi in legal parlance, simply denotes the right to sue where one’s personal rights or interests have been infringed. To possess it, a party must demonstrate a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the suit. In Lujuna Shubi Ballonzi vs. Registered Trustees of Chama Cha Mapinduzi [1996] TLR 203, this court noted that the term is governed by common law, where a person bringing a matter to court should be able to show that his right or interest has been breached or interfered with. It is therefore settled, that unless a person stands in a sufficient close relation to the subject matter so as to give a right which requires protection or infringement of which he brings the action, he cannot sue on it as held in Page. 10

Godbless Lema vs. Mussa Hamis Mkanga and 2 Others , Civil Appeal No. 47 of 2012. I have no doubt as well that locus standi is a jurisdictional issue, which can therefore be raised at any time. Not, as it has been argued by Mr. Kabuguzi, that the appellants did not raise it at the trial. To determine the first ground, I have to say, it is a settled principle of the law that customary inheritance constitutes a recognized mode of acquisition and devolution of land rights. It is true that inheritance is legal succession of property that occurs on person’s death. Its purpose, I think, is to ensure continuity of disposal over property. Customary law, as it is commonly understood applies in respect of the estate of the deceased who is a member of a certain customary community and in respect of which customary law is meant to apply. Rules of inheritance commonly applied in most communities appear in the second schedule to the Local Customary Law (Declaration) (No. 4) Order 1963, GN 463 of 1963. In most cases, such rules were applied with discrimination to women who were not allowed to disposal of the land inherited except when there was no male person to inherit. The 1st respondent testified, and it was not disputed that she inherited that land absolutely as the sole remaining person in the family. It is clear to me therefore that, being the sole heir of the estate of her parent possess title to the land. Page. 11

Where a person acquires a beneficial interest in land through customary succession and remains in possession or exercises incidents of ownership over such land, that person may possess sufficient legal interest to challenge acts of trespass or unlawful interference with the property. In this regard, I find guidance in Moya Lumuni (Administrator of the Estate of Lumuni Masangu) vs. Village Government of Chamalendi & Others, Civil Appeal No. 277 of 2024, wherein the Court held that customary succession may confer possessory and beneficial rights in land notwithstanding the absence of formal probate proceedings. I am therefore satisfied that, in the circumstances of this case, the 1 st Respondent demonstrated a sufficient proprietary and beneficial interest in the suit land arising from customary inheritance to confer upon her the necessary locus standi to institute legal proceedings before the Tribunal. This above finding equally disposes of the fourth ground of appeal, which contended that the suit was time barred. I have to add that it is not true of a appellants’ argument that the cause of action arose upon the death of the 1 st Respondent’s father in 1958 and that any claim relating to the suit land ought to have been instituted within twelve years from that date. The evidence on record clearly reveals that the cause of action did not accrue upon the deaths of her deceased parents, but rather upon the alleged encroachment on the suit land and the subsequent discovery thereof by the 1 Page. 12

Respondent. The 1 Respondent testified that she became aware of the st st existence of the telecommunications tower erected on the land in 2012. Significantly, the appellants acknowledged in their submissions that the dispute arose around that time. It is my opinion that accrual of action in any suit is governed by section 5 the Law of Limitation Act [Cap.89 R.E 2023], which provides for the right of action in respect of any proceeding, to accrue on the date on which the cause of action arises. I think, the appellants are inviting this court to apply section 9(1) of the Act assuming that the right of action accrued in either 1958 or 1980 when the 1st respondent’s parents died. In my considered opinion, that is not the case, since the 1st respondent instituted a suit to recover land, which had devolved into her possession when her parents died. She was therefore in control of the land, until she was dispossessed by the appellants. The right of action is therefore deemed to have accrued on the date of the dispossession which squarely falls under section 9(2) of the Act, The record further reveals that, upon discovering the alleged intrusion, the 1 st Respondent promptly pursued her claim and instituted Land Case No. 2 of 2015 in the District Land and Housing Tribunal of Kigoma, approximately three years after the cause of action accrued. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the suit was commenced well within the statutory limitation period and was therefore not time-barred. Accordingly, Page. 13

I find, both the first and fourth grounds of appeal are devoid of merit and are hereby dismissed. Turning to the second ground of appeal, the appellants contend that the Tribunal erred in finding that the suit land had not been surveyed. I have examined the record and the documentary evidence tendered at the trial, particularly Exhibit D7. A perusal on it reveals that it merely indicates that, upon conducting a physical site inspection and scrutiny of the relevant records, the area identified as Plot No. 6 measured approximately 11,171 square meters and had been reserved for religious or worship purposes. However, the document does not establish ownership of the disputed land in favour of the Appellants. After all erection of a telecommunications tower is not a religious activity. I have further noted that the Tribunal considered Exhibit D7 and correctly observed that, while it referred to Plot No. 6, it did not certainly establish that the Appellants were the lawful owners or occupiers of the suit land. Moreover, the evidence of SU2 revealed that following the rise of the dispute in 2013, the Appellants had not been issued with a Right of Occupancy in respect of the land in question. In my considered view, even if the land could have been surveyed and designated as Plot No. 6, such fact alone would not confer ownership upon the Appellants in the absence of evidence linking them to the plot through a Page. 14

valid title or other legally recognized interest. Accordingly, I find no error in the conclusion reached by the trial Tribunal that the documentary evidence tendered did not establish ownership of the suit land to belong to the Appellants. In the circumstances, I find that the second ground of appeal is devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed. My determination on the third ground which challenged the award of TZS 40,000,000.00 on the basis that the Tribunal failed to provide adequate reasons for arriving at that figure. Upon examining the pleadings before the Tribunal, it is evident that, under paragraph 7 of her plaint/application the 1 st Respondent specifically prayed for compensation in the sum of TZS 20,000,000.00 as special damages, together with monthly rental income of TZS 5,000,000.00, or such other amount as the Tribunal might assess, with effect from 1 January 2016. st She further sought interest at the court rate of 7% per annum on the decretal sum from the date of judgment until full payment thereof. I have further noted that, in awarding TZS 40,000,000.00, the trial Tribunal expressly stated that the award was intended to compensate the 1 st Respondent for the period during which the Appellants had unlawfully benefited from rent payments derived from the installation and operation of the telecommunications tower on the disputed land. Page. 15

It is therefore evident that the Tribunal assigned reasons for making the impugned award and explained the basis upon which it exercised its discretion in assessing compensation. But assessment of damages is altogether not at the absolute discretion of the court or as in this the tribunal. It is not either just a guess work. It should be measured with reasonableness based on the supplied evidence. There is no record showing the amount of rent payable monthly and the 1st respondent did not even hint the tribunal on that figure apart from pleading it. Her pleadings I think are not back by her evidence. In the circumstances, I find merit in the Appellants’ complaint that the award was made without justification, it is therefore excessive. Accordingly, the third ground of appeal is merited to some extent. The amount of compensation of TZS 40,000,000.00 is quashed and reduced to TZS 10,000,000.00 Lastly, the appellants contended that the Tribunal failed to properly evaluate the evidence on record and consequently arrived at an erroneous decision. I have carefully examined the proceedings, the evidence adduced by both parties, and the impugned judgment of the Tribunal. I am unable to agree with the Appellants’ contention. The record exhibits that the Tribunal duly considered the respective evidence advanced by the parties, evaluated both oral and documentary evidence presented before it, and made its findings on the basis of the evidence available on record. Page. 16

A perusal of the impugned judgment further reveals that the Tribunal identified the issues for determination, analyzed the evidence tendered by the parties, and provided reasons for the conclusions it ultimately reached. I find no indication that the Tribunal disregarded any material evidence or failed to consider the appellants’ defense. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the Appellants have failed to establish that the Tribunal improperly evaluated the evidence or that any alleged deficiency in its assessment occasioned a miscarriage of justice. Consequently, the fifth and sixth grounds of appeal are devoid of merit and are hereby dismissed Having reviewed the proceedings, I am satisfied that the appeal lacks merit. Consequently, it is dismissed except on the amount of compensation which is reduced to TZS 10,000,000.00 as amount of compensation generally for the use of land since 2016. Costs to follow the event. Dated at KIGOMA this 11th of June 2026 . A. K RWIZILE JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT Page. 17