Dismas Mathew Tesha vs Denis Mathew Tesha and 2 Others (Civil Appeal No. 6437 of 2026) [2026] TZHC 3069 (10 June 2026)

The Judiciary of Tanzania IN THE HIGH COURT OF UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA AT ARUSHA PC CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6437 OF 2026 DISMAS MATHEW TESHA APPELLANT Versus ANNA MATHEW TESHA DENIS MATHEW TESHA DUSTAN MATHEW TESHA 1 st RESPONDENT 2 nd RESPONDENT 3 rd RESPONDENT (Arising from the decision of the District Court of Arusha) (Hon. H. MARANDO, PRM) Dated on 27th , February 2026. in Misc. Civil Application No.26199 of 2025 25th May & 10th June 2026. F.H. MAHIMBALI, J. This appeal arises from the decision of the District Court of Arusha in Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 000026199 of 2025, delivered on 27th February 2026, whereby the learned District Magistrate exercised revisional jurisdiction over proceedings in Probate and Administration Cause No. 26 of 2007 pending before the Arusha Urban Primary Court and, in the process, JUDGMENT 1

nullified the appointment of the present Appellant as administrator of the estate of the late Mathew Alois Tesha. The appeal concerns not merely the propriety of the impugned revision proceedings but also the limits of the District Court’s revisional jurisdiction in the face of prior determinations rendered by superior courts on substantially related issues concerning the same estate. The record reveals that Probate and Administration Cause No. 26 of 2007 was instituted before the Arusha Urban Primary Court in respect of the estate of the late Mathew Alois Tesha, who died leaving several beneficiaries, including the parties herein. Initially, the 3rd Respondent, Anna Mathew Tesha, was appointed administratrix of the estate. However, disputes subsequently arose regarding the administration of the estate, particularly concerning the filing of inventories, accounts, and distribution of estate properties. Following complaints by beneficiaries, the Primary Court, by its decision delivered on 11th October 2022, revoked the appointment of Anna Mathew Tesha and appointed the Appellant, Dismas Mathew Tesha, as administrator of the estate. 2

Aggrieved by that decision, Anna Mathew Tesha preferred Civil Appeal No. 66 of 2022 before the District Court of Arusha. The appeal was dismissed, and the appointment of the Appellant was upheld. Still dissatisfied, she lodged a further appeal to the High Court in PC Civil Appeal No. 5039 of 2024. In its judgment, the High Court carefully examined the administration of the estate and concluded that although certain documents had been filed purporting to be inventories and accounts, the estate had not been fully administered, the probate proceedings remained open, and the beneficiaries had not confirmed receipt of their respective shares. Consequently, the High Court upheld the revocation of the former administratrix and maintained the appointment of the Appellant. Thereafter, the matter escalated further when Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 22386 of 2024 was filed before the High Court seeking certification of points of law for consideration by the Court of Appeal. The High Court certified, inter alia, the question whether the mere filing of inventories and accounts, without judicial approval thereof, immunizes an administrator from revocation. 3

While those developments were ongoing, the Respondents instituted Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 000026199 of 2025 before the District Court under section 22 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act, challenging various proceedings and orders emanating from Probate and Administration Cause No. 26 of 2007. The District Court entertained the application and ultimately set aside the Appellant's appointment as administrator. The Appellant, being dissatisfied with that decision, has lodged the present appeal. The memorandum of appeal raises six grounds which may conveniently be summarized as follows:

1. That the Appellant was wrongly sued in his personal capacity instead of his representative capacity as administrator.

2. That the revision proceedings were time-barred under section 22(4) of the Magistrates' Courts Act.

3. That the District Court lacked jurisdiction because the matter was res judicata, sub judice, and the court had become functus officio.

4. That revision was an inappropriate remedy and the Respondents ought to have appealed. 4

5. That the Appellant was denied an opportunity to file a counter affidavit and thus denied the right to be heard.

6. That the District Court lacked jurisdiction to revoke an administrator appointed by the Primary Court. Both parties filed extensive written submissions and rejoinders which may be summarized as follows: On the first ground, it is contended that, the revision proceedings were fundamentally defective because he (the appellant) was sued in his personal capacity rather than in his representative capacity as administrator of the estate. According to him, an administrator must sue or be sued in that official capacity, and failure to do so renders the proceedings a nullity. Second, he argues that the revision application was statute-barred. He maintains that his appointment as administrator was made on 11th October 2022, whereas the revision proceedings were commenced in September 2025, well beyond the twelve-month period prescribed under section 22(4) of the Magistrates' Courts Act. Third, the Appellant submits that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the revision because the legality of his appointment had already 5

been determined in Civil Appeal No. 66 of 2022 and subsequently in PC Civil Appeal No. 5039 of 2024. He further contends that a Notice of Appeal had been lodged before the Court of Appeal, thereby rendering the matter both resjudicata and sub judice. Fourth, he maintains that revision was not the proper remedy available to the Respondents. In his view, if they were dissatisfied with the Primary Court's order of 4th September 2025, their recourse lay in filing an appeal rather than invoking the District Court's revisional jurisdiction. Fifth, the Appellant argues that he was denied the right to be heard because he was unable to file a counter-affidavit due to court closures and internet disruptions. Although he addressed a letter to the District Court seeking extension of time, the court allegedly ignored his request and proceeded to determine the matter without his response. Lastly, he submits that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his appointment as administrator because such power belongs to the court which made the appointment, namely the Primary Court. The Respondents oppose the appeal and support the decision of the District Court. 6

Regarding the issue of capacity, they argue that the omission to describe the Appellant as administrator was merely a procedural irregularity that caused no prejudice. They submit that throughout the proceedings it was clear that the Appellant was participating in his capacity as administrator and that substance should prevail over form. On limitation, the Respondents contend that the revision application was filed within time because it challenged fresh orders issued on 29th August and 4th September 2025. They further argue that issues touching on jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Concerning the plea of resjudicata and sub judice, the Respondents submit that the earlier appeals involved different parties and different issues from those raised in the revision proceedings. They also maintain that the Notice of Appeal relied upon by the Appellant had been withdrawn and therefore could not operate as a bar to the revision application. The Respondents further argue that revision was the proper remedy because their complaint concerned procedural irregularities, denial of the right to be heard, excess of jurisdiction, and the Primary Court's purported 7

interference with a District Court order. Such matters, they submit, fall squarely within the scope of revisional jurisdiction. With regard to the counter-affidavit, they contend that the Appellant was granted sufficient time to file his response but failed to do so. They characterize his explanations relating to elections and internet disruptions as unsubstantiated and legally insufficient. Finally, the Respondents maintain that the District Court acted within the powers conferred by section 22 of the Magistrates' Courts Act when it intervened to correct illegality, procedural impropriety, and miscarriage of justice in the proceedings before the Primary Court. In rejoinder, the Appellant reiterates that suing him in his personal capacity instead of as administrator was a fatal defect which vitiated the entire proceedings because personal and representative liabilities are distinct. He further insists that the revision application was filed outside the statutory twelve-month period since the challenge ultimately targeted his appointment made on 11th October 2022. The Appellant also maintains that the issue of his appointment had already been conclusively litigated before the District Court and the High Court, 8

and that the matter had progressed to the Court of Appeal, thereby depriving the District Court of jurisdiction. He argues that the Respondents failed to address the substance of his complaint regarding the impropriety of revision proceedings and reiterates that the proper remedy was an appeal. On the issue of fair hearing, he insists that the District Court's failure to consider his request for extension of time violated his constitutional right to be heard under Article 13(6)(a) of the Constitution. Lastly, he reiterates that only the appointing court could revoke his appointment as administrator and submits that allegations concerning disposal of estate assets constitute new matters which were neither pleaded nor properly before the court in the revision proceedings Upon examination of the record and submissions, the following issues arise for determination:

1. Whether the District Court properly exercised its revisional jurisdiction.

2. Whether the impugned proceedings were barred by the doctrines of res judicata, sub judice, or functus officio. 9

3. Whether the District Court was competent to interfere with the Appellant's appointment as administrator.

4. What reliefs are available to the parties. On the Alleged Misdescription of Capacity, the Appellant contends that he was sued in his personal capacity instead of as administrator of the estate. The law is settled that where a litigant acts in a representative capacity, such capacity ought to be reflected in the title of proceedings. However, it is equally settled that omission to expressly state such capacity is not necessarily fatal where the record unmistakably demonstrates the capacity in which the party participated. See Suzana S. Waryoba v. Shija Dalawa, Civil Appeal No. 44 of 2017, in which the Court of Appeal observed that although representative capacity should be reflected in the title, omission thereof does not invalidate proceedings where the capacity is otherwise clear from the record. In the present case, there can be no doubt that the Appellant's participation in the proceedings stemmed solely from his position as administrator of the estate. No prejudice has been demonstrated to have 10

arisen from the omission complained of. Accordingly, I find no merit in this ground. On Limitation of time of the said revision proceedings, the Appellant further argues that the revision application was filed outside the twelve-month period prescribed under section 22(4) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act. However, the record shows that the revision application challenged, among other matters, arise from orders made on 29th August 2025 and 4th September 2025. The application itself was filed in October 2025. To that extent, the application was brought within the statutory period. However, to the extent that the revision sought to challenge the legality of the Appellant's appointment made on 11th October 2022, the complaint raises more complex considerations. Nevertheless, in view of my findings on jurisdiction, it is unnecessary to make a definitive pronouncement on this aspect. On Res Judicata, Sub Judice and Functus Officio, this issue is determinative of the appeal. The record demonstrates that the legality of the revocation of the former administratrix and the appointment of the Appellant was previously litigated before the District Court in Civil Appeal No. 66 of 2022 11

and subsequently before the High Court in PC Civil Appeal No. 5039 of 2024. The High Court rendered a final determination on the matter and upheld the Appellant's appointment. Subsequently, legal questions arising from the same administration dispute were certified for consideration by the Court of Appeal in Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 22386 of 2024. The fundamental question is whether, in those circumstances, the District Court could reopen matters touching upon the validity of the Appellant's appointment through revision proceedings. The answer must be in the negative. The doctrine of res judicata exists to bring litigation to finality. Equally important is the doctrine of functus officio, which prevents a court from revisiting matters already conclusively determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. The High Court had already pronounced itself on the propriety of the Appellant's appointment. That determination remained binding unless overturned by a superior court in the hierarchy. The District Court could not, under the guise of revision, effectively reverse or undermine conclusions already reached by the High Court. To permit 12

such a course would offend the hierarchical structure of courts and create uncertainty in the administration of justice. Furthermore, once a legal controversy has been escalated to the High Court and certified for consideration by the Court of Appeal, subordinate courts must exercise extreme restraint so as not to render contradictory determinations on substantially the same issues. Worse of the matter, the same magistrate vide the Civil Appeal No. 66 of 2022 before the same District Court of Arusha, dismissed the Respondent's appeal before her but now by guise turns the blind eye and allows the same. This is an abuse of the court processes which should be bitterly rebuked. In my considered view, the learned District Magistrate exceeded the permissible limits of revisional jurisdiction by reopening issues whose legality had already been adjudicated upon by superior courts. This ground succeeds. On the Competency of Revision Proceedings, it must be clear that its intent is to correct jurisdictional errors, illegalities, procedural improprieties, and material irregularities. It is not intended to provide an alternative avenue 13

for relitigating issues that have already been conclusively determined through appellate processes. Although some complaints raised before the District Court related to proceedings conducted in 2025, the practical effect of the impugned decision was to revisit and nullify the Appellant's appointment as administrator, an issue that had already been the subject of appellate adjudication. In doing so, the District Court exceeded the proper scope of revision. I therefore find merit in this complaint. On the right to be heard, the Appellant complains that he was denied an opportunity to file a counter-affidavit due to circumstances beyond his control and that his request for additional time was not considered. The right to be heard is a cardinal principle of natural justice and is constitutionally protected under Article 13(6)(a) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania. Although the record indicates that the Appellant had previously been granted an extension of time, it also discloses that he communicated difficulties and sought further indulgence from the court. 14

Whether such circumstances justified another extension is debatable. However, where proceedings have significant consequences upon proprietary and succession rights, courts ought to lean in favour of according parties a reasonable opportunity to present their case. This ground raises legitimate concerns, though it is unnecessary to determine it conclusively in view of the findings already made on jurisdiction. On Jurisdiction to Revoke the Administrator, the Appellant argues that only the appointing court could revoke his appointment. Ordinarily, questions concerning appointment and revocation of administrators are dealt with by the probate court exercising original jurisdiction. However, the more important consideration in this appeal is that the legality of the Appellant's appointment had already undergone appellate scrutiny and received judicial confirmation from the High Court. Accordingly, irrespective of the precise contours of the Primary Court's original jurisdiction, the District Court could not lawfully employ revision proceedings to overturn a position that had already been affirmed by a superior court. This complaint likewise succeeds. 15

Having carefully considered the entire record, the rival submissions of counsel, and the applicable law, I am satisfied that the learned District Magistrate misdirected himself in entertaining and determining matters whose substance had already been adjudicated upon through prior appellate proceedings. While some of the procedural objections raised by the Appellant are without merit, the central jurisdictional challenge is well-founded. The doctrine of finality in litigation is a cornerstone of the administration of justice. Courts are enjoined to ensure that disputes, once conclusively determined by courts of competent jurisdiction, are not endlessly reopened under different procedural guises. In this regard, the Court of Appeal in Saul Henry Amon & Another v. Hamis Bushin Pazi & Others [2024] TZCA 275 observed that a court of law cannot somersault and turn a blind eye to the well-established principle that litigation must come to an end, so as to afford litigants an opportunity to engage in other productive endeavours. In the current matter, the District Court exceeded the lawful scope of its revisional jurisdiction when it revisited and effectively nullified the 16

Appellant's appointment as administrator despite earlier determinations by the High Court concerning the same administration dispute. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above:

1. The appeal is hereby allowed.
2. The judgment and orders of the District Court of Arusha in Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 000026199 of 2025 delivered on 27th February 2026 are hereby quashed and set aside.
3. The appointment of Dismas Mathew Tesha as administrator of the estate of the late Mathew Alois Tesha, as previously upheld through the appellate process, is hereby restored and shall remain in force unless lawfully altered by a court of competent jurisdiction.
4. Given the family nature of the dispute and in the interest of preserving harmony among beneficiaries, each party shall bear his or her own costs. It is so ordered. Dated at Arusha this 10th day of June, 2026. 17

F.H. Mahimbali Judge 18