Ayubu Hamis Chang’a vs Shabani Daud Myava and Another (Misc. Land Application No. 8197 of 2026) [2026] TZHC 3038 (10 June 2026)

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA NJOMBE SUB - REGISTRY AT NJOMBE MISC. LAND APPLICATION NO. 8197 OF 2026 (Arising from the decision of the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Njombe at Njombe in Land Case No. 8 of 2023) CASE REFERENCE: 202604011000008197 AYUBU HAMIS CHANG’A ……………………….………………………. APPLICANT VERSUS SHABANI DAUD MYAVA ……………………….………………… 1 ST RESPONDENT MILTON DOWARD MYAVA ……………………………………… 2 ND RESPONDENT RULING 3 rd & 10 th June, 2026 NONGWA, J. On the 2 nd October, 2024, the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Njombe sitting at Njombe, delivered its judgment in Land case No. 8 of 2023. The same was in favor of the respondents, hence the applicant, who was not in accord with the said decision, wished to have the same reversed. H e, allegedly, waited for copies of both the decision and the proceedings of the trial tribunal but to no avail. Thus, he preferred his first application for extension of time at this court, Iringa sub registry , after he was legally advised that he could proceed without the said

2 copies but subject to limitation of time . However, his first attempt could not survive the magnitude of the respondents’ objection that he lacked locus standi to institute the same. He, therefore, had to rectify the alleged anomaly before approaching the stairs of this court once again. That is according to the affidavits by the rival sides. Confident that the alleged anomaly has been resolved and knowing that he is still beyond the statutory period within which he could automatically register his appeal to this court, he has preferred this second application. This time, however, he has his application filed at this sub registry, Njombe. And, in his application, which is made under section 14(1) of the Law of Limitation Act, [Cap 89 R.E 2023], and supported by an affidavit sworn by him, the applicant appeals this court to exercise its discretionary powers and enlarge time within which he can lodge his appeal against the trial tribunal’s decision. When the matter came for hearing, parties agreed the application to be disposed of by written submissions, and they observed the scheduling order. Submitting in chief, the applicant contended that his delay to appeal within the prescribed time was unilaterally actuated by the trial tribunal’s delay to supply him with its judgment and proceedings despite his several reminders. To him, those reminders show clearly that he

3 exhibited no negligence in challenging the trial tribunal’s decision. To support his stance, he cited the case of Mgombaeka Investment Company Limited & Others vs DCB Commercial Bank PLC (Civil Application No. 1162 of 2024) [2025] TZCA 921 (29 August 2025; TanzLII). Again, he submitted that since at the trial tribunal he was suing under Power of Attorney of his late mother, his first application for extension of time was objected to and accordingly withdrawn on an account that it was preferred by an unfit person having no locus standi over the same and that his late mother, who fell sick, could not re - grant him power to proceed with the appeal until her death on the 5 th June, 2025. As such, he argued, he had to apply for grant of letters of administration which could only be granted to him earlier this year by Makambako Primary Court. In his views, therefore, those circumstances constitute a valid justification for extension of time. Moreover, citing the case of Hamis Mohamed (Administrator of the Estate of Risasi Ngawe, Deceased) vs Mtumwa Moshi (Administrator of the Estate of Moshi Abdallah, Deceased) (Civil Application No. 526 of 2016) [2019] TZCA 338 (21 August 2019; TanzLII), the applicant reasoned that this court can proceed to enlarge time of appeal if it is satisfied that the trial tribunal’s decision is faulted

4 on ground of illegality like in the instant case where the trial tribunal did not hear him fully, nor did it allow him to call witnesses. On the other hand, the respondents whose joint reply submission was drafted by Ms. Gladness Fungo, the learned advocate, opposed the application and submitted generally that the applicant has shown no good cause and that he can only be taken to have explicitly shown how negligent he was in pursuing his right of appeal against the trial tribunal’s decision. Specifically, the respondents submitted that the complained copies of judgment and decree of the trial tribunal were ready for collection and were equally certified as true copies of the original on the 16 th June, 2025, just as shown in Annexure 2 of their joint counter affidavit. As such, they reasoned that the applicant’s blame towards the trial tribunal cannot be taken into account in absence of any supplementary affidavit from an officer of the trial tribunal named in the applicant’s affidavit. They cited the case of Abdallah Hamis Kazuba vs Attorney General and 4 Others (Misc. Criminal Application 27 of 2022) [2022] TZHC 14453 (30 September 2022; TanzLII), reasoning that such response from the said officer of the trial tribunal can only be taken to be hearsay and unreliable. Distinguishing the decision of this court in Mgombaeka Investment Company Limited & Others vs DCB Commercial

5 Bank PLC (supra), the respondents argued that the same is irrelevant in the instant application for in the cited case there was proof of the alleged application for the copies through a letter that was annexed with the applicant’s affidavit. In their view, the said letter constituted good cause warranting extension of time unlike in the instant application where the applicant has not attached his letter. The respondents also submitted that although it is true that the applicant preferred his first application for extension of time at Iringa sub - registry and that the same did not proceed on merits, it is not true that the same was withdrawn by him on his own accord, rather, it was preliminarily objected to by respondents on an account of locus standi . As such, they argued, the applicant cannot be excused on account of his ignorance of the law prohibiting institution of suits without locus standi . Additionally, they submitted that the original suit by the applicant in the trial tribunal was wrongly framed for the applicant implored the trial tribunal to declare him the lawful owner of the suit land whereas he was suing in his capacity as an Attorney of his late mother. As such, they contended, the applicant’s prayers were not tenable and continuity of the same is likely to drive this court into entering a misdirected precedent. On the basis of their submission, the respondents were of the view that no good cause has been shown by the applicant and that

6 there is no claim of illegality that can necessitate this court’s intervention with the trial tribunal’s findings. They, thus, implored the court to reject and dismiss the application with costs. Rejoining, the applicant invited this court to reject the respondents’ joint reply submission on an account that the same was filed after the scheduled date. Amplifying the same, the applicant averred that the respondents who were ordered to file their reply submission on or before the 25 th May, 2026, did, in fact, file it on the 28 th May, 2026. He also maintained that his application is merited and argued that any discussion about family conflict should be made on appeal and not in this application. To start with, I do not find any substance in the applicant’s objection to the validity of the respondents’ reply submission and the same is accordingly rejected for the reasons that will instantly become apparent here in below. Firstly, it is not true that the respondents were ordered to file their reply submission on or before the 25 th May, 2026. In lieu, they were ordered to do so on or before the 26 th May, 2026. Again, it is not true that the respondents filed their reply submission in total defiance of the scheduling order or that their submission in reply was filed on the 28 th May, 2026. In my view, w hat can be taken to be the precise and

7 clear answer as to when the respondents’ reply submission was filed can only be found in the Electronic Case Management System ( JoT - eCMS ) . The same shows, quite clearly, that the respondents’ reply submission was filed for admission on the 23 rd May, 2026, three days before the deadline. However, it is clear that the applicant’s complaint does not stem from nothing. It is likely stemming from the response made available to him when he requested to be supplied with a copy of the respondents’ reply submission on the 26 th May, 2026 . Indeed, on the said 26 th May, 2026, the respondents’ reply submission could not be seen or otherwise be found in the JoT - eCMS , the presiding Judge’s account in particular. That was also the case the following day ; unsurprisingly, the applicant averred that the s ubmission was supplied to him on the 28 th May, 2026. However, that does not, ipso facto , mean that the same was not yet to be filed by the respondents on the 26 th and 27 th May, 2026 . That is because, operation of the system requires the Registrar to admit, through his account, every document filed by the parties for admission. At that stage, any document which is yet to be admitted by the Registrar cannot be accessed by other users of the system, including the Judge presiding over the matter requiring such document. As such, it is upon the Registrar to admit all those documents timely and promptly. Otherwise, any complaint of delay can only be attributed to him.

8 In the instant application, after the Registrar’s admission, the JoT - eCMS shows that the complained reply submission by the respondents was filed for admission on the said 23 rd May, 2026 , as shown in the foregoing . Thus, in the circumstances of this case, two assumptions are quite obvious. One, the JoT - eCMS was not smoothly working since the 23 rd May, 2026, when the respondents filed their reply submission and that malfunction of the system persisted until the 27 th May, 2026. However, no proof to that effect can be found, at least at the moment. Two, the Registrar slept on his duties and delayed in admitting the said reply submission. In absence of any proof of malfunction of the system, the second assumption can only be taken to have been the exact picture of what has transpired. I n Tanga Cement Public Limited Company vs Commissioner General ( TRA ) (Civil Application No. 08/01 of 2025) [2025] TZCA 947 (9 September 2025; TanzLII) , the applicant therein was, inter alia , averring that he could not file his necessary documents timely because the JoT - eCMS was not working. The Court of Appeal reasoned and held as follows : - “The online JoT - eCMS, being the only preferred means of lodging a document in Court, is therefore, in terms of the Electronic Filing Rules, required to be reliable, active, easily accessible and user friendly as well as supportive of the filing process and the responsible authority is bound to ensure its efficiency. It would therefore be unfair to condemn a b onafide user who, due to the system

9 failure, fails to lodge a document electronically timely . …” (Emphasis is added). Guided by the reasoning above, I hold, similarly, that, in the circumstances of this case where the respondents’ reply submission could not be admitted timely by the Registrar, the respondents cannot be condemned even if the said submission was served lately to the applicant for after filing of the said submission, the duty shifted to the Registrar to admit the same promptly. See also the case s of 21 st Century Food and Packaging Ltd vs Tanzania Sugar Producers Association and 2 Others [2005] T.L.R 1 and Indo - African Estate Ltd vs District Commissioner for Lindi District & Others (Civil Application No. 12 of 2022) [2022] TZCA 135 (24 March 2022; TanzLII) where the Court of Appeal reasoned that parties cannot be blamed for the wrongs not committed by them. Therefore, my directive o f paramount significance is that Registrars should discharge their statutory and practical obligations carefully and promptly. Failure to do so will only attract unnecessary complaints by the parties, as demonstrated in this application. Having rejected the applicant’s objection as appearing above, I now revert to the substance of the applicatio n.

10 Whether the applicant has furnished any good cause sufficient to warrant extension of time within which he can challenge the trial tribunal’s decision is, in my considered view, the only apposite issue capable of disposing of this application. I have thoroughly gone through the affidavits of the parties together with their written submissions on the matter and I have noted that the parties had their battle over ownership of a landed property, suit land, settled by the trial tribunal. The same was concluded on the 2 nd October, 2024, and it ended in favor of the respondents. As such, the applicant, who wishes to challenge the said trial tribunal’s decision, is late in lodging his appeal to this court in terms of the prescription of section 44(2) of the Land Disputes Courts Act, [Cap 216 R.E 2023], which requires such an appeal to be lodged within forty - five (45) days after the decision of the trial tribunal. However, under the same provision, this court is mandated to extend time of filing an appeal either before or after expiration of the said 45 days. Such mandate of extension is also provided for under section 14(1) of the Limitation Act. The grant of an order for enlargement of time to appeal is discretional but judicious. As such, it is dependent on the applicant imploring the court to extend time within which to file his appeal furnishing good cause justifying his delay. What constitutes “good

11 cause” has not been provided for by either the Land Disputes Courts Act (supra) or the Limitation Act in relation to the instant application. However, courts of records in the land, including this court, have taken trouble to explain and give guidance of what is to be taken into account in ascertaining as to whether the applicant has shown good cause to warrant enlargement of time. For instance, in the case of Jacob Shija vs Ms. Regent Food & Drink Ltd & Another (Civil Application 440 of 2017) [2019] TZCA 56 (3 April 2019), the Court of Appeal had the following to say, and I quote in verbatim: - “… What amounts to good cause cannot be laid by any hard and fast rules but are dependent upon the facts obtaining in each particular case . That is, each case will be decided on its own merits, of course taking into consideration the questions, inter alia, whether the application for extension of time has been brought promptly , whether every day of delay has been explained away , the reasons for the delay , the degree of prejudice to the respondent if time is extended as well as whether there was diligence on the part of the applicant . …” (Emphasis is added). [See also the cases of Laurent Simon Assenga vs Joseph Magoso & Another (Civil Application No. 50 of 2016) [2016] TZCA 809 (1 June 2016; TanzLII); John Dongo & Others vs Lepasi Mbokoso (Civil Application 14 of 2018) [2019] TZCA 165 (9 April 2019; TanzLII); and National Bank of Commerce vs Saoligo Holdings Limited &

12 Another (Civil Application 661 of 2021) [2022] TZCA 514 (18 August 2022; TanzLII)]. In the light of the above position of the law, it is clear that the applicant must clearly explain as to why he delayed pursuing his automatic right to challenge the impugned decision or to institute his claim in the appropriate forum. In essence, his delay must not be excessively long, unreasonable, or far beyond what is normally expected. Otherwise, the applicant must explicitly show that there is a claim of illegality which must, however, be apparent on the face of records and of paramount importance. See the cases of Mabibo Beer Wines and Spirt vs Fair Competition Commission & Others (Civil Application No. 583/20 of 2018) [2019] TZCA 657 (27 May 2019; TanzLII); Mashaka Juma Shabani & Others vs The Attorney General (Civil Reference No. 30 of 2019) [2023] TZCA 17615 (12 September 2023; TanzLII); and Said Seleman Mgoto vs Ramadhani Shabani Nkupe & Another (Civil Application No. 187/17 of 2023) [2024] TZCA 281 (29 April 2024; TanzLII). In the instant application, the applicant’s main reasons as to why he is late in challenging the trial tribunal’s decision are apparent in his affidavit and the written submission in support of the application. They entail; one , trial tribunal’s delay in supplying him with both the

13 judgment and the proceedings; two , death of the applicant’s mother that necessitated appointment of an administrator who could legally proceed to pursue an appeal in this court; and three , illegality in the trial tribunal’s decision. In paragraphs 3 to 10 of his supporting affidavit, the applicant deposed that immediately after the trial tribunal’s decision was rendered, he requested for copies of both the proceedings and the judgment but he could not be supplied with any. He also deponed that he was firstly informed by the tribunal’s clerk that the copies would be ready for collection after sometimes and that sometimes in March 2025, he was again informed that he would be notified on the copies’ readiness for his collection. However, it is further deposed that no copies were supplied to him despite his several reminders , thus on the 27 th May, 2025, he sought legal consultation on whether he could proceed without having a copy of either the judgment or the proceedings of the trial tribunal and that he was told that he could so proceed subject to time limitation. He deposed further that having known that he could not appeal without seeking extension of time, he preferred his first application at Iringa sub registry which was, however, struck out on an account that he lacked locus standi .

14 His further deposition was that his mother could not re - grant him the authority to proceed with the appellate process until her death on the 5 th June, 2025, and that, following his mother’s death , he had to go through probate procedures at Makambako Primary Court where he was appointed to administer the estates of his late mother earlier this year. Thus, he deposed, under those circumstances, he could not process his appeal in time. Having dispassionately considered the application and the rival submissions, I am of the considered view that the applicant has sufficiently accounted for his delay unlike what was submitted by the respondents. Among other things, t he respondents’ counter affidavit shows that the attached certified copy of the trial tribunal’s judgment appearing as Annexure 2 was certified by the Chairman of the trial tribunal on the 16 th June, 2025. That was almost 14 days after the applicant had filed his first application for enlargement of time which was struck out by this court, Iringa sub registry, on the 6 th November, 2025, as per Annexure 1 of the respondents’ counter affidavit. As such, the applicant can only be taken to have been telling the truth when he deposed that his consistent reminders for copies of the trial tribunal’s judgment and proceedings were not acted upon until he decided to proceed applying for extension of time at Iringa sub registry.

15 In the circumstances of this application where it is vividly shown that a copy of the trial tribunal’s decision was certified on the 16 th June, 2025, even if it is true that the applicant did not secure supplementary affidavit from any officer of the trial tribunal showing that he was informed that the copies were not ready for his collection as stated, the fact that the said copies were not ready for his collection until his first application for enlargement of time was filed cannot be defeated simply because such supplementary affidavit is missing. I hold the view that it did not require the applicant to secure an affidavit from any officer of the trial tribunal in order to prove that he waited for almost eight (8) good months to be supplied with any copy of either the trial tribunal’s decision or proceedings before he decided to proceed to pursue his appeal process in the presence of the said Annexure 2 which was certified by the trial tribunal on the 16 th June, 2025. By its certification on that very day, it loudly speaks for itself, requiring no further proof, that the same was not ready for the applicant’s collection before the said 16 th June, 2025. Similarly, even without the applicant attaching the alleged letter which he allegedly wrote to the trial tribunal requesting to be supplied with copies of both the judgment and the proceedings, his complaint that the trial tribunal contributed in delaying his pursue of appeal can only be accepted .

16 Again, although it is not the law that the applicant had to wait to be supplied with a copy of either the judgment or the proceedings of the trial tribunal, I think he necessarily needed to have at least one of the documents he allegedly requested to be supplied with by the trial tribunal in order to properly proceed to challenge the trial tribunal’s decision. Without any of them, in my considered view, it would have been hard for the applicant to formulate his specific grounds of grievances even if the decision was delivered in his presence. Fairly in my view, by being supplied with either the decision or the proceedings of the trial tribunal, the applicant would have exactly known what error in the said trial tribunal’s decision or proceedings would ground his appeal to this court. Otherwise, in absence of any of the copies he allegedly requested to be supplied with, the applicant could not have known the exact areas which could sufficiently necessitate intervention of this court. Moreover, since the applicant had to go through probate procedures after his mother’s death and striking out of his previous application for enlargement of time, I cannot find any justification, whatsoever, to reason that his delay to institute his appeal against the trial tribunal’s decision is inordinate or that he acted with any kind of negligence and apathy. In the circumstances of this case, I find it hard

17 and unreasonable to agree with the respondents that the applicant was negligent in pursuing his right of appeal. However, applicant’s claim of illegality against the trial tribunal’s decision can only be rejected in the circumstances of this case. I hold that view because I do not think that the same is substantiated as required. Although any claim of illegality is a ground for extension of time, the same must be of paramount importance and apparent on the record to warrant extension of time. In Lyamuya Construction Co. Ltd vs Board of Registered Trustees of Young Women’s Christian Association of Tanzania (Civil Application 2 of 2010) [2011] TZCA 4 (3 October 2011; TanzLII), the following was stated: - “… Since every party intending to appeal seeks to challenge a decision either on point of law or fact, it cannot in my view, be said that in VALAMBHIA’s case, the Court meant to draw a general rule that every applicant who demonstrate that his intended appeal raises points of law should as of right, be granted extension of time if he applies for one . The Court there emphasized that such point of law must be that of sufficient importance and I would add that it must also be apparent on the face of the record , such as the question of jurisdiction; not one that would be discovered by a long drawn argument or process .” (Emphasis is mine). In the instant application, the applicant did not reveal his complaint of illegality through his affidavit. However, he only had it

18 appearing in the conclusion of his written submission in support of the application where he contended that the trial tribunal neither heard him fully nor allowed him to call witnesses. Although the complained denial of right to be heard puts legality of the trial tribunal’s proceedings and decision in question, it is my considered view that such a complaint cannot be summarily accepted and taken to warrant extension of time. That is simply because deliberating on whether or not the applicant was heard fully by the trial tribunal will require a long drawn - out process necessitating navigating over the entire proceedings and judgment of the trial tribunal. As such, in the light of the position of the law in Lyamuya ’s case (supra), the applicant can only be taken to have failed to demonstrate his complaint of illegality. Based on my deliberation in the foregoing, I am satisfied that, in the generality of the circumstances of this case, the first two reasons advanced by the applicant justify his delay to appeal against the trial tribunal’s decision. They, similarly, constitute good cause upon which the sought extension of time can be granted. As a result, I find merits in this application and the same is accordingly granted. The applicant has to file his petition of appeal within 14 days from the date of this ruling. Given that the applicant did not front any claim of costs, I make no order as to costs.

19 V. M. NONGWA JUDGE 10/06/2026 Dated and Delivered at Njombe this 10 th day of June, 2026, in the presence of both the applicant and the respondents in person. V. M. NONGWA JUDGE